I.P., Appellant-Respondent v. J.W., and A.C., Appellees-Petitioners (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] I.P. appeals the trial court's orders granting the adoptions of two of her children and claims the court erred in concluding that her consent to the adoptions was not required under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(11). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 11, 2023, J.W. filed a petition to adopt J.B. (Daughter), alleging that Daughter was born in October 2015, I.P. (Mother) is Daughter's biological mother, and W.B. (Father) is Daughter's biological father.¹ J.W. alleged that Daughter had lived with her continuously since May 2022, and that she had cared for Daughter for six years of Daughter's life. J.W. later amended her petition and argued that Mother's consent was not required because Mother abandoned or deserted Daughter for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, failed to support or communicate with Daughter, and was unfit to parent Daughter.²

[3] On November 13, 2023, A.C. filed a petition to adopt K.P. (Son), alleging that Son was born in December 2016, Mother is Son's biological mother, and Father is Son's biological father. A.C. alleged that Son had lived with her since January 2017. She argued that Mother's consent to adopt was not required because Mother abandoned or deserted Son for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition and failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Son for at least one year when she was able to do so. A.C. also argued that Mother was unfit to parent Son and that Son's best interests would be served by dispensing with Mother's consent.

[4] Pending the adoptions, the court appointed J.W. as guardian of Daughter and granted A.C. custody of Son.³ Mother filed a motion in each case contesting the adoptions. In August 2024, the court granted a motion consolidating Daughter's and Son's adoption cases. In November 2025, after a hearing, the court issued orders concluding that Mother's consent to adoption was not required for Daughter or Son.

[5] In its order regarding J.W.’s adoption of Daughter, the court found:

8. After [Daughter's] birth, [Daughter] lived with [Mother] until [Daughter] was seven months old.

9. When [Daughter] was approximately seven months, [Mother] placed [Daughter] with [J.W.] for approximately 2.5 months as respite care as [Mother] was dealing with another child who was sick. [Mother] did not know [J.W.] prior to placing [Daughter] in respite care with [J.W.] but was put in contact with [J.W.] through a private agency called Safe Families.

10. At approximately nine and a half (9.5) months, [Daughter] went back to live with [Mother], but [J.W.] continued to stay in contact with [Mother].

***

14. From the fall of 2017 until mid-June 2021, [Daughter] lived with [J.W.].

15. From June[ ] 2021 until May 2022, [Daughter] lived with [Mother]. In May[ ] 2022, [Mother] experienced financial difficulties and homelessness, leading to [Mother] seeking to return [Daughter] to [J.W.].

16. [Mother] re-established housing later in 2022 but did not request [J.W.] to return [Daughter] to her.

17. [Daughter] has lived in the home of [J.W.] continuously since May 27, 2022. The last time [Mother] saw [Daughter] was in March 2023.

***

20. Yet even during the period of times that [Daughter] lived with [J.W.], [Mother] continued to receive and use food stamps for [Daughter]. [Mother] never provided these food stamps to [J.W.] and did not use the funds to help provide food for [Daughter].

***

27. [Mother] admitted that the last time she saw [Daughter] was a chance meeting in a parking lot of a Big Lots store in March[ ] 2023. Prior to that chance meeting, [Mother] had not seen [Daughter] since Christmas 2022.

28. While [Mother] made claims of texting and calling [Daughter], the call logs and text messages admitted into evidence show, at best, token communication with [Daughter]. Indeed, call logs showed only 3 phone calls by [Mother] in the years 2022 and 2023, and two of those calls were after the adoption petition was filed. On the very day the adoption petition was filed, [Mother] admitted in a text message that “I may not call all the time.”

29. There is no evidence that [J.W.] ever made any efforts to thwart communication by [Mother]. Rather, [Mother] has failed to make much of an effort to communicate with [Daughter]. It is impossible to thwart efforts that are not being made.

30. [Daughter] has only had sporadic contact with [Mother] since [Daughter] was 7 years old and has had no contact for two years.

***

40. [Mother] has failed to provide any support for [Daughter] for any of the time that [Daughter] was in the custody of [J.W.].

41. There was no evidence of a Court Order which obviated [Mother's] obligation to provide support for [Daughter].

42. [Mother] has knowingly failed to provide for the care and support of [Daughter] when able to do so as required by law.

App. Vol. II pp. 66-70. The court concluded that Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B). Based on additional factual findings, the court also concluded Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(11).

[6] In its order regarding A.C.’s adoption of Son, the court found:

2. Prior to [Son's] birth, [Mother] had requested assistance through Safe Families, a program designed to assist families in need of short-term respite care. It was through this program that [A.C.] and [Mother] first came to know one another.

***

6. When [Son] was six (6) weeks old, he began spending nights at [A.C.’s] home.

7. In April 2017 [Mother] moved to Oklahoma leaving [Son] in the care of [A.C.]. [Mother] took her older five (5) children with her to Oklahoma and left her two (2) youngest (at the time) children in Indiana. [Son] remained in the care of [A.C.] and [Daughter] in the care of [J.W.].

8. After [Mother] settled in Oklahoma, she returned to Indiana by bus to retrieve [Son] from [A.C.] and took him to Oklahoma.

9. Less than two (2) months later, [A.C.] traveled to Oklahoma to bring [Son] back to Indiana. [Mother] and her other children returned to Indiana shortly thereafter.

10. After returning to Indiana, and up until January 2022, [Mother] would periodically ask to have [Son] in her care for short periods of time and then send him back to live with [A.C.]. During this period of time, [Son] resided primarily with [A.C.] although he visited [Mother] frequently. Both [A.C.] and [Mother] would communicate with one another and would have contact with [Son] when he was living in the “other” home.

***

12. In early summer of 2022, [Mother] returned [Son] to the care of [A.C.].

13. Several weeks later [Son] spent a few nights with [Mother]. He has not spent a single night in [Mother's] care since that time.

14. Since the summer of 2022 [Mother] has not maintained the same level of regular contact with [A.C.].

15. In the almost nine (9) years of his life, [Son] has spent well over six (6) years in the care of [A.C.]. He has lived with [Mother] for a total of less than twenty (20) months.

16. Although [Son] has been in the care of [A.C.] for over eighty percent (80%) of his life, [Son] has been exclusively in the care of [A.C.] since the summer of 2022.

***

18. Throughout the [Son's] life, and in particular from the summer of 2022 until the filing of this petition, [Mother] was never prohibited in any way from communicating with or visiting [Son].

***

20. [Mother] has not had regular contact or communication with [Son] since the summer of 2022.

21. In November of 2023, shortly before this Petition was filed, [A.C.] had arranged to bring [Son] to visit [Mother] at her home. [A.C.] and [Son] arrived as scheduled but [Mother] was not present. [Mother] had a pattern of not being present for scheduled visits. [A.C.] allowed [Son] to play with his siblings while attempt[ing] to contact [Mother] regarding her whereabouts. [Mother] did not return home and after a reasonable time of waiting, [A.C.] left with [Son].

22. The last time [Mother] saw [Son] in person was December of 2022. Since then, she has not provided a single card, letter, picture or gift to [Son]. [Mother] testified that she has purchased gifts and cards for [Son] but is keeping them until he can receive them at her home.

23. [A.C.] did not hinder communication between [Son] and [Mother] prior to the filing of her Petition for Adoption. Indeed, so little communication has been initiated by [Mother] that it is impossible for [A.C.] to hinder what is not being attempted.

24. The limited communication [Mother] had with [Son] between the summer of 2022 and the filing of this Petition in November of 2023, were merely token efforts.

25. [Mother] has been able, but has failed, to communicate significantly with this [Son] while in the care of [A.C.] from the summer of 2022 until the filing of this Petition.

26. [Mother] has abandoned [Son] for more than six months immediately preceding the filing of this Petition.

Id. at 28-31. The court found that A.C. established that Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code sections 31-19-9-8(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). Based on additional factual findings, the court also concluded Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code sections 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) and (a)(11).

[7] The court thus denied Mother's motions to contest, found that the adoptions were in Daughter's and Son's best interests, and granted J.W.’s and A.C.’s petitions to adopt. Mother separately appealed both adoptions. We granted a motion to consolidate the appeals. This decision follows.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) (quotations omitted). “Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” Id. We will not disturb a trial court's ruling unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). The court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, meaning there is no evidence to support the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762. We will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

[9] A trial court shall grant a petition for adoption if it hears evidence and finds that the adoption requested is in the best interest of the child and proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption has been given. Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1 (2023). Generally, a biological mother's written consent is required before a petition to adopt a child may be granted. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1 (2023). However, Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a) provides:

Consent to adoption, which may be required under section 1 of this chapter, is not required from any of the following:

(1) A parent or parents if the child is adjudged to have been abandoned or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption.

(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent:

(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or

(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.

***

(11) A parent if:

(A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; and

(B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parent's consent.

[10] Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(b) provides, “If a parent has made only token efforts to support or to communicate with the child the court may declare the child abandoned by the parent.” If a petition for adoption alleges that a parent's consent to adoption is unnecessary under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2) and the parent files a motion to contest the adoption, the petitioner for adoption has the burden of proving that the parent's consent to the adoption is unnecessary under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8. Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(a) (2021). “The party bearing the burden of proof in a proceeding under this chapter must prove the party's case by clear and convincing evidence.” Ind. Code § 31-19-10-0.5 (2005).

[11] Mother's sole challenge on appeal is that the court erred in concluding her consent was not required under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(11). She does not challenge the court's conclusions that her consent was not required for Son's adoption pursuant to sections 31-19-9-8(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (a)(2)(B) or for Daughter's adoption pursuant to section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B). Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a) is written in the disjunctive, and any one of its subsections provides independent grounds for dispensing with parental consent. In re Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). As explained below, because we affirm the judgment based on the court's conclusions regarding Mother's consent under other subsections, we need not consider Mother's argument that the court erred in its conclusion pursuant to subsection 31-19-9-8(a)(11).

[12] Mother does not challenge any individual findings the court made in either adoption order, and the unchallenged findings stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge trial court's findings results in waiver of argument the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. As to Daughter, the court found that no court order obviated Mother's support obligation and that Mother knowingly failed to provide for Daughter's care and support when able to do so as required by law. The court also found that Daughter had been in the custody of J.W. from fall of 2017 to June 2021 and from May 2022 through November 2023, and that Mother failed to provide any support for Daughter during any of the time Daughter was in J.W.’s care. See In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the relevant time period for determining whether a noncustodial parent has supported his or her child is any year in which the parent had an obligation and the ability to provide support but failed to do so). In addition, Mother experienced financial difficulties and homelessness in May 2022 but re-established housing later that year; however, she did not resume care of Daughter or provide support for her in J.W.’s care during the more than one year that elapsed between then and the November 2023 filing. Mother also obtained food stamps for Daughter's benefit but did not provide them to J.W. or use them to provide food for Daughter. Thus, the findings sufficiently support the court's conclusion that J.W. proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B).

[13] As to Son, the court found that nearly nine-year-old Son had lived with A.C. for over six years and with Mother for less than twenty months total. From the summer of 2022 until the petition was filed in November 2023—a period exceeding one year—Mother failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Son when she was able to do so. During that time, Son did not spend a single night with Mother, and Mother had last seen Son in person in December 2022. A.C. arranged a visit between Mother and Son shortly before the petition was filed, and Mother was not there for the visit. The court found that Mother's limited communication from the summer of 2022 to November 2023 amounted to only token efforts. These findings support the court's conclusion that A.C. proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's consent was not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A).

[14] The unchallenged findings support the determination that Mother's consent to adoption was not required as to either Son or Daughter. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother does not include J.W.’s amended petition in her appendix. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, the amended petition is part of the record on appeal, and we have taken judicial notice of this filing. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).

3.   We have taken judicial notice of these orders, which are not included in Mother's appendix. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1156.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.