III v. Erica L. Wilson a/k/a Norton, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] This appeal concerns an award of attorney fees in a post-dissolution custody matter. Roland B. Wilson III (“Roland”) petitioned to modify custody of the parties’ child, E.W., but withdrew the petition on the morning of the scheduled hearing because he was not prepared to proceed. Based on the withdrawal, the trial court ordered Roland to pay $6,000 of the attorney fees of Erica L. Wilson a/k/a Norton (“Erica”). Roland does not dispute that a fee award was appropriate, but he contends the amount of the award was an abuse of discretion. Because the record contains no evidence justifying the reasonableness of the $6,000 award under the circumstances herein, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 14, 2025, Roland filed a petition to modify custody of the parties’ minor son, E.W. The petition was set for an evidentiary hearing on December 17, 2025.¹ Roland, a licensed attorney, appeared pro se at the December 17 hearing and Erica appeared with her counsel, Jagen P. Arnold (“Arnold”). Roland told the trial court that he was not prepared to proceed with the custody petition because discovery was incomplete. Arnold noted the hearing had been scheduled since November 2025, and the trial court noted Roland had not filed a motion to compel. After the trial court confirmed the custody petition was set for hearing that morning, Roland explained:

Your Honor, I – I am not prepared. If that's the case then I need to pull the motion. I want to pull the petition. You can order attorney's fees and ill [sic] refile it. Because I'm not going to be brought in for this when I don't even have discovery from him.

(Tr. Vol. II at 14.) The trial court granted the withdrawal of the petition to modify custody.

[3] Before establishing a briefing schedule on attorney fees, the trial court announced its concern regarding appropriate allocation of attorney fees: “if you refile your petition some of the work obviously that he has done on modification would be relevant to that petition when we do hear it ․ the court will have to consider that.” (Id. at 15.) The trial court then directed Arnold to submit a fee affidavit within seven days and gave Roland seven days thereafter to respond.

[4] On December 22, 2025, Arnold filed an affidavit that requested $9,120 in attorney fees based on 45.60 hours of work at $200 per hour. The affidavit described the work as “conducting hearings, preparing pleadings, and conducting legal research responding to [Roland's] Motions.” (App. Vol. II at 12.) The affidavit did not include attachments of billing records, dates of work, task descriptions, or allocation among issues. Roland did not file a response within the seven-day period.

[5] On December 30, 2025, the trial court entered an Order on Attorney Fees that awarded $6,000 in attorney fees to Arnold. In the order, the trial court found that Roland was not prepared for the December 17 hearing and withdrew his petition; that Arnold was prepared and had spent substantial time in preparation; and that Roland had not filed a response to the request for attorney fees. The trial court's order did not identify the hours or tasks it accepted from Arnold's affidavit, explain how it arrived at $6,000, resolve the allocation concern it had raised during the December 17 hearing, or address either party's income or ability to pay.

[6] Roland refiled his custody-related petition on January 16, 2026. The next day he filed a motion to correct error that alleged the attorney fee award was insufficiently itemized, had not been allocated between work product that could and could not be reused, and was unsupported by financial evidence. The trial court denied his motion on January 20, 2026.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Roland argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay $6,000 in attorney fees.² Roland filed his appeal following the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error, which we review for an abuse of discretion. D.W. v. L.W., 917 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). When we review the trial court's order on a motion to correct error, it is also necessary to review the underlying order, Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), which here is the order awarding attorney fees. An award of attorney fees is also reviewed for abuse of discretion, Barger v. Pate, 831 N.E.2d 758, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), which “occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” D.W., 917 N.E.2d at 727.

[8] Indiana Code section 31-17-7-1(a) authorizes a trial court to order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost of maintaining or defending custody proceedings. Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1(a) similarly authorizes fee awards in post-dissolution proceedings. When determining whether an award is appropriate, the trial court must consider such factors as the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. In re Paternity of M.R.A., 41 N.E.3d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[9] Roland contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees without considering the parties’ resources, economic circumstances, and ability to pay. See id. (setting out those factors). A fee award in a domestic-relations proceeding may be based on a party's conduct that directly results in additional litigation expense, and where the award rests on that conduct rather than on the parties’ relative need, the trial court is not required to premise it on a disparity in their financial circumstances. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Here, the award arose from Roland's withdrawal of his petition on the morning of the scheduled hearing – conduct Roland conceded made a fee award appropriate. Moreover, Roland presented no evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances during the seven days the trial court afforded him to respond. The trial court cannot be faulted for failing to weigh financial evidence that neither party presented. We find no abuse of discretion on this basis.

[10] However, Roland also argues the trial court abused its discretion because Arnold's un-itemized affidavit provided insufficient support for an award and because the court failed to distinguish Arnold's reusable work from his unreusable work.³ With these arguments, we agree.

[11] In Barger, the trial court awarded attorney fees where the fee request listed litigation events but included no “corresponding time expenditure as to the events.” 831 N.E.2d at 765. We reversed because “there is no testimony or affidavit of record addressing the reasonableness of the fee amount.” Id. The same defect appears here. Arnold's affidavit stated he charged $200 per hour for 45.60 hours, and it gave a generic description of the work as “conducting hearings, preparing pleadings, and conducting legal research responding to [Roland's] Motions.” (App. Vol. II at 12.) However, as in Barger, the affidavit listed no time expenditure corresponding to individual tasks or proceedings. The trial court then awarded $6,000 without identifying what work that figure compensates or why it differs from the $9,120 requested. Under Barger, this record does not support the award.⁴

[12] This abuse of discretion is especially pronounced when, herein, the trial court also failed to explain how it was allocating between work rendered unnecessary by Roland's withdrawal of his petition and work that would remain relevant when he refiled the petition. In Montgomery v. Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, we reversed in part because the party seeking fees had not differentiated between categories of work when the record required such differentiation. The same problem exists here. Beyond the affidavit's deficiencies, the award is independently unsupported because the trial court never addressed the allocation concern it had raised before the briefing schedule was set – separating work rendered unnecessary by the withdrawal from work that remained useful in the refiled litigation. Neither Arnold's affidavit nor the fee order attempted that separation. For these reasons, we hold the trial court abused its discretion, and we reverse and remand.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $6,000 in attorney fees when the record contains no affidavit or testimony addressing the reasonableness of the fee amount, no time expenditure corresponding to individual tasks, and no allocation between work rendered unnecessary by the withdrawal and work that remains useful in the refiled litigation. We reverse and remand for a redetermination of a reasonable fee consistent with this opinion.

[14] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Roland did not include the entire Chronological Case Summary in his Appendix as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 50(2)(a). As Roland is a licensed attorney, we remind him to follow the Appellate Rules in future filings.

2.   Erica argues that Roland cannot challenge the award of attorney fees because he invited any error that occurred. Invited error is a judicial doctrine grounded in estoppel that prohibits a party from taking “advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct.” Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). At the hearing, Roland said: “I want to pull the petition. You can order attorney's fees and ill [sic] refile it.” (Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Roland thereby invited the court to award attorney fees, but he did not invite the trial court to enter an amount of attorney fees that was an abuse of discretion, and we therefore hold Roland did not waive his arguments for appeal.

3.   Erica also argues Roland waived his arguments on appeal by failing to respond within the seven-day briefing period at the trial court, and that his subsequent motion to correct error did not preserve those arguments for appeal. We need not decide this question because, as we discuss below, the party seeking attorney fees must demonstrate entitlement to the amount awarded, and Arnold did not do so regardless of Roland's response or non-response.

4.   Erica contends the trial court was not required to give reasons for its fee determination, and she cites Connolly v. Connolly, 952 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), for the proposition that a trial court need not explain its reasoning. However, Connolly does not aid Erica here. In Connolly, while the trial court gave no reasons for its award, the award stood because the court took judicial notice of prior findings and orders that already supported it; the absence of a stated rationale was therefore harmless because the record independently justified the award. Here, nothing in the record supplies that support – Arnold's affidavit contains no itemization or time entries tied to specific tasks, and there are no prior findings the court could have drawn upon. Connolly permits silence when the record speaks for itself; it does not permit an award the record does not support.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.