Yashpreet Singh, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Yashpreet Singh appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. Singh raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it removed a prospective juror for cause.

2. Whether Singh's argument that the trial court should have declared a mistrial is properly before us.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 13, 2024, Singh got into an argument with his wife and repeatedly struck her in the presence of their one-and-one-half-year-old child. Shortly after, Singh initiated a video call with his father-in-law, who lives in India. Singh's wife approached him “to get the phone,” at which point Singh struck her “in front of [her] father.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 76.

[4] The State charged Singh in relevant part with Level 6 felony domestic battery. During the ensuing voir dire of prospective jurors for his trial, the State engaged Prospective Juror 15 in the following colloquy:¹

․ I'm going to ask you guys all the same thing. Least amount of contact possible. All it is, is a touch, but it is [in a] rude, insolent, or angry manner. Could you find somebody guilty of battery if that's all the contact was?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [15]: No.

[The State]: No? Okay. If the Judge informs you that that's what the law is[?]

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [15]: That's based on the law, it would depend on what evidence to go by.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [15]: If the touch isn't any warrant or danger to the individual, then on the aggression of it.

Id. at 51. Based on Prospective Juror 15's responses, the State moved to exclude him for cause. The trial court granted the State's request over Singh's objection.

[5] During his ensuing jury trial, Singh's wife testified against him. On cross-examination, Singh asked her why she tried to hang up on the video call with her father. Singh's wife responded, “Because this wasn't the first incident that he hit me.” Id. at 79. Singh objected and asked for her statement to be stricken, which the trial court granted. Singh then stated that her response “almost rises to a mistrial,” and the court asked whether Singh was making “a motion on that[.]” Id. at 80. Singh clarified that he was not asking for a mistrial but simply “[j]ust to strike” the statement. Id. And, in its jury instructions, the court instructed the jury that it “must not consider” evidence the court had stricken. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 77.

[6] The jury found Singh guilty, and the trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Singh accordingly. This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court did not err in striking Prospective Juror 15 for cause.

[7] On appeal, Singh first argues that the trial court abused its discretion and, in doing so, violated his constitutional rights when it struck Prospective Juror 15 for cause. Our trial courts “enjoy broad discretion in regulating the form and substance of voir dire.” Doroszko v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1151, 1154-55 (Ind. 2023). We review the trial court's decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. See Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125, 133 (Ind. 2000). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if it misapplies the law.” M.D. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 303 (Ind. 2018).

[8] As our Supreme Court has explained, the parties may request to remove prospective jurors for cause

to exclude any prospective juror whose “views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath’ ” and thus violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Similarly, Indiana Code section 35-37-1-5 (2008) and Indiana Jury Rule 17 list many additional bases for removing a prospective juror for cause. A juror who qualifies for removal under these constitutional or statutory criteria may be removed as an “incompetent juror” ․

Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 246 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted). A prospective juror who “state[s] at the outset” that he will not follow the law is “incapable of following the court's instructions and [is] accordingly properly excused for cause.” Dye v. State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 16 (Ind. 1999).

[9] Here, Prospective Juror 15 stated that he would not follow the law, and the trial court therefore properly excused him for cause. A person commits domestic battery when the person knowingly or intentionally touches any family or household member “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) (2023). When the State asked Prospective Juror 15 if he “[c]ould ․ find somebody guilty of battery” if the touching was the “[l]east amount of contact possible” but nonetheless in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner,” as instructed, Prospective Juror 15 flatly said, “No.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 51. When the State followed up by asking, “If the Judge informs you that that's what the law is?,” Prospective Juror 15 insisted that his decision “would depend on what evidence to go by” and “the aggression” of the touching. Id.

[10] In other words, Prospective Juror 15 made clear that he would not be willing to follow the law in at least some circumstances. The trial court therefore properly excused Prospective Juror 15 for cause. And, as Singh's other arguments on this issue derive from his premise that the trial court's for-cause removal of Prospective Juror 15 was in error, his derivative arguments also fail.

2. Singh's mistrial argument is not properly before us.

[11] Singh also argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it did not sua sponte declare a mistrial after Singh's wife testified to prior instances of battery against her by Singh. Although Singh acknowledges on appeal that his trial counsel did not request a mistrial and thus failed to preserve the purported issue for our review, he disregards that his trial counsel affirmatively informed the court that he was not requesting a mistrial.

[12] We agree with the State that this record thus does not show mere neglect or the failure to object by trial counsel; the affirmative declaration to the trial court, when asked, that he was not seeking a mistrial represents a deliberate and well-informed strategy on counsel's part. Any error on this issue therefore falls not under the fundamental-error doctrine but under the invited-error doctrine. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874-75 (Ind. 2022). And “[t]he invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental.” Id. Accordingly, Singh's argument on this issue is not properly before us, and we decline to consider it. He may, however, challenge his counsel's strategy through a petition for post-conviction relief. See id. at 875.

Conclusion

[13] For all of these reasons, we affirm Singh's conviction.²

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The transcript does not identify the prospective juror as Prospective Juror 15, but the parties have submitted a certified agreed statement to our Court clarifying the prospective juror's designation. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 216.

2.   The trial court “merged” a Class A misdemeanor conviction with Singh's Level 6 felony conviction. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 11. The State suggests this might justify a remand to vacate the Class A misdemeanor conviction. See Appellee's Br. at 7 n.1. We acknowledge that, when Indiana substantive double jeopardy law was a constitutional doctrine, we would routinely direct such corrections on remand. But our Supreme Court has since moved the doctrine from a constitutional doctrine to a statutory one, which calls into question the “fundamental” nature of the doctrine from the standpoint of our sua sponte intervention. Cf. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020) (moving Indiana substantive double jeopardy law from a constitutional doctrine to a statutory one). And Singh himself did not argue in his lead brief on appeal that the trial court's merger was an error that we must correct. We therefore decline to intervene on this purported issue.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.