IN RE: the Guardianship of H.B. (Minor Child): Kristie Lee Teague (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kristie Teague (“Teague”) appeals following termination of her guardianship of her granddaughter, H.B. Teague argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider evidence presented to overcome the presumption that H.B.’s mother, T.F. (“Mother”), is the proper custodian of H.B. Because the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and the findings support the trial court's decision, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 7, 2023, Teague filed a petition for guardianship of her granddaughter, H.B. H.B. continued to live with Mother, Mother did not appear for the hearing on Teague's petition, and the trial court granted Teague d guardianship of H.B. on May 8, 2024. Less than two weeks later, on May 21, 2024, Mother filed a petition challenging the continued need for Teague's guardianship of H.B. The trial court reopened the matter and appointed a guardian ad litem on June 5, 2024. On July 8, 2024, the court authorized Mother to exercise supervised parenting time at a local facility and assigned Mother the responsibility for any costs associated with parenting time supervision.

[3] The court held evidentiary hearings on the matter on March 18, April 11, and May 20, 2025. On May 19, 2025, Mother filed a notice pursuant to Trial Rule 52 requesting findings and conclusions. The trial court issued its Final Order in Guardianship and Paternity Cases on October 14, 2025, concluding that “the evidence fails to show that a guardianship is legally appropriate in [H.B.’s] case.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II at 17.) The trial court found that, while Mother had “voluntarily relinquished care of [H.B.] to [Teague] for periods of time, the Court cannot find that short periods of relinquishment (and the lack of relinquishment at the time of the Court's guardianship order) makes a guardianship appropriate for that reason.” (Id.) Further, while the trial court acknowledged that Teague “has been one of [H.B.’s] important caregivers for [her] whole life” (id. at 18) and urged Mother to make arrangements for visitation between Teague and H.B., it found that whether Teague and H.B. would continue a relationship was Mother's decision. Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he law places a heavy presumption that a parent is the proper custodian of their child and [Teague] has not overcome that burden of proof.” (Id.)

[4] Mother was granted primary physical and sole legal custody of H.B. effective December 20, 2025, so that H.B. could complete the fall semester at the school she was attending. Teague now appeals the trial court's order terminating her guardianship of H.B.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Teague argues the trial court erred when it terminated her guardianship of H.B. The trial court's order in guardianship proceedings is reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Matter of Guardianship of A.Y.H., 139 N.E.3d 1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “When, as here, a trial court enters findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, we determine (1) whether the evidence supports the findings and (2) whether the findings support the judgment. We do not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous.” In re Paternity of L.J., 223 N.E.3d 716, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citations omitted). “In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility but rather consider the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment.” A.Y.H., 139 N.E.3d 1050 at 1052.

[6] “In a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party ․, there is a presumption that the natural parent should have custody of her child.” L.J., 223 N.E.3d at 720.

The third party bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence sufficient to overcome the natural-parent presumption includes a parent's (1) present unfitness, (2) long acquiescence in the third-party's custody, and (3) past abandonment of the child ‘such that the affections of the child and third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar and endanger the future happiness of the child.’

Id. (quoting In re L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). However, “the trial court's inquiry is not limited to these three factors.” A.Y.H., 139 N.E.3d at 1054. Rather, the court must determine “ ‘whether the important and strong presumption that a child's interests are best served by placement with the natural parent is clearly and convincingly overcome’ by the third-party's evidence[.]” Id. (quoting In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002)).

[7] Teague asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to analyze whether Teague's evidence overcame the presumption in favor of Mother. Specifically, Teague argues that the trial court did not “make findings regarding acquiescence, relinquishment, or the interwoven emotional bonds between [H.B.] and [Teague].” (Appellant's Br. at 13.) We disagree. The trial court explicitly included findings regarding relinquishment and acquiescence as well as emotional bonding.¹ Thus, we cannot say the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors. Moreover, the record supports those findings.

[8] In its final order, the trial court found that, while Mother had “voluntarily relinquished care of H.B. to [Teague] for periods of time, the Court cannot find that short periods of relinquishment (and the lack of relinquishment at the time of the Court's guardianship order) makes a guardianship appropriate for that reason.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II at 16.) Though Teague filed a petition for guardianship of H.B. on September 7, 2023, H.B. “was with her mother” until the trial court granted Teague's petition on May 8, 2024. (Tr. Vol. II at 104.) On May 21, 2024, less than two weeks after Teague's petition was granted, Mother challenged the guardianship. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Mother did not acquiesce to Teague's guardianship of H.B.

[9] Further, while the guardian ad litem testified about his concern that Mother had “only exercised very limited parenting time” (id. at 19) over the course of Teague's guardianship of H.B., he also acknowledged Mother's discomfort with supervised visitation at Teague's home and Mother's inability to pay for supervised visitation at a local facility. The guardian ad litem described the requirement that Mother's visitation with H.B. be supervised by Teague as “problematic” (id. at 26) and recommended no supervision requirements. This evidence, while favorable to Teague, does not undermine the validity of the trial court's finding that the periods of relinquishment had been brief, because we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment without reweighing it.

[10] Regarding the emotional bond between Teague and H.B., the trial court acknowledged that Teague “has been one of [H.B.’s] important caregivers for [her] whole life” (Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18) and urged Mother to “consider some type of visitation arrangement to help [H.B.] adjust and keep some relationship with [Teague].” (Id.) However, the court clarified that the decision about whether H.B. and Teague would maintain a relationship was “[Mother's] to make” (id.) and “the child's best interests by themselves are not a sufficient reason to grant or continue a guardianship.” (Id. at 17.) These findings were supported by the evidence, as the guardian ad litem testified that H.B. was “bonded” to Teague (Tr. Vol. II at 20), and that it “would be incredibly detrimental to [H.B.]” (id. at 170) if Teague were cut from H.B.’s life. However, when asked if there was any reason why Mother could not have custody of H.B., the guardian ad litem answered, “Uh, none that I can think of.” (Id. at 168.)

[11] Thus, the court considered whether Mother acquiesced to Teague's guardianship of H.B. or relinquished custody of H.B. for extended periods of time, and it also considered the close relationship between Teague and H.B. Ultimately, however, the trial court found that Teague had not met the burden of proof required to overcome the “heavy presumption that the parent is the proper custodian of their child.” (Id.) We cannot reweigh the evidence to overturn the trial court's determination based on Teague's arguments.

Conclusion

[12] The trial court considered the relevant factors in determining whether Teague overcame the presumption that Mother is the proper custodian of H.B. The evidence supported the court's findings, and the findings supported the court's determination that Teague did not overcome the parental presumption in favor of Mother. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Teague's guardianship of H.B., and we affirm its judgment.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court did not include a finding regarding parental present unfitness; however, we note that, in the trial court, Teague did not allege or present evidence that Mother was presently unfit. (See also Appellant's Br. at 19) (acknowledging Mother was not unfit). Instead, the evidence indicated Mother maintains full-time employment (Tr. Vol. II at 22), stable housing (id. at 23), and a “well-kept” bedroom for H.B. (Id. at 28.) The guardian ad litem testified that Mother's criminal history “doesn't indicate any ․ concerns[.]” (Id. at 15.) Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's failure to include a finding regarding this factor.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.