M.M. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In December 2023, 4-year-old E.M. and 2-year-old R.M. (collectively, Children) lived with their mother, M.M. (Mother), in a home overrun with roaches, bed bugs, mice, and animal feces. E.M. was still in diapers. Children subsequently were removed from Mother's care by the Indiana Department of Child Services, and each was found to be a child in need of services (CHINS). During the next 11/212 years, Mother secured no lasting income or safe and appropriate housing. She also showed no progress in developing her inadequate parenting skills or maintaining a clean house.

[2] After DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights, she moved to a relative's home at which she paid no rent. As of the hearing on that petition, Mother had no job, admitted she was not ready to care for Children yet, and could not say when she would start paying for her housing. The trial court ultimately terminated Mother's parental rights.

[3] Mother appeals, arguing DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in Children's removal were not and likely will not be remedied. Because removal was based on unclean and unsafe housing, Mother contends the lack of evidence as to her current home conditions was dispositive. But regardless of its condition, she had lived at that home for only the last month, and the unrefuted evidence showed her habitual lack of stable housing during the 22 months since Children's removal. As this was sufficient evidence that Mother had failed to remedy her housing problems and was unlikely to do so, we affirm.

Facts

[4] E.M., born in June 2019, and R.M., born in March 2021, had been in the DCS system for much of their lives. Children were first found to be CHINS in 2021 and remained wards of the State until March 2023, although Children were not removed from Mother and Ro.M. (Father) during that time. That case was closed just 10 months before DCS had to step in again.

[5] In December 2023, DCS received a report that Mother's home was filthy and Children were always dirty. A DCS investigator thereafter visited Mother's home, which contained gnats, roaches, mice, bed bugs, fleas, and animal feces and was overrun with trash that blocked movements within the home. Children slept on the floor in a corner of the home in the midst of these troubling conditions. Despite being more than 4 years old, E.M. was still in diapers.

[6] DCS staff repeatedly visited Mother's home during the next two weeks and provided assistance to her and to Father, who lived elsewhere. The home conditions remained unsafe for Children, prompting DCS to remove Children on an emergency basis on January 3, 2024. DCS petitioned to find Children to be CHINS for the second time. Mother admitted to “the allegations set out in the [CHINS] [p]etition” detailing the home conditions and her failure to cure them despite DCS's assistance. Exhs., pp. 14, 17.

[7] DCS initially placed Children with Father, but that arrangement did not last due to his own homelessness. Children then were placed with a relative. Father ultimately consented to Children's adoption.

[8] The CHINS court entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to:

• contact the DCS family case manager (FCM) every week.

• maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing “in a manner that is structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe for Children.” Id. at 20.

• secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income sufficient for Mother and Children.

• successfully complete all recommendations developed from a parenting assessment.

• meet all personal medical and mental health needs in a timely and complete manner.

[9] At each case review hearing over the next 18 months, the CHINS court's findings reveal that Mother did not resolve her housing issues. Those findings were expressly adopted later by the court that terminated her parental rights. They show that in June 2024, Mother “still need[ed] assistance in learning how to keep the home clean and in obtaining employment,” and, though “an exterminator has been to the home,” she was “still having issues with cockroaches and bedbugs.” Id. at 25. By December 2024, she “ha[d] not maintained suitable housing and continue[d] to struggle with pest control and cleanliness in the home.” Id. at 28. Mother had “also not secured a stable source of income.” Id.

[10] Though Mother had initially stayed at the original home, which was never fully remediated of pests, she at one point moved to a cabin ¹ consisting of a single room and a bath but no cooking area or appliances. Mother's parenting evaluator, Kimberly Cutsinger, reported the home, which was close to a highway, was unfit for the long term. Mother remained in that cabin less than a month before returning to the still-deficient original home, from which she was eventually evicted.

[11] Mother's income followed a similar pattern. She was employed at Harvest Market for part of 2023. She relied on her mother and aunt to support her until she became employed again in January 2025. Mother worked at that job for only a month before being dismissed for being too slow. Mother worked as an Uber driver for two months ending in May 2025. In that position, she earned between $600 and $800 monthly, but she quit when her car broke down. After the Uber work ended, Mother's only income source was relatives.

[12] Around the same time, Cutsinger completed her parenting assessment of Mother. Cutsinger determined that Mother was not ready to care for Children, despite the substantial assistance that DCS had provided. Cutsinger concluded:

Mother currently demonstrates limited parental capacity, primarily due to emotional withdrawal, low engagement with her children during visits, and the need for significant prompting to provide discipline and structure. Her recent acquisition of housing is a step in the right direction, but she has not yet demonstrated the skills necessary for independent parenting. Her parenting interactions appear passive and she lacks the initiative and emotional responsiveness needed for full reunification at this time.

***

At this stage, it is recommended that if parents cannot make significant changes in the next 30/60 days[,] the agency and the court should consider a permanency plan of adoption as potentially the most stable, safe, and nurturing long-term option for [Children]. These children require caregivers who are consistently attuned, emotionally available, and developmentally responsive—needs that their biological parents have not been able to meet, despite extended time and support.

Id. at 48.

[13] At the review hearing on July 23, 2025—one month before DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights—the CHINS court detailed Mother's continuing struggles to parent and obtain stable, appropriate housing:

[Mother has] partially complied with the children's case plan. While Mother has completed her parenting assessment, Mother has not maintained suitable housing nor a stable source of income during the reporting period. Mother is participating in individual therapy and Mother's therapist has recommended Mother participate in a psychological evaluation. Mother is also participating in home based casework. While Mother has participated in supervised visitation, said visits have been inconsistent. Mother has been observed to be disengaged during visits with the children, requiring continuous prompts from the Provider to engage or redirect behavior. Provider reports there is minimal evidence of attachment-building or emotional responsiveness during observed family interactions. Providers have also reported issues including poor hygiene, not bringing enough supplies for the four (4) hour visit, a lack of structure, [and] not changing [R.M.’s] diaper unless it is soiled with feces.

Id. at 33.

[14] When no further progress was made by Mother, DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights in August 2025. The next month Mother moved to a two-bedroom home in Lapel owned by her grandfather, who then lived in Virginia. Mother reported that she and her grandfather agreed that she would pay rent as soon as she could obtain employment. In the meantime, Mother's grandfather was paying the utility bills. No DCS caseworker, Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), or service provider had ever been inside the grandfather's home at the time of the termination hearing.

[15] At that hearing, FCM Vernon Caudill testified that Mother had complied with every service asked of her but had not shown identifiable progress. Both the FCM and the CASA recommended termination of Mother's parental rights. DCS staff made clear that Mother's circumstances were unlikely to substantially change even if she were given more time to prepare for Children. DCS had already identified a potential joint pre-adoptive home for Children.

[16] Mother acknowledged during her testimony that she was not ready to have Children fully back in her care yet, although she hoped to be in 30 days. Her car, broken five months earlier, was still in the repair shop, with the costs to be paid by Father. She was unemployed.

[17] In its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court adopted the parenting assessor's June 2025 summary that Children, who are behind other children of similar ages, “require caregivers who are consistently attuned, emotionally available, and developmentally responsive—needs that their biological parents have not been able to meet, despite extended time and support.” App. Vol. II, p. 19. The court observed that Children's continued involvement in the system is itself “a harm, albeit a beneficent one” and that “the harm ․ increases with elongation of the time.” Id. at 18. The court noted that Children had already been in that system, on this occasion, “well beyond the one-year window contemplated by [the] Indiana legislature for parents to achieve reunification.” Id. at 18-19.

[18] Invoking the elements of the termination of parental rights statute, the court determined that Children had been removed and under DCS supervision for at least 15 of the most recent 22 months, and that Mother, despite DCS's reasonable efforts, had been unable to remedy the circumstances resulting in their placement outside her home. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2) (2025). The court also found a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal or continued placement outside the home would not be remedied. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2025). Finally, the court concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for their care. Mother appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

[19] To terminate the parent-child relationship, DCS must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that termination is in the child's best interests; (2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) that one or more of the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) exists. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025) (elements for termination); In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (clear and convincing evidence standard). Here, DCS alleged that two subsection (d) circumstances existed:

• that Children had been removed for at least 15 of the most recent 22 months and, despite DCS's reasonable efforts, Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Children's removal. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2) (2025); and

• that there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2025).

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that both of those circumstances existed and that all other termination elements were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

[20] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143. “We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment, giving ‘due regard’ to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). We reverse only if the judgment is clearly erroneous—that is, the findings fail to support the conclusions or the conclusions fail to support the judgment. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009).

[21] Mother challenges only the trial court's conclusions that the conditions resulting in Children's removal were not and likely would not be remedied. She does not contest that termination of her parental rights serves Children's best interests or that DCS has a satisfactory plan for their care. Nor does she challenge any specific finding of fact. Unchallenged findings are accepted as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[22] As Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, DCS was required to prove only that the circumstances leading to Children's removal had not been remedied (Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2) (2025)) or, alternatively, that there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances leading to removal or to placement outside the home will not be remedied (Indiana Code § 31-35-2- 4(d)(3) (2025)). In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). DCS need not prove both, although the trial court found that DCS had. See id.

[23] Mother contends DCS proved neither alternative element. Her argument boils down to one point: no one inspected her most recent housing—her grandfather's home—into which she had moved about a month prior to the termination hearing; therefore, DCS never proved the removal condition persists or that a reasonable probability exists that the circumstances leading to placement outside the home will not be remedied. We focus on the reasonable probability issue.

[24] Courts apply a two-step analysis when determining whether such a probability exists. First, the court identifies the conditions that led to removal and continued placement outside the home. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (applying previous version of termination statute). Second, the court considers whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. The second step includes consideration of the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing weighed against the parent's habitual pattern of conduct. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The court may weigh historical conduct more heavily than any eleventh-hour effort to improve. Id.; K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013).

[25] Children initially were removed due to unsafe living conditions and their parents’ failure to rectify those conditions even with DCS services. However, Children continued to be placed outside Mother's home not only due to her failure to provide a safe home but also due to her parenting deficits. The parenting assessor viewed Mother as having limited parental capacity, largely due to Mother's emotional withdrawal, low engagement with Children, and inability to provide discipline and structure on her own. Mother needed directions from visitation supervisors to provide basic care for Children during her visitations. For instance, Mother failed to change the youngest child's diaper as needed during the lengthy visits.

[26] And the evidence showed that any recent correction of Mother's unsafe living conditions likely would not last. For the nearly two years between DCS's first observation of the deplorable conditions in Mother's home and the termination hearing, the record shows Mother's multiple moves to homes inadequate for Children's needs, her eviction from one, and her persistent failure to keep any of them. The evidence showed that long after she began receiving DCS services, she still needed assistance in learning how to perform basic life functions such as maintaining a clean home. During that period, she also lacked stable income or transportation and was financially dependent on family for much of that time. Mother never progressed during the nearly two years that she had been receiving DCS services. The parenting assessor's conclusions about Mother's limited parenting capacity suggest Mother's likely inability to ever do so.

[27] All this evidence showed Mother habitually lacked safe housing, a reliable source of income, and necessary parenting skills—evidence on which the trial court could rely in determining whether those conditions ever would be remedied. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. And the court was entitled to weigh any improvement in her living conditions at her grandfather's home against this documented, multi-year history of instability. See id.; In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (“[I]t is within the trial court's discretion to disregard the efforts [the parent] made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily [the parent's] history of conduct prior to those efforts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[28] The trial court did not clearly err in finding a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. See In re A.I., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (termination is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities”).

[29] As the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights, we affirm that judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The home also was described as a cabin.

2.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.