Brandon C. Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Brandon C. Jones was convicted of two counts of Class A felony child molesting, one count of Class C felony child molesting, and one count of Class D felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors. He now appeals, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions and (2) whether his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2013, five-year-old K.T. lived on Barr Street in Fort Wayne with her two brothers, her mother, Dorea, and Jones, Dorea's boyfriend. Jones was the children's “primary caregiver” while Dorea worked long hours as a certified nursing assistant. Tr. Vol. II p. 239.

[3] One day when K.T. was five or six, Jones was watching her and her brothers as well as his own young sons. Jones told the boys to stay in a bedroom and took K.T. to the living room. He then played her a pornographic video of two women and a man engaging in oral sex and told her to “copy them.” Id. at 123. She “put [her] mouth on his penis” and “touched his penis with [her] hands[.]” Id. at 123, 124. Jones then “put his mouth on [her] vagina” and “used a vibrator” on her vagina. Id. at 125, 123.

[4] Thereafter, “almost every night” Jones would go into K.T.’s room, which she shared with her brothers, and “put his hands in [her] pants” and “rub [her] vagina.” Id. at 127. This continued until the family moved to a new home in 2014. In 2017, Dorea and Jones ended their relationship and he moved out.

[5] When K.T. was ten or eleven years old, she told another child Jones “raped” her, but the child thought she was joking. Id. at 132. In 2022, when K.T. was fourteen, a speaker came to her school and gave a presentation on child abuse. This prompted K.T. to tell her school guidance counselor that Jones had molested her. A few weeks later, K.T. disclosed the abuse to her mother, who eventually reported it to the police. K.T. participated in a forensic interview, in which she stated Jones molested her while they lived in the home on Barr Street.

[6] The State charged Jones with two counts of Class A felony child molesting, one count of Class C felony child molesting, and one count of Class D felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors. A jury trial was held in November 2025. K.T. testified as to Jones's molestations. Specifically, as to the timeline, she testified that the molestation occurred when she was “five” or “six” and lived at Barr Street. Id. at 119.

[7] The jury found Jones guilty as charged. At sentencing, the court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Jones's criminal history, consisting of two juvenile adjudications, sixteen misdemeanors and seven felonies; (2) Jones previously received the benefit of suspended sentences and probation, both of which were revoked multiple times; (3) while this case was pending, he was charged with various drug-dealing offenses including Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine; (4) he violated a position of trust with K.T.; (5) K.T.’s tender age; and (6) “the extraordinary impact that [Jones's] conduct has had on her and her family.” Tr. Vol. III p. 163. The court sentenced Jones to fifty years for each Class A felony, eight years for the Class C felony, and three years for the Class D felony, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 111 years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Jones now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Jones first argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, he argues K.T.’s testimony should be disregarded under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. In general, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We may make an exception, however, when that testimony is incredibly dubious. Under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity, we may impinge upon a fact-finder's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witness. Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The doctrine requires there be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). “Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Hampton, 921 N.E.2d at 29 (quoting Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007)).

[9] Jones argues K.T.’s testimony was inherently contradictory or equivocal because in her pre-trial disclosures to the school guidance counselor and the forensic interviewer, she stated the molestations occurred when she was three years old and ten years old, respectively.¹ But at trial, K.T. consistently testified that these events occurred when she was five or six years old and lived on Barr Street. We note the incredible dubiosity rule applies “only when a witness contradicts herself in a single statement or while testifying; it does not apply to conflicts between multiple statements.” Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied; see also Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 758 (“[E]ven if the trial testimony is inconsistent with pre-trial statements, that does not necessarily make the testimony at trial incredibly dubious.”). Thus, any discrepancy between K.T.’s pre-trial statements and her trial testimony does not render such testimony incredibly dubious. See Chambless, 119 N.E.3d at 193.

[10] Jones also argues various parts of K.T.’s testimony were so “inherently improbable” that no reasonable person could believe it. Appellant's Br. p. 18. Specifically, he points to the following: (1) K.T. testified the acts sometimes occurred while her brothers or Jones's sons were in the house or room, (2) K.T. once described Jones's molestation as rape rather than molestation, (3) K.T. allegedly acted normally in the years that followed, and (4) she delayed disclosing the abuse.

[11] But none of this makes K.T.’s testimony “so bizarre as to make her testimony inherently improbable.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 n.3 (Ind. 2002). We have previously held testimony as to sexual abuse is not incredibly dubious merely because others were present during the abuse but did not hear or see it. See Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)Ones, reh'g denied, trans. denied. Further, we cannot say that K.T.’s referring to the acts as rape rather than molestation—when she was approximately ten or eleven at the time—makes her testimony improbable. And neither her perceived “normal” behavior nor her delayed disclosure makes the testimony improbable. See Hero v. State, 765 N.E.2d 599, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. As such, the incredible dubiosity rule is not applicable and the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions.

II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[12] Jones next argues his 111-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[13] We first consider the statutory range for the offenses. A person convicted of a Class A felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term between twenty and fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a) (2023). A person convicted of a Class C felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term between two and eight years, with an advisory sentence of four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). And a person convicted of a Class D felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term between six months and three years, with an advisory sentence of one-and-a-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2026). Here, the trial court sentenced Jones to the maximum 111 years, fully executed in the DOC.

[14] As Jones acknowledges, the nature of the offenses here is “serious and despicable.” Appellant's Br. p. 24. He repeatedly molested his girlfriend's five-year-old daughter, at times in front of her siblings. He also forced her to watch pornography and used a sex toy on her. In doing so, he violated the position of trust he held with K.T. and her family. Jones argues he did not physically injure K.T., but we note K.T. suffers from “severe depression” and “even attempted to take [her] own life” as a result of his actions. Tr. Vol. III pp. 144-45. And despite Jones's contention that the offenses occurred “over a short duration[,]” K.T. testified the abuse occurred nearly every night until the family moved in 2014. Appellant's Br. p. 24. This evidence does not portray the nature of the offenses in a positive light. See Wilmsen v. State, 181 N.E.3d 469, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (affirming defendant's 190-year sentence where he molested his girlfriend's young daughters daily for months).

[15] Turning to Jones's character, we note his extensive criminal history. At forty-four years of age, Jones has been convicted of sixteen misdemeanors and seven felonies. At the time of sentencing, he also had pending felony charges relating to drug dealing and money laundering. Jones emphasizes most of his prior convictions were not crimes of violence, but nonetheless numerous criminal convictions are a “poor reflection on [Jones's] character” as they reveal he “has not been deterred even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.” Webb v. State, 149 N.E.3d 1234, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005)).

[16] Jones has failed to show compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of his offense and his character. As such, we cannot say his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Notably, although the forensic interviewer testified K.T. stated the abuse occurred when she was around ten years old, the forensic interviewer later clarified she was “guess[ing]” because she “didn't really get [K.T.’s] age” during the interview but did know that the abuse occurred “when [K.T.] lived on Barr Street[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 51.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.