Charles L. Sittloh, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following Charles Sittloh's sentencing for misdemeanor battery, the trial court ordered him to pay court costs and a supplemental public defender fee. The court also ordered both sums retained from Sittloh's cash bond. Sittloh appeals the imposition of the costs and fee, arguing that the trial court failed to first conduct an indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay either or both.¹

[2] Because the supplemental public defender fee was retained from Sittloh's cash bond pursuant to a bond agreement, the court was not required to conduct an indigency hearing before imposing it. But an indigency hearing was statutorily required before the court could impose the court costs, and the court's limited inquiries into Sittloh's finances were insufficient to satisfy that requirement. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts

[3] Sittloh was arrested, jailed, and charged with Class B misdemeanor battery for punching his landlord during an argument. The next day, he was released from jail after posting a $500 cash bond and signing a bond agreement. Among other terms, the agreement provided: “If there is a judgment entered for a fine, court costs, restitution, public defender fee, probation user fee, or other fees imposed by in [sic] my criminal case, the Clerk will apply the money posted for this cash bond toward those obligations, as ordered by the court.” App. Vol. II, p. 17.

[4] At his initial hearing on the battery charge, Sittloh had the following pertinent exchange with the trial court:

[Court]: ․ And is your address still correct on Randolph Street, [Mr. Sittloh]?

[Sittloh]: It's pending at this time.

[Court]: What do you mean by that?

[Sittloh]: I have an eviction, and I'm still battling the eviction.

***

[Court]: Are you going to try to hire an attorney, Mr. Sittloh, if the case does not get dismissed; or do you need me to appoint someone?

[Sittloh]: I have a retainer down at this time, but he's refused to take the case, unless I pay another five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). So I - I can't afford that.

***

[Court]: ․ Well are you working anywhere, [Mr. Sittloh]?

[Sittloh]: No, I'm not.

[Court]: Did you want me to appoint a public defender?

[Sittloh]: Yes.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 8-9 (indentation modified).

[5] The trial court appointed Sarah Welcome as Sittloh's public defender, and she represented him through a jury trial. Sittloh was ultimately convicted of the battery charge, and the trial court sentenced him to 100 days in jail. After sentencing, when Sittloh indicated his intent to appeal, he had the following pertinent exchange with the trial court:

[Court]: Now [Mr. Sittloh], we've appointed Sarah Welcome from the public defender's office, because I found you indigent at the time that she was appointed. Now has your financial status changed in any way significantly, to where you can hire an attorney, [Mr. Sittloh]?

[Sittloh]: No, Your Honor.

[Court]: You don't have anything of value that you can sell, to employ an attorney?

[Sittloh]: That'd be an automobile.

[Court]: A what?

[Sittloh]: An automobile.

[Court]: Is it worth - how much is it worth?

[Sittloh]: Maybe two thousand ($2,000.00).

Id. at 103 (indentation modified).

[6] After this exchange, the trial court appointed appellate counsel for Sittloh. The court also ordered him to pay $189 in court costs and a $200 supplemental public defender fee. Additionally, the court ordered those sums retained from Sittloh's $500 cash bond, with the remaining balance refunded to the bond payor. Sittloh appeals the imposition of the court costs and public defender fee.

Discussion and Decision

[7] “We review a trial court's sentencing decisions—including the imposition of fines, costs, and fees—under an ‘abuse-of-discretion standard.’ ” Eversole v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1000, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted a law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[8] Sittloh claims the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay court costs and a supplemental public defender fee without first conducting an indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay either or both. The Indiana Code generally requires a trial court to conduct an indigency hearing before ordering a defendant to pay court costs or a public defender fee. See Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 (court costs); Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6 (public defender fee). But where the latter is retained from a defendant's cash bond pursuant to a bond agreement, no such hearing is required. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 774 (interpreting Indiana's “cash-bail statute,” Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2).² Sittloh's challenge to the public defender fee is therefore without merit.

[9] As for the court costs, the State contends the trial court conducted an adequate indigency hearing after Sittloh's sentencing. It did not. Indiana Code § 35-33-7-6.5(a) (2025) (Indigency Hearing Statute) specifically requires trial courts to consider a person's “assets,” “income,” and “necessary expenses” when determining if the person is indigent. And our Supreme Court has held that “ ‘the record of an indigency determination must disclose evidence’ of those three factors to satisfy the indigency hearing requirement.” Eversole, 260 N.E.3d at 1004-05 (quoting Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 780).

[10] After Sittloh's sentencing, the trial court made two pertinent inquiries into Sittloh's finances. First, it asked if Sittloh's financial status had changed significantly since his initial hearing. Second, it asked if Sittloh had anything of value he could sell. Taken together, these inquiries satisfied only the assets factor of the Indigency Hearing Statute; they revealed nothing about Sittloh's income or necessary expenses.

[11] The State suggests that, by asking Sittloh if his financial status had changed significantly since his initial hearing, the trial court incorporated by reference everything it learned at that hearing about Sittloh's income and necessary expenses. But evidence of those statutory factors was not disclosed at the initial hearing. Rather, the hearing revealed only that Sittloh was being evicted, was not working, and could not afford to pay $5,000 to his retained counsel.

[12] Interpreting the Indigency Hearing Statute, our Supreme Court has deemed it “incumbent” on trial courts to consider a person's assets, income, and necessary expenses when conducting an indigency hearing. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 778. “This means that if the parties fail to provide the information, courts themselves must make inquiries calculated to bring out the necessary evidence.” Id. Here, the trial court did not make all the necessary inquiries before imposing court costs on Sittloh. It therefore abused its discretion.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court was not required to conduct an indigency hearing before ordering Sittloh to pay a supplemental public defender fee from his cash bond. But the court was required to conduct an indigency hearing before imposing court costs on Sittloh, and the hearing it conducted was insufficient. We therefore affirm the trial court's order as to the supplemental public defender fee, reverse the order as to the imposition of court costs, and remand for the trial court to reconsider costs after holding an adequate indigency hearing.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We read Sittloh's appellate brief as challenging only the imposition of court costs, but the State's brief responds as though Sittloh also challenges the imposition of the public defender fee. We therefore address both as if raised by Sittloh.

2.   We note that our General Assembly recently amended the cash-bail statute, Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2, as well as Indiana's indigency hearing statute, Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5, to specify that an indigency hearing is not required before ordering a defendant to pay “publicly paid costs of representation and fines, costs, fees, and restitution” from their cash bond. P.L.64-2026, secs. 2, 4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2027).

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.