Reggie E. Wills, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Reggie E. Wills (Reggie) appeals his convictions for Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 5 felony possession of cocaine, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence cocaine and a handgun found during warrantless searches of his person and car at a traffic stop. Concluding that the search of his person was valid as a search incident to arrest and that the search of his car was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Reggie, who was born in 1991, used to go by two last names, Turentine and Wills, but now goes by Wills. At the time of the events in this case, law enforcement only knew Reggie as Reggie Turentine. Under Turentine, Reggie had an identification card for several years (2017-2022) as well as several arrests (2011, 2018, 2020, and 2022) and convictions, including a conviction in 2011 for Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended and convictions in 2012 for Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class B felony dealing in cocaine, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. See Ex. p. 119. For the 2012 convictions, Reggie served time in prison as Turentine. Although Reggie never obtained a driver's license under Turentine, he had a BMV driver record under that name that included five suspensions, and his license status was “UNLICENSED” and “SUSPENDED - PRIOR” at the time of the events in this case. See id. at 11-12. Under Wills, Reggie obtained an identification card in 2010, a learner's permit in 2019, and a driver's license in 2021. See id. at 18-19.

[3] In August 2023, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Violent Crimes Task Force started to investigate Reggie Turentine based on information received from a confidential informant and several Crime Stoppers tips that he was sourcing illegal drugs to a house in Indianapolis. One of the tips included information about a “very noticeable” orange Dodge Challenger with a “unique” license plate. Tr. pp. 15, 110. Task-force member Detective Jacob Chestnut had become familiar with Reggie Turentine in 2020 due to one of his arrests and knew that he drove an orange Dodge Challenger, which was registered to his longtime girlfriend. Detective Chestnut also knew that Reggie Turentine's driving status was suspended with a prior conviction. See id. at 21, 24, 120. During the months-long investigation, Detective Chestnut checked Reggie Turentine's BMV records “numerous” times, and “[e]very time” he did, the records showed that his driving status was “suspended prior.” Id. at 80.

[4] In May 2024, Detective Chestnut, who was in plain clothes driving an unmarked car, was investigating an unrelated matter when he saw an orange Dodge Challenger “park the wrong direction ․ in front of a known drug house.” Id. at 83. Detective Chestnut observed Reggie and a small child exit the car, enter the house, and then leave the house “shortly after.” Id. When Reggie and the small child got back into the car, Detective Chestnut followed in his unmarked car “for a short amount of time.” Id.

[5] During that time, Reggie failed to stop at a stop sign. Detective Chestnut then briefly lost sight of Reggie. When Detective Chestnut later relocated Reggie, he observed him switch lanes without signaling. At this point, Detective Chestnut radioed for a marked patrol car to conduct a traffic stop of Reggie for the traffic infractions as well as for misdemeanor driving while suspended. See id. at 22, 42, 129. IMPD Officer Matt Coffing, who is a member of the IMPD Violence Reduction Team and was familiar with Reggie Turentine, responded. He heard over the radio that Reggie's driving privileges were suspended, and he confirmed that information using his in-car computer. See id. at 130. “[W]ithin a couple of minutes” of Detective Chestnut's radio request, Officer Coffing pulled Reggie over. Id. at 85.

[6] Detective Chestnut arrived on scene “[j]ust a few minutes” later. Id. at 86. At that point, Officer Coffing had already removed Reggie from the car and was handcuffing him. Detective Chestnut went straight to the passenger side of the car due to “just [having] seen a small child in the vehicle.” Id. According to Detective Chestnut, the car's window tint was dark, and he wanted to make sure no one else was inside the car. When Detective Chestnut opened the car door, he smelled “burnt marijuana coming from” inside. Id. at 93. He didn't find anyone else inside the car (unknown to him, Reggie had already dropped off the child, see id. at 56).

[7] Detective Chestnut identified Reggie as Reggie Turentine based on his familiarity with him. Reggie, however, “laughed and acted like [Detective Chestnut] had the complete wrong person and that he didn't even know who Reggie Turentine was.” Id. at 46. Reggie identified himself as Reggie Wills and produced a driver's license in that name. See id. at 116. Detective Chestnut was skeptical because of his familiarity with Reggie over the years and the fact that people lie to law enforcement “all the time” and provide “fake” driver's licenses. Id. at 39, 45. An officer on the scene had “a fingerprint scan tool,” so they scanned Reggie's fingerprint, which identified him as Reggie Turentine. Id. at 87.

[8] Meanwhile, Detective Chestnut searched Reggie “incident to arrest for driving while suspended” and found in his pants pocket a small amount of powder that was later identified as cocaine. Id. at 88. Based on the odor of marijuana in the car and the drugs found in Reggie's pocket, Detective Chestnut conducted “a probable cause search” of the car, finding a handgun and several phones. Id. at 93. After conducting these searches, Detective Chestnut determined that Reggie Turentine and Reggie Wills are the same person and that Reggie had a valid driver's license under Wills.¹ See id. at 40 (testifying he discovered Reggie had a valid driver's license under Wills only “after illegal items were found”), 48 (“We did run the license and we did see that it was valid, but ․ the evidence that we obtained as a result of that traffic stop had already been obtained by the time that we found out that he was Reggie Wills.”), 49 (confirming in response to trial court's question that “the search was conducted before [he] checked on the Wills license”).

[9] The State ultimately charged Reggie with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (based on his 2012 conviction for Class A felony dealing in cocaine) and two counts of Level 5 felony possession of cocaine (one count was based on possessing cocaine while also possessing a firearm). Before trial, Reggie moved to suppress the cocaine and handgun on the basis that any probable cause to arrest and search him dissipated once he produced his “actual identification.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 68. At the suppression hearing, Detective Chestnut testified to the timeline described above regarding when the searches occurred. The court denied Reggie's motion to suppress. See Tr. pp. 63-65; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 78.

[10] A bench trial was held, and the trial court admitted the cocaine and handgun into evidence over Reggie's objections. The court found Reggie guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and both cocaine counts (but only entered judgment of conviction on one of the cocaine counts due to double-jeopardy concerns). The court sentenced Reggie to an aggregate term of six years, with four years in prison and two years on community corrections.

[11] Reggie now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Reggie contends that the trial court erred by admitting the cocaine and handgun into evidence because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his person and car without a warrant. The trial court generally has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). However, when a challenge to the admissibility of evidence is based on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, our review is de novo. Id.

[13] The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 991 (Ind. 2021). Because it generally requires warrants for searches and seizures, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. Combs, 168 N.E.3d at 991.²

I. Detective Chestnut conducted a valid search incident to arrest

[14] Reggie first argues that Detective Chestnut violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he searched his person after arresting him for misdemeanor driving while suspended. One well-delineated exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest. In Indiana, an officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has “probable cause to believe the person is committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor in the officer's presence.” Ind. Code § 35-33-1-1(a)(4). “Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer knows of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.” I.G. v. State, 177 N.E.3d 75, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Probable cause is “not a high bar” and is “cleared when the totality of the circumstances establishes a fair probability—not proof or a prima facie showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or evidence of a crime.” Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (quotations omitted). “[O]nce a lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a full search of the arrestee for weapons or concealed evidence.” Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (quotation omitted). “The critical issue is not when the arrest occurs but whether there was probable cause to arrest at the time of the search.” VanPelt v. State, 760 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[15] Indiana Code section 9-24-19-3 establishes the offense of Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended:

(a) An individual who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway when:

(1) the individual knows that the individual's driving privileges, driver's license, or permit is suspended or revoked; and

(2) the individual's suspension or revocation was a result of the individual's conviction of an offense (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-215);

commits a Class A misdemeanor.

Here, based on Reggie's BMV records under Turentine and the officers’ familiarity with him under that name, Detective Chestnut and Officer Coffing believed Reggie's license was suspended due to a prior conviction, giving them probable cause to believe he was committing misdemeanor driving while suspended in their presence and, in turn, probable cause to arrest him for that offense.

[16] Reggie argues that while the police “may have had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop of [him] for driving while suspended,” once they “learned [he] had a valid license under a different name, that probable cause dissipated and further investigation became necessary.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. But the record shows that Detective Chestnut searched Reggie's person before he discovered that Reggie had a valid driver's license under Wills. See Tr. pp. 40, 48, 49. Thus, probable cause existed at the time of the search, which is all the search-incident-to-arrest exception requires.

[17] But even if Detective Chestnut searched Reggie's person after learning that he had a valid driver's license under Wills, Detective Chestnut still had probable cause to arrest Reggie for misdemeanor driving while suspended. The State doesn't dispute the case law cited by Reggie that probable cause can dissipate, see Appellant's Br. pp. 15-16 (citing cases); rather, it argues that no dissipation occurred here, see Appellee's Br. p. 22. We agree. This is because Reggie's mere possession of a valid driver's license under Wills did not remove his identity as Turentine. The BMV record under Turentine was a valid official record based on Reggie's own use of that name for several years in legal settings and interactions with the police, including as recently as 2022. Moreover, Detective Chestnut's repeated checks of Reggie's BMV records throughout the investigation consistently confirmed that his driving privileges remained suspended under Turentine up through the time of the stop. And Reggie's 2011 conviction for driving while suspended under that same identity gave the officers a reasonable basis to believe he was aware of the suspension and that it traced to a criminal conviction, as the statute requires. That basis is not erased by Reggie's later acquisition of a license under a different name, particularly where, as noted above, he never disclosed or acknowledged the Turentine identity to officers at the scene.

[18] Finally, Reggie, noting that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, argues that it was “unreasonable for officers to immediately order [him] to exit his car and then handcuff him when they merely suspected him of committing an A-level misdemeanor traffic offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. He says that the “reasonable course of action would be to ask him for his license and registration to confirm that he was Reggie Turentine, and that his driving privileges were suspended.” Id. But as explained above, at the time of the search, Detective Chestnut knew Reggie as Reggie Turentine based on his years of familiarity with him, including that his driving privileges were suspended with a prior conviction. The officers acted reasonably given this unique situation.

[19] Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Reggie for misdemeanor driving while suspended, the cocaine was found on Reggie's person pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the cocaine into evidence.

II. Detective Chestnut conducted a lawful search of Reggie's car

[20] Reggie doesn't dispute that the smell of marijuana established probable cause to search his car. Indeed, he conceded below that it did. See Tr. p. 65 (defense counsel: “And I would agree with the Court that once marijuana smoke was detected, the search of the vehicle was perfectly valid.”). Instead, he argues that Detective Chestnut initiated the search by opening the door to his car, which occurred before he smelled burnt marijuana. But as the State notes—and Reggie doesn't dispute in his reply brief—Reggie didn't make this argument below. See Appellee's Br. p. 30.

[21] In any event, Detective Chestnut searched Reggie's car for another, independent reason: he found drugs on his person during the lawful search incident to arrest. According to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, police are allowed to search a car without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the car. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010). That Detective Chestnut found drugs on Reggie's person before searching the car separately gave rise to probable cause that there would be evidence of a crime in his car. See Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 879-80 (Ind. 2010) (finding driver's possession of ink pen with powdery residue supplied probable cause to conduct warrantless search of car for contraband). Because Detective Chestnut had probable cause to search Reggie's car based on the drugs found on his person, the trial court did not err in admitting the handgun found during that search.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indeed, in December 2024, the BMV investigated the driver records of Reggie Wills and Reggie Turentine, determined that they belonged to the same person, and “combine[d]” the two driver records into one under Wills. Ex. p. 34.

2.   Reggie also argues that his Indiana constitutional rights were violated. The State responds that Reggie has waived this argument because he did not cite the Indiana Constitution in either his motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing, and he mentioned the Indiana Constitution “in name only” at trial with no separate analysis. Appellee's Br. p. 24. Reggie doesn't dispute this in his reply brief. In any event, for the same reasons that the searches of Reggie's person and car were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they were reasonable under the Indiana Constitution.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.