Catherine J. Barekman, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nancy Ellen Tripp, Deceased, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Dallas Paul Collins, et al., Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On April 14, 2024, Dallas Paul Collins was driving a vehicle in which his wife, Nancy Ellen Tripp, was a passenger near United States Route 41 (“US 41”) in Gibson County. Tripp died after she and Collins were involved in a traffic collision with Shannon Frye. On September 26, 2024, Catherine Barekman, as the Personal Representative of Tripp's Estate (“Barekman”), filed a wrongful-death action against Collins.¹ Collins asserted that he was immune from liability under the Indiana Guest Statute (“the Guest Statute”) and moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Collins's motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Collins and Tripp married on January 3, 2010. On April 14, 2024, Collins was driving himself and Tripp to lunch after the two had attended church. As Collins attempted to cross US 41, the vehicle in which he and Tripp were traveling collided with a vehicle being driven by Frye. Tripp died as a result of the traffic collision.² At the time of the collision, Frye was traveling at a rate of seventy-seven miles per hour in a sixty-mile-per-hour zone. The standard crash report compiled by the Gibson County Sheriff's Department following the collision indicated that Collins was at least partially at fault as he appeared to have disregarded a stop sign and had entered the path of travel of Frye's vehicle.

[3] On September 26, 2024, Barekman filed a wrongful-death action against Collins. Barekman alleged that the collision had occurred after Collins had driven “through a stop sign without stopping while attempting to cross U.S. Highway 41.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. Barekman further alleged that

6. [Collins] drove directly into the path of a vehicle travelling north on U.S. Highway 41 driven by [Frye].

7. At the time, [Frye] was exceeding the applicable speed limit, sixty (60) miles per hour.

8. Due to [Collins's] and [Frye's] violation[s] of laws governing motor vehicle operation, and otherwise negligent conduct, the vehicle [Collins] was driving, and the vehicle [Frye] was driving suffered a violent collision.

9. As a proximate result of [Collins's] and [Frye's] acts and omissions, [Tripp] was trapped inside of the vehicle, suffered extensive internal injuries, and was ultimately pronounced dead at the scene of the collision.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. Barekman claimed that Collins and Frye had violated their duties to Tripp to “behave as reasonably prudent drivers.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. In his answer, Collins raised the affirmative defense that Barekman's claims against him were “barred pursuant to [the Guest Statute], Indiana Code § 34-30-11-1.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22.

[4] On June 27, 2025, Collins moved for summary judgment. Collins argued that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he was immune for liability pursuant to the Guest Statute. Collins asserted that Barekman's complaint had only alleged ordinary negligence and her answers to the interrogatories that he had supplied to her during discovery had not provided a “foundation for an allegation that [Tripp's] injuries or death were caused by” his wanton or willful misconduct. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. Collins further asserted that “[i]t is undisputed that there have been no factual allegations of wanton or willful misconduct” by him. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. In support, Collins designated Barekman's complaint, petition for leave to administer Tripp's estate, and answers to interrogatories as well as his deposition testimony.

[5] Again, Barekman's complaint alleged mere negligence. The relevant interrogatory, interrogatory number twenty-two, and Barekman's answer to said interrogatory read as follows:

22. State each and every fact upon which you base your claim against [Collins] that constitute willful and wanton conduct on the part of [Collins], to support your claim as alleged in your Complaint.

ANSWER: [Collins] was driving the vehicle with [Tripp] as a passenger. He pulled out in front of the vehicle driven by [Frye] stating that he did not see the vehicle when it was daylight, and the day was clear. There was no reason why he should have not seen the vehicle therefore his conduct was wanton or reckless.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65.³

[6] Regarding the traffic collision with Frye, Collins stated in his deposition that upon approaching US 41, he had “had to wait a couple minutes, and then when the southbound traffic cleared, I looked to the south and I did not see any vehicle or anything so I pulled over between the lanes, looked again, didn't see anything and got hit.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. Northbound traffic had been “pretty heavy” before the collision, and Collins had been waiting on “the west side of 41” while waiting for the traffic to clear before attempting to cross US 41. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 48. Collins testified that prior to the collision, he had come to a complete stop at the stop sign and reiterated that after crossing some of the lanes of US 41, he had stopped in the median and had again checked for oncoming traffic before attempting to cross the remaining lanes of US 41. Collins had been wearing his glasses at the time of the collision and had not been under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Collins asserted that even if he could be found to be partially to blame for the collision, he was “not totally to blame.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. Collins stated that prior to the collision, he had not been concerned about being struck by another vehicle because he had “done [his] due diligence” by looking for any oncoming traffic before attempting to cross US 41. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52.

[7] Barekman responded by moving to strike portions of Collins's summary judgment motion and opposing an award of summary judgment. Barekman asserted that application of the Guest Statute posed a question of fact that could not be resolved as a matter of law and that Collins bore the burden of proving the applicability of the Guest Statute. In support, Barekman cited Frye's deposition testimony that she had not seen Collins stop in the median or at the stop sign and that she believed the collision would not have occurred if Collins had stopped in the median.

[8] The trial court conducted a hearing on the pending motions on September 30, 2025. On December 30, 2025, the trial court issued an order granting Collins's motion for summary judgment.⁴ In its order, the trial court found as follows:

[Barekman's] Complaint stems from a collision that occurred on April 14, 2024, in which [Tripp] was a passenger in the vehicle being driven by [Collins]. On April 14, 2024, [Collins] was the spouse of [Tripp].

[Barekman's] Complaint makes no allegation that [Tripp's] injuries or death were caused by the wanton or willful misconduct of [Collins].

[Barekman's] Answers to Interrogatories provide no foundation for an allegation that [Tripp's] injuries or death were caused by the wanton or willful misconduct of [Collins].

Eyewitness [Frye] provided no statement or allegation in reference to the mental state of [Collins].

The Princeton Police Department Crash Reconstruction report on the incident presents no evidence or assessment of whether [Collins] acted with willful or wanton misconduct.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. The trial court noted that “[w]anton or willful misconduct requires that the host-driver be: l) conscious of her misconduct; 2) motivated by reckless indifference for the safety of her guest; and 3) know that her conduct subjects her guest to a probability of injury.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8 (citing Thrapp v. Austin, 436 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). The trial court further noted that “[a] driver's mistake or error in judgment alone is insufficient to establish wanton or willful misconduct ․ [r]ather, the plaintiff must show that the driver had an adverse or perverse attitude towards her guest such that she was indifferent to the consequences of her conduct.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8 (citing Thrapp, 436 N.E.2d at 1175).

[9] Applying Thrapp to the case at hand, the trial court concluded that

[t]he evidence presented does not establish that [Collins] acted with wanton or willful misconduct as required under Indiana Code 34-30-11-1. [Barekman's] allegations of willful and wanton misconduct do not meet the criteria as established in Thrapp. [Barekman's] interrogatory responses only allege that: [Collins] “pulled out in front of the vehicle driven by [Frye] stating he did not see the vehicle when it was daylight, and the day was clear. There was no reason why he should not have seen the vehicle therefore his conduct was wanton or reckless.” Exhibit D, Catherine J. Barekman, As The Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Nancy Ellen Tripp, Answers To Interrogatories, No. 22. [Barekman] has only alleged facts amounting to a mistake or error in judgment by [Collins], which fails to meet the threshold to establish wanton or willful misconduct as discussed in Thrapp.

There have been no factual allegations of wanton or willful misconduct on the part of [Collins]. As a result, [Barekman's] wrongful death claims against [Collins] fail as a matter of law.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8 (emphases in original).

Discussion and Decision

[10] Barekman contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Collins.

When reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. The moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is improper if the movant fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the reviewing court considers only the evidentiary matter the parties have specifically designated to the trial court. We construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party's favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.

Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

[11] Collins raised the Guest Statute as an affirmative defense below. The Guest Statute provides that the

person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle is not liable for ․ the death of: ․ the person's spouse ․ resulting from the operation of the motor vehicle while the ․ spouse ․ was being transported without payment in ․ the motor vehicle unless the injuries or death are caused by the wanton or willful misconduct of the ․ person responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle.

Ind. Code § 34-30-11-1. The Indiana Supreme Court has found the Guest Statute to be unambiguous in that it “states that the operator of a motor vehicle may not be held liable for injuries negligently caused to a close family member ․ when those injuries are incurred while the [close family member] ․ was being transported without payment in or upon the motor vehicle.” Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58, 62 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted, emphases and bracketed material in original, ellipses added). We have noted that “in many instances the application of the [G]uest [S]tatute may be determined on a motion for summary judgment.” Liebner v. Dobson, 474 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied.

[12] “The touchstone to be employed in determining liability under the guest statute is well settled.” Barrow v. Talbott, 417 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). As the trial court noted, “[i]n order to be guilty of wanton misconduct a host-driver must: (1) be conscious of his misconduct; (2) be motivated by a reckless indifference for the safety of his guest; and (3) he must do so knowing his conduct subjects his guest to a probability of injury.” Id. A driver's mistake or error of judgment alone is insufficient to establish wanton or willful misconduct. Thrapp, 436 N.E.2d at 1175. Stated differently, to constitute wanton or willful conduct,

it must appear that the driver of the automobile is conscious of his conduct, and with an appreciation of existing conditions knows that his conduct, if persisted in, will probably result in injury to his guest and yet, with reckless indifference to consequences, he consciously or intentionally persists in such conduct and as the result thereof his guest is injured.

Loehr v. Meuser, 120 Ind. App. 630, 633–34, 93 N.E.2d 363, 365 (1950). “The question should be determined by a consideration of his whole course of conduct leading up to the accident and the inquiry will not be confined to occurrences at the immediate time and place thereof.” Id. at 634, 93 N.E.2d at 365.

[13] In arguing that the trial court erred in granting Collins's motion for summary judgment, Barekman cites the Appellate Court of Illinois's opinion in Rekosh v. Parks, 735 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) for the proposition that “[w]hether conduct is willful and wanton is ultimately a question of fact for the jury[.]” However, Barekman, fails to acknowledge the rest of the Illinois Court's sentence, which states “however, a court must first decide as a matter of law whether plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts such that a jury question is created.” Rekosh, 735 N.E.2d at 775. Thus, even if we found Rekosh to be persuasive, it does not support Barekman's suggestion that any question regarding whether a person acted with wanton or willful misconduct must be decided by a jury. (Appellant's Br. p. 17) In any event, we have previously noted that “in many instances the application of the [G]uest [S]tatute may be determined on a motion for summary judgment.” Liebner, 474 N.E.2d at 1042.

[14] Barekman claims that the designated evidence indicating that Collins had potentially pulled into oncoming traffic without stopping was sufficient to establish an issue of material fact as to whether he had engaged in wanton misconduct. In support, Barekman cites Rickner v. Haller, 124 Ind. App. 369, 376–77, 116 N.E.2d 525, 528 (1954), in which we stated that

it would seem that a fair statement of the law, applicable to the facts before us, would be that to be liable for wilful or wanton misconduct under the [G]uest [S]tatute, it was sufficient that appellant failed to stop before entering upon the intersection of the preferential highway, at which time he was conscious of the fact of the stop sign and that his conduct was in violation of the law and that, notwithstanding such knowledge, he proceeded to drive into the intersection with conscious indifference to the likelihood of resulting injury to his guest.

Notably, the Indiana Supreme Court has distinguished Rickner from other cases involving the Guest Statute, noting that in Rickner, “there was evidence from which a jury might have concluded that appellant entered the preferential highway with conscious indifference to the likelihood of injury to his guest and with warning and knowledge of the approach of the other car[.]” Reynolds v. Lanford, 241 Ind. 431, 437, 172 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1961) (emphasis in original). In this case, none of the designated evidence suggests that Collins had acted with conscious indifference or that he had seen Frye's vehicle but proceeded into the roadway anyway. As such, like the Indiana Supreme Court in Reynolds, we do not find Rickner to be persuasive as to the facts at issue in the instant case.

[15] As the trial court found, the underlying lawsuit “stems from a collision that occurred on April 14, 2024, in which [Tripp] was a passenger in the vehicle being driven by” her husband. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. Barekman's complaint alleged negligent behavior on Collins's part but did not allege that Tripp's death was “caused by the wanton or willful misconduct of [Collins].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. In granting summary judgment in favor of Collins, the trial court found that “[t]here have been no factual allegations of wanton or willful misconduct on the part of [Collins]. As a result, [Barekman's] wrongful death claims against [Collins] fail as a matter of law.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. We agree.

[16] Again, to constitute wanton or willful conduct, it must appear from the designated evidence that Collins, as the driver of the automobile, had been conscious of his conduct and, “with an appreciation of existing conditions knows that his conduct, if persisted in,” would probably result in injury to Tripp and yet, with reckless indifference to consequences, had consciously or intentionally persisted in such conduct, resulting in Tripp's death. See Loehr, 120 Ind. App. at 633, 93 N.E.2d at 365. The designated evidence most favorable to Barekman indicates that Collins may have failed to stop at either the stop sign or in the median before attempting to cross US 41. When asked to state “each and every fact upon which [she] base[d] her claim against [Collins] that constitute[d] willful and wanton conduct on the part of” Collins, Barekman merely stated that Collins had pulled out in front of Frye's vehicle, “stating that he did not see the vehicle when it was daylight, and the day was clear. There was no reason why he should have not seen the vehicle therefore his conduct was wanton or reckless.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65. As the trial court concluded, this allegation falls short of the standard for proving wanton or willful misconduct. We agree with the trial court that “[t]here have been no factual allegations of wanton or willful misconduct” by Collins and, as a result, Barekman's wrongful-death claim fails as a matter of law.⁵ Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Barekman initially included Frye as a defendant to the wrongful-death action but, at some point, Frye was dismissed from the litigation.

2.   Collins was eighty-seven years old at the time of the collision and Tripp was seventy-nine years old.

3.   Barekman's petition for leave to administer Tripp's estate did not contain any factual allegations supporting either negligence or wanton and willful misconduct.

4.   While the record appears to be silent with regard to the trial court's ruling on Barekman's motion to strike, one may reasonably infer from context that the motion was denied.

5.   To the extent that Barekman argues that the trial court erroneously placed the burden on her to prove that the Guest Statute did not apply, we note that once Collins raised the issue and designated evidence in support, Barekman bore the responsibility to designate contrary evidence sufficient to raise an issue of material fact, which Barekman failed to do. See Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.