Aaron Thomas Maupin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2023, Aaron Maupin facilitated the sale of crushed fentanyl pills to Joshua Harris. Harris's girlfriend, Bryanna Taylor, died after she and Harris ingested some of the pills. Maupin was subsequently charged with and convicted of Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. He was sentenced to thirty years, with twenty-six years executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and four years executed on work release. Maupin contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his statements to the police, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September and October of 2023, Harris and Taylor lived together in Franklin. At some point, Harris and Taylor decided that they wanted to purchase fentanyl, which in pressed-pill form is commonly referred to as “Roxies[,]” “Blues, M-30's, [and] 30's.”¹ Tr. Vol. I p. 237. In the fall of 2023, the street value of pressed pills containing fentanyl was “$2.50 a pill to $20.00” per pill. Tr. Vol. I p. 241. The price of the pills typically depended on the amount purchased, the payment method used, and whether travel was required for delivery. In 2023, drug users often paid for pills with cash, EBT ² cards, or some combination of the two.

[3] Harris knew Maupin and Maupin's girlfriend, Jaiden Hampton. In late September or early October, Harris texted Maupin and asked if he “could get some Roxies from him[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 180. Harris and Maupin agreed that Harris “would get some Roxie pills” from Maupin “in return for” EBT funds and/or cash. Tr. Vol. II p. 181.

[4] On September 30, 2023, Maupin texted Harris, “[s]ave that $100 in EBT and I'm sure my plug would trade Roxys for it[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 94. A “plug” is street slang for an individual's “supplier or their drug dealer.” Tr. Vol. I p. 241. On October 2, 2023, Maupin arranged for an individual named Marcus to drive to Franklin to sell fentanyl to Harris for “$80 and that $100 in ebt[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 96. Marcus indicated that he could “do 10 for the food stamps and for 80 can do like 18–20[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 103. Maupin responded for Marcus to “[d]o 20 for the $80 and I'll hook u up with and [sic] extra 10–15 when I'm paid.” Ex. Vol. III p. 103.

[5] Later that day, Marcus messaged Maupin and told him that he could no longer meet in Franklin. In response, Maupin arranged for Hampton to borrow her mother's car and drive Harris to Indianapolis to meet Marcus. Hampton drove Harris from his house to Indianapolis, where they met with Marcus to acquire the pills. Harris gave Hampton the EBT card and some cash in exchange for the pills. At that point, Hampton and Harris drove back to Franklin where she gave him “ten or twelve” fentanyl pills and dropped him off a few blocks from his house.³ Tr. Vol. I p. 182.

[6] That evening, Harris and Taylor crushed two pills and snorted them. They shared another pill the next morning. At about 9:00 a.m., Taylor went outside to smoke a cigarette and had a “mini” seizure. Tr. Vol. I p. 184. After the seizure, Taylor was talking and “seemed fine[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 190. Harris helped Taylor to bed before leaving to go to work. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Harris returned home from work and found Taylor still lying in bed. Harris initially thought Taylor was sleeping but realized something was wrong when he noticed that “[h]er face was pale.” Tr. Vol. I p. 186. Harris called 911, and paramedics from the Franklin Fire Department and officers from the Franklin Police Department responded to the scene.

[7] When officers arrived, Harris directed them to the back bedroom where they observed Taylor “laying perpendicularly across the bed” with her “head up against the wall and [ ] her feet hanging off” the bed. Tr. Vol. I pp. 158, 162. Officer John Hale could not locate a pulse and noted that Taylor “felt cold” to the touch. Tr. Vol. I p. 158. Although the officers had Narcan with them, they did not immediately administer it because “the paramedics were closely behind [them] and [they] weren't one hundred percent positive that it was an overdose at that point.” Tr. Vol. I p. 158. The paramedics arrived “[r]elatively quickly” after the officers. Tr. Vol. I p. 158.

[8] Paramedic Logan Coffey responded to the 911 call and, upon examining Taylor, noticed that Taylor did not have a pulse and that she was not breathing. Because Taylor “did not have signs of obvious death, which would be rigor mortis, [ ] dependent lividity[,] or decomposition[,]” Coffey performed CPR and “advanced life support [ ] treatments to try and start her heart[.]” Tr. Vol. I pp. 165, 166. While Coffey was attending to Taylor's care, Harris told Detective Kody Martin that Taylor may have overdosed on fentanyl. Coffey administered Narcan and Epinephrine and performed CPR for thirty-two minutes before Taylor was “pronounced deceased.” Tr. Vol. I p. 167.

[9] Police found four and one-half blue pills in the bedroom near where Taylor's body had been discovered. The blue pills were taken to the Indiana State Police Crime Laboratory for analysis, where they were determined to contain acetaminophen, 4ANPP, and fentanyl.

[10] Later that day, Harris showed Detective Martin text messages that Detective Martin believed “had evidentiary value[,]” leading Detective Martin to place Harris's cellular telephone on airplane mode and seized it “[i]n order to preserve those messages and any other phone calls or messages that may be on that phone[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 202. Meanwhile, police obtained search warrants for Taylor's home and cellular telephone and the cellular telephones and records for the telephones belonging to Maupin, Harris, and Hampton. A few days later, police were able to identify Marcus through a traffic stop while conducting surveillance on Maupin's home and police eventually obtained a warrant for Marcus's telephone records as well.

[11] The search of Taylor's telephone revealed that she had not had a service plan and there had been no data used or communications sent from the telephone in October of 2023. The search of Hampton's telephone showed that she had done a “hard delete” of her communications so that they were unretrievable. Tr. Vol. II p. 37. The search of Maupin's telephone revealed that he had placed many of his relevant communications with Harris, Hampton, and Marcus in the trash folder, but had not actually deleted the messages, meaning that the communications were retrievable. The text messages recovered from Maupin's cellular telephone detailed his facilitation of the sale of fentanyl pills to Harris. The text messages also indicated that Maupin, Hampton, and Marcus had discussed whether the EBT card that had been provided by Harris had been used after Harris had informed Maupin that Taylor had died.

[12] GPS location data recovered from Harris's, Hampton's, and Marcus's cellular telephones confirmed that they had met in Indianapolis on October 2, 2023. Police also obtained FLOCK camera photographs of a vehicle registered to Hampton's mother, which matched the description of the vehicle Harris told police he had ridden in with Hampton to Indianapolis to get the pills. The times and locations of the pictures confirmed Harris's account of Hampton picking him up at approximately 12:22 p.m., heading north to Indianapolis, and driving in Indianapolis at approximately 1:10 p.m.

[13] On October 25, 2023, police executed a search warrant at Maupin and Hampton's home. During the search, police spoke with Maupin and advised him of his Miranda ⁴ rights. Maupin admitted that he is a drug user and takes fentanyl, “blues[,]” or “30's[.]” State's Ex. 27 Part 1 at 4:23–4:24. Maupin initially denied knowing Taylor but ultimately admitted that he knew she was Harris's girlfriend who had just died. Detective Martin asked Maupin if he knew where Taylor got the fentanyl pills, and he admitted, “probably from me[.]” State's Ex. 27 Part 1 at 7:49–7:51. Maupin admitted that he had “facilitated” the drug transaction. State's Ex. 27 Part 1 at 10:27–10:30. In an apparent attempt to deflect responsibility from Hampton, Maupin falsely claimed that he had driven Harris to get the pills and that Hampton had had nothing to do with the drug deal. Maupin also initially claimed that he did not know Marcus before admitting that Marcus had come to his home a few days prior. Maupin admitted that cash and Taylor's EBT card had been used to buy the fentanyl pills. During the search of Maupin's home, police found Taylor's EBT card next to some Narcan. Police subsequently learned that despite Maupin's claim that he had driven Harris to purchase the pills, Maupin had been at work and had not traveled with Harris and Hampton to meet Marcus in Indianapolis to complete the transaction.

[14] Stuart Kuntz, a forensic toxicologist at Axis Forensic Toxicology, analyzed a sample of Taylor's blood, finding that Taylor's blood contained “12.8” ng/mL of fentanyl. Ex. Vol. p. 135. The reference range for a comatose or fatal amount of fentanyl in a person's blood ranges between “3 – 20” ng/mL. Ex. Vol. p. 135. The level of fentanyl in Taylor's blood was consistent with cases in which fentanyl had “been certified as cause of death.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. Dr. Latanja Watkins, a forensic pathologist at Saguaro Forensic Consulting, performed an autopsy on Taylor at the request of the Johnson County Coroner's Office. Dr. Watkins determined that Taylor's cause of death was “Acetyl Fentanyl and Fentanyl toxicity.” Tr. Vol. II p. 101. Dr. Watkins further determined that Taylor's “having seizure-like activity earlier in the day” did not affect her determination regarding Taylor's cause of death. Tr. Vol. II p. 101.

[15] On December 19, 2024, the State charged Maupin with Level 1 felony dealing in fentanyl, a controlled substance, resulting in death.⁵ On January 5, 2026, Maupin filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, inter alia, certain statements that he had made to police officers, which portion of Maupin's motion in limine the trial court ultimately denied. On January 15, 2026, a jury found Maupin guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Maupin to a term of thirty years, with twenty-six years executed in the DOC and four years executed on work release.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting Maupin's Statements to Detective Martin

[16] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[17] Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Ind. Evid. Rule 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evid. Rule 401. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Ind. Evid. Rule 402. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evid. Rule 403.

[18] Maupin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his statements to Detective Martin, claiming that one of the statements made during his conversation with Detective Martin was false and likely “misleading and confusing to the jury, and thus, the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Appellant's Br. p. 22 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, Maupin argues that because his assertion that he had driven Harris to meet Marcus was false, his entire statement to Detective Martin should have been found to be inadmissible.

[19] Maupin does not dispute that his statements to Detective Martin were relevant. Maupin instead argues that the probative value of his statements, including his admission to facilitating the transaction, was substantially outweighed by the alleged confusion from which the jury may have suffered after he had falsely told Detective Martin that he had been in the vehicle when Hampton and Harris drove to meet Marcus in Indianapolis. We cannot agree.

[20] Maupin's claim to have driven Harris to Indianapolis reflects an apparent attempt by Maupin to shield Hampton from responsibility. When Detective Martin indicated that he knew that Hampton had been involved in the execution of the transaction, Maupin attempted to shield Hampton by claiming that he had driven the vehicle to meet Marcus and had texted Harris from Hampton's cellular telephone because his had not been operational at the time. While Maupin's statements to Detective Martin at times directly contradicted his text messages, the contradiction was not so complex that the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, could not weigh the credibility of the conflicting evidence to determine what evidence to believe and what evidence to disbelieve. See Kilpatrick v. State, 746 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ind. 2001) (“It is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which witnesses to believe or disbelieve.”); Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 480 (Ind. 2001) (“Weighing the credibility of witnesses and drawing inferences and conclusions therefrom is within the jury's province.”). Maupin's false assertion regarding his presence in the vehicle did not render his entire statement inadmissible as it was not likely to have confused the jury in a manner that would have caused any potential unfair prejudice stemming from the false assertion to outweigh the probative value of Maupin's entire statement. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

[21] In any event, as Maupin admits, his admission to facilitating the transaction “was ․ cumulative of other evidence presented by the State.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. Maupin's text messages—the admission of which he does not challenge on appeal—established that he had facilitated the transaction. Thus, the admission of Maupin's statements to Detective Martin was not likely to have affected his substantial rights. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that

[g]enerally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. In viewing the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant's substantial rights, we look to the probable impact on the fact finder. The improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Moreover, any error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial, and is therefore harmless, if the same or similar evidence has been admitted without objection or contradiction.

Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation omitted). Given that the challenged evidence was cumulative of other evidence, which Maupin has not challenged on appeal, we conclude that even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, the error suffered by Maupin was harmless.

II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain Maupin's Conviction

[22] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[23] Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1.5(a) provides that

[a] person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures or delivers a controlled substance ․ that, when the controlled substance is used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested, results in the death of a human being who used the controlled substance, commits dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony.

“ ‘Delivery’ means: (1) an actual or constructive transfer from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship; or (2) the organizing or supervising of an activity described in subdivision (1).” Ind. Code § 35-48-1.1-10.

A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that Maupin Knew the Pills Contained a Controlled Substance.

[24] Maupin contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove he committed the charged offense because “[t]he State failed to prove that [he] knew the tablets contained a ‘controlled substance.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 16. In support, Maupin argus that the pills had been in Marcus's possession and he had never possessed or controlled them. Maupin suggests on appeal that the term “Roxies” refers to oxycodone and that he was unaware that the pills had contained fentanyl. Despite Maupin's claim on appeal, the evidence clearly establishes that the term “Roxies” referred to pressed fentanyl pills and that the transaction in question had involved the sale of pressed fentanyl pills. Maupin's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that Maupin Delivered the Controlled Substance.

[25] Maupin also contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he delivered the pills in question. In support, Maupin cites Hyche v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. However, we find the facts in Hyche to be readily distinguishable from the facts of the instant matter. In Hyche, the defendant had been found guilty of dealing in a controlled substance and felony murder with the underlying felony being dealing in a controlled substance. 934 N.E.2d at 1178. In finding the evidence to be insufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions, we concluded that the evidence had established that the defendant had “merely attempted to purchase ecstasy. He [had] acted as the transferee, not the transferor.” Id. at 1179. Unlike in Hyche, in this case, the evidence establishes that Maupin had not merely been attempting to purchase a controlled substance for his own use but, rather, had organized the sale of the controlled substance to Harris. Maupin's reliance on Hyche is therefore unavailing.

[26] Maupin asserts that the “evidence also does not show that [he] performed an ‘actual or constructive transfer’ from one person to another” because “there was no actual transfer as Maupin did not physically deliver any pills” and he “did not constructively transfer the drugs because ․ he did not control the drugs or other people's actions.” Appellant's Br. pp. 17, 18. The statutory definition for “delivery,” however, does not only include the actual or constructive transfer of the contraband but also includes “the organizing or supervising” of the transfer of the contraband. Ind. Code § 35-48-1.1-10. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Maupin organized and facilitated the transfer of the pills from Marcus to Harris. Again, Maupin's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

C. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that the Controlled Substance Caused Taylor's Death.

[27] Finally, Maupin contends that “[t]he evidence was insufficient to prove that the pills sold by Marcus caused Taylor's death.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. In support, Maupin points to the fact that Taylor had suffered a mini seizure on the day of her death. This health issue, he claims, was an intervening and superseding cause which had broken the chain of causation. Maupin also argues that the responding officers’ delay in administering Narcan had been an intervening cause that may have contributed to Taylor's death.

[28] Despite Maupin's claims, the evidence at trial established that when the responding officers had arrived, they had been unable to locate a pulse and Taylor had been cold to the touch. The evidence also established that the reference range for a comatose or fatal amount of fentanyl in a person's blood ranges between “3 – 20” ng/mL and, at the time of Taylor's death, her blood had contained “12.8” ng/mL of fentanyl. Ex. Vol. III p. 135. The amount of fentanyl in Taylor's bloodstream was consistent with cases where fentanyl had “been certified as cause of death.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. In addition, Dr. Watkins determined that Taylor's cause of death had been “Acetyl Fentanyl and Fentanyl toxicity” and that Taylor's “having seizure-like activity earlier in the day” did not affect her determination regarding Taylor's cause of death. Tr. Vol. II p. 101. The evidence was sufficient to prove that ingestion of the pressed fentanyl pills provided by Maupin had caused Taylor's death. Once again, Maupin's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.⁶ See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

III. Maupin's Thirty-Year Sentence is Not Inappropriate

[29] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[30] “[A] person who commits a Level 1 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. Maupin was sentenced to an advisory thirty-year sentence, with twenty-six of those years executed in the DOC and the remaining four years executed on work release. We have said that an appellate court is “unlikely to consider an advisory sentence inappropriate[,]” Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, and that a “defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[31] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant's participation.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Maupin attempts to downplay his participation in the transaction, referring to himself as merely a “middleman[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 24. Contrary to Maupin's claim, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Maupin had organized and facilitated the sale and, after Taylor died, had attempted to cover up his, Hampton's, and Marcus's acts. Maupin also asserts that although he knows that fentanyl is dangerous, he is an addict who makes poor choices and “did not intend or expect that Taylor would die.” Appellant's Br. p. 25. Maupin's assertion reflects his continued attempt to downplay the seriousness of his actions, which again ultimately led to Taylor's death.

[32] “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Perry, 78 N.E.3d at 13 (internal quotation omitted). Maupin claims to have a “limited criminal history[,]” and “a decent work history.” Appellant's Br. pp. 25, 26. He claims to have taken “responsibility for his poor choices because of drug addiction” by previously seeking treatment. Appellant's Br. p. 26. Maupin acknowledges that he was found to be a moderate risk to reoffend but claims that “his life has changed and so has his risk-taking.” Appellant's Br. p. 27.

[33] Maupin has amassed a number of detentions and arrests for substance-abuse-related offenses. He has also violated probationary terms both as a juvenile and as an adult. Maupin's criminal history demonstrates that he has long suffered from substance-abuse issues, which he has not successfully treated. Maupin's numerous contacts with law enforcement and failure to address his substance-abuse issues reflect poorly on his character. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). Moreover, Maupin's ability to obtain and maintain employment do not reflect positively on his character as “[m]any people are gainfully employed[.]” Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

[34] In sum, Maupin committed a serious crime that resulted in the death of another human being, and his criminal history and failure to successfully complete a substance-abuse-treatment program reflect poorly on his character. As such, Maupin has failed to meet his “particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1089.

[35] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Franklin police detective Zach Russell testified at Maupin's trial that if he saw a blue pill with an M-30 imprinted on it in a pharmacy, he would expect it to contain oxycodone but if he encountered the same pill on the street, it would likely contain fentanyl. Detective Russell also testified that “99.9%” of fentanyl pills are pressed in Mexico with a cutting agent such as Tylenol and brought into the United States for sale and consumption. Tr. Vol. I p. 240.

2.   EBT funds were referred to as “food stamp money” during trial. Tr. Vol. I p. 181.

3.   Harris gave two fentanyl pills to a friend of Taylor's and kept the remaining pills for him and Taylor.

4.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5.   The State later amended the charging information to remove the specific identification of fentanyl as the controlled substance.

6.   We are likewise unconvinced by Maupin's suggestion that Taylor's alleged depression and anxiety may have caused her to commit suicide or that she may have taken pills other than those provided by Marcus. Even if Taylor had suffered from depression or anxiety or had ingested some substance other than the pills in question, Maupin has failed to point to any evidence which could reasonably establish that either of these facts was an unforeseeable potential intervening cause of Taylor's death. Maupin's suggestion in this regard is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.