John Thomas Alford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While working at Dollar Tree, Krystal Smith set her cell phone on a store display, stepped away for a moment, and returned to find it gone. John Alford, a regular customer, was recorded on the store's surveillance camera picking something up from the spot where Smith left her phone. Alford later admitted to police that he had found a phone and given it to an acquaintance. That acquaintance had used Smith's Facebook account to send messages.

[2] After a jury trial, Alford was convicted of Level 6 felony theft. He now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. But because Alford merely asks us to reweigh the evidence, we affirm.

Facts

[3] On the morning of August 27, 2024, Krystal Smith was stocking shelves in the health and beauty aisle at a Dollar Tree in Warsaw. She was listening to music on her cell phone, which she had set on a towel display in that aisle. She routinely placed her phone on that display while stocking shelves. Smith briefly stepped away to help another employee at the cash register, leaving the phone on the towel display. When she returned, her phone was gone.

[4] Smith later reviewed the store's surveillance camera footage and saw a man in pants and a black top in the health and beauty aisle. The man walked to the display where Smith had set her phone and picked something up before walking away. Smith recognized the man as a regular customer at the store. She had seen him enter the store before her phone was taken and leave the store soon afterward. He was the first and only customer in the store at that point; the only other people in the store were Smith and another employee, the cashier.

[5] Officer Kevin Kyle investigated the reported theft. He collected a physical description of the suspect from Smith and located security footage from a nearby store depicting a man on a bicycle matching that description near the time of the theft. Smith later reported to police that her Facebook account, which had been logged in on her phone, was being accessed by someone other than her. Multiple messages had been sent from her account by someone who had used the names “Josh” and “Puckett.” Tr., p. 51. Officer Kyle knew a local man named Joshua Puckett, but when he located him, Puckett no longer had the phone.

[6] Officer Kyle eventually located a man on a bicycle matching the description of the suspect. The man identified himself as John Alford and acknowledged that he was sometimes known as “Rambo”—a name that Officer Kyle had discovered, following his conversation with Puckett, was connected to the suspect. Id.

[7] When Officer Kyle asked about the phone that was stolen from the Dollar Tree, Alford denied knowing anything about it. Officer Kyle then asked Alford if he had given the phone to a man “from Anderson” who had been using the phone. State's Exh. 2, 4:16-17. Alford said that he knew the man had a phone but did not give it to him. Officer Kyle pressed him, stating: “But he used the one that you took from Dollar Tree.” Id. at 4:35-40. Alford then admitted: “Okay, I found the phone. I found a phone, he got the phone, and I haven't seen the phone.” Id. at 4:51-57. When asked if the man knew the phone was stolen, Alford said: “I told him I'd found the phone.” Id. at 5:14-16.

[8] Alford was charged with both theft as a Class A misdemeanor and theft as a Level 6 felony, an elevated version of the offense based on a qualifying prior conviction. At his jury trial, Smith and Officer Kyle testified. The State also introduced, and the trial court admitted, surveillance footage from the Dollar Tree and the nearby store, as well as screenshots of the messages sent through Smith's Facebook account. The body camera footage of Officer Kyle's conversation with Alford was also admitted into evidence.

[9] The jury found Alford guilty of Class A misdemeanor theft, and he separately stipulated to a prior qualifying conviction. He ultimately was convicted of Level 6 felony theft, and the trial court sentenced him to 30 months in county jail.

Discussion and Decision

[10] On appeal, Alford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we consider only the probative evidence favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Carmouche v. State, 188 N.E.3d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “We affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find each element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

[11] To convict Alford of Level 6 felony theft, the State was required to prove that he “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use,” and that Alford had a prior qualifying conviction. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(C) (2024). Alford challenges only one element: whether he exerted control over Smith's phone. To “exert control over property” means “to obtain, take, carry, drive, lead away, conceal, abandon, sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to secure, transfer, or extend a right to property.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(a).

[12] Here, the State presented ample evidence that Alford exerted control over the phone. Smith testified that Alford was the first and only customer at the time of the theft, and she recognized him as a regular. In court, she identified Alford as that regular customer and the man in the surveillance video. That video showed a man pick something up from the very display where the phone was left and then walk away. When Officer Kyle asked about the theft of a phone at Dollar Tree, Alford admitted that he had found a phone and given it to a man who had since been using it. The messages sent from Smith's Facebook account—signed with the name Puckett—clearly permitted the jury to infer that Alford gave Smith's phone to Puckett. The jury was not required to believe Alford's claim that he merely found the phone. See Brown v. State, 827 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he trier of fact is free to reject a defendant's explanation.”).

[13] Alford argues that this evidence is insufficient and points to contrary pieces of evidence. He notes that the cell phone was not clearly visible in the surveillance video, that two employees were in the Dollar Tree at the time of the theft, that Alford did not possess the phone when confronted by Officer Kyle thirteen days after the theft, and that Alford and Officer Kyle could have been referencing a different phone in their conversation. But Alford's argument is plainly a request to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See Carmouche, 188 N.E.3d at 485. And though no eyewitness caught Alford in the act of taking the phone, “[a] theft conviction may be sustained by circumstantial evidence.” Bennett v. State, 871 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[14] Alford's reliance on Kindred v. State, 257 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. 1970) and Bennett, 871 N.E.2d 316 is unpersuasive. In Kindred, the defendant's conviction for theft was upheld where he was the only person in the gas station when money went missing. 257 N.E.2d at 668. In Bennett, the defendant's conviction for theft of a knife and toolboxes was upheld where those objects were last seen in the stolen vehicle and were not present in the vehicle when Bennett was later found in it. 871 N.E.2d at 323. Though Alford merely recites the facts of these cases, we understand him to argue that the evidence in his case is weaker. We cannot agree. Here, there is ample evidence tying Alford to the theft, such as his admission that he found a phone and the surveillance video of a man identified as Alford picking something up from the precise place the phone was left.

[15] Because a reasonable factfinder could determine that Alford exerted unauthorized control over Smith's phone—the only challenged element of his offense—we affirm his conviction.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.