Christopher Sutton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Christopher Sutton appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at the hearing and there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2014, Sutton broke into a senior living facility in Shelby County, Indiana, and stole a safe. He pled guilty to Class B felony burglary in August 2017. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence, with ten years executed in the Department of Correction, two years on Community Corrections, and the remaining three years suspended to probation.

[3] Sutton's probationary period began in December 2022. Pursuant to the terms of his probation, as relevant here, Sutton was obligated to: (1) refrain from committing new criminal offenses; (2) notify the probation department within twenty-four hours of any contact with law enforcement; and (3) remain in the State of Indiana unless he was given written consent to leave. In November 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation, alleging that he had violated these three probation conditions. Specifically, the State alleged Sutton had committed residential burglary and burglary in St. Clair County, Illinois.

[4] At the fact-finding hearing, Sutton's probation officer testified about her conversations with Officer Mounts, the Illinois police officer who investigated these offenses. Officer Mounts informed her that he was investigating a break-in and the theft of a safe at a senior living facility in St. Clair County, and Sutton was the primary suspect. The officer had obtained Sutton's cellphone and vehicle GPS data, both of which placed Sutton around the facility at the time of the burglary. The stolen safe was also found near Sutton's home in Indiana. Sutton objected to this line of testimony as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection on the grounds that the rules of evidence were inapplicable in probation proceedings.

[5] During the probation officer's testimony, the State introduced an exhibit containing numerous documents related to the Illinois investigation, including the charging information, arrest warrant, petition for pre-trial detention, a report of Sutton's criminal history, and an incident report detailing the investigation up to that point in time. The exhibit was certified by both the Illinois Circuit Court clerk and the judge. Sutton objected again on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibit, reasoning that the documents had been certified and the rules of evidence were inapplicable. Ultimately, the court found Sutton had violated the terms of his probation, revoked his three years of probation, and ordered him to execute the same in the Department of Correction. Sutton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). Because probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, the State only needs to prove the defendant violated the terms of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2015). Sutton presents two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at the fact-finding hearing, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the probation revocation. We address each issue in turn.

1. Hearsay Evidence

[7] Sutton argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing his probation officer's testimony and admitting the incident report included in the State's exhibit, asserting neither were substantially reliable. While a defendant maintains his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in probation revocation proceedings, I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f), the Indiana Rules of Evidence do not apply in such proceedings, Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2). See Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007) (“[C]ourts may admit evidence during probation revocation hearings that would not be permitted in a full-blown criminal trial.”), reh'g denied. As a result, a trial court may consider hearsay evidence so long as it “bear[s] some substantial indicia of reliability.” Watters v. State, 22 N.E.3d 617, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Peterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 494, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). This requires the court to “evaluate the hearsay's substantial trustworthiness.” Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 442. The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether evidence is admissible, “and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Watters, 22 N.E.3d at 619 (quoting Peterson, 909 N.E.2d at 499).

[8] Sutton contends that the State's exhibit, specifically the “forty pages of police reports[,]” did “not bear sufficient indicia of reliability ․” Appellant's Brief at 16. He cites Baxter v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, for the proposition “that unverified, unsigned police reports” are inadmissible in probation revocation hearings. Id. However, the panel there found the trial court erred in admitting a police report that was “uncertified, unverified, and ․ unsigned ․” Baxter, 774 N.E.2d at 1043 (emphasis added). Notably, the Baxter panel distinguished its facts from those in Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh'g denied, trans. denied, where a different panel affirmed the admission of “certified copies of the court docket, police report, and charging information” to establish that the defendant had committed a new criminal offense. Id. The facts in this case are more akin to those in Pitman. As was noted by the trial court, all the documents contained in the State's exhibit were certified by both the clerk and the judge of the Illinois Circuit Court. See id. (“[C]ertification of the documents by the court provides substantial indicia of their reliability.”).

[9] Sutton also likens his case to Mateyko v. State, 901 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. There, this Court found the defendant had established prima facie error that a probation officer's testimony, which contained multiple layers of hearsay, was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Mateyko, 901 N.E.2d at 558. Here, Sutton argues that his probation officer's testimony, as well as the incident report, similarly contained multiple layers of hearsay and were therefore not reliable. However, we find Mateyko distinguishable from this case. First, we note the difference in the standard of review in Mateyko versus the case before us. Proving prima facie error, “i.e. an error at first sight or appearance[,]” as was required in Mateyko, demands less of an appellant than showing an abuse of discretion. Id. at 557. Second, in Mateyko, the probation officer who testified “had no direct involvement with [the defendant] or the events which the State alleged constituted a violation of the terms of his probation.” Id. at 558. Here, the probation officer who testified was Sutton's probation officer who had been in communication with Officer Mounts and had even provided the officer with information to assist in his investigation. Furthermore, the probation officer's testimony came from her direct conversations with Officer Mounts and was consistent with the information provided in the exhibit.

[10] Under the facts and circumstances here, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in either admitting the State's exhibit or allowing the probation officer's testimony.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Next, Sutton argues the State presented insufficient evidence that he committed a new criminal offense. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.’ ” Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1267 (quoting Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied). Sutton is correct that “[t]he filing of a criminal charge[ ] and the issuance of an arrest warrant” alone are not sufficient to prove that he committed a new offense. Appellant's Br. at 11 (citing Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Rather, the State had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sutton committed the new offense. Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042.

[12] There was evidence here beyond the charges and Sutton's arrest to show he committed a new criminal offense. First, the offense was almost identical to the one for which Sutton was on probation—breaking into a senior living facility and stealing the safe. Second, Sutton's GPS and phone records “place[d] [him] as having driven about a seven hour round trip from [Indiana] to [St. Clair County, Illinois], being in the area at the time of burglary, and then coming back to Indiana[.]” Tr. at 110. Third, the stolen safe “was recovered within the vicinity” of Sutton's home in Indiana. Id. at 111. And lastly, the probation officer provided Officer Mounts with a photo of Sutton, and when he compared that photo to the security footage from the nursing home, the officer confirmed they were the same person. Given this evidence, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to find that Sutton violated the terms of his probation by committing a new criminal offense.¹

Conclusion

[13] Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence and that there was sufficient evidence that Sutton committed a new criminal offense, we affirm.²

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sutton also argues there was insufficient evidence that he left Indiana without permission and failed to notify the probation department about contact with law enforcement. Appellant's Br. at 12-14. Initially, we note that because there was sufficient evidence to show Sutton committed the new criminal offense in Illinois, there was also sufficient evidence to show he left Indiana without permission. But regardless, because one violation of probation is enough to support revocation, we need not address these other arguments. Knecht v. State, 85 N.E.3d 829, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[O]ne violation of a condition of probation is enough to support a probation revocation.”).

2.   Sutton argues in his Reply Brief that in the event we find there was sufficient evidence he committed a new offense, we should remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration of his sanction. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, Sutton did not challenge his sanction in his initial brief, and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 885 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Second, we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sanction even if it had not considered the two additional violations, as his commission of a new offense was the most egregious of the three violations. See Morelock v. State, No. 23A-CR-365, 2023 WL 7127693, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2023) (mem.) (affirming probation violation sanction where the appellate court was “confident that the trial court would have ordered the same sanction even if it had not considered” additional violations).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.