Joseph Allen Trushel, Sr., Appellant-Respondent, v. The Board of Commissioners of the County of LaGrange, Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Officials in LaGrange County attempted to sell Joseph Allen Trushel, Sr.’s house at a tax sale for failure to pay property taxes and sewer liens. When the house did not sell, the Board of Commissioners of LaGrange County (“the Commissioners”) took a lien over the house, and the trial court later determined that the Commissioners should receive a tax deed for the property.

[2] Trushel appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error following the court's denial of his motion to set aside the Commissioners’ tax deed. He argues that the court should have set aside the tax deed because the county auditor violated his right to due process by failing to give him appropriate notice of the right to redeem the property after the tax sale. Trushel also claims that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his motion to correct error and should have further determined that the tax deed was void because his wife, Nancy Trushel, was named as a co-respondent in the tax sale and tax deed proceedings even though she had died in 2006. Concluding that he has not demonstrated reversible error, we affirm.

Issues

[3] Trushel raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court should have set aside the tax deed because the county auditor allegedly deprived Trushel of due process by failing to give appropriate notice of Trushel's right to redeem the house after the tax sale.

II. Whether the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on Trushel's motion to correct error to address an alleged factual inconsistency in the record.

III. Whether the trial court should have set aside the tax deed as void because the Commissioners named Trushel's deceased wife as a co-respondent.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] Trushel owned a house in Howe, LaGrange County, Indiana. In court filings, he stated that he has lived at that home “since 1996[,]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 115, except for an undefined period of time in 2017 when he “temporarily relocated” to an address in Montague, Michigan, id. at 110.

[5] Trushel had co-owned the house in Howe with Nancy, but she passed away in 2006. There is no evidence that Trushel contacted the appropriate county agency after Nancy's death to update the property tax records.

[6] During the period of time relevant to this case, the LaGrange County Auditor's (“the Auditor”) records listed Trushel's street address in Howe as the place to send notifications about property taxes. County officials alleged that, over a span of several years, Trushel failed to pay property taxes and sewer liens related to the house. Trushel denies that he is liable for the sewer liens, but he was aware that the county contended that he should pay them. The LaGrange County Regional Utility (“the Utility”) had filed the liens with the LaGrange County Recorder (“the Recorder”) in 2022, 2023, and 2024.

[7] Trushel has stated that in 2022 and 2023, he received notices from county officials stating that his property would be sold at the annual tax sales for those years. The record does not include further information about those sales or whether the county attempted to sell Trushel's home during those years.

[8] On or around July 15, 2024, the Auditor sent a notice to Trushel at his home in Howe by certified mail and by first class mail. The notice stated that county officials intended to sell his home, along with other properties, at the 2024 tax sale. In the notice, the Auditor stated that the property was encumbered with $3,217.88 in unpaid taxes and penalties plus $157,807.12 in unpaid sewer assessments. The certified mail notice was returned undelivered, but the first-class mail notice was not returned. The Auditor also posted a notice of the tax sale in the local newspaper on three consecutive weeks in August 2024.

[9] On August 26, 2024, in Case Number 44C01-2408-TS-1, the Auditor and the LaGrange County Treasurer petitioned to sell multiple properties, including Trushel's home, at the annual tax sale. They named “Trushel, Joseph Allen Sr. & Nancy Jane[ ]” as the home's owners. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 16. On September 6, the trial court issued an order authorizing the sale.

[10] LaGrange County held a public tax sale on September 17, but no one purchased Trushel's home. The County acquired a lien on the property by law.¹ The County's acquisition of the lien began a 120-day period for Trushel to redeem the property by paying the tax bill and sewer liens. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4(b) (2023) (setting forth the redemption period).

[11] In November 2024, the Auditor sent a notice to Trushel via certified mail advising him of the redemption period. The United States Postal Service returned the notice to the County, stating that the mailing was “unclaimed.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 45. Trushel claims that he did not receive the notice. Also in November 2024, the county ordered a title search for the home to discover if anyone else had an interest in the property. The search did not disclose any other owners. The redemption period expired on January 15, 2025.

[12] Next, in April 2025, the Commissioners (1) asked the trial court to generate a new case focusing on Trushel's property; and (2) submitted a petition for issuance of tax deed, to be filed in the new case. A new case number, 44C01-2504-TP-4, was generated, and the tax deed petition was filed on April 15, 2025. The petition named Trushel, Nancy, and the Utility as respondents. Trushel later stated that he learned about the petition in “April 2025.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 35.

[13] On June 6, the trial court granted the Commissioners’ petition. In the order, the court stated that: (1) the statutory period of redemption had expired; (2) the property had not been redeemed within that period; and (3) all required notices had been sent. As a result, the court ordered the Auditor to issue a tax deed to the Commissioners.

[14] On November 7, approximately seven months after learning about the Commissioners’ petition for issuance of tax deed, Trushel moved to set aside the tax deed pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). In the motion, Trushel alleged that the Auditor had failed to notify him about his right to redeem the property after the tax sale. Trushel further alleged that the Commissioners had defrauded the court by falsely stating in the petition for issuance of tax deed that Trushel had been given notice. The Commissioners opposed Trushel's motion, and the trial court denied the motion.

[15] Next, Trushel filed a motion to correct error, and the Commissioners responded in opposition. The trial court denied Trushel's motion, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[16] “Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.” McGee v. Kennedy, 62 N.E.3d 467, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Similarly, we review the denial of a motion under Trial Rule 60(B) for an abuse of discretion. See Wilkerson v. Egan, 253 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (discussing standard of review for motion for relief from judgment). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We review questions of law de novo. McGee, 62 N.E.3d at 470.

[17] Trushel is litigating this appeal without an attorney. “Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel[.]” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Yang, 238 N.E.3d 649, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We give self-represented litigants “no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

I. Due Process Claim – Notification of Redemption Period

[18] Trushel argues that the trial court should have vacated its grant of a tax deed to the Commissioners because the Auditor did not give him notice of his right to redeem his home, in violation of his right to due process.

[19] Before we address the merits of Trushel's claim, the Commissioners argue that Trushel is barred by statute from contesting the issuance of the tax deed. They cite Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6 (2023). That statute provides that once the redemption period expires following a tax sale, a party that purchased property at the tax sale or obtained a lien over the property may petition for issuance of a tax deed if the property was not redeemed. Any party that has an interest in the property may file a written objection to the petition within thirty days of the petition being filed. The Commissioners direct us to the following statutory language: “A tax deed issued under this section is incontestable except by appeal from the order of the court directing the county auditor to issue the tax deed filed not later than sixty (60) days after the date of the court's order.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.6(l).

[20] The Commissioners argue that Trushel's motion to set aside the tax deed and subsequent appeal is barred because he did not file it within sixty days of the issuance of the trial court's order directing the Auditor to issue a tax deed. We disagree. An exception to the statutory deadline exists “where a motion for relief from judgment alleges a tax deed is void due to constitutionally inadequate notice[.]” Diversified Invs., LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, 838 N.E.2d 536, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In that circumstance, “an appeal must be brought within a reasonable time rather than within sixty days.” Id.

[21] Here, Trushel claims that he received constitutionally inadequate notice, rendering the tax deed void. And the Commissioners did not allege that the timing of his motion to set aside was unreasonable, only that it was filed after the statutory deadline. Consequently, we reject the Commissioners’ claim of waiver and turn to the merits of Trushel's claim.

[22] When county officials attempt to sell land due to the owner's failure to pay property taxes, the officials must provide notice “in a manner that satisfies due process requirements of the United States Constitution.” Lamasco Redevelopment, LLC v. Henry Cnty., 80 N.E.3d 257, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), aff'd on reh'g, 84 N.E.3d 1243. “[T]he government must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 2011 Marion Cnty. Tax Sale v. Marion Cnty. Auditor, 14 N.E.3d 883, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A “title conveyed by tax deed may be defeated if three required notices, specifically the notice of tax sale, the notice of the right of redemption, and the notice of petition for tax deed, are not in substantial compliance with statutory requirements.” Prince v. Marion Cnty. Auditor, 992 N.E.2d 214, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[23] This case concerns the notice of the right of redemption. When a county executive obtains a lien over a property that was not sold at a tax sale, the executive is entitled to a tax deed if, among other requirements, the county auditor gives notice to the owner of record at the time that the executive acquires the lien. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.5(b) (2016). The auditor must send the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner at the last address of record. I.C. 6-1.1-25-4.5(d). Among other requirements, the notice must inform the owner of the right to redeem the property, the deadline for redemption, and the amount the owner must pay to accomplish redemption. I.C. 6-1.1-25-4.5(e).

[24] Here, in compliance with the statutory requirements, the Auditor sent notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Trushel's mailing address of record, notifying him that the tax sale had occurred and that he had a right to redeem the property. The certified mail was returned as unclaimed. At the same time, the county ordered a title search for the home. The county's efforts complied with due process requirements for post-tax sale notices of redemption. See S&C Fin. Group, LLC v. Khan, 172 N.E.3d 280, 291-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (notice of right of redemption complied with due process requirements; auditor sent notice by certified mail to last address of property owner; previous notice sent by first class mail had not been returned), trans. denied.

[25] Citing the holding in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), Trushel argues that when the notice of redemption was returned unclaimed, the auditor was obligated to take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice in another manner. But the holding in Jones applies to a notice that property will be sold at a tax sale, not to a post-sale notice of the right of redemption. See id. at 227 (“due process requires the government to do something more before real property may be sold in a tax sale.”). Trushel has not directed us to any cases applying the Supreme Court's rule in Jones to a post-tax sale notice of the right of redemption.²

[26] Next, Trushel argues that the Auditor should have also sent the notice of the right of redemption to his Michigan address. He claims that the Auditor and the Recorder both had that address in their records. Trushel, as the party challenging the issuance of the tax deed, bears the burden of rebutting a presumption that the tax sale and all statutory steps leading up to the issuance of the tax deed were proper. See S&C Fin. Group, 172 N.E.3d at 290. But, even if the Auditor had access to the Michigan address, Trushel did not submit any evidence to show that he would have received the notice at the Michigan address. By his own admission, he moved to the Michigan address temporarily in 2017. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 110. There is no evidence that Trushel would have continued to receive mail there seven years later, in 2024. In the absence of evidence to show that the notice would have reached Trushel via the Michigan address, he has failed to rebut the presumption that the tax sale and tax deed process were proper. There is no basis for reversal on due process grounds.

II. No Hearing on Motion to Correct Error

[27] Trushel next argues that the Commissioners’ own documents demonstrated a factual contradiction that invalidated the tax deed process. Specifically, the Commissioners alleged in their petition for issuance of tax deed that the house had not been purchased at the tax sale, but the county's electronic records, which the Commissioners attached to their petition, listed the property as having been sold. Trushel states that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his motion to correct error to address the contradiction.

[28] “ ‘This Court has long and consistently held that a trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to correct error.’ ” In re Estate of Wheat, 858 N.E.2d 175, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Ortiz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. 2002)). “If the evidence before the trial court in the motion to correct errors was sufficient to support its decision, the court could rule on the motion without a hearing.” Id.

[29] Trushel presented this evidentiary claim for the first time in his motion to correct error. As a result, he waived the claim. See R.P. Leasing v. Chem. Bank, 47 N.E.3d 1211, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (appellant waived claim by failing to raise it prior to motion to correct error). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on a waived claim.

III. Validity of Judgment Involving Deceased Co-Respondent

[30] Next, Trushel claims that the trial court's order issuing the tax deed to the Commissioners was void because Nancy was named as a co-respondent, but she had passed away well before the tax sale proceedings began. He reasons that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and that judgments issued without personal jurisdiction are void.

[31] Trushel raised this claim for the first time in his motion to correct error, so it is waived. See Wilder v. DeGood Dimensional Concepts, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 757, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (party may not present argument for the first time as part of motion to correct error). Waiver notwithstanding, even if we assume without deciding that the trial court's issuance of a tax deed was void as to Nancy, Trushel has not shown that the judgment is void as to him. Indiana Trial Rule 25(A)(2) provides:

In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death may be suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties.

[32] Nancy's death did not abate the Commissioners’ action to obtain a tax deed for the property or render it a nullity from the start. Rather, under Rule 25(A)(2), the Commissioners could still proceed against Trushel, who was the sole owner of the house after Nancy's death. In addition, it is undisputed that Trushel received notice of the Commissioners’ petition for tax deed in April 2025, and the court granted the petition on June 6. Trushel had thirty days to file a response to the tax sale petition, in which he could have suggested Nancy's death on the record, among other issues. But he waited over seven months to move to set aside the tax deed. Trushel has failed to demonstrate the court abused its discretion on this point.

Conclusion

[33] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-6(a) (2015) provides:When a tract or an item of real property is offered for sale under this chapter and an amount is not received equal to or in excess of the minimum sale price prescribed in section 5 of this chapter, the county executive acquires a lien in the amount of the minimum sale price. This lien attaches on the day on which the tract or item was offered for sale.

2.   The difference in due process requirements for a pre-tax sale notice and a post-tax sale notice of the right of redemption can be seen in the statutes that govern those notices. For a pre-tax sale notice, the county auditor must send it to the property owner by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first class mail. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4(b) (2023). If both mailings are returned, then the auditor “shall take an additional reasonable step to notify the property owner[.]” Id. By contrast, as noted, for a notice of the right of redemption after a tax sale, the auditor need only send the notice to the owner of record by certified mail, return receipt requested. I.C. 6-1.1-25-4.5(d).

Baker, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.