Ronnie Bradley, Appellant-Defendant, v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ronnie Bradley (Bradley)¹ appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment and decree of foreclosure. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Bradley raises three issues which we restate as:

I. Whether Macallan Properties 2 is the real party in interest in that it failed to record an assignment of the mortgage or the judgment;

II. Whether Macallan Properties’ failure to include a certificate of service in this appeal and this Court's notice of defect precluded the grant of summary judgment in the trial court; and

III. Whether the trial court erroneously denied Bradley a settlement conference and time to finalize a pay-off of the mortgage.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 24, 2010, Fronnie and Robert Bradley obtained a loan for which they executed a promissory note in favor of Urban Financial Group. Fronnie and Robert also gave a mortgage on their home to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. to secure the note. This particular mortgage is a home equity conversion, commonly known as a reverse mortgage, payable upon the deaths of the borrowers.

[4] Robert died on June 6, 2012, and Fronnie died on June 7, 2021.

[5] The mortgage became delinquent on January 7, 2025. And on April 2, 2025, AAMG FC Properties, LLC., as owner of the mortgage, filed its complaint to foreclose on the mortgage and named Robert and Fronnie's heirs as defendants.

[6] Bradley is a son and heir of Robert and Fronnie. According to Bradley, he recorded a deed at some point with the county recorder that transferred the property to him. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. Bradley filed a response to AAMG's complaint and then requested a mediation conference. In response to Bradley's request, the court scheduled a telephonic settlement conference for August 25. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 51-53. On that date, Bradley failed to call as directed by the court's order. Id. at 55. The court then set another settlement conference for September 25. Id. at 56. Bradley again failed to call for the conference. Id. at 57.

[7] That same month, AAMG moved for an in rem summary judgment and a foreclosure decree, and the court set the motion for hearing. A hearing was held November 6, at which Bradley appeared, and the court's order granting AAMG's motion for summary judgment and foreclosure was filed November 17.

[8] Bradley filed his notice of appeal on November 18 and named AAMG as the Appellee.

[9] On December 9, 2025, AAMG assigned the note, mortgage, and judgment to Macallan Properties, LLC. And on December 18, AAMG tendered to the trial court a notice of substitution of real party in interest, which was later filed.³ The trial court ordered that Macallan Properties, LLC be substituted as the plaintiff.

[10] On January 27, 2026, counsel for Appellee filed with this Court its notice of substitution of real party in interest, notifying us that AAMG had assigned the mortgage to Macallan Properties LLC and requesting that we substitute Macallan Properties LLC as the real party in interest in this cause. We granted that request by order on February 2, 2026.⁴

Discussion and Decision

[11] When reviewing the entry of summary judgment, our standard of review is similar to that of the trial court: whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 205-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “Once the moving party has sustained its initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, the party opposing summary judgment must respond by designating specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial.” Sheehan Const. Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 938 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. 2010). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Id. at 688. Further, the “ ‘trial court's grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous.’ ” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Benko, 964 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Cox v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 848 N.E.2d 690, 695-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied.

[12] Both here and in the trial court, Bradley has chosen to proceed pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Jones v. Hawk, 233 N.E.3d 1061, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Pro se litigants are bound to follow the rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 1066-67. We will not become an advocate for any party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood. Id. at 1067. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

I. Real Party in Interest

[13] Bradley first contends that

[t]o succeed in a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must prove it is the “real party in interest” at the time the complaint is filed. Ind. Trial Rule 17. In this case, the chain of title was broken. The Appellee failed to provide an unbroken sequence of assignments from the original lender to “Macallan Properties, LLC.”

․

A “genuine issue of material fact” exists as to whether the Appellee actually owned the debt when the suit began.

Appellant's Br. p. 8. Thus, we understand Bradley's argument to be that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Macallan Properties is the real party in interest and, therefore, entitled to enforce the note and foreclose on the mortgage. Bradley does not dispute the authenticity of the note or the mortgage or that the note is due and payable.

[14] The purpose of the real party in interest requirement under Trial Rule 17(A) is to ensure that the party before the court has the substantive right to enforce the claim being asserted. Lunsford v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas as Tr., 996 N.E.2d 815, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Bradley designates no support for his assertion that Macallan Properties is not the real party in interest, and the designated evidence shows that:

(1) On June 24, 2010, Fronnie and Robert obtained a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 18-28 (Ex. B to Plaintiff's Complaint). They also executed a note in favor of Urban Financial Group. See id. at 12-17 (Ex. A to Plaintiff's Complaint).

(2) On August 6, 2014, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. assigned the mortgage to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. See id. at 29-30 (Ex. C to Plaintiff's Complaint).

(3) On February 4, 2025, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development assigned the mortgage to AAMG FC Properties, LLC. See id. at 31-33 (Ex. D to Plaintiff's Complaint).

(4) On April 2, 2025 AAMG, as the mortgage holder, filed the foreclosure action. See id. at 2-11. On November 13, 2025, the trial court entered summary judgment and a decree of foreclosure that was filed with the court on November 17. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 11-13.

(5) On December 9, 2025, AAMG sold the loan to Macallan Properties, LLC. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 81-91.

[15] Thus, at the time of filing its complaint, AAMG possessed an unliquidated claim against Bradley. After the claim was reduced to a judgment, AAMG assigned all of its rights and obligations under the loan documents to Macallan Properties, including the judgment and decree of foreclosure. See id. at 81 (Loan Purchase and Sale Agreement, ¶ 1.2). As a result of this assignment, Macallan Properties became the holder of the note and mortgage, owned the judgment, and was entitled to enforce them. See Ind. Code § 26-1-3.1-301(1) (providing that holder of instrument is party entitled to enforce it); see also Lunsford, 996 N.E.2d at 821 (noting it is well-established that promissory note secured by mortgage is negotiable instrument which may be enforced by its holder).

[16] The note executed by Bradley's parents provides that the “Borrower shall have no personal liability for payment of the debt.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 12 (Fixed Rate Note, ¶ 4(C)). But the note was the necessary predicate for the in rem action upon the mortgage which secured it.

[17] The record does not disclose that Macallan Properties perfected the assignment by recording it in the clerk's judgment docket in accordance with Trial Rule 63.1(B).⁵ Neither does the record disclose that Macallan Properties recorded the assignment of the mortgage in the office of the recorder as provided for in Indiana Code section 32-29-1-8(a).⁶ Cf. Lunsford, 996 N.E.2d at 818 (noting that mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank under assignment of mortgage which was also recorded).

[18] Nevertheless, it is well settled that as between the assignor (in this case, AAMG) and the assignee (in this case, Macallan Properties), the validity of a mortgage assignment is not contingent upon whether the assignment has been recorded. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 14 N.E. 586, 587-88 (Ind. 1887). The statutory requirements for recording mortgage assignments are meant to protect subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Id. at 588. While an unrecorded mortgage assignment is void as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, the recording statute does not otherwise impair the rights of the assignee. Id. Thus, Macallan Properties’ failure to record the assignment does not void the otherwise valid assignment of the mortgage from AAMG to Macallan Properties.

[19] Moreover, Bradley is an heir and successor in interest to the mortgagors, his parents; he is neither a subsequent purchaser, nor a mortgagee or lessee. Accordingly, the mortgage assignment from AAMG to Macallan Properties did not need to be perfected on the public record to be valid and enforceable against him. See, e.g., ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC, 845 N.E.2d 209, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that purpose of recording statutes is to provide protection to subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and lessees). Therefore, Bradley may not challenge the chain of title and Macallan Properties’ status as the real party in interest based upon Macallan Properties’ failure to record the assignment of the mortgage and judgment from AAMG.

[20] The evidence establishes that AAMG held the note and the mortgage that secured it at the time AAMG filed suit. Macallan Properties subsequently became the holder of the note and mortgage, which rendered Macallan Properties the real party in interest and the true owner of the right to enforce the note, mortgage, and subsequent judgment. These facts entitle Macallan Properties to summary judgment as a matter of law.

II. Defective Certificate of Service

[21] Bradley further asserts that:

This Court (the Court of Appeals) already recognized these procedural deficiencies by issuing a Notice of Defect in this cause number on the 9th day of December 2025. If the Appellee's filings were too “defective” for this Court to proceed without correction, then the Appellee certainly did not meet the high burden required to take a [sic] home via Summary Judgment in the Trial Court.

Appellant's Br. p. 8.

[22] Odyssey shows that the Clerk of this Court issued a Notice of Defect on December 9, 2025 to counsel for Macallan Properties. The notice states that counsel tendered for filing a defective appearance and that the document was defective merely because it lacked a certificate of service. Odyssey also reveals that counsel filed an appearance that contained a certificate of service on December 12, remedying the defect. And on the same date the court issued a notice that the defect had been cured.

[23] Appellate Rule 24(D) requires that all documents tendered to our Clerk for filing must include a certificate of service specifying, among other information, that service has been made or will be made contemporaneously with the filing of the document, the persons served, the date of service, and the means of service. The certificate of service is an administrative function of the court system, and its purpose is to ensure that parties receive notice of the filings in their case. See Gaines v. State, 999 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing purpose of certificates of service).

[24] Here, the document lacking a certificate of service was the appearance of Macallan Properties’ counsel. Counsel corrected the defect three days later, and Bradley does not allege that he did not receive notice of counsel's appearance. The lack of a certificate of service on counsel's appearance does not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of summary judgment.

III. Denial of Settlement Conference and Time to Pay

[25] For his final allegation of error, Bradley argues that “the Trial Court strictly enforced procedural rules against a pro se litigant, denying him a settlement conference and the time to finalize a payoff with third-party financier Michael Epps. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 19).” Appellant's Br. p. 8. We address Bradley's concerns in turn.

[26] First, as we noted above, Bradley is a pro se litigant, and as such, he is held to the same legal standards and rules of procedure just as licensed attorneys. See Jones, 233 N.E.3d at 1066-67. In other words, he will not be given special treatment or consideration because he is proceeding pro se. See Kelley, 166 N.E.3d at 937. From the record it is clear that the trial court properly held Bradley to the same standard as that of trained counsel. Nonetheless, the court took time to explain the process to him and allowed him to state his concerns.

[27] Second, with regard to Bradley's assertion that the trial court denied him a settlement conference, he claims that “[f]undamental fairness and the principles of equity require” that he be given a “ ‘second chance’ ” to fix his mistakes. Appellant's Br. p. 8. The record shows, however, that at Bradley's request the trial court scheduled two telephonic settlement conferences, neither of which Bradley attended. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 5, 6; Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 51-57.

[28] Third, Bradley again calls upon fundamental fairness and the principles of equity when he claims that he should have been granted time to finalize a payoff of the mortgage. The foreclosure action was filed on April 2, 2025, and the hearing was held on AAMG's motion for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure seven months later on November 6. At the hearing, counsel for AAMG characterized as “disingenuous” Bradley's claims that he “didn't know this was a foreclosure, didn't know what was going on.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. Counsel informed the court that he had spoken several times with Bradley during the pendency of the action, even as early as twelve days after the action was filed. Id. at 7, 12. Bradley advised the court that the “ ‘very famous,’ ‘very rich’ ” actor Mike Epps is a friend of his and that Epps had indicated to Bradley he would “be there for [him] financially.” Id. at 15-16.

[29] The court ruled that it would move forward and grant AAMG's motion for summary judgment, stating that “what I hear is [you] have no idea whether [you] have the financing.” Id. at 16. Nevertheless, the court informed Bradley that he could still try to negotiate something with AAMG. Id. The court further explained:

Well, what I heard was that you've been having conversations with Counsel for many months now. And I -- you have been given the opportunity from what I see. And listen to what I'm saying, sir. This does not stop you from attempting to finance and to get the property, okay. It just means that the process continues, okay. It doesn't stop you.

․

So if you have financing from somebody, follow up on it okay.

․

-- like I said, this process doesn't mean that all is lost. It doesn't. It just means that it's going forward. So you have to work within those parameters. Okay.

Id. at 17-18.

[30] As the party who lost in the trial court, Bradley had the burden on appeal of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. We cannot say that he has met that burden.

Conclusion

[31] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Macallan Properties’ failure to record the assignment of the mortgage or the judgment is of no consequence. Macallan Properties is the holder of the note and mortgage and owner of the judgment, and as such, is the real party in interest. We further conclude that Macallan Properties’ defective certificate of service did not preclude the grant of summary judgment and that the trial court did not commit error when it denied Bradley's request for another settlement conference and further time to obtain financing to pay off the mortgage. Bradley has not shown that the summary judgment and decree were erroneous, and thus, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment and decree of foreclosure.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Inexplicably, both parties refer to the Appellant interchangeably as “Ronnie” and “Ronny.” As Bradley provided an email address using the spelling of “Ronnie” in his notice of appeal and both parties use that spelling in the caption on their brief, we will use that spelling throughout our decision.

2.   Although the Appellee's name is spelled “Macallen” throughout its brief, we assume the correct spelling is “Macallan” as found in the Loan Purchase and Sale Agreement, and we employ that spelling in this decision. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 81-88.

3.   Appellate Rule 2(L) provides in part that the record on appeal shall consist of all proceedings before the trial court, whether or not they were transmitted to this Court on appeal. As this document and others were not provided in either Bradley's or Macallan Properties’ appendices, we accessed the missing documents through the Odyssey Case Management System (“Odyssey”).

4.   By separate order issued simultaneously with this memorandum decision, we deny Bradley's motion to supplement the record with what he characterizes as “newly discovered evidence.” The documents Bradley tendered do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence. We also grant Macallan Properties’ motion to strike Bradley's reply brief because the arguments therein are based on the documents attached to his motion to supplement the record, which we are denying.

5.   Trial Rule 63.1(B) provides, in part, that “[a] satisfaction, dismissal, release or assignment of claims or matters recorded or filed in the lis pendens record relating to land or of a judgment entered in the judgment docket may be filed or recorded and indexed in the same manner as originally filed, recorded or docketed, and for the same fees.”

6.   Indiana Code section 32-29-1-8(a) provides in part: “Any mortgage of record or any part of the mortgage may be assigned by the mortgagee or any assignee of the mortgage, either by an assignment entered on the margin of the record, signed by the person making the assignment and attested by the recorder, or by a separate instrument executed and acknowledged before any person authorized to take acknowledgments, and recorded in the mortgage records of the county.”

Najam, Senior Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.