C.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.C. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to V.C. (“Child”). She presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) provided Mother with adequate services intended to help her achieve reunification with Child; and

2. Whether the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother's care would not be remedied.

We affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother and M.S. (“Putative Father”)² in April 2016. Child lived with Mother prior to DCS intervention. In March 2023, DCS investigated a report that Child's half-sibling (“Sibling 1”) tested positive for THC at birth and that Mother used THC while in the home with Child and his other half-sibling (“Sibling 2”). After an investigation, DCS filed a petition ³ alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[3] On May 22, 2023, the trial court held an initial hearing and removed Child from Mother's care. Child was placed in foster care and lived in several different placements during the pendency of the CHINS and termination cases. On June 23, 2023, Mother admitted Child was a CHINS based on Mother's drug use, specifically of THC and methamphetamine, and Child's poor school attendance. Putative Father admitted Child was a CHINS based on his inability to care for Child because he had not established paternity. The trial court adjudicated Child as a CHINS based on the admissions of Mother and Putative Father. On August 8, 2023, the trial court held its dispositional hearing, after which it ordered Mother to, among other things, refrain from using drugs and violating the law; complete parenting and substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations; complete random drug screens; and participate in supervised visitation with Child.

[4] Initially, Mother was mostly compliant with services such as home-based counseling and supervised visitation with Child. Mother participated in most drug screens that were offered and tested negative on some. However, she tested positive for THC “on more than one screen.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 47.)

[5] In December 2023, Mother was shot and injured while at work. The police seized Mother's phone as evidence. Family Case Manager Mercedes Smith (“FCM Smith”) was able to contact Mother through maternal grandmother's phone during the time Mother did not have a phone. During her recovery, Mother did not engage in services except for drug screens. Mother did not visit with Child because she “didn't want [Child] to be freaked out when there was a hole in [her] chin” where she had been shot. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 249.)

[6] Thereafter, Mother was mostly non-compliant with services. Family Case Manager Michale Fountain (“FCM Fountain”) referred Mother to homebased therapy, intensive outpatient treatment for substance abuse, and random drug screens. Mother inconsistently attended therapy and missed several drug screens. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and THC multiple times. Mother was terminated from one intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment program for non-compliance but later participated in those services through two other providers.

[7] Mother was also inconsistent with visitation with Child. In March 2025, the trial court suspended Mother's visitation with Child because she was “not compliant with drug screens and [was] not participating in homebased case work” and “continued visitation [would] cause emotional harm to [Child].” (Ex. Vol. 4 at 123.) Mother's visitation with Child was never reinstated.

[8] On May 19, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child based on her non-compliance with services. The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the matter on August 14 and October 9, 2025. During those hearings, the trial court heard evidence of Mother's non-compliance with services, including documentation that Mother missed 172 random drug screens. FCM Fountain also testified that Mother lacked suitable housing because maternal grandmother's house, where Mother lived, did not have a reliable water source, there were “spots in the floor that seemed to be caving in[,]” and FCM Fountain was concerned Child would be burned because the home had “a gas stove in the middle of the living room.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 211.) Family Case Manager Kierstan Tolnay (“FCM Tolnay”) testified that Mother did not provide her with proof of employment. Mother provided the trial court with documentation that she had been employed at a restaurant for one week. On November 3, 2025, the trial court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights after concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother's care would not be remedied, the continuation of the Mother-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment following termination, and termination was in Child's best interests.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mother challenges the involuntary termination of her parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. “If ‘parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,’ termination of parental rights is appropriate.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[10] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Such circumstances include:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the child's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the child's care following termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024).

[11] DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” In re K.E., 162 N.E.3d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2019)), trans. denied. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their child, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[12] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When “the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: ‘we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them.” In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

1. Services

[13] Mother argues “DCS did a poor job of seeing that Mother got the services she needed for reunification with [Child].” (Mother's Br. at 27.) She contends she “felt abandoned by DCS after she had heard nothing from them for months after her December 2023 shooting and hospitalization” because the only services DCS required of her at that time were random drug tests. (Id. at 25.) However, “a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied). Further, if Mother felt the services DCS offered were inadequate, it was her responsibility to bring that to DCS's attention. See, e.g., In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.”). Therefore, we decline Mother's request to reverse the termination of her parental rights to Child based on her allegation that she did not receive adequate services.

2. Conditions would not be Remedied

[14] Mother also argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from her care would not be remedied. In its order, the trial court concluded that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother would not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. To terminate Mother's rights, the trial court needed to reach only one of those conclusions under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Mother does not argue that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Mother-Child relationship poses a risk to Child's well-being, and thus we may affirm under that portion of the statute without addressing her argument about the probability that conditions will be remedied. See In re L.S. 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (because Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)⁴ is written in the disjunctive, court needs to find only one requirement to terminate parental rights), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[15] Mother cannot challenge the adequacy of services in her appeal. Similarly, we need not consider whether DCS proved that the conditions under which Child was removed from her care would not be remedied because she did not challenge the other element of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d), which is written in the disjunctive. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights to Child.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS argues that Mother impermissibly included documents and transcripts from the related Child in Need of Services proceedings involving Child and that we should exclude them from our review. We agree Mother should not have done so and admonish Mother's counsel to follow the Indiana Appellate Rules when preparing the record of the proceedings in the future. See App. R. 2(E) (indicating contents of Clerk's Record); App. R. 27 (noting the record on appeal must include the clerk's record and “all proceedings before the trial court”); and see, e.g, Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“facts outside the record cannot be considered by this court on appeal”). Therefore, we will not consider these materials when considering the issues Mother has presented.

2.   Putative Father's parental rights to Child were also terminated but he does not participate in this appeal.

3.   DCS also filed separate CHINS petitions regarding Sibling 1 and Sibling 2.

4.   The language of this statute is virtually identical to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d).

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.