IN RE: L.B. (Minor Child); A Child in Need of Services (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] V.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order adjudicating her infant son, L.B. (“L.B.”), to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother specifically argues that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating L.B. to be a CHINS. Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating L.B. to be a CHINS.

Facts

[3] The evidence most favorable to the CHINS adjudication reveals that twenty-four-year-old Mother, who has a learning disability, is the parent of L.B. Following L.B.’s birth at the end of July 2025, he was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (“NICU”) because of respiratory distress.

[4] Ten days later, L.B. was nearly ready to be discharged from the hospital. However, because L.B. had been in the NICU and Mother had not been actively participating in his care, a physician ordered Mother to complete a twenty-four-hour rooming-in process to demonstrate her ability to care for L.B. before he could be discharged.² On August 10, 2025, at approximately 1:00 p.m., NICU nurse Heather Bennett (“Nurse Bennett”) explained the rooming-in process to Mother and her mother (“maternal grandmother”). Specifically, Nurse Bennett explained that during the rooming-in process, Mother would need to wake up on her own every three hours to feed L.B. In addition, Mother would need to change L.B.’s diapers and take his temperature. Mother, maternal grandmother, and Nurse Bennett all signed a rooming-in information sheet with instructions for the rooming-in process.

[5] Two hours later, at 3:00 p.m., maternal grandmother approached Nurse Bennett and asked her if maternal grandmother could spend the night with Mother and L.B. Nurse Bennett informed maternal grandmother that Mother needed to take care of L.B. on her own. Maternal grandmother told Nurse Bennett that she understood and left the hospital.

[6] When Nurse Bennett entered L.B.’s room an hour later at 4:00 p.m., Mother was FaceTiming maternal grandmother. Specifically, maternal grandmother was “walking [Mother] through what to do for [L.B.].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). Nurse Bennett, who was concerned that Mother was not demonstrating the ability to care for L.B. on her own, ended her shift at 6:00 p.m.

[7] At that time, NICU nurse Ashli Zolman (“Nurse Zolman”) took over L.B.’s care. When Nurse Zolman entered L.B.’s room at 7:00 p.m., Mother was FaceTiming maternal grandmother, who was “giving [Mother] step-by-step instructions of how to prepare [L.B.’s] bottle[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 45). Nurse Zolman returned to L.B.’s room at 10:00 p.m. and again found Mother FaceTiming maternal grandmother, who was instructing Mother how to feed L.B. and change his diaper.

[8] When Nurse Zolman returned to L.B.’s room at 1:00 a.m., Mother was sleeping. At 1:10 a.m., Nurse Zolman woke Mother up and told her that it was time to feed L.B. Mother appeared confused and told Nurse Zolman that she had already fed him. Nurse Zolman explained to Mother that Mother had fed L.B. at 10:00 p.m., that L.B. had to eat every three hours, and that it was time to feed him again. Mother responded that it was still dark outside and that L.B.’s next feeding was in the morning. Mother appeared agitated and attempted to FaceTime maternal grandmother. When maternal grandmother did not answer her phone, Mother asked Nurse Zolman what Mother needed to do. Nurse Zolman responded that Mother needed to feed L.B. Mother asked Nurse Zolman how much breastmilk Mother needed to give to L.B., and Nurse Zolman responded that he needed 55 milliliters of breastmilk. When Mother only filled the bottle with 50 milliliters of breastmilk, Nurse Zolman told her to add a bit more. Mother became upset and said that she had added the correct amount of breastmilk to the bottle but then added a little more. In addition, Mother asked Nurse Zolman how to use the bottle warmer, and Nurse Zolman assisted Mother in warming L.B.’s bottle. When Nurse Zolman asked Mother if she had set an alarm for L.B.’s next feeding at 4:00 a.m., Mother asked Nurse Zolman if that would be in the morning. Nurse Zolman responded affirmatively but reminded Mother that it would still be dark outside.

[9] When Nurse Zolman returned to L.B.’s room at 4:00 a.m., Mother told Nurse Zolman that she had already fed L.B. At 5:30 a.m., Nurse Zolman heard L.B. crying and went to his room. Mother was FaceTiming maternal grandmother, who was yelling at Mother about the rooming-in process “and how it was mistreatment and illegal what was going on.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 10). Mother appeared agitated, and she tried to console a crying L.B. by forcefully patting him and aggressively rocking him.

[10] Nurse Zolman's shift ended at 6:00 a.m., and NICU Nurse Sydney Lanum (“Nurse Lanum”) took over L.B.’s care. When Nurse Lanum entered L.B.’s room at 7:00 a.m., Mother, whose eyes were closed, was sitting in a chair rocking L.B. Nurse Lanum told Mother that it was time to feed L.B. Mother disagreed with Nurse Lanum about the time, and Nurse Lanum told Mother to look at her cell phone. Mother FaceTimed maternal grandmother, who told Nurse Lanum that she had “been screen recording everything and [wa]s going to take legal action.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 12).

[11] Hospital staff determined that Mother had failed the rooming-in process and contacted the Department of Child Services (“DCS”). A DCS assessment case manager (“the ACM”) met with Mother at the hospital. After speaking with Mother, the ACM was concerned that L.B.’s “mental and physical condition was going to be impaired by leaving [him] with Mother by herself[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 120). The ACM removed L.B. from Mother's care and placed him in foster care. In August 2025, DCS filed a petition alleging that L.B. was a CHINS.

[12] The trial court held a two-day CHINS factfinding hearing in October and November 2025. At the hearing, the trial court heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, a visitation facilitator (“the visitation facilitator”) testified that, for the previous three months, she had been facilitating Mother's two-hour visits with infant L.B. four days each week. According to the visitation facilitator, she had needed to prompt Mother to feed L.B. during every visit. When asked if she thought that Mother would be able to take care of L.B. by herself, the visitation facilitator responded, “I don't think so yet[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 104). The visitation facilitator acknowledged that Mother had been making some progress because when she was prompted to feed L.B., Mother was able to properly make his bottle. However, the visitation facilitator further agreed that Mother “still need[ed] some more work.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 106).

[13] The ACM also testified at the hearing. When asked if she thought that L.B.’s “mental and physical condition was going to be impaired by leaving [him] with Mother by herself[,]” the ACM responded that she did. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 120). Further, when asked if she “believe[d] that coercive intervention of the Court [wa]s needed to ensure [L.B.]’s safety at this point in time[,]” the ACM again responded that she did. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 120).

[14] Further, the therapist (“the therapist”) who had completed Mother's parenting assessment and who had observed Mother's parenting time with L.B. also testified at the hearing. When asked if she believed that Mother was ready to care for L.B. by herself that day, the therapist responded, “․ no today, no, but over time.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88). The therapist recommended the implementation of programs that would offer Mother continuing formal support and expressed her concern that without this additional support, “[L.B.] m[ight] not be fed at the correct times[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 99).

[15] Mother testified that she had been setting an alarm on her cell phone to alert her to feed L.B. When DCS asked Mother why the visitation facilitator needed to prompt her to feed L.B. if Mother had set an alarm on her cell phone, she responded that she did not need to be prompted to feed L.B. However, she acknowledged the visitation facilitator's testimony that she did need to be prompted to feed L.B.

[16] At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated as follows:

It's the failure to feed that's the issue because for an infant, especially one this young, failure to ․ receive appropriate nutrients can so quickly become a failure to thrive and be dangerous to the child's health and wellbeing, and the Court is not required to wait until the child is further harmed ․ to take some sort of action to protect ․ the child's wellbeing․ and the fact that neither Mother nor ․ maternal grandmother[ ] believe she needs help ․ is indicative of the ․ coercion necessary.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 169). In November 2025, the trial court issued an order adjudicating L.B. to be a CHINS. Further, the trial court held a dispositional hearing in December 2025 and issued a dispositional order on December 8, 2025. The dispositional order was noted in the Chronological Case Summary (“the CCS”) on December 22, 2025.

[17] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[18] At the outset, we note that the State argues that Mother has “forfeit[ed] her right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal.” (State's Br. 4, n.1). Under Appellate Rule 9(A)(5), the right to appeal “shall be forfeited” unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) provides that a party must file “a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk ․ within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” In a CHINS matter, the dispositional order is the final judgment. See In re D.J. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). Here, a CCS entry reveals that the dispositional order was noted in the CCS on December 22, 2025. Thus, Mother's notice of appeal was due to be filed no later than January 21, 2026. Mother filed her notice of appeal on that date. Accordingly, Mother timely filed her notice of appeal and has not forfeited her right to appeal. We now turn to the substantive issue in this case.

[19] Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating L.B. to be a CHINS. She specifically contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication. We disagree.

[20] A CHINS proceeding is a civil action. In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Therefore, DCS had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that L.B. was a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. See id. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[21] A CHINS adjudication focuses on the child's condition rather than the parent's culpability. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to provide proper services for the benefit of the child, not to punish the parent. Id. at 106. A CHINS adjudication in no way challenges the general competency of a parent to continue her relationship with her child. Id. at 105.

[22] Here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon. “As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Under the general judgment standard of review, the reviewing court “may look both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.” C.B. v. B.W., 985 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Further, we accept unchallenged findings as true. In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[23] Lastly, we note that, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[24] Here, the trial court adjudicated L.B. to be a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, which provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[25] The Indiana Supreme Court has synthesized this statutory language, explaining that a CHINS adjudication requires proof of “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

[26] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication. Specifically, she first argues that DCS did not meet its burden to prove that L.B. was seriously endangered because “there was no indication that [L.B.] suffered any harm or injury as a result of Mother's actions or inactions.” (Mother's Br. 10).

[27] First, “[t]he CHINS statute does not require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene.” Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 476. Second, our review of the evidence reveals that Mother has never demonstrated an ability to feed infant L.B. without prompting. Specifically, during the rooming-in process, the nurses had to prompt Mother to feed L.B. Further, following L.B.’s discharge from the hospital, the visitation facilitator had to prompt Mother to feed L.B. during every visit. From this evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that infant L.B. was seriously endangered by Mother's inability to feed him without being prompted. Mother's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

[28] Mother also argues that there is insufficient evidence that L.B.’s needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. However, our review of the evidence reveals that the ACM opined that L.B.’s needs would not be met without the coercive intervention of the court. In addition, the visitation facilitator testified that she needed to prompt Mother to feed L.B. during every visit. On the other hand, Mother testified at the hearing that she set an alarm on her cell phone to alert her when she needed to feed L.B. and that she did not need to be prompted to feed him. From this evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that L.B.’s needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. Again, Mother's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

[29] There is sufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication, and the trial court did not clearly err in adjudicating L.B. to be a CHINS. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   L.B.’s father is unknown.

2.   Mother lived alone and would be caring for L.B. on her own when he was discharged from the hospital.

Pyle, Judge.

May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.