N.F., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While alone in his bedroom, 15-year-old N.F. accidentally shot himself in the leg with a handgun. The State thereafter filed a delinquency petition, alleging N.F. engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be felony criminal recklessness and misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. N.F. was detained pending a fact-finding hearing, which was not held within the 20-day deadline prescribed by statute. After the hearing, the trial court entered true findings on both allegations and adjudged N.F. to be a delinquent child.

[2] N.F. appeals his delinquency adjudication, claiming he was unfairly prejudiced by evidence the State was able to present due to the delay in holding his fact-finding hearing. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he engaged in conduct that would be criminal recklessness if committed by an adult. Because release from pre-adjudication detention is the only available remedy for a violation of the 20-day statutory deadline, and N.F. is no longer detained in that manner, his first claim is moot. However, we find insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation.

[3] The true finding on the dangerous possession of a firearm allegation remains, however. And it independently supports N.F.’s delinquency adjudication. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to vacate the true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation and, if necessary, modify N.F.’s disposition.

Facts

[4] On August 25, 2025, 15-year-old N.F. accidentally shot himself in the leg while alone in his bedroom. His mother heard the gunshot from the kitchen and, after checking on N.F., called 911. Emergency responders soon arrived and cared for N.F. while police arrived and investigated the incident. A few days later, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging N.F. engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be felony criminal recklessness and misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm.

[5] Police took N.F. into custody on August 29, 2025. After a detention hearing, the trial court ordered him to remain detained pending a fact-finding hearing on the State's delinquency petition. That hearing was initially set for September 29, 2025. But four days prior, the State moved for a continuance because one of its witnesses, the police officer who investigated N.F.’s accidental shooting, was out of the country. The trial court granted the continuance over N.F.’s objection.

[6] On October 20, 2025, the parties appeared for the rescheduled fact-finding hearing. At its outset, the State moved for an additional continuance because another one of its witnesses, N.F.’s mother, had failed to appear. The trial court denied the State's motion, after which the State called the investigating officer to testify about the handgun involved in N.F.’s accidental shooting. At the end of the officer's testimony, the State moved to bifurcate the fact-finding hearing so that N.F.’s mother could be called as a witness. The court granted the bifurcation over N.F.’s objection.

[7] The fact-finding hearing resumed on October 27, 2025, and N.F.’s mother appeared and testified. During her testimony, the State presented a recording of the 911 call she made after N.F. shot himself. This recording contained three pertinent statements: (1) N.F.’s mother told the 911 dispatcher, “My son got shot in the leg”; (2) N.F. interjected, “Nobody shot me, it was an accident”; and then (3) N.F.’s mother replied “Yes” when the dispatcher clarified, “Did he accidentally shoot himself?” Exh. 6 at 0:54-1:12.

[8] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court entered true findings on the criminal recklessness and dangerous possession of a firearm allegations.¹ The court then adjudicated N.F. to be a delinquent child and, after a dispositional hearing, ordered him placed at the Indiana United Methodist Children's Home, a Qualified Residential Treatment Facility.

Discussion and Decision

[9] N.F. appeals his delinquency adjudication, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by holding his fact-finding hearing more than 20 days after the State filed its delinquency petition; and (2) the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he engaged in conduct that would be criminal recklessness if committed by an adult. N.F.’s first argument is moot, but we find insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

I. Delay in Fact-Finding Hearing

[10] N.F. first argues that the trial court erred by holding his fact-finding hearing more than 20 days after the State filed its delinquency petition. Our Juvenile Code includes a “deadline statute” that provides, in pertinent part: “If ․ a child is in detention; and ․ a petition has been filed; a fact-finding hearing or a waiver hearing must be commenced not later than twenty (20) days ․ after the petition is filed.” Ind. Code § 31-37-11-2(a).² Here, the parties do not dispute that N.F. was detained pending his fact-finding hearing or that the hearing was held more than 20 days after the State filed its delinquency petition. Rather, they disagree on the remedy available for a violation of the deadline statute.

[11] N.F. asks us to treat the statutory violation as ordinary trial error, review it for harmlessness, and reverse his delinquency adjudication. He claims the violation was not harmless because the delay in holding his fact-finding hearing enabled the State to present the prejudicial testimony of both the investigating police officer and N.F.’s mother. But as the State correctly contends, the Juvenile Code's “release statute” provides the only available remedy. That statute states: “If ․ a child is in detention; and ․ the times in [the deadline statute] are not followed; the child shall be released on the child's own recognizance or to the child's parents, guardian, or custodian.” Ind. Code § 31-37-11-7.

[12] In Brown v. State, 448 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 1983), our Supreme Court applied the substantively identical predecessors to the deadline and release statutes and concluded the latter “makes it clear that failure to hold the waiver hearing within twenty [20] days of the filing of the petition alleging delinquency entitles the juvenile to no more than release on his own recognizance or to his parents, guardian, or custodian.” Id. at 16 (brackets in original, emphasis added). The Court further stated: “We see nothing in any other part of the [release statute] that can be read to entitle the juvenile to outright dismissal of the charges or to cause the juvenile court to lose jurisdiction when the time limits in [the deadline statute] are not met.” Id.

[13] This Court has analyzed the current deadline and release statutes and reached the same conclusion as our Supreme Court did in Brown. See, e.g., State v. D.R., 119 N.E.3d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); K.G. v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1147, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); J.D. v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, it is well established that the release statute provides the only remedy for a violation of the deadline statute: the juvenile must be released from pre-adjudication detention.

[14] We can no longer grant N.F. that lone remedy because there is no more pre-adjudication detention from which to release him. He has been adjudicated and placed. His claim is therefore moot. See C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing mootness of deadline statute violation where court could no longer render effective relief under release statute). N.F. tries to escape this conclusion by framing his claim as one seeking reversal from ordinary trial error. But he cannot avoid the release statute, which does not authorize reversal due to a violation of the deadline statute.

II. Criminal Recklessness Finding

[15] N.F. next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he engaged in conduct that would be criminal recklessness if committed by an adult. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a true finding on a delinquency allegation, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018). We view all evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the judgment and will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[16] A person commits criminal recklessness when they “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally perform[ ] an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(a). N.F. does not dispute that, by shooting himself in the leg, he created a substantial risk of bodily injury to his mother, who was in the nearby kitchen. He claims only that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he discharged the gun recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. According to the State, the evidence showed that N.F. discharged the gun recklessly.

[17] “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c). Here, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows only that N.F. shot himself in the leg with a handgun. There is no evidence of how N.F. handled the gun. Thus, there is nothing from which the factfinder could reasonably infer that N.F. handled the gun “in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result.” Id. Likewise, there is no means by which the factfinder could evaluate whether N.F.’s purported disregard “involve[d] a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Id.

[18] The State asserts: “N.F. shot himself while alone in his room, which leads to the commonsense conclusion that he did so because he was handling a firearm carelessly.” Appellee's Br., p. 16. But Indiana law distinguishes mere negligence from reckless conduct. Shepherd v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1227, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Beeman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind. 1953)) (“[I]t is well-established that evidence that ‘an accident arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention, forgetfulness or thoughtlessness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of judgment on his part’ does not amount to reckless conduct.”). Absent evidence of how N.F. was handling the gun when he shot himself, the factfinder could not conclude that such conduct fell on the reckless end of the spectrum.

[19] Finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court's true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation, we reverse that finding and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate it.

III. Delinquency Adjudication and Disposition

[20] Reversing the true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation does not affect N.F.’s delinquency adjudication. Beyond his moot deadline claim, N.F. does not challenge the true finding on the dangerous possession of a firearm allegation, and that finding independently supports the trial court's conclusion that N.F. is a delinquent child. See Ind. Code § 31-37-1-1 (“A child is a delinquent child if ․ the child commits a delinquent act[.]”); Ind. Code § 31-37-1-2 (“A child commits a delinquent act if, before becoming eighteen (18) years of age, the child commits a misdemeanor or felony offense.”).

[21] On the other hand, we can only speculate how the true finding on the felony criminal recklessness allegation may have impacted N.F.’s disposition. See App. Vol. II, p. 101 (listing as consideration in dispositional decree that “Youth is pending [d]isposition for shooting himself in the leg”). While nothing in the record suggests the disposition would have differed had the trial court entered a true finding on the misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm allegation alone, “[t]he disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the juvenile court's discretion.” Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). We therefore remand for the trial court to modify its dispositional decree if, in its sole discretion, the court deems it necessary.

Conclusion

[22] We affirm the trial court's true finding on the dangerous possession of a firearm allegation and affirm N.F.’s delinquency adjudication based on that finding. However, we reverse the trial court's true finding on the criminal recklessness allegation and remand for the court to vacate it. We also remand for the trial court to modify its dispositional decree if, in its sole discretion, the court deems a modification necessary in light of this opinion.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State's delinquency petition specifically alleged that N.F. engaged in conduct that would be Level 5 felony criminal recklessness “by shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling.” App. Vol. II, p. 44; see generally Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(2)(A) (making criminal recklessness a Level 5 felony when “it is committed by shooting a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle, an inhabited dwelling, or another building or place where people are likely to be present”). The trial court found that N.F. engaged in conduct that would be the lesser included offense of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. See generally Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(A) (making criminal recklessness a Level 6 felony when “it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon”).

2.   The deadline statute's 20-day deadline “exclud[es] Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.” Ind. Code § 31-37-11-2(a). It also excludes delays attributable to the child or, under certain circumstances, court congestion. Ind. Code § 31-37-11-6.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.