Emmett Cromwell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Emmett Cromwell was convicted of two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, in part, because he pointed a handgun at his roommate during an argument. Cromwell appeals those convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to negate his claim of self-defense. He also claims the dual convictions place him in substantive double jeopardy, which the State concedes. We find sufficient evidence to negate Cromwell's self-defense claim and accept the State's concession as to the double jeopardy violation. We therefore affirm one of Cromwell's intimidation convictions, reverse the other, and remand for the trial court to vacate the reversed conviction and its corresponding sentence.

Facts

[2] In June 2025, Cromwell and his coworker, Kevin Richards, lived with their boss, Bryan Waldrip, in an Indianapolis apartment. One day, Waldrip was awakened by Cromwell and Richards arguing over money. Cromwell had borrowed $100 from Richards, and Richards wanted it back. But Cromwell had already spent the money and was unable to repay Richards at that time.

[3] During a pause in the arguing, Waldrip got out of bed and went to Cromwell's bedroom, hoping to “make peace” between his two employees. Tr. Vol. II, p. 8. He found Cromwell lying in bed and, from the doorway of the room, suggested that Cromwell go to work so he could repay Richards. Waldrip's peace efforts were short-lived, however, as Richards soon came to the doorway and resumed arguing with Cromwell.

[4] Cromwell was calm at first and repeatedly told Richards to be quiet, go away, and leave him alone. But Richards did not stop. He yelled at Cromwell from the doorway and demanded to know why Cromwell could not pay him back immediately. Eventually, Cromwell became angry and picked up a handgun that was lying on the floor nearby. He pointed it at Richards and said, “[Y]ou're not going to make it back to Colorado if you keep on harassing me.” Id. at 12. Upon seeing and hearing Cromwell's threat, Richards walked away, left the apartment, and called the police.

[5] Police were dispatched to the apartment, and Cromwell was arrested. The State later charged him with two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, among other crimes. The intimidation charges specifically alleged the following:

COUNT I

On or about June 9, 2025, EMMETT CROMWELL did communicate a threat to Kevin Richards[ ] ․ by drawing or using a deadly weapon, with the intent that Kevin Richards[ ] be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out[.]

COUNT II

On or about June 9, 2025, EMMETT CROMWELL did communicate a threat to Kevin Richards[ ] ․ while drawing or using a deadly weapon, with the intent that Kevin Richards[ ] engage in conduct against his will by telling him he would shoot him if he did not shut up[.]

App. Vol. II, p. 14.

[6] The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which Waldrip testified but Cromwell and Richards did not. Waldrip described Richards as unprecedentedly “angry” during his argument with Cromwell. Id. at 10. According to Waldrip, Richards had an “aggressive” demeanor and was “harassing” Cromwell about the money he had borrowed. Id. at 9, 10. When asked if Richards was being threatening toward Cromwell, Waldrip replied, “I guess through words, maybe?” Id. at 18. Waldrip then clarified: “He was being threatening by stating that he wanted his money right then and there” while “kn[owing] for a fact that [Cromwell] didn't have the money.” Id.

[7] Waldrip further testified that he did not believe Richards was going to attack Cromwell or vice versa. Richards was unarmed and never entered Cromwell's bedroom. He simply stood at the doorway and yelled at Cromwell about the money. And though Cromwell asked Richards to stop and go away roughly 20 times, Cromwell never got out of bed. According to Waldrip, Cromwell threatened Richards because Cromwell was “annoyed.” Id. at 21.

[8] Through counsel, Cromwell argued that he intimidated Richards in self-defense. But the trial court found him guilty of intimidation and entered judgments of conviction on both Counts I and II. The court later sentenced Cromwell to identical sentences on each count—730 days in prison with 365 days suspended—and ordered him to serve those sentences concurrently.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Cromwell appeals his intimidation convictions, arguing that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to negate his claim of self-defense; and (2) the dual convictions place him in substantive double jeopardy. We find sufficient evidence to negate Cromwell's self-defense claim, and the State concedes the double jeopardy violation. We therefore affirm Cromwell's conviction on Count II, reverse his conviction on Count I, and remand with instructions.¹

I. Self-Defense Claim

[10] Cromwell first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to negate his claim of self-defense. “A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). It “requires a defendant to have acted without fault, been in a place where he or she had a right to be, and been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm.” Id. “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[11] We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense the same as we do for any claim of insufficient evidence. Ervin v. State, 114 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). That is, “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and “[w]e consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision.” Id. “If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, [we] will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ind. 2002).

[12] Here, the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Cromwell did not have a reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm when he intimidated Richards. Although Waldrip testified that Richards was angry and aggressive toward Cromwell about the borrowed money, Waldrip also testified that Richards never entered the bedroom where Cromwell was lying down. According to Waldrip, Richards yelled at Cromwell from the bedroom doorway and was unarmed. Waldrip further testified that he did not believe Richards was going to attack Cromwell and that Cromwell threatened Richards with the gun because he was “annoyed.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 21. Given this evidence, we cannot say “no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800-01.

[13] Cromwell's claim to the contrary is also unavailing. He emphasizes that Waldrip described Richards's behavior as both “harassing” and “threatening.” Id. at 10, 18. But Waldrip was clear that Richards's behavior was entirely verbal. Indiana's self-defense statute specifically provides, in pertinent part: “A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (emphasis added). And nothing Richards said can be reasonably construed as threatening the imminent use of unlawful force against Cromwell. Moreover, our Supreme Court has ruled that “a self-defense justification cannot be based on a mere verbal threat because ‘oftentimes combatants make threats of violence which are never carried out.’ ” Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 541 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Henson, 786 N.E.2d at 278).

[14] For these reasons, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to negate Cromwell's claim of self-defense as to Counts I and II.

II. Double Jeopardy

[15] Cromwell next argues that his dual convictions for Level 5 felony intimidation place him in substantive double jeopardy. “[T]he substantive bar to double jeopardy restrains the courts’ power to impose multiple punishments for the same offense[.]” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis omitted). Whether multiple convictions place a defendant in substantive double jeopardy presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id. But here, the State concedes that Cromwell's dual intimidation convictions constitute double jeopardy, recognizing that both were based on Cromwell pointing the handgun at Richards. We accept the State's concession, reverse Cromwell's conviction on Count I, and remand for the trial court to vacate that conviction and its corresponding sentence.

Conclusion

[16] We affirm Cromwell's conviction on Count II (Level 5 felony intimidation), reverse his conviction on Count I (Level 5 felony intimidation), and remand for the trial court to vacate his conviction and corresponding sentence on Count I.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In a third argument, Cromwell claims the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he committed the intimidation alleged in Count I. Because we reverse Cromwell's Count I conviction on double jeopardy grounds, this claim is moot, and we do not consider it.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown. J., concur.