IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.B. (Minor Child) and A.A. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.A. (“Father”) appeals the Washington Circuit Court's order terminating his parental rights to his four-year-old child, N.B. Father claims that the trial court's order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] N.B. was born in January 2022, and she was removed from M.B.’s (“Mother”) care in October 2024 after Mother was arrested for public intoxication and neglect of N.B.¹ Mother was N.B.’s sole caregiver. Father was incarcerated in October because he had been charged with domestic battery in the presence of a child, confinement, and strangulation. Mother was the victim of the offenses, which were committed in N.B.’s presence. Ex. Vol. 3, pp. 172-74.

[4] On October 8, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that N.B. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Both parents admitted that N.B. was a CHINS. The trial court issued a dispositional order directing Mother and Father to complete assessments and services. The court noted that DCS had previously been involved with the parents for prior neglect of N.B.

[5] On November 19, Father pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery. The Scott Circuit Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 730 days with 360 days suspended to probation. Id. at 165-66, 176. Father was released from incarceration in January 2025. The family case manager unsuccessfully attempted to contact Father multiple times after he was released. In February 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Father's probation. Father admitted that he had violated his probation and agreed to serve 180 days of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction. Id. at 188.

[6] Because Mother made progress in services and maintained a period of sobriety, in June 2025, DCS placed N.B. in a trial home visit with Mother. In July, Father met Mother and N.B. in a hotel room in violation of the no contact order. Several adults were present in the hotel room and they used marijuana and engaged in sexual activity while N.B. was present. N.B. reported that Father hit her while they were together in the hotel room. As a result of this incident, DCS removed N.B. from the trial home visit with Mother.

[7] Mother eventually stopped communicating with service providers and participating in services. DCS later learned that Mother had moved to Wisconsin and was living with a man who had a known history of domestic violence.

[8] Father was incarcerated throughout most of the CHINS proceedings. Father was released from incarceration between April 2025 and August 2025. During those months, Father failed to communicate with DCS and did not attempt to participate in services. The family case manager was able to reach Father via phone on one occasion. During the brief call, Father stated he was living in Louisville and was unable to participate in services in Indiana.

[9] In August, Father was charged with domestic battery, strangulation, criminal confinement, intimidation, and invasion of privacy for violating the no contact order. Id. at 128-33. The State alleged that the offenses occurred on or about August 15, and Mother was the alleged victim of the charged offenses. Id. at 133. Father was returned to incarceration while awaiting trial on those charges.

[10] On September 21, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights over N.B. During the January 29, 2026, factfinding hearing, the family case manager and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in N.B.’s best interests. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 55, 71. Father remained incarcerated on the pending charges on the date of the hearing.

[11] In its order terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights,² the court found that Father has not shown that he is able to “act as a responsible parent in any way for this young child,” that “there is simply no evidence of any progress by the father at all in the underlying case,” and “there is very little evidence of any meaningful or appropriate relationship between the child and the father in light of the father's frequent incarcerations and poor decision making.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 13. The court also found that Father had been convicted of acts of domestic violence posing “a significant threat to the child especially when coupled with the other criminal involvement of the father.” Id. at 14. The court concluded that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence of the statutorily required factors to terminate Father's parental rights.

[12] Father appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to N.B.

Standard of Review

[13] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[14] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) to (c)(3) (2025).

[16] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) to (d)(4). Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, we need only discuss one of these elements raised by Father in this appeal, namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in N.B.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

[17] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to N.B.’s removal will not be remedied.

[18] Father claims that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in N.B.’s removal and her continued placement outside of his home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[19] Father has never had N.B. in his care. When N.B. was removed from Mother's care, placement with Father was not an option because Father was incarcerated. Specifically, Father was incarcerated for strangling and battering Mother. There was also a no contact order between Father and Mother and N.B.³ Therefore, Father's claim that the conditions that led to N.B.’s removal and placement outside his home were attributable solely to Mother is not supported by the evidence.

[20] Father also argues that DCS did not offer Father services while he was incarcerated. Father was released from incarceration from January through February 2025 and from April through August 2025. And Father had notice of the dispositional order that listed the services requiring his participation. DCS made several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Father during those months. Father had one brief communication with a family case manager in July and told her that he could not participate in services in Indiana because he was living in Louisville, and he then ended the call. During the months he was released from incarceration, Father did not take any steps to engage with DCS, to improve his ability to parent, or to address his issues with domestic violence. Instead, Father repeatedly committed acts of domestic violence against Mother. And N.B. told the family case manager that Father had hit her while they were in the motel room during her trial home visit with Mother. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 54.

[21] Father directs our attention to several cases reversing orders terminating parental rights of incarcerated parents. See Appellant's Br. at 15-20. But unlike the parents in those cases, Father's habitual patterns of conduct established that he has no interest in parenting N.B.⁴ Cf. K.E. v Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 648-49 (Ind. 2015) (reversing an order terminating incarcerated father's parental rights because the father's release was pending, he made nightly phone calls to his children, and he undertook “substantial efforts towards bettering his life through programs that were available during his incarceration”).

[22] For these reasons, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in N.B.’s removal or the reasons for her continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

Termination of Father's parental rights is in N.B.’s best interests.

[23] Father also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of his parental rights is in N.B.’s best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[24] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[25] First, we observe that DCS presented evidence that N.B. needs permanency and stability and that she is flourishing in her stable foster placement.⁵ See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 71-72 (testifying that N.B. “has grown by leaps and bounds in” her foster placement). And the foster parents have expressed that they want to adopt N.B. Id. at 55.

[26] The family case manager and the CASA testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in N.B.’s best interests. Id. at 55, 71. Father claims that our court should not credit their opinions concerning N.B.’s best interests because they failed to investigate Father's ability to parent. But the family case manager attempted to communicate with Father and engage him in services during the months he was released from incarceration. Father refused to communicate except on one occasion when he told the case manager he could not participate in services in Indiana and then ended the phone call. Because of Father's incarceration and his refusal to communicate with DCS, there was no reason for the case manager and CASA to further investigate Father or his ability to parent.

[27] In his brief, Father relies on his testimony that if DCS “gave me the resource, I'd do whatever it takes to” be reunited with N.B. Id. at 77. But the trial court was free to determine that Father's testimony lacked credibility, particularly because Father's conduct during these proceedings established that Father was not willing to take any steps to show that he had interest in parenting N.B.

[28] Father has been incarcerated for most of four-year-old N.B.’s life. During the months he was released from incarceration he did not do anything to improve his ability to parent a child or to address his issues with domestic violence. On the contrary, Father was repeatedly incarcerated because he continued to batter and strangle Mother.

[29] For these reasons, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in N.B.’s best interests.

Conclusion

[30] The trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights over N.B. is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother pleaded guilty to neglect of a dependent. On October 31, 2024, the Washington Superior Court ordered her to serve 425 days, with 365 days suspended to probation. Ex. Vol. 3, pp. 141-42.

2.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Father complains that he was unable to participate in visitation with N.B. because of the no contact order. The no contact order was issued in his criminal case, and if Father desired to participate in visitation with N.B., the onus was on Father to seek to modify the no contact order. But there is no evidence in the record that he attempted to do so.

4.   Father attempts to analogize his circumstances with the incarcerated parent in In re R.A., 19 N.E.3d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. In that case, throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, the father was incarcerated on pending charges, during his incarceration he learned he was the baby's father, and DCS filed a petition to terminate his parental rights six months after the father made that discovery. Our court concluded that terminating father's parental rights was premature because the father was not ordered to participate in services until he was released from incarceration and his sister was available to care for the child. Here, however, Father was not incarcerated for the entire duration of these proceedings, he failed to communicate with DCS, and he did not attempt to improve his ability to parent N.B. during the months he was released.

5.   Father complains that DCS failed to consider paternal relative placement in this case. But he relies on his own testimony that he had four relatives who were suitable and willing to care for N.B. Again, it was within the province of the trial court to weigh the credibility of Father's testimony, and we will not reweigh the testimony on appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.