IN RE: the Matter of J.W. and K.O. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.L. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's adjudication of her two minor children as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother raises one issue, namely, whether the court clearly erred when it accepted Mother's mediated agreed entry and did not conduct a fact-finding hearing. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has two children: J.W., born May 20, 2013, and K.O., born August 1, 2017 (collectively, the “Children”). On August 19, 2025, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions alleging the Children to be CHINS. The petitions alleged that: Mother had “failed to provide the [C]hildren with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment free from neglect and substance abuse”; Mother had tested positive for drugs; Mother has a history of mental health diagnoses that she is not addressing; J.W. has stolen marijuana from Mother; J.W. was admitted to the hospital for suicidal behavior; and Mother failed to implement a safety plan for J.W. following his release. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29.¹ The Children were removed from Mother's home on August 19. J.W. was placed in foster care, and K.O. was placed with his father.

[3] On October 16, DCS, Mother, and the Children's Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) entered into an agreed entry. Pursuant to that entry, Mother agreed:

[J.W.] and [K.O.] are each a minor child in need of services pursuant to Indiana Law, as defined in IC 31-34-1, because [Mother] needs the assistance of DCS[ ] to ensure that the [C]hildren are provided with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment and to ensure the mental health needs of the family are appropriately met and addressed. Therefore, the coercive intervention of the court is necessary.

Id. at 75.²

[4] The court held an admission hearing on October 20. At the beginning of the hearing, the court read the language from the agreed entry aloud and asked Mother if that was “the admission [she] intended to make[.]” Supp. Tr. at 5. Mother responded: “Yes.” Id. The court then asked Mother if she understood that, by entering into the agreement, the court would not hold a hearing and asked if Mother had spoken to her attorney. Mother responded in the affirmative to both questions. The court also asked Mother if she understood the legal consequences of the agreement. Mother stated: “Not clearly but I kind of got an idea.” Id. at 6.

[5] At that point, the court gave Mother and her attorney an opportunity to speak with one another privately. Following their conversation, Mother said she had learned that one of the Children had been removed from his placement and placed at Damar, which left her feeling “emotionally perplexed and overwhelmed[.]” Id. at 7. She then stated that she “[didn't] want” to make an admission and asked for a continuance. Id. The court continued the matter and scheduled a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition.

[6] At a pre-trial conference on November 18, Mother formally moved to withdraw her admission. Mother stated that she had “reconsidered” the admission and “decided that she would prefer to go to trial.” Tr. at 6. Mother then told the court that she “didn't have a problem with signing for services” but that she “had an issue with” admitting that she was “an abusive and neglective [sic] parent.” Id. at 10-11. The court then stated that, if it accepted the agreement, it was “not going to make [Mother] make additional admissions of anything other than what's written on [her] agreement[.]” Id.

[7] At that point, the court read the language from the agreed entry:

[J.W.] and [K.O.] are each a minor child in need [of] services pursuant to Indiana law ․ because [Mother] needs the assistance [of] DCS to ensure the children are provided with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment and to ensure the mental health needs of the family are appropriately met and addressed. Therefore, the course of [sic] intervention of the court is necessary.

Id. at 11-12. The court continued: “So what I'm understanding you saying [is] you don't have a problem with that. You have a problem with saying other things?” Id. at 12. Mother responded: “Yes.” Id.

[8] The court then stated that Mother had signed the agreement and that her “request for the withdrawal has nothing to do with the validity or the enforceability of the agreement[ ].” Id. And the court found the agreement to be “fully enforceable[.]” Id. Following a contested dispositional hearing, the court entered an order stating that it accepted Mother's admission and adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. The court also entered a dispositional decree and ordered Mother to participate in services. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] On appeal, Mother contends that the court violated her due process rights when it found the Children to be CHINS without first holding a fact-finding hearing. See Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1 (“[U]nless the allegations of a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a fact[-]finding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a” CHINS petition is filed.). We will review Mother's constitutional challenge de novo. See E.P. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re M.P.), 162 N.E.3d 585, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[10] While the court did not hold a specific “fact-finding hearing,” it held several hearings throughout the proceedings. At the October 20 admission hearing, Mother, while represented by counsel, initially agreed that she needed the assistance of DCS to ensure the Children were safe and that their needs were met, and she agreed that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. See Supp. Tr. at 5. However, after a colloquy with the court and a conversation with her attorney, Mother decided that she did not want to admit that the Children were CHINS, and the court scheduled another hearing.

[11] Then, at a pretrial conference on November 18, Mother, again represented by counsel, moved to withdraw her admission. However, the reasoning behind her motion was that she had “reconsidered” the admission and that she did not want to admit that she was “an abusive and neglective [sic] parent.” Tr. at 11. The court then said that Mother had agreed that the Children are in need of services because Mother “needs the assistance of DCS to ensure the [C]hildren are provided with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment and to ensure the mental health needs of the family are appropriately met and addressed. Therefore, the course of [sic] intervention of the court is necessary.” Id. at 11-12. The court then noted, with Mother's agreement, that Mother did not “have a problem with that.” Id. at 12.

[12] Stated differently, Mother admitted, in open court, that she was unable to provide for the Children's needs on her own, that she needed the assistance of DCS, and that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary.³ Based on those factual admissions, the court then made the legal determination that the Children were CHINS. Thus, while not styled as such, the court essentially held a fact-finding hearing at which Mother admitted to the facts the court used to conclude that the Children were CHINS. See C.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re Ce.B.), 74 N.E.3d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting a custodian's argument that the court failed to hold a fact-finding hearing when the court held a hearing at which the custodian stipulated to facts that supported a CHINS adjudication). As a result, the trial court did not deny Mother her due process rights.

[13] Still, much of Mother's argument focuses on the court's denial of her request to withdraw her written stipulation. But, as discussed above, regardless of what was contained in the agreed entry, Mother admitted to the facts that the court used to adjudicate the Children to be CHINS.

[14] In any event, “stipulations generally may only be withdrawn for cause[.]” Id. As this Court has stated:

As a general rule, stipulations may not be withdrawn without the consent of both parties, or for cause. Typically, the grounds for setting aside a stipulation include fraud, mistake, undue influence, or grounds of a similar nature. It is not a ground for relief that the stipulation was disadvantageous to the party seeking relief.

Id. (quoting Harlan v. Harlan, 544 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted)). Other than simply saying that she had reconsidered the admission, Mother has not set forth any grounds for cause. The court did not err when it denied her request to withdraw her admission.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not violate Mother's due process rights when it did not hold a specific fact-finding hearing because Mother admitted in open court to the facts necessary for the court to conclude that the Children are CHINS. Nor did the court err when it denied Mother's request to withdraw her stipulation. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS filed separate petitions for each child, but the relevant language of each petition is identical. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29, 32.

2.   The version of the agreement in Mother's appendix is not signed, but Mother does not dispute that she signed the agreement. See Appellant's Br. at 10 n.3.

3.   In order for a court to adjudicate a child as a CHINS, the court must find: (1) that the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision when the parent is financially able to do so or due to the parent's failure, refusal, or inability to seek financial or other reasonable means and (2) that the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.