KATS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jacob Glen Kats (“Kats”) pleaded guilty to aggravated battery ¹ as a Level 3 felony and was sentenced to fifteen years with thirteen years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) and two years suspended to probation. Kats appeals and raises the following two restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it found aggravating factors that were not supported by the record and failed to find a mitigating factor that was supported by the record; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Kats was sixteen years old when his daughter, C.Y., was born in November 2022; her mother, N.Y., was fifteen at the time. Kats turned seventeen a month later, and following the birth of C.Y., the three lived with Kats's parents.

[4] On March 20, 2023, after Kats and N.Y. got home from school, N.Y. asked Kats to take the baby upstairs to put her down to sleep. Kats had come home from what he described as a “difficult day at school.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 106. When C.Y. would not stop crying, Kats put his hand around her throat and pinned her to the bed, squeezing her neck until she lost consciousness. Kats then placed C.Y. in her Pack ‘n Play and went downstairs; he did not seek medical attention for her. Approximately forty-five minutes later, N.Y., who was downstairs with Kats's niece, checked on C.Y. because she was still crying. She found that C.Y. could not move her neck, that the back of her neck was red, and that C.Y. seemed to be in severe pain if she attempted to move her neck.

[5] Kats and N.Y. took C.Y. to the emergency room, where x-rays revealed healing rib fractures. C.Y. was transferred to Riley Children's Hospital (“Riley”), where further scans revealed compressions fractures to her ribs and a broken sternum that were in various stages of healing. There were also several newer cervical spine fractures in C.Y.’s neck and soft tissue injuries including bruising and petechiae around her neck. C.Y. was fitted with a cervical neck brace that she wore continuously for five months.

[6] While at Riley, the police initially spoke with Kats with his father present. At that time, Kats stated that C.Y. had “fallen out of the bed a couple of weeks prior” and that was how she sustained “some of her injuries.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 19. He also stated that, as to the present injuries, he had been “walking down the stairs” holding C.Y. when she began “falling out of his arms,” and the injuries occurred when he grabbed her to keep her from falling. Id. When the officer explained to him that he did not believe what Kats was saying, Kats asked to speak with the officer without his father present. After his father left the room, Kats began to cry and admitted that he had “lost control of his emotions” about two weeks earlier and gripped C.Y. under the arms and squeezed her chest, agreeing that was probably how her sternum had been fractured. Id. at 20. Kats further admitted that on the night in question he had choked C.Y. to unconsciousness by pinning her to the bed.

[7] On March 28, 2023, the State charged Kats with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. On July 29, 2025, Kats entered into a plea agreement with the State under which he would plead guilty to Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and the State would dismiss the remaining counts. The agreement left sentencing to the trial court's discretion. On October 3, 2025, Kats pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and the trial court accepted the guilty plea. The trial court then proceeded to the sentencing hearing, at which it heard evidence and argument from both parties.

[8] At the time of Kats's sentencing hearing, C.Y. was living in a foster placement, and N.Y. was in a sober living facility and not living with C.Y. or the foster placement. N.Y. testified that C.Y was required to wear a custom-made cervical brace at all times after her injuries, and although initially, she was only to wear it for three months, she ended up wearing it for five months. N.Y. also testified that C.Y. began having seizures in 2025, roughly six months before sentencing, and that it was not clear if the seizures were related to C.Y.’s injuries as there was evidence that other family members of N.Y. had suffered similar seizures. Foster placement testified that, at that time, C.Y.’s neurosurgeon stated that C.Y. could participate in normal childhood activities, including “a little bit of gymnastics” but “suggested” that less strenuous activities such as “music ․ would be a better pastime.” Id. at 36. Foster placement testified that in the week before sentencing, C.Y. was riding a balance bike and laughing and giggling with no apparent issues.

[9] Kats submitted a sentencing memorandum, which proposed multiple mitigating circumstances, including acceptance of responsibility, likelihood of responding to probation or short-term imprisonment, character and family support, willingness to pay restitution, absence of criminal history, the unlikelihood that the circumstances would recur, cooperation with law enforcement, and undue hardship from imprisonment. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 96–99. He also referenced the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and a psychological assessment that had been performed on Kats and included four character letters from family friends that were submitted in support of Kats. The trial court accepted into evidence the State's exhibits that included photographs and C.Y.’s medical records and the defense exhibits, including the character letters and psychological assessment; it also took judicial notice of the probable cause affidavit.

[10] In its sentencing argument, the State acknowledged the existence of mitigating circumstances, including Kats's lack of criminal history or delinquent activity, young age, and guilty plea. However, it tempered the mitigation of the guilty plea because of the “significant benefit” he received by avoiding a more severe sentence through the plea agreement. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 41. The State also acknowledged that Kats appeared remorseful “once he finally came clean,” noting that “it was important to him that N.Y. not be blamed” but noted that it took Kats “a significant amount of time to actually come clean about” what he had done. Id. at 42. The State argued as aggravating factors that Kats committed a crime of violence in the presence of another minor, as both N.Y. and Kats's niece were in the home at the time the crime was committed; that he occupied a position of care, custody, or control over C.Y.; and that C.Y. was significantly younger than twelve years old, which is “the statutory threshold for that aggravator.” Id. at 43. The State also argued that it remained unknown whether C.Y. would face long-term effects from her injuries. The State requested a sentence of fourteen years, with nine years executed and five years suspended to probation.

[11] Kats argued the same mitigating factors from his sentencing memorandum and stated that Kats wanted to read a prepared letter that he wrote and wished to express his remorse. Kats also argued that he had experienced suicidal ideation, including one prior suicide attempt before C.Y.’s birth and that he had matured over the course of the proceedings and “gotten control of his anger, his depression, and his moods.” Id. at 47. Kats read a statement of allocution, in which he apologized to C.Y., N.Y., and his family; expressed a wish to eventually rebuild a relationship with C.Y.; stated that he wished daily that he could undo his actions; described progress toward personal goals, including graduating high school and maintaining employment; and asked the court for mercy.

[12] The trial court identified seven aggravating circumstances: (1) the “tender age of the victim, making the victim particularly defenseless and vulnerable”; (2) the position of trust between Kats and C.Y., particularly because C.Y. was his child; (3) the size disparity between Kats and his four-month-old daughter; (4) the severity of C.Y.’s injuries; (5) evidence of abusive trauma and repeated acts of aggression beyond the single charged count; (6) the psychological and emotional impact on Kats's family, including C.Y. and N.Y.; and (7) the unknown long-term effects of the violence on C.Y. Id. at 57–59; Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. The trial court found four mitigating circumstances: (1) Kats's guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility, which was offset by the significant benefit that Kats received from the dismissal of the Level 1 felony attempted murder count; (2) his cooperation with law enforcement, offset by his initial dishonesty; (3) the adolescent age of Kats at the time he committed the offense, offset by the four months he had to acclimate to being a parent to C.Y.; and (4) Kats's lack of criminal history, which the trial court tempered because of his young age. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 55–57; Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. The trial court separately set out the proffered mitigating factors that it declined to find, including that he was likely to respond to probation or short-term imprisonment, that he was unlikely to reoffend, that he was willing to make restitution, that the circumstances of the offense were unlikely to recur, and that imprisonment would constitute an undue hardship.

[13] The trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Kats to fifteen years, with thirteen years executed in the DOC and two years suspended to probation. Kats now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[14] Kats argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because of its allegedly improper handling of aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation of the ․ reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. If the sentencing statement “includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. “The reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 491.

[15] Kats asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because it found two aggravating factors that were not supported by the evidence presented and because it failed to find a mitigating factor that was clearly supported by the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not support the aggravating factors of the psychological and emotional impact on his family and the unknown long-term effects to the victim of the violence inflicted on her. He further argues that the evidence clearly supported finding his remorse as a mitigating factor.

[16] When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)). The trial court is not required to give the same credit or weight to the proffered mitigating circumstance that the defendant does. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[17] Here, although the trial court did not find Kats's remorse as a mitigating factor, it did make the following statement when pronouncing his sentence: “I respect his statements here that he wants to make amends, that he wishes he could talk to her and apologize. I frankly don't know what that apology would look like.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 58. This was at least a reference to Kats's feelings of remorse for his actions. Additionally, the trial court found Kats's acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor. We give “ ‘substantial deference’ to a trial court's evaluation of remorse.” Howard v. State, 266 N.E.3d 304, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). “A trial court's determination of a defendant's remorse is similar to a determination of credibility and, without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial court,” we will accept the trial court's determination. Id. (citing Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002)). Here, there are no allegations of any sort of impermissible consideration. Instead, Kats points to his allocution statement where he expressed that he was sorry for his actions and that he wished he could go back and stop himself and the fact that he sobbed openly when speaking to the police about his actions and made it clear that N.Y should not be blamed. We conclude that it was within the trial court's discretion to not explicitly find Kats's remorse as a significant mitigating factor, especially in light of the court's finding of his acceptance of responsibility to be mitigating. Kats had not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in not explicitly finding his remorse as a mitigating factor.

[18] As to his assertion that two of the trial court's aggravating factors were not proper, any impropriety in the trial court's finding of aggravating factors does not require remand for resentencing given the trial court's finding of other valid aggravating circumstances, five of which Kats does not challenge. If a trial court abuses its discretion by improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, we need to remand for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

[19] Even assuming, without concluding, that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the aggravating factors that Kats challenges, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an enhanced sentence. We are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not considered the psychological and emotional impact on Kats's family and the unknown long-term effects to C.Y. of the violence inflicted on her as aggravating factors. The trial court found five other aggravating factors outside of those, including the “[t]ender age of the victim,” the “[p]osition of trust between [Kats] and victim[,]” the difference in size between the four-month-old victim and Kats, the severity of the injuries sustained, and the evidence of repeated acts of aggression on the victim even though he was only convicted of one count. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. The trial court found the violation of the position of trust between C.Y. and Kats particularly aggravating “given the role a father plays in the upbringing of a child and how the child [was] unable to oppose or resist” Kats's actions. Id. Given the numerous unchallenged aggravating factors and the great significance that the trial court placed on several of those factors, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it did not consider the challenged aggravating factors. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[20] Kats also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[21] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[22] Kats was convicted of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. A person who commits a Level 3 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three and sixteen years, with the advisory sentence being nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Here, the trial court sentenced Kats to fifteen years with thirteen executed in the DOC and two years suspended to probation.

[23] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Kats contends that “[t]here is nothing in the nature of the crime to make it deserving of an aggravated sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 30. Although acknowledging that his crime was serious, he asserts that it was “no more egregious” than other similar cases. Id. at 28.

[24] Looking to the nature of Kats's offense, the evidence established that, on two occasions over the span of a few weeks, he battered and severely injured his three- or four-month-old daughter. The first time, he gripped C.Y. under the arms and squeezed her chest with so much force that he broke three of her ribs and caused a fracture to her sternum. He did not seek any medical attention at that time. Then, two weeks later, after having a difficult day at school, Kats put his hand around C.Y.’s throat when she would not stop crying and pinned her to the bed, squeezing her neck until she lost consciousness. Again, Kats did not seek medical attention immediately and, instead, placed her in her Pack ‘n Play and went downstairs. Medical attention was not sought until N.Y. discovered C.Y. crying forty-five minutes later and noticed that C.Y. could not move her neck. At the hospital, it was determined that C.Y. had suffered cervical spine fractures in her neck and soft tissue injuries that included bruising and petechiae around her neck. Doctors told the police that C.Y.’s injuries were “potentially fatal.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 22. As a result of the injuries, C.Y. was fitted with a cervical neck brace that she wore continuously for five months. Kats has failed to demonstrate compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. The lack of compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light means Kats must make an even stronger showing regarding his character to prevail. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.

[25] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). Kats argues that his sentence should be revised based on his character primarily because the instant crime was his first criminal conviction, he was only seventeen when he committed the crime, and he showed remorse.² Kats's lack of a criminal history is offset by the fact that he was only seventeen when he committed the instant offense. While Kats's assertions are true, his actions in severely battering his daughter and not seeking medical attention even when she lost consciousness speaks to his character. He also initially failed to take responsibility when asked about the injuries and instead stated that C.Y.’s most recent injuries were caused when he almost dropped her, and her older injuries were caused by a fall off the bed. He only took responsibility when he was confronted by the police telling him that they did not believe these stories. We conclude that Kats has not demonstrated substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character to portray his character in a positive light such that sentence revision is warranted. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Overall, Kats has not presented compelling evidence of good character needed to justify overriding the trial court's considerable sentencing discretion, particularly in light of the serious nature of his offenses.

[26] Based on the facts in the record, Kats has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5.

2.   In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Kats references the mitigating factors and how they should not have been discounted by the trial court when he was sentenced. See Appellant's Br. pp. 26–27. However, whether a trial court has abused its discretion in its recognition of mitigators and whether a defendant's sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) are two distinct analyses. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Further, the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating or mitigating factors is not subject to appellate review for an abuse of discretion, Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491, so we analyze Kats's argument solely within the framework of 7(B).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.