HUSEIN v. NEXTGEAR CAPITAL INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] NextGear Capital, Inc. (“NextGear”) sued Ahamad Husein and his business AH Ride & Pride Auto Group (“AH Ride & Pride”) for failing to make payments on a note and improperly selling collateral. Husein and AH Ride & Pride failed to answer the complaint, so NextGear obtained a default judgment. Thereafter, Husein filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court denied. Husein now appeals and raises several issues for our review, one of which is dispositive: Whether the default judgment order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 6, 2024, NextGear agreed to provide AH Ride & Pride with a line of credit, which was individually guaranteed by Husein. The individual guarantee document (“Individual Guarantee”) was signed by Husein and listed his address as “164 Keystone Dr, Norton, OH 44314” (the “Norton Address”). Appellant's App. Vol. II at 37.

[4] On June 3, 2025, NextGear filed a complaint against AH Ride & Pride and Husein, alleging that AH Ride & Pride failed to make payments and sold collateral without remitting the proceeds to NextGear.¹ The affidavit of service notes that (1) a copy of the summons and complaint were “affix[ed] ․ in an obvious manner to the door or main entrance” of the Norton Address because neither Husein nor a person of suitable age and discretion was present, and (2) the process server thereafter mailed a copy of the documents to the Norton Address. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 45.

[5] After AH Ride & Pride and Husein failed to respond to the complaint, NextGear filed a motion for the entry of default judgment, which on September 26, the trial court granted. The clerk of the court mailed notice of the judgment to Husein at the Norton Address; however, the mailing was returned undeliverable.

[6] On November 11, Husein filed a pro se motion to set aside the default judgment on the grounds that the judgment was “void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 73. In the attached affidavit, Husein stated that his “correct residence [and] mailing address” is “164 Keystone Drive, Wadsworth, OH 44281” (the “Wadsworth Address”), id. at 75; he attached copies of his residential lease and driver's license, listing his address as such. Husein further alleged he “never received, and ․ never signed for, any certified or registered mailing containing the summons and complaint”; and he “learned of this lawsuit only after the entry of the default judgment.” Id. at 75. In the alternative, Husein argued that he had timely “wired” the required payments to NextGear. Id. at 73. The trial court denied the motion to set aside, noting, “The record reflects good service on [Husein] prior to the entry of judgment.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 108.

[7] On December 2, Husein filed a motion to correct error, maintaining that the judgment was void due to improper service. NextGear filed a statement in opposition and attached an amended affidavit of service. The amended affidavit of service stated that the Norton Address and the Wadsworth address referred to the same residence:

According to various mapping systems, the city in the service address is listed as Norton or Wadsworth. However, it is the same property. Norton and Wadsworth are neighboring municipalities in the same general area, and this subdivision lies very close to the boundary between them. Different mapping and GPS providers label this same area as either Norton or Wadsworth.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 145. NextGear attached satellite images showing the same residence marked for both addresses. The trial court denied the motion to correct error. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Default Judgment Order Is Not Void for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

[8] Husein argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) because the judgment was void. “When a judgment is void under Rule 60(B)(6), the trial court has no discretion to enforce it, and thus, we review the court's decision de novo.” T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023) (citing M.H. v. State, 207 N.E.3d 412, 416 (Ind. 2023)). “A judgment is void when the issuing court lacks personal jurisdiction.” T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 726. Under such a circumstance, the judgment “ ‘is a complete nullity’ without legal effect from its inception.” Id. (quoting Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998)).

[9] Husein argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because the complaint and summons were improperly served at the Norton Address instead of the Wadsworth Address. Service of process on the defendant is necessary for the trial court to acquire personal jurisdiction. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 759 (Ind. 2014) (citing Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155 n.3). At the time service was made here, Indiana Trial Rule 4.1(A)(3) provided that “[s]ervice may be made upon an individual” by “leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at [the defendant's] dwelling house or usual place of abode.” T.R. 4.1(A)(3) (effective Jan. 1, 2018, to Dec. 31, 2025). When such service was made, Trial Rule 4.1(B) provided that “the person making the service also shall send by first class mail, a copy of the summons and the complaint to the last known address of the person being served, and this fact shall be shown upon the return.” T.R. 4.1(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2018, to Dec. 31, 2025).²

[10] There is no dispute that the requirements of Trial Rule 4.1(A)(3) were met. The affidavit of service indicates that the process server “affixed” a copy of the summons and complaint to the “door or main entrance” of the Norton Address. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 45. The Norton Address was the address listed for Husein in the signed Individual Guarantee and, according to the amended affidavit of service, indicates the same physical residence as the Wadsworth Address, at which Husein claims service should have been made.

[11] As for Trial Rule 4.1(B), Husein argues that because the clerk's notice of judgment mailed to the Norton Address was returned undeliverable, the service of process (e.g. the summons and complaint) mailing to the Norton Address likewise never reached Husein. Husein further argues that the process server could not “substitute[ ]” the Wadsworth Address for the Norton Address in the amended affidavit of service. Appellant's Br. at 16.

[12] Even if we ignore the amended affidavit of service, service to the Norton Address suffices as a mailing to Husein's “last known address,” T.R. 4.1(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2018, to Dec. 31, 2025). The Norton Address was listed as Husein's address in the Individual Guarantee signed less than one year before NextGear filed its complaint, and Husein points to no evidence that NextGear should have known that address was incorrect. As for delivery of the mailing, unlike Trial Rule 4.1(A)(1), which requires mailing “by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained,” Trial Rule 4.1(B) does not contain similar provisions requiring proof of receipt.

[13] Moreover, Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, “No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond.” Because proper service under Trial Rules 4.1(A)(3) and (B) was attempted here, Trial Rule 4.15(F) applies. See Menard, Inc. v. Lane, 68 N.E.3d 1106, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied; Barrow v. Pennington, 700 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Affixing a copy of the summons and complaint at Husein's actual residence and the subsequent mailing of the documents thereto was sufficient to meet this standard.

[14] In sum, Husein was properly served, and the default judgment order is not void for lack of personal jurisdiction.³ The trial court did not err by denying Husein's motion to set aside that judgment.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On March 23, 2026, AH Ride & Pride was dismissed from this appeal with prejudice.

2.   Indiana Trial Rule 4.1(B) has since been amended and no longer requires that a copy of the summons and complaint be mailed to the defendant's “last known address,” T.R. 4.1(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2018, to Dec. 31, 2025); instead, the current rule requires that those documents be mailed to “the address on the summons of the person being served,” T.R. 4.1(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2026).

3.   Because Husein raises the issue on appeal, we address the trial court's order denying Husein's motion to set aside, which stated that Husein did not “allege[ ] a meritorious defense.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 108. A meritorious defense need not be shown when a default judgment is entered without proper service of the summons and complaint on the defendant. Shotwell v. Cliff Hagan Ribeye Franchise, Inc., 572 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. 1991) (citing Peralta v. Heights Medical Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988)); see Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) (requiring movant to allege a meritorious claim or defense only when a motion is brought under T.R. 60(B)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (8)). The trial court's remark, however, is harmless because service on Husein was not improper. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error ․ in any ruling or order ․ by the trial court ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

Felix, Judge.

Bradford, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs in result without opinion.