BARNETT v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Brandon Barnett was convicted of criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury after he held a child by the hair while he and his girlfriend attacked her. Barnett now appeals and raises one issue: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 16, 2025, 12-year-old A.G. was at a park in Jeffersonville, Indiana, with her friends. L.S., another child, was also at the park. After A.G. “ma[de] fun” of L.S., and was “rude” to her, L.S. called her mother, Erica Snider, and Barnett, Snider's boyfriend.¹

[4] Snider and Barnett went to the park, where Snider talked with A.G. A.G. had an “attitude,” so Snider “got in [A.G.’s] face” and the two began to fight. Tr. Vol. II at 196. Barnett then got involved. Barnett “grabbed” A.G. by the hair and “kept ․ pushing [her] down and wouldn't let [her] get up,” id. at 245; he “was moving [Snider] out [of] the way” while “hitting [A.G.] at the same time,” id. at 218. Some of Barnett's involvement was recorded on the nearby children's cell phones.

[5] After the fight, Snider and Barnett left the park, and the children called 911. The State charged Barnett with criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury as a Level 4 felony ² and battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 14 years of age as a Level 5 felony ³ .⁴ The State further alleged that Barnett was a habitual offender.⁵

[6] After the State presented its case in chief during the jury trial, Barnett requested a directed verdict on the confinement count, which the trial court denied. Barnett did not present any evidence. The jury found Barnett guilty as charged, and the trial court found him to be a habitual offender. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court vacated the conviction on the battery count and entered a conviction on only the criminal confinement count. Barnett was ordered to serve an enhanced sentence of 12 years, with 4 of those years executed in prison, 4 years executed on community corrections, and 4 years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Barnett's Criminal Confinement Conviction

[7] Barnett frames the issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury as a Level 4 felony. In making this argument, Barnett argues that the trial court “abused its discretion” by denying his motion for a “directed verdict.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Barnett does not cite Indiana Trial Rule 50, which governs motions for a directed verdict, nor does he present a cogent argument regarding the motion; his challenge to the denial of the motion is thus waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring arguments be supported with “cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities [and] statutes ․ relied on”); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”).

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we address Barnett's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[9] A person commits criminal confinement when he or she “knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a). “Confine” means to “substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” Id. § 35-42-3-1; see also id. § 35-31.5-2-57 (applying definition to criminal confinement). “[A]ny amount of force can cause a confinement because force, however brief, equals confinement.” Dorsey v. State, 262 N.E.3d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Merriweather v. State, 778 N.E.2d 449, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied, 265 N.E.3d 1008 (Ind. 2025).

[10] In Hardley v. State, this court affirmed a defendant's conviction for criminal confinement because he had “pinned down” the victim such that she could not “move or get up.” 893 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 905 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009). Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Barnett prevented A.G. from getting up off the ground by holding her hair and “pushing [her] down.” Tr. Vol. II at 245.

[11] Barnett argues that by the time he intervened, A.G. was “already on the ground with Snider on top of her.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Barnett contributed to A.G.’s confinement by holding her down while Snider attacked her. Barnett's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Barnett's conviction. We thus affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Barnett's relationship to L.S. is not described precisely in the record. For the purposes of this appeal, we refer to him as Snider's boyfriend.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(g)(5)(B) (effective July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2026), recodified at I.C. § 35-42-2-1(h)(5)(B).

4.   Snider was charged with identical offenses in Cause 10C01-2504-F4-000023.

5.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.