Rashaan Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Rashaan Williams sold Shylis Garrett pills and cocaine, and Garrett died of an overdose within hours of ingesting those drugs. Williams was found guilty of dealing in a controlled substance causing death, admitted to being a habitual offender, and was sentenced to 40 years of incarceration. Williams now appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting into evidence Williams's unrecorded statements to law enforcement; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Williams's conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In July 2023, Garrett and her boyfriend Donovan Watson lived in an apartment in Marion County, Indiana. On July 13, Garrett was texting on her phone and told Watson that she was trying to obtain cocaine and blue pills (“Blues”). Garrett “eventually exited the apartment and came back in with the drugs”—“a small bag of cocaine and ․ maybe three ․ pills” with an “M” stamped on them. Tr. Vol. II at 133.¹ Garrett and Watson both used the cocaine, and Garrett also crushed and “snorted” at least one of the Blues. Id. at 135. Watson did not witness Garrett buy or use any other drugs that night. Garrett went to bed after she “did the drugs,” id., and Watson joined her in bed “later on[ ],” id. at 136. Watson observed Garrett “breathing very heavily that night,” so he “rolled her over on her side” and “went back to sleep.” Id.

[4] When Watson woke up the next morning, he noticed that Garrett was “very cold,” so he “tr[ied] to wake her up by shaking her and calling her name.” Tr. Vol. II at 136. Watson eventually called 911 after Garrett failed to wake.

[5] When law enforcement officers and a deputy coroner arrived at the apartment, Garrett was deceased. Watson gave the deputy coroner and the officers Garrett's phone and told them about the drugs Garrett snorted. Garrett's phone revealed text messages between Garrett and “Og Pills,” whose phone number was 765-609-9900, Tr. Vol. II at 154, that were “indicative of a potential drug distribution that was set to take place,” id. at 215. Officers also saw that Garrett had “Cash App” on her phone, which is a financial transaction application that requires users to register using their name, date of birth, and the last four digits of their Social Security numbers. Id. at 220. Accordingly, law enforcement officers sought and received call detail and Cash App records for the phone numbers of Garrett and “Og Pills.” Id. at 215.

[6] The records for Garrett's phone number revealed that between 7:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on July 13, Garrett called “Og Pills” several times, she sent him her location, and he messaged her that he was on his way to her at approximately 10 p.m. After Garrett sent her location to “Og Pills” but before he texted that he was on his way, Garrett texted a different contact labeled in her phone as “Need Rehab.” In the text, Garrett told Need Rehab that someone else wanted to charge her “$5 for blues. And [she would] buy some coke from him.” Ex. Vol. I at 45. Garrett's Cash App records showed that she made a $35 payment to “Gotti” for “food.” Ex. Vol. I at 33. The Cash App record for “Gotti” (1) was linked to phone number 765-609-9900; (2) gave the verified name as “Rashaan Williams”; (3) listed Williams's birthdate as October 1, 1977; and (4) showed a $35 payment from “Shylis Garrett” for “food.” Id. at 34–35. Williams's phone records revealed text messages that “mirror[ed]” the text messages exchanged between Og Pills and Garrett in Garrett's phone records. Tr. Vol. III at 91. Using historical cell site analysis, law enforcement officers found that at approximately 10 p.m. on July 13, Williams and Garrett were both near Garrett's home.

[7] In addition to evidence being discovered through the police investigation, Dr. Jimmie Smith performed an autopsy of Garrett. The toxicology report revealed “a breakdown of clonazepam ․ [,] fentanyl, and a breakdown product of fentanyl[,] acetyl fentanyl[,] bromazolam[, a]nd ․ a metabolite or breakdown product of cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II at 189. Acetyl fentanyl “is an illicit street medication that people take to get high.” Id. at 190. Fentanyl can be fatal at amounts greater than or equal to 3 nanograms per milliliter of blood. Garrett's toxicology report revealed 6.8 nanograms per milliliter of “fentanyl or fentanyl breakdown product” in her blood. Id. at 193. Dr. Smith determined that Garrett's cause of death was “combined intoxication by clonazepam, acetyl fentanyl, bromazolam, fentanyl, and cocaine.” Id. at 194.

[8] In January 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Master Detective Chris Smith conducted a custodial interview of Williams wherein he admitted that he knew Garrett, admitted his phone number was 765-609-9900, and admitted to selling Garrett marijuana on the night of July 13 (collectively, the “Custodial Statements”). Williams denied selling Garrett anything other than marijuana. A system “glitch” prevented the interview from being recorded, Tr. Vol. III at 5, so Detective Smith “documented ․ what [he] could recall [from] the interview,” id. at 6.

[9] The State charged Williams with dealing in a controlled substance causing death as a Level 1 felony,² and alleged he was a habitual offender ³ . At trial, Detective Smith testified that he “kn[e]w through [his] experience, ‘food’ is fentanyl.” Tr. Vol. III at 95. Detective Smith also testified that Blues typically contain fentanyl, and he confirmed that $35 was “a reasonable [or] expected amount to pay for three blue pills and a small amount of cocaine,” id. at 129. Detective Smith additionally testified about the Custodial Statements. Federal Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Justin Brandt testified that one “could make a profit” from selling three Blues and “some” cocaine for $35. Id. at 150.

[10] The jury found Williams guilty as charged, and he admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Williams to 40 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by Admitting the Custodial Statements

[11] Williams claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial. “Although an abuse-of-discretion standard typically applies to a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence, we engage in de novo review when an alleged ‘constitutional violation has resulted from the admission of evidence.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)).

[12] Williams failed to object to the admission of the Custodial Statements on due process grounds at trial, so he asks us to review his claim for fundamental error. “Fundamental error is an exception to the general rule that a party's failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or amounted to a clear violation of basic due-process principles.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (citing C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 595 (Ind. 2019)).

[13] Here, the State failed to record Williams's custodial interview due to a system glitch, and Detective Smith “documented” what he remembered from the interview. Tr. Vol. III at 6. When asked during a hearing outside the jury's presence whether “one of the federal agents ․ show[ed] Williams two photographs to ask him to point out someone from whom he may have gotten pills,” Detective Smith could not recall. Tr. Vol. II at 172. On appeal, Williams argues that the failure to create a record of “whether the defendant was promised leniency if he would point a finger in the direction of someone else” amounts to a failure to preserve exculpatory information. Appellant's Br. at 25. We cannot agree.

[14] The State has a duty to preserve exculpatory evidence. See Albrecht v. State, 737 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Holder v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind. 1991)). Although Williams presents his claim as one of a failure to preserve evidence,⁴ he cites no authority that extends this rule to cases involving evidence that was never created or possessed by law enforcement or the State. For this reason, we need not address the exculpatory nature of the evidence or whether the State acted in bad faith in handling this evidence. See Brown v. State, 222 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding the destruction of evidence that the State never possessed cannot be attributed to the State), trans. denied, 232 N.E.3d 642 (Ind. 2024); see also State v. Jessop, 540 P.3d 713, 719–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2023) (concluding that when an officer fails to activate a body camera, no video footage ever existed that could have been lost or destroyed, so the case law controlling claims for destruction of or failure to preserve evidence did not apply), cert. denied, 550 P.3d 998 (Utah 2024). Notably, Williams did not present any evidence that any law enforcement officer asked him about his suppliers or offered leniency to him for providing information about those suppliers. Williams's entire argument is couched in terms of these questions having been asked to him, but he never developed the record through the law enforcement officers who testified at trial or as an offer of proof through Williams that these questions were ever even asked. Williams has not demonstrated a violation of his right to due process. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit fundamental error in admitting the Custodial Statements.⁵

2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Williams's Conviction

[15] Williams argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for dealing in a controlled substance causing death as a Level 1 felony. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[16] In order to convict Williams as charged of dealing in a controlled substance causing death under Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1.5(a), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams “knowingly or intentionally ․ deliver[ed]” a fentanyl containing substance “that, when ․ used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested,” resulted in Garrett's death. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a)(1); id. § 35-48-4-1. “Fentanyl containing substance” includes, among other things, acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl. Id. § 35-48-1.1-19(2), (26).

[17] Williams argues first that the State did not sufficiently prove that he delivered drugs to Garrett and second that the State failed to prove that the drugs delivered by Williams caused Garrett's death. We address each argument in turn.

[18] First, Williams claims that the State failed to demonstrate that he was the person who delivered fentanyl to Garrett because Garrett also shared her location with “Need Rehab,” and Watson did not see who delivered the Blues and cocaine to Garrett. This is a clear request to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that (1) although Garrett attempted to obtain drugs from Need Rehab, he refused to “serve” her, so she told him someone else was “charg[ing her] $5 for blues. And [she]’ll buy some coke from him,” Ex. Vol. I at 45–46; (2) Garrett sent her location to Williams; (3) Williams texted Garrett that he was on his way at approximately 10 p.m.; (4) Garrett paid Williams $35 at approximately 10 p.m. for “food,” which is slang for fentanyl, id. at 33; (5) Watson testified Garrett was trying to obtain Blues and cocaine, saw her exit the apartment and return with them, and watched her consume them; and (6) based on cell site data, Williams and Garrett were both near Garrett's home at approximately 10 p.m. on July 13. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Williams supplied Garrett with the Blues and cocaine.

[19] Second, Williams asserts the State failed to prove causation. Where, as here, “a crime requires not merely conduct but also a specified result of conduct, a defendant generally may not be convicted unless his conduct is both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the legal cause (often called the proximate cause) of the result.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1083 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014)). This means that the State must prove (1) “that the decedent's death resulted from the drugs the defendant distributed” and (2) “that the death was reasonably foreseeable.” Russell v. State, 217 N.E.3d 544, 550 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), trans. denied, 221 N.E.3d 1212 (Ind. 2023). Moreover, “[i]t is reasonably foreseeable that a person who receives a drug will consume it,” so the decedent's “ingestion of the drug is not an intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation.” Id. (citing Yeary, 186 N.E.3d at 673). When, as here, multiple drugs are in the decedent's system, proof of a causal connection “may consist of evidence that the drug distributed by the defendant was enough, by itself, to cause the death. It may also consist of evidence that the distributed drug, while not enough to cause the death by itself, foreseeably combined with other substances to cause the death.” Yeary, 186 N.E.3d at 674.

[20] We have already concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams delivered Blues and cocaine to Garrett. As to causation, Williams's primary argument appears to be that because the “State failed to quantify acetyl fentanyl,” it “failed to establish that illicit fentanyl delivered by Williams killed” Garrett. Appellant's Br. at 24. Williams's argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which again, we will not do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). The State alleged that Williams committed dealing in a controlled substance causing death by delivering fentanyl, in violation of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1, which killed Garrett. Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1 criminalizes delivering “fentanyl containing substances,” including both fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl, id. § 35-48-1.1-19(2), (26). Williams's distinction between fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl is therefore irrelevant.

[21] Williams nevertheless appears to argue that fentanyl is a legal prescription and that Blues only contain acetyl fentanyl ⁶ and not fentanyl. See id. at 18–19. We disagree. Dr. Smith testified one of the breakdown products shown in the toxicology report was “4-ANPP,” which is “often detected when the fentanyl that the person used was the illicit type.” Tr. Vol. II at 199. Thus, the jury could infer from the evidence that the pills Williams delivered contained illicit fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl as a derivative of that illicit fentanyl. Even if we were to assume that fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl are two separate, unrelated drugs, Blues commonly contain a mixture of drugs, so a jury could still infer the Blues contained both substances.

[22] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that (1) Blues typically contain fentanyl; (2) Garrett texted Need Rehab that she was getting Blues and coke; (3) Watson testified that Garrett ingested cocaine and Blues; (4) Garrett's cause of death was “combined intoxication by clonazepam, acetyl fentanyl, bromazolam, fentanyl, and cocaine,” Tr. Vol. II at 194; (5) the toxicology report showed 6.8 nanograms per milliliter of fentanyl in Garrett's blood, which was within the “lethal range” and “could be fatal” without any of the other drugs, including acetyl fentanyl, id. at 193; (6) Garrett went to bed after ingesting the cocaine and Blues she received from Williams, did not buy or use any other drugs, and died within hours; and (7) fentanyl is “a very potent medication, stronger than morphine, stronger than heroin,” id. at 191, and is a “central nervous system depressant,” id. at 200, that decreases “the breathing rate,” id. at 191. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Garrett died from the drugs Williams delivered and that her death was reasonably foreseeable. For the foregoing reasons, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Williams's conviction.

Conclusion

[23] In sum, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting the Custodial Statements into evidence, and the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Williams's conviction. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although “[t]rial records are rarely if ever perfect,” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 753 N.E.2d 649, 662 (Ind. 2001), the Transcript in this case is far from the best. The Transcript contains various types of errors. There are numerous typos that change the meaning of the testimony, question, or objection. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 137:18, 144:10, 147:10; Tr. Vol. III at 6:13. In some instances, witnesses’ and trial attorneys’ names are reported incorrectly. Tr. Vol. II at 220:5; Tr. Vol. III at 142:15–20, 143:15, 162:4–5. At one point in the Transcript, a motion, presumably made by the State, is attributed to the trial court. Tr. Vol. II at 107–08. At another point, an objection, presumably made by Williams, is attributed to the Bailiff. Tr. Vol. II at 177:15. At yet another point, the State's closing argument is attributed to the trial court. Tr. Vol. III at 228:1. These errors, among others not described herein, complicated but did not substantially impede our review of Williams's appeal. Regardless, we remind the Court Reporter that this court relies on transcripts being true and accurate representations of the transcribed proceedings. See Ind. Appellate Rule 28(B) (“The Court Reporter shall certify the Transcript is correct.”); see, e.g., Orr v. State, 277 N.E.3d 1262, No. 25A-CR-1786 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2026) (mem.) (identifying similar errors), trans. denied, 280 N.E.3d 249 (Ind. 2026).Based upon the types of errors reviewed, it appears that generative artificial intelligence may have assisted with the preparation of this transcript. While AI can improve efficiency and be a productive tool for many professionals, it is incumbent upon those using such systems to proofread and ensure the accuracy of the generated product.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a)(1).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

4.   At trial, Williams objected to the admission of the Custodial Statements, claiming Indiana Evidence Rule 617 barred their admission. Williams did not renew this argument in his Appellant's Brief, so he has waived it for our review. Likewise, in his reply brief, Williams argues for the first time that Evidence Rule 617’s exceptions make it “unworkable.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. Because Williams did not raise this argument until his reply brief, he has waived it for our review. See Newcomb v. State, 194 N.E.3d 131, 142 (Ind. Ct. App.) (citing Snow v. State, 137 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied), trans. denied, 199 N.E.3d 778 (Ind. 2022).

5.   Even if the State had failed to preserve the evidence Williams alleges was omitted from Detective Smith's recorded recollection, it would not have been considered exculpatory because it only addressed from whom Williams bought the Blues—not whether someone other than he delivered the drugs to Garrett. See Albrecht v. State, 737 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ind. 2000) (defining “exculpatory” as “[c]learing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt”) (alteration in original) (quoting Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

6.   Acetyl fentanyl is a “derivative” of illegally manufactured fentanyl. Tr. Vol. III at 173.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.