Nathan Jacobs, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Progressive Insurance, Appellee-Defendant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Nathan Jacobs appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error following the court's dismissal with prejudice of his complaint against Progressive Insurance. Jacobs argues that the trial court's dismissal order is confusing and that the court should have dismissed his complaint without prejudice. Concluding that Jacobs has not demonstrated error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Jacobs was in an auto accident with Mickey Covington. Covington had allegedly purchased auto insurance coverage from Progressive. Jacobs, by counsel, filed suit against Covington. Early in the case, Jacobs fired his counsel. He then alleged that Progressive had engaged in misconduct. Jacobs filed lawsuits against Progressive for its alleged misconduct.

[3] The current case began on August 4, 2025, when Jacobs, proceeding without counsel, filed a “Class Action Complaint” against Progressive. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 4. He claimed that he was filing suit on behalf of the following class: “All policyholders, claimants, or legal clients nationwide who were subjected to unauthorized legal representation, post-claim filings, or obstruction by Progressive Insurance or its agents after legal counsel was terminated or post-accident.” Id. at 4-5. Jacobs raised four claims on behalf of himself and the putative class: “Declaratory Relief,” “Injunctive Relief,” “Monetary Damages, and “Punitive Damages.” Id. at 5. He did not file a motion to certify a class.

[4] On December 9, 2025, Progressive filed a notice of enlargement of time to file an answer. The company also filed a jury trial demand. On December 22, Progressive filed a motion in a different Marion County case, which was also brought by Jacobs against Progressive, to consolidate the current case with that one. Id. at 233.

[5] On December 23, 2025, Jacobs filed in the current case a “Motion for Court Approval of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice of Putative Class Action (Trial Rule 23(E))” and a proposed order. Id. at 6. He claimed that he “does not intend to litigate class allegations without counsel and cannot adequately represent the interests of absent class members in this posture.” Id. Jacobs further stated that he intended to “focus his efforts” on his individual claims against Progressive in the other pending Marion County case. Id.

[6] On January 12, 2026, Progressive responded to Jacobs’ motion, asserting that the court should either dismiss this case with prejudice or consolidate it with the other case. The next day, Jacobs filed a reply, arguing that the circumstances did not merit dismissal with prejudice.

[7] On January 14, 2026, the court issued an order that consisted of a block of text typed or printed on Jacobs’ proposed order, as follows:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Id. at 2.

[8] Jacobs filed a “Motion to Correct Error,” arguing that the court's dismissal order was ambiguous because the court had not crossed out or otherwise eliminated the language in his proposed order dismissing the case without prejudice. Appellee's App. Vol. 3, p. 8. Progressive opposed the motion.

[9] On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued an order denying Jacobs’ Motion to Correct Error. The court stated that its dismissal of the case was “with prejudice.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 3. This appeal followed.¹

Discussion and Decision

I. Language of Dismissal Order

[10] Jacobs argues that the trial court's dismissal order “must be clarified” because it contained both the trial court's language dismissing the case with prejudice and his own language dismissing the case without prejudice. Appellant's Br. p. 8. He further claims that the trial court's order denying his Motion to Correct Errors did not adequately address the conflicting language. We disagree.

[11] Trial courts sometimes handwrite or print their decisions on litigants’ proposed orders or on preexisting forms. See, e.g., In re M.W., 913 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (trial court issued printed order with handwritten statement about litigation costs). A fully typed order is preferable to minimize the possibility of confusion, but it is not mandatory.

[12] In the current case, the trial court's order denying Jacobs’ motion to correct error resolves any ambiguity in the court's dismissal order, because the court clearly stated that it had dismissed the case with prejudice. There is no need for remand.

II. Dismissal With Prejudice – Factors Presented in Record

[13] Jacobs argues that the record does not support the trial court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice.² Dismissal of civil actions by plaintiffs is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 41(A), which provides:

(A) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.

(1) By Plaintiff—By Stipulation. Subject to contrary provisions of these rules or of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court:

(a) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs; or

(b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.

Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply if the plaintiff in such action could not effectuate service of process, or otherwise procure adjudication on the merits.

(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in subsection (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim or cross-claim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice.

[14] In Indiana, it has long been the case that “dismissals [without prejudice] should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” Rose v. Rose, 526 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied. “ ‘Legal prejudice is shown when actual legal rights are threatened or when monetary or other burdens appear to be extreme or unreasonable[.]’ ” Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Needler, 816 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 8 Moore's Federal Practice § 41.40[6], pp. 41-140, 41-142 (3d ed. 2003)). Relevant factors for consideration include:

(1) the extent to which the suit has progressed, including the defendant's effort and expense in preparing for trial, (2) the plaintiff's diligence in prosecuting the action or in bringing the motion, (3) the duplicative expense of relitigation, and (4) the adequacy of plaintiff's explanation for the need to dismiss. Other factors that have been cited include whether the motion is made after the defendant has made a dispositive motion or at some other critical juncture in the case and any vexatious conduct or bad faith on plaintiff's part.

Id. (quoting Moore's, § 41.40[6], pp. 41-140, 41-142).

[15] The current case had not progressed very far when Jacobs moved for dismissal. Progressive had not yet filed an answer, choosing instead to extend the filing deadline, and Jacobs had not yet moved to certify a class. As a result, Progressive's effort and expense in this case were minimal. But Jacobs had not been diligent in prosecuting the suit, allowing it to remain inactive for three months.

[16] We next turn to the element of duplicative expense of relitigation. Regarding Jacobs’ individual claims against Progressive (which were the only claims in dispute in this case because Jacobs had not yet moved to certify a class), this lawsuit was duplicative of another case pending in Marion County and brought by Jacobs. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 6 (Jacobs stated in his motion that he is “pursuing his individual claims ․ in a related civil action”).

[17] Next, Jacobs’ explanation for the need to dismiss was inadequate. Although he requested dismissal without prejudice, the language of the motion suggested that he was abandoning his class action claims. He simply stated that he “does not intend to litigate class allegations without counsel and cannot adequately represent the interests of absent class members in the posture.” Id. Jacobs did not describe his past efforts to hire counsel, if any, and he did not state whether he would hire counsel in the future. Under Rule 41, Jacobs was not obligated to explain his future plans, if any, for the class claims. But the motion reads as if he was finished pressing those claims, leaving only Jacobs’ individual claim to be adjudicated in another case. Finally, Jacobs moved to dismiss at a critical juncture, which was Progressive's filing of a motion to consolidate this case with another pending Marion County case.³

[18] Rule 41(A)(2) provides that dismissal without prejudice is the default, unless the trial court determines otherwise. And Indiana's courts prefer to “resolve cases on the merits” when possible. Garrett v. Nissan of Lafayette, LLC, 216 N.E.3d 496, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). But considering the factors discussed above, Jacobs has not demonstrated that the trial court's denial of his motion to correct errors or its dismissal of this case with prejudice were abuses of its discretion. See Hartford Iron & Metal v. August Mack Env't, Inc., 254 N.E.3d 1090, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (trial court did not abuse discretion by dismissing case with prejudice after plaintiff moved to dismiss without prejudice; plaintiff failed to take timely action on case and moved to dismiss only after defendant requested referral to arbitration), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[19] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jacobs has filed a motion for oral argument. We deny the motion by separate order.

2.   Jacobs also presents several procedural arguments. He claims that the trial court should have provided him with certain safeguards before dismissing the case with prejudice, such as: (1) an evidentiary hearing; (2) “case-specific findings” explaining why dismissal without prejudice was inadequate (Appellant's Br. p. 9); and (3) an opportunity to withdraw his motion for dismissal. Jacobs also states that the Court should follow a line of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and other federal circuits that state: (1) when a plaintiff moves to dismiss a case without prejudice; but (2) the defendant requests dismissal with prejudice; then (3) the trial court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to withdraw the motion. Appellant's Br. p. 9 (citing, e.g., Carter v. City of Alton, 922 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2019)).Jacobs did not present these claims to the trial court, either in his reply in support of his motion to dismiss or in his motion to correct error. We will not address them. See Garcia v. Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., 14 N.E.3d 88, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Appellate courts generally do not review an issue that was not presented to the trial court.”), trans. denied.

3.   Progressive, citing Jacobs’ history of filing lawsuits against it in relation to the car accident and subsequent litigation, argues that Jacobs filed this case in bad faith. We need not address that argument to resolve this appeal.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.