Charles J. Evans, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Charles J. Evans (“Evans”) appeals the trial court's orders revoking his probation and bail in four consolidated criminal cases. Evans presents two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Evans's bail; and

II. Whether it abused its discretion by revoking the balance of his suspended sentence and ordering that time executed in the Scott County Jail.

[2] We find no abuse of discretion in the bail and probation revocation decisions and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2023, an officer observed Evans sleeping inside a city-owned building without permission. Evans refused orders to leave and then physically resisted law enforcement efforts to handcuff him. The State then charged Evans with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in cause number 72C01-2308-CM-284 (“Case 1”). In March 2024, Evans pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 365 days, all suspended to probation.

[4] In August 2024, while on probation in Case 1, law enforcement observed Evans sitting at a Circle K gas station, a location where he was prohibited from being. The State then charged Evans with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass in cause number 72C01-2408-CM-296 (“Case 2”). Evans pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 360 days with 356 days suspended to probation. At the same time Evans pleaded guilty to Case 2, he also pleaded guilty to criminal mischief under Cause 72C01-2411-CM-388 and received a 90-day jail sentence that was time served. Evans was thereafter serving probation in both Cases 1 and 2.

[5] While on probation in Cases 1 and 2, on December 27, 2024, the State charged Evans in cause number 72C01-2412-CM-438 (“Case 3”) with Class A misdemeanor trespass after Evans refused to leave the front porch of a private residence while appearing intoxicated by narcotics. Evans's bail was set at a $10,000 corporate surety bond or $1,000 cash bond.

[6] In March 2025, the State filed separate petitions to revoke Evans's probation in Case 1 and Case 2. The petition in Case 1 alleged the following violations: (1) the new criminal conduct in Cases 2 and 3 and (2) failing to meet with his probation officer. The Case 2 petition alleged violations based upon the new offense charged in Case 3 and failure to meet with his probation officer. The trial court issued a summons for Evans to appear for an initial hearing on the violations on April 29, 2025.

[7] However, Evans failed to make it to the initial hearing without again being charged with a new crime. On April 17, 2025, the State charged Evans with Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury in cause number 72C01-2504-CM-109 (“Case 4”). This charge arose from an incident in which Evans allegedly attacked Morris Eden (“Eden”). At this point, Evans was being held without bail in Case 3 and on a $20,000 corporate surety bond or $2,000 cash bond in Case 4. Although bail was set in Case 4, Evans was arrested and detained for violating his release conditions in Case 3 by committing the alleged battery in Case 4 and was therefore held without bail pending a hearing on the petition to revoke bail in Case 3. Shortly after filing the charge in Case 4, the State amended both probation revocation petitions to include the new criminal conduct in Case 4.

[8] In July 2025, Evans moved to have bail set in Case 3 and to reduce his bail in Case 4. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion in August 2025, and the court set bail in Case 3 as a $10,000 cash only bond and declined to modify the terms of bail in Case 4. Then, in October 2025, Evans was again charged with new criminal offenses under cause number 72C01-2510-F6-224, where it was alleged that Evans had harassed and intimidated an officer of the Scott County Jail. The State then moved to revoke Evans's bail in Cases 3 and 4, alleging he had committed new offenses of intimidation and harassment. This would be Evans's fourth new criminal case since being placed on probation in Cases 1 and 2.

[9] On December 1, 2025, the trial court then held a consolidated hearing on the State's petitions to revoke probation in Cases 1 and 2 with its petitions to revoke bail in Cases 3 and 4. Evans's probation officer stated that Evans attended only a few probation meetings before losing contact with the office, fell behind on his fees, and had criminal charges filed against him in three new cases, indicating that he is unfit to remain on probation. At one point during the hearing, the trial court observed that Evans had his probation revoked in 2019 for possession of methamphetamine.

[10] Sergeant Cody Kelly of the Austin Police Department (“Sergeant Kelly”) also testified regarding his investigation of the battery alleged in Case 4. Sergeant Kelly shared that he responded to a report of a physical fight at Eden's house. Eden told Sergeant Kelly that he had gone to the grocery store for Evans, and upon returning, Evans became enraged over the purchases, climbed onto Eden's bed, and began striking him. Sergeant Kelly observed blood on Eden's face and chest. A witness, Charles Bowling, told Sergeant Kelly he had heard someone yelling for help, went to the shed in the back, and found Eden on a bed with Evans on top of him. Evans told law enforcement that Eden struck him first with a stick when Evans declined to buy him cigarettes, but no witness corroborated his account. A second witness, Gladys Sizemore (“Sizemore”), said she believed Eden's account over Evans's because Eden did not pick up a stick until after the two were separated, and she never saw him swing it. Evans did not testify.

[11] The trial court took the matter under advisement and set a pronouncement hearing for December 18, 2025. At the hearing, the trial court concluded that the State proved by a preponderance of evidence that Evans had violated the terms of his probation by committing new criminal offenses and failing to report as directed. The court concluded that Evans was “not an appropriate candidate for either probation or home detention” because he had been charged in several new cases. Tr. Vol. I p. 52. Consequently, the court revoked the entirety of his previously suspended sentences,¹ which were 365 days in Case 1 and 356 days in Case 2 and ordered Evans to serve consecutive sentences at the Scott County Jail. Next, the court concluded that Evans violated the conditions of bail and revoked bail in Cases 3 and 4. The trial court stated: “that the ․ State has established by clear and convincing evidence ․ [that] [Evans] violated the conditions of his bond ․ [a]nd order that the bond be revoked in both cases [.]” Id. at 53 (emphasis added). Evans now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Evans claims the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his bail in Cases 3 and 4 and by revoking his probation and imposing the balance of his suspended time in Cases 1 and 2. We address each revocation decision in turn.

I. Bail

[13] Evans argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his bail because the State did not provide sufficient evidence that he committed a new criminal offense, and to the extent that a crime had been committed, failed to demonstrate that the crime demonstrated “instability and disdain for the trial court's authority.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. We review the trial court's decision to revoke bail for abuse of discretion. Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). It is the fact-finder's responsibility to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. Moreover, we consider any conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.

[14] Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5 provides the statutory framework for alteration or revocation of bail. In pertinent part, the bail revocation statute provides:

(d) The court may revoke bail or an order for release on personal recognizance upon clear and convincing proof by the state that:

(1) while admitted to bail the defendant:

(A) or the defendant's agent threatened or intimidated a victim, prospective witnesses, or jurors concerning the pending criminal proceeding or any other matter;

(B) or the defendant's agent attempted to conceal or destroy evidence relating to the pending criminal proceeding;

(C) violated any condition of the defendant's current release order;

(D) failed to appear before the court as ordered at any critical stage of the proceedings; or

(E) committed a felony or a Class A misdemeanor that demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial;

(2) the factors described in IC 35-40-6-6(1)(A) and IC 35-40-6-6(1)(B) exist or that the defendant otherwise poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community; or

(3) a combination of the factors described in subdivisions (1) and (2) exists.

Ind. Code § 35-33-8-5 (emphases added).

[15] Clear and convincing evidence is a standard of proof that exceeds a preponderance of the evidence but is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A.P. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 238 N.E.3d 704, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “In order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact must be highly probable.” Id.

[16] As an initial matter, we observe that the record reflects inconsistency between the trial court's oral revocation decision issued on December 18, 2025, and its subsequent written order, which was entered on January 16, 2026. At the hearing, the trial court explained that it was revoking bail based on “clear and convincing evidence ․ [that] Mr. Evans violated the conditions of his bond.” Tr. Vol. I p. 53. This statement appeared to indicate that the trial court intended to revoke Evans's bail under subsection (d)(1)(C) of the revocation statute, which authorizes the trial court to revoke bail if the defendant “violated any condition of the defendant's current release order ․” I.C. § 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(C). However, the subsequent written order—which referred to the “[p]ronouncement made December 18, 2025”—states in pertinent part: “The State has satisfied its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that while released on bail, [Evans] committed a felony that demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court's authority to bring him to trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 220 (emphasis added ² ). This statement appears to indicate that the trial court intended to revoke Evans's bail under a different subsection of the revocation statute, subsection (d)(1)(E), which authorizes the revocation of bail where the defendant “committed a felony or a Class A misdemeanor that demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial ․” I.C. § 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(E).

[17] Neither the inconsistency nor the inaccurate characterization of Evans's recent offense warrants reversal, as the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that revocation was proper under either subsection (d)(1)(C) or subsection (d)(1)(E). With respect to subsection (d)(1)(E), the State was required to prove that Evans committed a Class A misdemeanor battery that demonstrated instability and a disdain for the trial court's authority. Id.

[18] A person commits Class A misdemeanor battery causing bodily injury if the person “knowingly or intentionally ․ touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner” and the touching “results in bodily injury to any other person[.]” I.C. § 35-42-2-1. Sergeant Kelly testified that he observed the victim, Eden, with blood on his face and scratches on his chest. Eden reported to law enforcement that Evans became angry, climbed on top of him while he was in bed, and struck him. This was corroborated by a neighbor who reported hearing Eden screaming for help and witnessed Evans on top of Eden. Another witness, Sizemore, reported that, based on her observations, she believed Eden's account of what happened rather than Evans's. Sizemore told law enforcement that Evans was lying about defending himself and that Eden never swung a stick at Evans. Evans's claim of self-defense is merely a request to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. Hall, 166 N.E.3d at 412. The commission of a new criminal offense was sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore, revocation under subsection (d)(1)(E) was permitted. I.C. § 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(E).

[19] The specific facts and circumstances of Evans's Class A misdemeanor battery offense against Eden—committed while on pretrial release for multiple pending cases—provide clear and convincing evidence of both instability and disdain for the court's authority to bring him to trial. Id. We, therefore, disagree that there was insufficient evidence to revoke bail under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(E).

[20] Turning to subsection (d)(1)(C), which allows for revocation if any condition of release is violated, one of the conditions for Evans's release was to “not violate the laws of the State of Indiana.” I.C. § 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(C); Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 133. As we stated above, the State provided clear and convincing evidence that Evans violated the laws of the State of Indiana by committing Class A misdemeanor battery, and therefore revocation was permitted under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5(d)(1)(C).

[21] Because the State provided sufficient evidence of Evans's new offense and a violation of his pretrial release conditions, we find that the trial court's decision to revoke Evans's bail was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and therefore not an abuse of discretion. Sneed, 946 N.E.2d at 1257. We, therefore, affirm the decision to revoke Evans's bail in Case 3 and Case 4.

II. Probation

[22] Evans argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. “Probation is a matter of grace left to [the] trial court[’s] discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if these conditions are violated. Id. If a trial court determines that a person has violated a term or condition of probation within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifyin or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).

[23] We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[24] Evans argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence for mere technical violations. He asserts that the State failed to prove he committed a new criminal offense, maintaining that he acted in lawful self-defense after Eden struck him during an argument. Because he contends no new crime occurred, Evans argues the sole remaining basis for his revocation was missing an undetermined number of probation appointments, which was insufficient to support the imposition of the remainder of his suspended sentences. Evans argues that imposing the execution of the remainder of his suspended time is disproportionate to the minimal severity of missed appointments and thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[25] Evans's arguments are unavailing. As explained above, the State provided clear and convincing evidence that Evans committed a new offense of battery, and his self-defense claim is merely a request to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. Hall, 166 N.E.3d at 412. Having proven the battery by clear and convincing evidence in the bail revocation context, the State necessarily satisfied the lower preponderance standard governing probation revocation. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f) (State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of evidence); A.P., 238 N.E.3d at 709 (“Clear and convincing evidence is defined as an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

[26] In support of this argument regarding the severity of the trial court's sanction, Evans's reliance on Brown is misplaced. In Brown, we held that a trial court abused its discretion by imposing a term of imprisonment exceeding sixteen years as a sanction for missing only an undetermined number of probation appointments. 162 N.E.3d at 1182–84. Here, by contrast, the trial court's sanction was based upon a determination that Evans committed a new criminal offense in addition to missing probation appointments. Furthermore, this is not the first time Evans has failed to comply with the trial court's orders allowing him to remain in the community under court supervision. As the trial court observed, Evans previously had his probation revoked in 2019 for possession of methamphetamine. The trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that Evans was not a suitable candidate for placement in the community and to order Evans to serve the balance of his suspended sentence at the Scott County Jail.

Conclusion

[27] Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's orders revoking Evans's bail in Cases 1 and 2 and his probation in Cases 3 and 4. Likewise, the trial court's imposition of the balance of Evans's suspended sentences in Cases 1 and 2 as a sanction for violating his probation was not an abuse of discretion.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Evans received 182 actual days and 182 good time days of credit towards his sentence in Case 1, and the trial court found that sentence served. In Case 2, Evans received 65 actual days and 65 good time days towards his sentence. Evans, therefore, had a remainder of 226 days executed in the Scott County Jail.

2.   This statement inaccurately referred to Evans's new criminal conviction as a felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor, which is not material to our review and appears to be a scrivener's error.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.