Orpah Daruwala, Appellant-Respondent v. Anonymous Healthcare System, et al., Appellees-Third Party Respondents (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In July 2022, Orpah Daruwala was hospitalized for several weeks and cared for by various hospital employees, including physicians, nurses, and social workers. Almost exactly two years later, Daruwala filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint against thirteen providers involved in her care and treatment, including Anonymous Physician E. A few weeks later, Daruwala amended her complaint to add an additional five providers.

[2] Anonymous Physician E then filed a motion for summary judgment in the Lake Superior Court, requesting a preliminary determination as to Daruwala's claim. The remaining seventeen healthcare providers (collectively, the Healthcare Providers) together filed a motion for summary judgment and requested a preliminary determination.¹ The trial court granted both summary judgment motions. Daruwala now appeals pro se. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 24, 2022, Daruwala was transported by ambulance to Anonymous Hospital A, where she was treated by several healthcare providers, including Anonymous Physician E. The following day, she was transferred to Anonymous Hospital B. On August 4, Daruwala was discharged from Anonymous Hospital B.

[4] On August 2, 2024, Daruwala, pro se, filed her proposed medical malpractice complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) against Anonymous Physician E and twelve other healthcare providers. On August 31, Daruwala filed an amended proposed complaint naming an additional five healthcare providers.

[5] On December 9, 2024, while Daruwala's proposed complaint was still pending before the medical review panel, Anonymous Physician E filed a motion for summary judgment in the Lake Superior Court, seeking a preliminary determination of law on the issue of whether Daruwala's claim was within the statute of limitations. Daruwala did not file a response. On January 28, 2025, the trial court granted that motion. However, on February 28, the trial court sua sponte set aside that judgment, stating it was inadvertently entered and granting Daruwala thirty more days to respond to the motion.

[6] On February 27, 2025, the Healthcare Providers also filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a preliminary determination of law on two issues: (1) whether Daruwala's claims were within the statute of limitations for some of the Healthcare Providers, and (2) whether the remaining Healthcare Providers owed a duty to Daruwala. A hearing was held on March 10, at which Daruwala appeared pro se. The trial court instructed her to respond to all pending motions by May 9.

[7] On May 3, the Healthcare Providers filed a motion for summary ruling, requesting the trial court rule on their February 27 motion for summary judgment. On May 6, the trial court granted their summary judgment motion. On May 8, the trial court sua sponte set aside that judgment, stating it was inadvertently entered. That same day, Daruwala filed a response to the Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment. She did not file a response to Anonymous Physician E's motion for summary judgment.

[8] On May 14, Anonymous Physician E filed a motion for summary ruling on the December 9 motion for summary judgment, noting Daruwala never filed a response. On May 21, the trial court granted that motion and entered summary judgment in favor of Anonymous Physician E. In its order, the court also stated the “Indiana Department of Insurance shall expunge from its records any and all references to Anonymous Physician E associated with” Daruwala's claim. App. Vol. II p. 30 (formatting altered).

[9] A hearing on various remaining motions, namely the Healthcare Providers’ February 27 motion for summary judgment, was held on August 5. On August 21, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Healthcare Providers and again ordered the IDOI to expunge from its records any references to the Healthcare Providers associated with Daruwala's claims.

[10] Daruwala now appeals both summary judgment orders. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[11] We first note Daruwala chose to proceed pro se in the trial court and on appeal. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. at 984 (quotation omitted). “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of [her] pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

I. Preliminary Determination

[12] Daruwala first argues the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant summary judgment while her proposed complaint was still pending before the medical review panel. Generally, the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) requires a medical review panel to first “render an opinion on a claimant's proposed complaint before the claimant can sue a health-care provider in court.” Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 394 (Ind. 2025) (quotation omitted). However, pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1, “a trial court may assert jurisdiction over threshold issues and preliminarily determine an issue of law or fact while the proposed complaint is pending before the medical review panel in the [IDOI].” Dermatology Assocs., P.C. v. White, 67 N.E.3d 1173, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “The limited authority under the MMA to assert jurisdiction over threshold issues permits the trial court to preliminarily determine an affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure.” Waggoner v. Anonymous Health Sys., Inc., 274 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. 2026) (quotation omitted). We review the scope of the trial court's preliminary determination jurisdiction de novo. Id.

[13] Daruwala contends the limited authority granted to trial courts under Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1 applies only to motions brought under Indiana Trial Rules 12(D) and 26 through 37, not to summary judgment motions brought under Indiana Trial Rule 56. To support this proposition, she cites Griffith v. Jones, 602 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ind. 1992), which held this statute “specifically limits the power of the trial courts of this State to preliminarily determining affirmative defenses under Trial Rules, deciding issues of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under Trial Rule 12(D), and compelling discovery pursuant to Trial Rules 26 through 37, inclusively.”²

[14] But Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1(a)(1) grants trial courts jurisdiction to “preliminarily determine an affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure[.]” We have specifically held this limited jurisdiction “includes the jurisdiction to rule upon issues not preserved for the medical review panel which can be preliminarily determined under a ․ Trial Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.” Harper v. Hippensteel, 994 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); see also Waggoner, 274 N.E.3d at 1250. Contrary to Daruwala's assertion, this is consistent with Griffith, which allows trial courts to “preliminarily determin[e] affirmative defenses under Trial Rules[,]” including summary judgment motions under Trial Rule 56. Griffith, 602 N.E.2d at 110.

[15] Here, Anonymous Physician E and some of the Healthcare Providers sought summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations—an affirmative defense. See Ind. Trial Rule 8(C). The remainder of the Healthcare Providers sought summary judgment based on a lack of duty to Daruwala, specifically a lack of physician-patient relationship, which is a matter of law. See Harper, 994 N.E.2d at 1236 (“Where, as here, the trial court is asked to determine whether, given a seemingly undisputed set of facts, a physician-patient relationship existed, the question is a legal question for the court and is not reserved for the medical review panel.”).

[16] As such, the trial court had jurisdiction under Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1 to rule on the summary judgment motions here.

II. Personal Jurisdiction

[17] Additionally, Daruwala argues the judgments are void because she was improperly served and thus the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. “Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's power to impose judgment on a particular defendant.” Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). Whether a court has personal jurisdiction presents a question of law we review de novo. Id. at 508.

[18] Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers contend Daruwala has waived this argument. We agree. “A party can waive lack of personal jurisdiction and submit [her]self to the jurisdiction of the court if [s]he responds or appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, Daruwala appeared at the March 10 hearing, and thereafter filed various motions with the court, including her May 8 response to the Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment and a July 7 motion for a protective order. By taking these actions without challenging personal jurisdiction, Daruwala waived her claim and submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction. See Liberty First Bank v. Automotive Finance Corp., 179 N.E.3d 510, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding garnishee waived its argument that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction by filing its responses to interrogatories without challenging personal jurisdiction).

III. Summary Judgment

[19] Daruwala next contends the trial court erred in granting both summary judgment motions. We note Daruwala's arguments regarding the summary judgments are not substantive, but rather procedural.³ First, she argues summary judgment was inappropriate because “no civil action had commenced.” Appellant's Br. p. 32. As noted above, the trial court may make a preliminary determination on these matters via summary judgment. See supra ¶ 15. She also argues summary judgment was inappropriate because she “could [not] ascertain who was plaintiff [and] who was defendant[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 32. This appears to be a reference to the fact that Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers were anonymous in the court documents. See Tr. Vol. II p. 25 (Daruwala expressing confusion at the hearing as to the parties’ identities). The providers’ anonymity is consistent with the MMA's “identity confidentiality provision” which states a complaint filed under the MMA “ ‘may not contain any information that would allow a third party to identify’ ” the healthcare provider. Kho v. Pennington, 875 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7) (formatting altered). Given Daruwala initiated proceedings with the IDOI against Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers, she seemingly knows their identities. To the extent Daruwala was confused by the anonymity of the parties in the court documents, we note she chose to proceed pro se and must accept the consequences of having done so. See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984.

[20] Finally, Daruwala argues summary judgment was inappropriate because discovery was ongoing and she had not yet received requested evidence. It is generally improper for a court to grant summary judgment while reasonable discovery requests that bear on issues material to the motion are still pending. Leasing One Corp. v. Caterpillar Financial Servs. Corp., 776 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). However, with regard to Anonymous Physician E's summary judgment motion, the record does not indicate there were any pending discovery requests or requests for additional time for discovery. See App. Vol. II pp. 111-19 (CCS). In the absence of such requests, a trial court is not required to sua sponte order further time for discovery before ruling on a summary judgment motion. Leasing One Corp., 776 N.E.2d at 411.

[21] Similarly, regarding the Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment, Daruwala filed her response to their motion on May 8, 2025. In it, she neither contended there were outstanding discovery requests, nor asked for additional time for discovery. See App. Vol. III pp. 43-54. Rather, she substantively addressed the motion. Before the court ruled on the motion, Daruwala did file discovery requests and a Trial Rule 56(F) request for a continuance—in July and August respectively—but this was well after the summary judgment deadline had passed. “When a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within thirty days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the thirty-day period.” Regalado v. Est. of Regalado, 933 N.E.2d 512, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Thus, these filings were not and could not be considered by the court.⁴ See id. (determining nonmovant's timely response to the summary judgment motion could be considered by the trial court but his later, untimely affidavits could not). Given this, we cannot say the trial court should have ordered additional time for discovery before ruling.

[22] Finally, as to the Healthcare Providers, Daruwala asserts the court erred in considering certain evidence, specifically the “treatment-date charts and ‘tables’ assigning statute-of-limitations accrual dates to” each of the Healthcare Providers. Appellant's Br. p. 33. This argument appears to be a reference to the charts included in the Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment memorandum. Specifically, the Healthcare Providers included in their memorandum various charts detailing each provider, the dates they treated Daruwala (if applicable), and a citation to where this information could be found in the designated evidence. An example of one of these charts is shown below:

Anonymous Providers Physician C Physician D Nurse First & Last Date of Treatment 07/26/22-07/27/22 07/24/22-08/04/22 07/28/22 Citations Ex. 3 at 11-12, 90-92 Id. at 14, 103, 108-109, 386 Id. at 83, 284, 298

App. Vol. III p. 15.

[23] We reject the premise of Daruwala's argument, namely that these charts or tables are evidence. These were included in the Healthcare Providers’ memorandum in support of summary judgment to the trial court. We agree with the Healthcare Providers that these were not evidence, but rather party-created visual aids meant to help the trial court understand the argument in the memorandum. The information on the charts was compiled from the designated evidence submitted by the Healthcare Providers, none of which Daruwala challenges as inadmissible. Given this, the trial court did not err in considering these tables and charts as argument in favor of summary judgment.

IV. Standing

[24] Daruwala also asserts the following: (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Providers, and (2) the trial court lacked authority to order the IDOI to expunge from its records the claims relating to Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers. Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers contend she lacks standing to bring these claims.⁵ We agree with the providers.

[25] To seek relief from the courts, a party must first have standing. Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

Standing is a fundamental, threshold, constitutional issue that must be addressed by this, or any, court to determine if it should exercise jurisdiction in the particular case before it. The issue of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper one to invoke the court's power. The standing requirement assures that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested, as plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the litigation's outcome in addition to showing that they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the defendant's conduct.

Alexander v. PBS Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

[26] Daruwala has failed to establish standing to bring these claims. While Daruwala lists several injuries she will sustain as a result of the summary judgment orders—namely the dismissal of her claims—she does not identify any injury she has or will sustain from the expungement orders, nor is one apparent from the record. Instead, Daruwala merely asserts the court does not have the authority to make such an order. See Appellant's Reply Br. as to Anonymous Healthcare Providers p. 39. This is exactly the type of claim our standing requirement is meant to preclude, as Daruwala has no personal stake in the outcome. As for the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Providers, again Daruwala appears to have no sustained injury there. Any alleged error with the personal jurisdiction of the Healthcare Providers may be asserted by the Healthcare Providers themselves. Because Daruwala does not have standing to bring these challenges, we will not address her arguments. See Moon v. Konkle, 254 N.E.3d 1143, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (declining to address argument where appellants lacked standing).

[27] Affirmed.⁶

FOOTNOTES

1.   These seventeen healthcare providers are: Anonymous Healthcare System, Anonymous Health Medical Group, Anonymous Health Partners, Anonymous Health Network, Inc., Anonymous Hospital A, Anonymous Hospital B, Anonymous Physician A, Anonymous Physician B, Anonymous Physician C, Anonymous Physician D, Anonymous Nurse Practitioner A, Anonymous Nurse Practitioner B, Anonymous Nurse, Anonymous Social Worker A, Anonymous Social Worker B, Anonymous Social Worker C, and Anonymous Social Worker D.

2.   Griffith was citing to Indiana Code section 16-9.5-10-1. That statute has since been recodified into Indiana Code section 34-18-11-1 and is substantially similar in all relevant respects.

3.   Daruwala does not challenge the merits of either summary judgment in her initial brief. In her reply briefs, for the first time, she contends that Anonymous Physician E and the Healthcare Providers failed to make a prima facie showing that her claims were outside the statute of limitations or that they did not owe her a duty of care as a matter of law. Because she raises these arguments for the first time in her reply briefs, each is waived. Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Ind. 2001) (noting a party may not raise an issue for the first time in his or her reply brief); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.”).

4.   The record is unclear as to whether Daruwala's response to the Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment was considered by the court. Daruwala's response was filed on May 8, 2025. Thereafter, the Healthcare Providers filed a motion to strike Daruwala's entire response, contending the deadline to respond to their February 27 summary judgment motion was March 31, notwithstanding the trial court's clear statements at the March 10 hearing that Daruwala had until May 9 to respond. See Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Alternatively, the Healthcare Providers argued Daruwala's May 27 sur-reply should be stricken. At a later hearing, the Healthcare Providers argued that even if the trial court did not strike Daruwala's entire response, it should strike certain portions. Ultimately, the trial court granted Healthcare Providers’ motion for summary judgment and “Motion to Strike” without explanation. App. Vol. III p. 218. The court did not reference which portions of Daruwala's response or sur-reply it was striking, and it did not order the Clerk's office to strike either. Notably, we can still access both on the Odyssey Case Management System. Ultimately, whether Daruwala's response was stricken does not affect our outcome here.

5.   Daruwala also argues the court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the IDOI Commissioner. We note it is unclear that the IDOI Commissioner is even a party to this case. Indisputably, the MMA states the party bringing the action in court should “cause as many summonses as are necessary to be issued by the clerk and served on the commissioner, each nonmoving party to the proceedings, and the chairman of the medical review panel[.]” Ind. Code § 34-18-11-2(c) (1998). But the Seventh Circuit has found this does not necessarily make the Commissioner a party. Jones v. Griffith, 870 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1989). Regardless, for the same reasons Daruwala does not have standing to challenge personal jurisdiction as to the Healthcare Providers, nor does she have standing to do so as to the IDOI Commissioner.

6.   While this appeal was pending, Daruwala filed a “Verified Motion to Clarify Scope of Record on Appeal and Inclusion in Supplemental Appendix.” In this motion, she requests to file a supplemental appendix containing documents relating to the IDOI proceedings. But this is an appeal from a summary judgment, and as such we can consider only those materials specifically designated to the trial court, and none of these documents were included in any parties’ designation of evidence. See Pond v. McNellis, 845 N.E.2d 1043, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (appellate review of summary judgment is limited to materials designated to trial court), trans. denied. As such, we deny her motion.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.