IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.P. (Minor Child) and H.P. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.P. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to E.P. (“Child”) as clearly erroneous, raising three restated issues:

(1) Were Mother's procedural due process rights violated during the child in need of services (“CHINS”) and termination proceedings?

(2) Are certain findings of fact supported by the evidence?

(3) Was the trial court's decision that termination was in Child's best interests supported by sufficient evidence?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[3] In April 2024, Mother's parental rights to her then-six-year-old autistic son, D.P., were involuntarily terminated. The trial court's conclusion that termination was in D.P.’s best interests was affirmed on appeal “[g]iven Mother's persistent drug use and failure to engage in services, the recommendations of both the FCM and GAL, and [D.P.’s] unique needs[.]” In re D.P., No. 24A-JT-1269, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024) (mem.).

[4] Child was born on July 15, 2024. The next day, after investigating and substantiating a report of neglect, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) requested and received an emergency custody order based on information that Mother had received minimal pre-natal care and tested positive for methamphetamine and ecstasy while pregnant; Child was born drug-exposed; and Mother had attempted to leave the hospital with him against medical advice. DCS took Child into custody at the hospital and filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS the next day. Child was eventually placed in a foster home with D.P. After the initial/detention hearing on July 18, the trial court ordered Mother's visits with Child to be supervised and at the discretion of DCS and ordered Mother to submit to random drug screens. Mother refused all requested drug screens and declined DCS’ offer of virtual visits with Child. As a result, Mother did not see Child after DCS intervened.

[5] At the CHINS factfinding hearing in November, Mother said she would not engage in court-ordered services or take a drug and alcohol evaluation. See In re E.P., No. 25A-JC-547, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2025) (mem.), trans. denied. She also acknowledged her rights to D.P. had been terminated. The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS and pursuant to statute, found reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Child were not required because Mother's parental rights to Child's sibling had been involuntarily terminated. The trial court entered a dispositional order in February 2025 granting wardship of Child to DCS, imposing no participation requirements on Mother due to the no reasonable efforts finding, and approving a permanency plan of adoption. A panel of this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that no reasonable reunification efforts were required. Id. at *4.

[6] On March 31, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The petition alleged there is a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment; termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests; and four statutory circumstances warranted termination, including that a court had entered a finding that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification were not required.² The trial court appointed counsel for Mother and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child.

[7] For various reasons, the termination hearing was not held until December 2025.³ The Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and GAL testified Child's foster family had adopted D.P. and were willing to adopt Child.⁴ Child had medical issues and developmental delays due to his neonatal drug exposure but was participating in speech and occupational therapy through First Steps to address those issues. Mother did not stay in regular contact with the FCM and had reached out to him for updates about Child only two or three times. She did not report voluntarily participating in any services, and she turned down an offer to participate in virtual visits with Child. Neither the FCM nor the GAL had received information that Mother's substance use had been treated or remedied. The FCM had no reason to believe Child would have a sober caregiver or receive the medical care he requires if he were returned to Mother's care. Both the FCM and the GAL testified termination of Mother's rights was in Child's best interests.

[8] The trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon in January 2026. The trial court found DCS had proved the allegations of its petition by clear and convincing evidence and ordered Mother's parental rights be terminated.

Standard of Review

[9] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12).⁵

[10] If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (2012); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997) (burden of proof). As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses for ourselves but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id. at 642. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and second, whether those findings support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We will set aside the trial court's findings of fact and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

Mother's due process rights were not violated.

[11] Mother first claims procedural irregularities in the proceedings denied her due process and require reversal of the termination order. Mother claims the trial court did not observe several statutory timelines, including the requirements that a CHINS factfinding hearing be completed within sixty days of a petition being filed, see I.C. § 31-34-11-1; a dispositional hearing be held within thirty days of adjudicating a child a CHINS, see I.C. § 31-34-19-1; and a hearing on a termination petition be commenced within ninety days and concluded within 180 days of its filing, see I.C. § 31-35-2-6. Mother also claims the trial court did not follow Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E) when it issued its termination order while a transfer petition was still pending in her appeal of the CHINS case.⁶

[12] Mother did not object to any of these irregularities in the trial court, and the State argues she has waived this issue. “[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). Because Mother did not present her due process argument to the trial court and does not argue fundamental error to this court, we agree with the State that her argument is waived for purposes of appeal, and we need not consider it. Cf. In re N.C., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (ruling parent waived issue raised for first time on appeal but addressing issue on its merits because parent claimed fundamental error), trans. denied. However, we have discretion to address such claims, especially when they involve constitutional rights. See In re M.M.E., 146 N.E.3d 922, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Because of the important rights at issue, we exercise our discretion to review Mother's due process claim.

[13] When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution “prohibits state action that deprives a person of life, liberty or property without a fair proceeding.” In re E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “Due process requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Due process at all stages of a CHINS case is vital because “procedural irregularities, like an absence of clear findings of fact, in a CHINS proceeding may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to a potential subsequent termination of parental rights.” Id. at 1258 (quoting In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). Finally, “if the State imparts a due process right, then it must give that right.” In re A.P., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In a CHINS or termination proceeding, a parent is statutorily entitled to (1) cross-examine witnesses, (2) obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process, and (3) introduce evidence on behalf of the parent. C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (citing I.C. § 31-32-2-3(b) (1997)).

[14] Mother argues her due process rights were violated because DCS and the trial court failed to abide by the relevant procedural statutes and rules. But a violation of state law does not establish a due process violation, and accordingly, her argument has no merit. Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), aff'd in relevant part, 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Charleston v. Bd. of Trs., 741 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will be clear once more: a plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to state-mandated process.”); Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n error of state law is not a violation of due process.”)).

[15] The trial court held all required hearings in the CHINS and termination proceedings, giving Mother a meaningful opportunity to contest the allegations. During the termination hearing, Mother was represented by counsel who advocated for her by objecting to the admission of evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and presenting Mother's testimony. Mother has not shown how the delay in the hearings—some of which was attributable to her own conduct—or the timing of the termination order prejudiced her in any way. Mother's right to due process was not violated in these proceedings.

The challenged findings of fact are supported by the evidence.

[16] Next, Mother challenges nine findings of fact from the trial court's termination order as clearly erroneous. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1044.

[17] Mother challenges two of the findings as containing erroneous dates. In finding 21, the trial court states, “Mother now states she did not testify to admitting she used drugs during [D.P.’s] hearing on February 13, 2024, while she was pregnant with [Child].” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 36. Mother points out D.P.’s termination hearing was held on February 14, 2024. In finding 29, the trial court states the termination petition in Child's case was filed “on or about April 1, 2025.” Id. at 38. Mother points out the petition was filed on March 31, 2025. Even if Mother is technically correct in each instance,⁷ she does not demonstrate these errors affected the outcome of her termination case. Therefore, these errors are harmless. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (stating no error in any order is ground for reversal on appeal “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties”).

[18] Five of the findings Mother challenges (findings number 19, 20, 23, 24, and 44) contain what are presented as quotes from testimony at the termination hearing. Mother claims none of the quotes are “exact words” from the testimony. Appellant's Br. at 33; see generally id. at 32–34. Again, even if Mother is technically correct, our review of the record shows the trial court's words summarize the essence of the testimony. Finding 44 also states, “[Child] was born with neonatal withdrawal syndrome caused by Mother's use of drugs[,] yet Parents now refuse to even acknowledge he suffers from the syndrome.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 40. Mother claims Father questioned Child's diagnosis but “the record does not show that Mother questioned or denied the issue[.]” Appellant's Br. at 34. Even if Mother did not explicitly question Child's diagnosis, she denied using drugs during pregnancy and therefore implicitly refuses to acknowledge Child could be suffering from withdrawal.

[19] Finding 26(h) states, in part, the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) “has no reason to believe that the Parents would assure [Child] received the appropriate medical services to address his needs, and in particular, any ongoing needs surrounding [his] neonatal withdrawal syndrome.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 37. Mother claims this finding is not supported by the record. But the FCM was asked, “[D]o you believe that if [Child] was returned to [Mother's] home, that his routine and regular medical care to deal with the consequences of being born drug-exposed, that he would receive that appropriate care and treatment?” Tr. Vol. 2 at 133. The FCM answered, “I have no reason to believe that he would.” Id. Finding 26(h) is supported by the record.

[20] Finally, Mother claims finding 42—in which the trial court found Parents have never asked for visits—is erroneous because Mother requested in-person visits with Child. First, we note the transcript page Mother cites does not support her assertion. See Appellant's Br. at 34 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 178, where Mother explains why she did not accept virtual visits). But we also note the trial court acknowledged in another finding that Mother asked for visitation with Child on one occasion but declined the virtual visit that was offered as a starting point. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 36 (finding 26(g), based on FCM's testimony that Mother asked for visitations once but turned down the virtual visits he offered, see Tr. Vol. 2 at 131). The trial court's error in including Mother in the statement that “Parents” have never asked to visit with Child is harmless given its acknowledgement otherwise elsewhere in the order. See A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 881 N.E.2d 706, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that erroneous findings of fact are harmless if the court's unchallenged or otherwise valid findings still support its judgment), trans. denied.

[21] The challenged findings are supported by the record or constitute harmless errors. Regardless, the many unchallenged findings support the trial court's judgment. See In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting we accept unchallenged findings as true).

The trial court's best interests conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence.8

[22] With respect to Child's best interests, the trial court recited evidence of Mother's failure to address or even acknowledge her substance use, to do any services or treatment to work toward reunifying with Child, or to allow anyone to help her, and concluded there was “no hope or expectation that ․ Mother ․ would do anything to assure the safety and needs of [Child] now or in the future.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 41. The court further found that termination “is a necessary step towards permanency” for Child and is in his best interests. Id. Mother argues the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests is clearly erroneous.

[23] The question of whether terminating parental rights is in a child's best interests is “[p]erhaps the most difficult determination in a TPR” because it “necessarily places the [child's] interest in preserving the family into conflict with their need for permanency.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647. When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, courts look to the totality of the evidence and “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration, and they “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Although permanency is among the factors a court may consider, it “is not reason enough to terminate parental rights where the parent has an established relationship with his/her child” and has “taken positive steps” in accordance with the plan for reunification. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1152 (Ind. 2016).

[24] Mother cites In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, in which our Supreme Court reversed an order terminating the father's parental rights. There are marked differences between the father in R.S. and Mother. In R.S., the father and child had a loving bond, and the father had successfully completed multiple self-improvement and parenting courses, repeatedly expressed his desire to parent the child, and exercised regular visitation with him. Under those circumstances, the court found termination was not in the child's best interests. Id. at 630–31. Here, Mother has no relationship with Child. Mother has never had Child in her care outside of the hospital; he was removed on an emergency basis shortly after his birth because he was born drug exposed and remained outside her care for the entire seventeen months until the termination hearing. Mother did not avail herself of the opportunity to start a relationship with Child with the virtual visits DCS offered and therefore has not seen him since his removal. She did not voluntarily participate in any services or substance use treatment to show DCS that she was taking positive steps to establish herself as a suitable, sober caretaker. Unlike the father in R.S., Mother has not “demonstrate[d] the desire and ability to achieve a meaningful reunification” with Child. 56 N.E.3d at 630.

[25] Mother's other arguments—concerns over the foster placement, complaints about DCS not providing services it was not required to provide—amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[26] Recommendations of a FCM and service providers like a GAL or court appointed special advocate, in addition to evidence that conditions will not be remedied, are enough to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The trial court here found there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's removal—Mother's substance use—would not be remedied. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 42–43. And both the FCM and the GAL testified termination was in Child's best interests. The trial court's best interests conclusion is supported by the evidence.

Conclusion

[27] Mother's due process rights were not violated during the proceedings, and the trial court's termination decision is not clearly erroneous.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(1) (2024).

3.   Among the reasons were: the trial judge recused because Mother appeared uninvited at his private residence, Mother's appointed counsel withdrew because Mother filed a disciplinary complaint against him, and a scheduled hearing was continued because Father's standby counsel did not appear.

4.   Child's placement was changed for about four months because the foster family needed additional resources to deal with D.P.’s “higher needs,” and they learned they were expecting a child. Tr. Vol. 2 at 159. The interim placement lived nearby, and the families worked together for Child and D.P. to continue to have contact. Once the additional resources were procured, the foster family “found a particular stride” and Child was returned to their care. Id. at 167.

5.   In this case, DCS alleged the following circumstances applied: (d)(1) (a trial court made a no reasonable efforts finding); (d)(3) (a reasonable probability conditions will not be remedied); (d)(4) (a reasonable probability continuation of the relationship poses a threat to the welfare of the child); and (d)(9) (parent has a history of controlled substance use and has failed or refused to complete treatment). See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17–18.

6.   Mother also argues a due process violation occurred because “when the trial court went over the contents of the [termination] petition with Mother, she stated that she did not understand.” Appellant's Br. at 24. She states the “trial court did not attempt to clarify or explain the allegations and failed to offer to go over them again.” Id. But this argument is not supported by the record—Mother answered “no” when the trial court asked Father if he understood the allegations against him. When the trial court read the allegations against Mother and then offered to reread them, Mother declined. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 8, 11.

7.   Finding 21 may be read to mean Mother now denies she admitted at D.P.’s termination hearing on February 14, 2024, that she used drugs on February 13 while she was pregnant with Child. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 40 (trial court's finding 44 stating, “Parents assert ․ that Mother did not use illegal drugs when pregnant with [Child], even though she testified to the same under oath on February 14, 2024 in [D.P.’s] hearing”). And “on or about April 1, 2025” in Finding 29 would most certainly include the day before.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.