WALKER v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Walker appeals his convictions for Level 3 felony criminal confinement and Level 5 felony domestic battery. Walker raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement.

2. Whether his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery is contrary to Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy.

3. Whether remand is required to correct technical errors in the trial court's documents.

[2] We affirm Walker's conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement, reverse his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2023, Walker lived with his grandmother, Tehani Jordan, in Marion County. Jordan provided daycare and babysitting services out of her home.

[4] In the early morning hours of August 16, Jordan got up to be ready for a child to be dropped off. Jordan took a bath in her upstairs bathroom. Afterward, she started to go downstairs. She heard Walker come up behind her, and he then pushed her down the stairs. She landed face down at the bottom of the stairs. There, Walker “started beating” and “hitting” her. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 25. Walker said, “I'm going to kill you” as he hit Jordan about her head and body. Walker also stomped on her and struck her with an iron. Id. at 26. While he was standing over her, Jordan “turned towards the door” and tried “to get up to go to the door.” Id. Walker then “pushed [her] over,” locked the door, and stood between Jordan and the exit. Id.

[5] Walker eventually went back upstairs. At that point, Jordan left the residence and went to a neighbor's house. The neighbor then called 9-1-1.

[6] On March 15, 2024, the State charged Walker with the following two offenses:

COUNT I [Level 3 Felony Criminal Confinement]

On or about August 16, 2023, JAMES WALKER did knowingly confine Tehani Jordan without the consent of [Jordan], said act resulting in serious bodily injury to [her], to wit: facial fracture(s) and/or extreme pain;

COUNT II [Level 5 Felony Domestic Battery]

On or about August 16, 2023, JAMES WALKER did knowingly or intentionally touch Tehani Jordan, a family or household member, in a rude, insolent[,] or angry manner ․ by striking and/or stomping Tehani Jordan, resulting in serious bodily injury, that is: facial fracture(s) and/or extreme pain ․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 19 (bold font removed).

[7] Jordan testified at Walker's ensuing jury trial. She confirmed for the jury that Walker's attack on her had left her with multiple injuries and multiple facial fractures. She also testified that she had suffered serious physical pain and could not “lift [her] body for over a week” due to the pain alone. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 38.

[8] Following the close of the evidence, the State argued the following during its closing statement:

Now in Count 1, ․ we deal with the term confinement․ when you go back to deliberate and you're thinking about this term confinement and whether somebody's liberty was interfered with, I ask that you think, was Miss Jordan free when she was falling down those stairs to the floor below landing face down? Was she free to move as she pleased? Was she free to do as she please[d] when the Defendant was on top of her beating her, kicking her, hitting her in the head with an iron? Was Miss Jordan free from physical restraint when she tried to get out and get away from him and he walked up and locked that door or was she stuck there?

* * *

The State has showed you that Miss Jordan was confined. Her liberty was restrained. She could not move her body freely when she was flailing down the stairs. She could not move freely when she was face down on the floor with somebody on top of her beating her, hitting her in the back of the head with an iron. She did not have freedom when somebody locked the door preventing her from exiting and her injuries were serious․

Id. at 102, 108. The State's closing statement did not separately discuss Count 2.

[9] Thereafter, the jury found Walker guilty as charged, and the trial court orally entered its judgment of conviction on both counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered Walker to serve concurrent terms in the aggregate total of nine years with two years executed in the Department of Correction. The court did not sign its sentencing order or the abstract of judgment.

[10] This appeal ensued.

1. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Walker's conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement.

[11] On appeal, Walker first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[12] Indiana Code section 35-42-3-3(a) and (b)(3) (2023) provide that a person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent, which results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining person, commits Level 3 felony criminal confinement. Walker argues that the State failed to prove that he confined Jordan and that Jordan suffered serious bodily injury.

[13] Walker is incorrect. “The offense of confinement requires proof of a substantial interference with a person's liberty without the person's consent.” Cunningham v. State, 870 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). There is no question that the State's evidence demonstrated that Walker substantially interfered with Jordan's liberty without her consent. Indeed, Walker acknowledges that the State's evidence of his battery of Jordan was part-and-parcel with the State's evidence of his confinement of her. See Appellant's Br. at 15. Insofar as his argument here requires a double-jeopardy analysis, we address that below. As for the evidence of confinement, however, the acts of battery plus Walker locking the front door and placing himself between Jordan and the door suffices to show confinement. See id. (noting that “something more” than battery is required for confinement).

[14] Walker also asserts that “locking the door” did not itself result in any physical injury to Jordan, and, thus, the State failed to demonstrate that she suffered serious bodily injury. Again, Walker's real argument here is that the facts of the battery should be parsed out from the facts of the confinement, which is not a correct argument for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the confinement. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Walker's Level 3 felony criminal confinement conviction.

2. Walker's conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery is contrary to Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy.

[15] Walker also contends that his Level 5 felony domestic battery conviction is contrary to Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy. We review such issues de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[16] As we have explained:

Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources ․” Id. The first step is to look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits multiple punishments,” then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, [the parties] agree that the first step is not dispositive․

We thus turn to the second step. At this step, as clarified by our Supreme Court in A.W., we look to the face of the charging information to discern if the factual bases identified for the charges implicate our statutory definitions of an “included offense.” Id. In particular, the Indiana Code defines an included offense as an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (2021). As our Supreme Court has further clarified, an offense is also an included offense where the charging information states that the “means used” to commit the alleged greater offense “include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (quotation marks omitted).

This step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis creates a risk of “an asymmetrical benefit to the State” because a prosecutor may “unilaterally decide how much” information “to include (or not include) in the charging instrument, which could decisively determine the outcome of a double jeopardy claim.” Id. at 1069 (emphasis omitted). Thus, to eliminate that asymmetry, our Supreme Court requires that, “where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor[ ] and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2.” Id.

Bolcerek v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1206, 1217-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[17] Here, the parties agree that neither Step 1 nor Step 2 of our substantive double jeopardy analysis is dispositive. We agree and turn to whether the State rebutted the presumptive double jeopardy violation:

The third and final step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation. To do so, “the State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a ‘distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.’ ” Ratliff v. State, 242 N.E.3d 1070, 1078-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071), trans. denied. However, if the State's evidence at trial “shows only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. at 1079 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Id. at 1219.

[18] We agree with Walker that the State cannot demonstrate that it “made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge,” here, the Level 5 felony domestic battery, “was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.” Id. (quoting Ratliff, 242 N.E.3d. at 1078-79) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the State's closing statement to the jury made no attempt to provide a separate factual basis for the Level 5 felony domestic battery allegation. The State instead described the totality of Jordan's testimony as demonstrative of Level 3 felony criminal confinement and then asked the jury to use the same facts to find Walker guilty of both counts.

[19] On appeal, the State argues that the facts might be parsed such that a freestanding battery happened and then Walker pushed Jordan back down in the commission of confinement. In taking this nuanced approach to the facts, the State suggests that we should disregard how it argued the evidence to the jury. But we decline to do so. What matters for Step 3 of our substantive double jeopardy analysis is how the State led the jury to see the evidence, not a hypothetical reading of the evidence the State never advocated to the fact-finder. See id. (quoting Ratliff, 242 N.E.3d at 1078-79).

[20] Accordingly, we agree with Walker that his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery is contrary to law and must be vacated.

3. Remand is necessary for the trial court to correct its records.

[21] Finally, the parties agree on appeal that the trial court's original sentencing order and abstract of judgment were improper as they lacked the signature of a judicial officer. On remand, the trial court shall correct those documents in accordance with this decision. We also agree with Walker that, on remand, the trial court shall enter a written and corrected judgment of conviction in accordance with this decision.

Conclusion

[22] For all of these reasons, we affirm Walker's conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement; we reverse his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery; and we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a written and corrected judgment of conviction as well as a corrected and signed sentencing order and abstract of judgment.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.