Joseph D. Raimondi, Appellant-Respondent v. Makenzie D. Raimondi, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joseph P. Raimondi (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order modifying legal custody and child support of the children he shares with Makenzie D. Raimondi (“Mother”). Father raises the following restated and consolidated issues:

I. Whether the trial court had authority to modify legal custody;

II. Whether remand is necessary because the trial court failed to enter written findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2 (“the Special Findings Statute”) supporting its decision to modify legal custody; and

III. Whether the trial court lacked authority to modify child support or otherwise erred in its computation and entry of the child support orders.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for (1) entry of special findings as required by the Special Findings Statute; (2) correction of the allocation of uninsured healthcare expenses between the parties in the child support orders; (3) correction of the effective date of the child support orders.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother (together, “the Parents”) married on March 27, 2021. Over the course of their marriage, they had two children, J.R. born in March 2021, and E.R. born in June 2022 (together, “the Children”). See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The Parents separated on May 1, 2023, and Mother resided in Indiana with the Children while Father, who was a member of the U.S. Marine Corps, was stationed and resided in South Carolina. A petition to dissolve the marriage was filed on February 29, 2024, and both parents proceeded without representation by counsel in the dissolution proceedings and eventually entered into a settlement agreement. On May 29, 2024, the trial court entered its decree of dissolution of marriage, which approved the settlement agreement (“the Decree”).

[4] The Decree provided that the Parents would have joint legal custody over the Children with Mother having primary physical custody, and Father having parenting time, at minimum, as provided by the Parenting Time Guidelines (“IPTG”). See id. at 13. The Decree provided that Father would have no child support obligation and that there was no child support arrearage.¹

[5] On November 4, 2024, less than six months after the trial court entered the Decree, Mother filed a pro se handwritten “Court Memo” stating that she “would like to start child support.” Id. at 24. The trial court then set the matter for a hearing on November 21, 2024. Only Mother attended the hearing,² after which the trial court entered an order requiring Father to pay child support in the amount of $266.00 per week effective November 8, 2024. The order determined Father's arrearage to be $532.00 as of November 21, 2024, and ordered Father to pay $14.00 per week towards the arrearage until satisfied.³ See id. at 25.

[6] On November 25, 2024, Father appeared by counsel and filed his Verified Motion to Vacate Order on Hearing and Schedule Modification Hearing, and his Verified Petition to Modify Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support. In his petition, he asserted that “since the last custody order in this case on May 30, 2024, there has been a substantial change in circumstances which makes the current order unreasonable” and requested that “[c]ustody, [p]arenting [t]ime, and [c]hild [s]upport be modified.” Id. at 29. The trial court set the matters for a hearing on January 9, 2025, but that hearing was continued and eventually rescheduled for July 31, 2025.

[7] Prior to the presentation of evidence, Father proposed that the parties stipulate that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred—a position that, if accepted, eliminated the trial court's ability to modify custody. Mother did not agree to the stipulation, so the trial court stated that the hearing would proceed “with the understanding that all potential issues are ․ available to the Court.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 13.

[8] Mother described the Children's medical needs and Father's limited involvement in their care. Their son, then four years old, had been diagnosed with severe autism and was nonverbal, requiring weekly occupational and speech therapy, a strict daily routine, nightly medication, and weighted coverings at bedtime. Their daughter, then three, had difficulties with her speech and attended weekly speech therapy sessions. The Children's conditions required active, ongoing management. Mother stated that she had shared the details of the Children's diagnoses with Father, but he had not attended any of their therapy sessions, spoken to their providers, participated, by video or otherwise, in any of the appointments, or inquired about their appointments. Mother claimed that Father did not know the Children's daily schedules or what foods they ate, but that she “let[s] him know when he does call the [C]hildren, if anything has happened, or if there's anything of significance that needs to be brought up.” Id. at 21.

[9] Father stated that he knew about his son's autism diagnosis, but that Mother “hasn't provided [him] any documentation for it.” Id. at 45. As to his involvement in the Children's various therapies, Father said that he was “never [ ] made aware” that he was supposed to be participating, explaining that Mother “goes to [the Children's therapies], but hasn't told [him] any time or dates of when it happens.” Id. at 46. Father confirmed that he had not read any of the medical documentation about the Children, did not know who their medical providers were, and was unsure about their care needs. See id. at 51–52. He asserted that Mother “ha[d] not provided those documents[,]” and explained that he did not have any information regarding the Children's doctors, stating that he was “waiting on her to do it.” Id. at 51.

[10] With respect to child support, Father's gross income was approximately $5,895.47 per month from his full-time job in the military, which equates to approximately $1,360.49 per week. See Appellant's Ex. Vol. 3 p. 4. Father has a second job where he works “anywhere between 14 to 26 hours” a week and earns $16.25 per hour, which corresponds to additional gross income of between $227.50 and $422.50 per week. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 50. The trial court determined Father's gross weekly income to be $1,701.74, attributing approximately $341.25 of income from Father's second job towards his weekly gross income calculation.

[11] Despite not being court ordered to pay child support, Father stated that in May 2024, he began paying Mother $150.00 per week because “they're still [his] kids.” Id. at 48. In late May 2024, Father reduced his payments to $200.00 every other week. In October 2024, Mother asked Father to increase the payments to $400.00 or $500.00 every other week because she “was going through some hardships[.]” Id. at 49. Father refused, and Mother thereafter filed her request to establish child support in November 2024.

[12] Mother explained that when she filed her request to establish child support, she had lost her job where she was making $15.50 or $15.25 per hour. See id. at 35. After two months, Mother found a new job making $15.00 per hour working thirty-two to forty hours weekly. In April 2025, Mother began her current job as a cook, making $15.50 per hour and working forty hours per week, resulting in gross weekly income of $620.00. Mother's job required that she have childcare for the Children. Mother paid $480.00 weekly for the Children to attend daycare for four days per week. Mother's husband helped pay the daycare expense because Mother's take home pay was insufficient to cover the expense.

[13] After the presentation of evidence, Mother argued that Father “admitted today that he is unclear about the needs of his children. He is unclear about their medical care. He is unclear and unaware of their daily schedules. He does not know how to care for these children.” Id. at 59. Mother did not request modification of legal custody but instead argued for an adjustment to the parenting time schedule to provide for Father's reintegration into the Children's lives. See id. Likewise, Father did not request modification of custody and argued for enforcement of the existing parenting time order with accommodations based upon his requirement to remain within a certain proximity to his base in South Carolina. See id. at 62.

[14] With respect to child support, Father argued that the trial court's November 21, 2024, order be vacated because Father did not have notice of the hearing. Father then argued that Mother had failed to establish a substantial and continuing change in circumstances in support of her request to modify child support. Father conceded that a modification of his child support would result in more than twenty percent deviation of his current $0.00 support order, but that any modification could not be effective until May 29, 2025, one year after the entry of the Decree. Father further argued that the trial court should not include income from his second job in its calculation of his gross income and that the trial court should impute Mother's husband's income to Mother “because that's what her husband is making, and the husband is regularly contributing to her living expenses.” Id. at 61.

[15] The trial court made the following remarks at the conclusion of the hearing:

[B]ecause of limited contact on both parties’ parts between the, the [C]hildren and Father, however, understanding the special needs kids’[,] Father is living in South Carolina, Mother is up here, not-not assuming bad faith but, but because of the, ․ both parties’ parts, [Father] could have done more, [Mother] could have done more. There were some attempts. I don't see a situation where there was, ․ intentional contentious behavior on Mother's part not to allow it to occur. But that may be something the [c]ourt finds in the future. The [c]ourt is, however, awarding legal and physical custody to Mother ․ [with] these special needs kids. And so she can make these decisions here where these children are at this point in time, without causing issues.

Id. at 67. The court then issued a written order containing handwritten statements.⁴ The written order contained the following statements pertinent to the modification of legal custody: “[a]s there has been limited contact between [Father] and [the] [C]hildren[,] the court modifies the custody. [Mother] is awarded [p]hysical and [l]egal custody of the [C]hildren. [Father] shall continue to have parenting time pursuant to [the IPTG].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10.

[16] As to child support, the trial court vacated its November 21, 2024, order, establishing Father's child support obligation in the sum of $266.00 per week, and then issued two separate orders modifying Father's support obligation. The first order (“the January Order”) modified Father's child support obligation to $428.00 per week effective January 23, 2025, and determined an arrearage of $0.00 as of November 21, 2024. The second order (“the July Order”) modified Father's child support obligation to $503.00 per week effective July 31, 2025, and required Father to pay an additional sum of $20.00 per week towards his arrearage that was “TBD as of 11-21-2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. Each order required Father to pay 55% of annual uninsured healthcare expenses despite the attached Child Support Obligation Worksheets indicating that his share of the expenses would be 73.3% and Mother's would be 26.7%. See id. at 8–11. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Authority to Modify Legal Custody

[17] Father challenges the trial court's modification of legal custody from joint legal custody to Mother having sole legal custody.⁵ Despite having filed a petition to modify custody, Father claims the trial court modified the custody order sua sponte and “failed to follow proper procedure when it modified legal custody when neither party requested such a change,” necessitating reversal. Appellant's Br. p. 11 (emphasis removed). Prior to the presentation of testimony and evidence, the parties and the trial court discussed the possibility of limiting the scope of the hearing. The following exchange occurred:

[The Court]: Well, just a minute ago, you were making an argument that, that there's been no substantial and continuing change of circumstances. Are – so you, you are not – are, are you wanting to modify the parenting time or custody order at this point in time? Sounds like they're in agreement not to modify that and simply to look at the issue of support, and I want to look toyou [sic] on that if that's --

[Father's Counsel]: If we are stipulating that there has been no substantial change in circumstances, then we can just deal with support today. And if parenting time doesn't start happening, we'll deal with it either with a new motion or with a Rule to Show Cause. Because there's been no parenting time and none allowed.

[The Court]: Sounds like there's not agreement. So, if you, Ms. Klink, if you want to, uh, to – with the understanding that all potential issues are, are available to the Court.

[Mother's Counsel]: Sure.

Tr. Vol. 2 p. 13.⁶

[18] We take the trial court's statement that, “all potential issues are, are available to the [c]ourt[,]” to include Father's petition to modify custody. Id. Where a party has petitioned to modify custody, whether physical or legal custody, the trial court may consider modification of legal or physical custody, regardless of the specific request plead in the petition to modify. See McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. In McDaniel, the modification petition only requested modification of physical custody, but the trial court ordered a modification of legal custody. In affirming the trial court's authority to do so, we explained: “[T]he child's best interest is the touchstone of any custody determination and ․ the trial court's discretion is ‘unfettered by the contents of a party's motion for the hearing.’ ” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 291 (quoting In re Paternity of W.R.H., 120 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Crone, J., dissenting)). Because Father's own petition placed the issue of custody before the court, the trial court was permitted to consider modification of legal custody.

II. Compliance with the Special Findings Statute

[19] Father claims the court failed to comply with the Special Findings Statute because the written order “does not contain any findings showing that modification of legal custody is in the best interests of the [C]hildren or that [the court] considered the factors” found in Indiana Code sections 31-17-2-8 or 31-17-2-15. Appellant's Br. p. 14. In general, “[t]he court may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider” as provided in Indiana Code sections 31-17-2-8 and if applicable, 31-17-2-8.5. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a).

[20] The Special Findings Statute provides as follows:

(a) As used in this section, “custody order” means:

(1) a final order:

(A) awarding custody;

(B) modifying custody; or

(C) denying modification of custody;

under this chapter; or

(2) an appellate decision affirming or reversing an order described in subdivision (1).

The term does not include a preliminary order or provisional order awarding custody.

(b) The following shall be included in a custody order:

(1) A trial court shall include the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based.

(2) An appellate decision shall include the facts upon which the appellate court relied to affirm or reverse an order.

I.C. § 31-17-2-8.2.⁷

[21] With respect to the modification of custody, the trial court's order simply stated, “[a]s there has been limited contact between [Father] and [the] [C]hildren, the court modifies the custody. [Mother] is awarded [p]hysical and [l]egal custody of the [C]hildren. [Father] shall continue to have parenting time pursuant to [IPTG].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. Father argues the order was deficient because it did not contain written findings and conclusions articulating its rationale as to whether modifying legal custody “is in the best interests of the child” and “there is a substantial change in one (1) or more” of pertinent statutory factors. I.C. § 31-17-2-21(a). Mother defends the judgment, pointing out that “neither party requested specific findings in writing.” Appellee's Br. p. 14. Mother also suggests that, under the circumstances, the trial court was not obligated to enter written findings and conclusions, inviting us to consider the trial court's written custody order in conjunction with its oral remarks made at the conclusion of the hearing. See id.

[22] We first consider whether the Special Findings Statute requires written findings of fact and conclusions of law.⁸ We are unaware of any published case interpreting the Special Findings Statute and therefore proceed to interpret the statute.

[23] We interpret statutes de novo. E.g., O'Connell v. Clay, 267 N.E.3d 994, 999 (Ind. 2025). “When interpreting a statute, our goal is to ‘determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’ ” Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1269 (Ind. 2024) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1196 (Ind. 2016)). We begin with the language used in the statute, considering “the structure of the statute as a whole” and giving “words their plain meaning ․” Id. (quoting ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1195). We consider both what the statute says and what it does not say. Id. “[W]e do not presume that the Legislature intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015)). Rather, we strive to “give effect to every word,” avoiding interpretations that treat words as meaningless or surplusage. Ind. Off. of Util. Consumer Couns. v. Duke Energy Ind., LLC, 248 N.E.3d 1205, 1213–14 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cutchin v. Beard, 171 N.E.3d 991, 997 (Ind. 2021)).

[24] First, the Special Findings Statute applies because the order was “a final order ․ modifying custody under [Indiana Code chapter 31-17-2].” I.C. § 31-17-2-8.2. We begin by observing that the Special Findings Statute does not explicitly state that findings must be “written.” See id. In other contexts, our legislature used the word “written” when contemplating the entry of written findings. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 31-34-19-6.1(e)(1) (directing the court in a Child in Need of Services case to “enter its dispositional decree with its written findings and conclusions” pursuant to other statutory sections); 31-37-18-9 (providing that, in a juvenile delinquency case, the court “shall accompany [its] dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning approval, modification, or rejection of the dispositional recommendations submitted in the predispositional report”).

[25] Nonetheless, the order is a judgment, and as such is subject to the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 58.⁹ The rule provides that “upon a decision of the court, the court shall promptly prepare and sign the judgment[,]” and requires that a judgment “shall be set forth on a separate document, except that a judgment may appear upon the same document upon which appears the court's findings, conclusions, or opinion upon the issues.” T.R. 58(A). Subsection B of the rule concerns the content of a judgment and requires a judgment to contain certain “statement[s]” with respect to the pleadings or submission at issue, the presence of the parties, the relief granted, the date the judgment and signature of the judge. T.R. 58(B). Clearly a judgment must be in writing in order to comply with the requirements of Trial Rule 58. Because the Special Findings Statute requires that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law be included “in a custody order[,]” which is a written judgment, it follows that the trial court's findings and conclusions must also be written. I.C. § 31-17-2-8.2 (emphasis added).

[26] We next consider whether the trial court's one sentence statement in its order in this case was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Special Findings Statute. The sole finding and or conclusion in the trial court's custody order stated, “[a]s there has been limited contact between [Father] and [the] [C]hildren, the court modifies the custody.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. This sentence did not address any of the elements of the custody modification statute, or provide us with a sufficient basis for the modification to allow us to perform our function as a reviewing court. In Dowdell, the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he principal purpose of findings of fact is to have the record show the basis of the trial court's decision so that on review the appellate court may more readily understand the former's view of the controversy.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Love v. State, 272 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. 1971). Additionally, because the modification was from joint legal custody to sole legal custody, the court must also consider the factors for joint legal custody set forth in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15.¹⁰ “When considering modification from joint legal custody to sole legal custody, the trial court must determine whether there has been a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-15, in addition to considering any substantial change to the Section 8 factors, as is typically necessary for physical custody modifications.” Shao v. Li, 276 N.E.3d 89, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). We therefore conclude that the trial court's sole written finding was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Special Findings Statute.

[27] Father argues that “[t]he proper remedy is remand for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law” consistent with the Special Findings Statute. Appellant's Br. p. 16. Mother agrees and stated that if we conclude the trial court was obligated to enter written findings and conclusions, the case should “be remanded to the [t]rial [c]ourt for additional findings in its Order.” Appellee's Br. p. 12. We agree with the parties and therefore remand for the trial court to enter an order that includes written special findings and conclusions as required by the Special Findings Statute and consistent with this opinion.¹¹

III. Child Support

[28] Father also challenges the trial court's child support orders. Father argues: (1) the trial court lacked authority to modify child support prior to May 29, 2025; (2) the trial court erred in its calculation of the Parents’ respective gross incomes; and (3) the trial court erred in its determination of the Parties’ pro rata share of the uninsured healthcare expense.

A. Authority to Modify and Effective Date

[29] Father contends that the trial court was precluded from considering Mother's request to modify child support because her petition was filed less than twelve months after the entry of the Decree and that there had not been a substantial change in circumstances that would allow modification prior to the expiration of the twelve-month requirement. Father does not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter; rather, he argues that “Mother was statutorily barred from obtaining modification under [Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b)(2)(B)].” Appellant's Br. pp. 28–29.

[30] Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1 permits modification of a child support order so long as one of two conditions have been met, namely: “(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable[,]” or, (2) that the new child support amount differs by at least twenty percent from the prior order and that the prior order was issued at least twelve months before the petition requesting modification was filed. I.C. § 31-16-8-1(b)(1), (b)(2).

[31] At the hearing Father conceded that Mother met the requirements for modification as set forth in (b)(2). Father's position was not that the $0.00 obligation established in the Decree should be preserved; rather, it was that any modification should be calculated from May 29–twelve months after the issuance of the Decree. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 60. We agree with Father that Mother failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances under Section (b)(1) that would permit the trial court to modify support sooner than May 29, 2025. Father never argued before the trial court that Mother's petition was premature or untimely and therefore deprived the trial court from considering a modification of support. Rather, Father only challenged the effective date of any modification of his support. Therefore, to the extent Father claims that the trial court was not permitted to consider Mother's request to modify support because her petition was filed sooner than twelve months after the issuance of the Decree, Father has invited such error. A party who invites a ruling cannot later complain that the court had no authority to make it. See Sullivan Builders & Design, Inc. v. Home Lumber of New Haven, Inc., 834 N.E.2d 129, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is well established that a party cannot complain of an error it has invited.” (quoting Ind. Dep't of Ins. v. Zenith Re-Ins. Co., 596 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ind. 1992))), trans. denied.

[32] However, we agree with Father's position before the trial court that because the trial court did not find there to be a substantial change in circumstances, the modification of Father's child support must be retroactive to May 29, 2025.¹² Therefore, we reverse the child support orders, in part, and remand for the entry of an order modifying Father's child support retroactive to May 29, 2025.

B. Income Calculations

[33] Father challenges the trial court's determination of Father's and Mother's gross incomes, arguing that the trial court impermissibly included income from his second job and failed to impute Mother's husband's income to Mother. “[A] trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid.” Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008) (citing Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “We review decisions regarding child support for an abuse of discretion.” Mitten v. Mitten, 44 N.E.3d 695, 699 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144, 1149–50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). However, we will “reverse decisions ․ imputing potential income to [a] parent only for an abuse of the trial court's discretion.” Walters v. Walters, 186 N.E.3d 1186, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re Paternity of C.B., 112 N.E.3d 746, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences therefrom.” Hooker v. Hooker, 15 N.E.3d 1103, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[34] “Upon the review of a modification order, ‘only evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment are considered.’ ” DeGrado v. DeGrado, 243 N.E.3d 381, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015)). We note that “[r]eversal of a trial court's child support order deviating from the appropriate guideline amount is merited only where the trial court's determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court.” Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 738 (quoting Kinsey v. Kinsey, 640 N.E.2d 42, 43 (Ind. 1994)). “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)).

[35] “The calculation of the weekly gross income of both parents is the ‘starting point’ when determining a parent's child support obligation.” DeGrado, 243 N.E.3d at 387 (quoting Meredith v. Meredith, 854 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Weekly gross income is defined as the “actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and the value of in-kind benefits received by the parent.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1).

[36] With respect to irregular income, comment (b) to Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(A)(2), provides that:

[A] form of irregular income may exist when an obligor takes a part-time job for the purpose of meeting financial obligations arising from a subsequent marriage, or other circumstances. Modification of the support order to include this income or any portion of it may require that the obligor continue with that employment just to meet an increased support obligation, resulting in a disincentive to work.

Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(2), cmt. 2(b).

With respect to imputed income, Child Support Guideline 3(A), comment 2(d) provides that:

Whether or not the value of in-kind benefits should be included in a parent's weekly gross income is fact-sensitive and requires careful consideration of the evidence in each case. It may be inappropriate to include as gross income occasional gifts received. However, regular and continuing payments made by a family member, subsequent spouse, roommate or live-in friend that reduce the parent's costs for housing, utilities, or groceries, may be included as gross income.

(emphasis added).

[37] Finally, Indiana Child Support Rule 2 states that “[i]n any proceeding for the award of child support, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which would result from the application of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines is the correct amount of child support to be awarded.” Ind. Child Support Rule 2. With respect to deviations from the Indiana Child Support Guidelines (“CSG”), Indiana Child Support Rule 3, Deviation from Guideline Amount, provides that “[i]f the court concludes from the evidence in a particular case that the amount of the award reached through application of the [CSG] would be unjust, the court shall enter a written finding articulating the factual circumstances supporting that conclusion.” Child Supp. R. 3.

1. Father's Income

[38] Father argues that the trial court erred when it included the earnings from his second job in determining his weekly gross income. See Appellant's Br. p. 23. Father argues that he took his second job for the sole reason to pay the child supported ordered by the trial court in its November 2024 order.

[39] Our court has previously noted that “a trial court must carefully scrutinize a parent's second job in determining weekly gross income, and that a parent should not have to maintain a second job to satisfy a support obligation.” Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E. 2d 100, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Father testified that he started the second job because of the arrearage ordered in the now-vacated support order from November 2024. However, Father also testified that he planned on keeping the job indefinitely because “it helps out ․ financially.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 48. Regardless of Father's motivation for obtaining the second job, he clearly intended to keep working the second job indefinitely. Father likewise did not state that he was maintaining his second job to satisfy his present support obligation. Since Father planned on maintaining his second job indefinitely it was not an abuse of discretion to include at least a portion of his income from that job in the determination of his gross income. See Marshall, 92 N.E.3d at 1121 (remanding for the trial court to “calculate [the parent's] weekly gross income including his dependable overtime and additional income”).

2. Mother's Income

[40] Father argues that the trial court erred by failing to impute to Mother in-kind benefits she received from her husband, asserting that the “regular payments that Mother received from her husband should have been included in support calculations because receipt of that money freed up her income for support of the [C]hildren.” Appellant's Br. p. 25.

[41] In Stanke v. Schmitt, our court reiterated that the “imputation of the value of in-kind benefits is not mandatory.” 273 N.E.3d 89, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (emphasis added) (citing Laux v. Ferry, 34 N.E.3d 690, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). Rather “the [CSG] contemplate a flexible approach wherein trial courts exercise discretion, providing a parent's remarriage ‘may give rise to a situation where either potential income or the value of in-kind benefits or both should be considered in arriving at gross income.’ ” Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(d)).

[42] Here, the trial court did consider Mother's husband's financial contributions to their household by reducing the amount of credit attributed to Mother's work-related childcare expenses. Mother testified that her childcare expenses were $480 per week. The trial court noted that Mother's weekly gross income was insufficient to cover that expense and recognized that Mother's husband's income was used to subsidize that expense. While the trial court declined to impute Mother's husband's income to her gross income, the court reduced the credit attributable to that expense in recognition of husband's contribution. The trial court reduced Mother's credit for work-related childcare expenses by one-half, from $480.00 to $240.00 per week.

[43] Father cites to the cases Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ind. 1999), Faulk v. Faulk, 166 N.E.3d 939, 944–45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), and Thomas v. Orlando, 834 N.E.2d 1055, 1060–61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) for the proposition that the trial court must impute income to Mother. However, Glass and Faulk are distinguishable from the facts in the present case. In Glass, the father was living rent free in a home. We affirmed the trial court's decision to impute income of $1,500.00 per month to father, noting that the father's lack of rent “free[d] up money for the support of his children and was a proper basis for the trial court to impute income.” 716 N.E.2d at 417. In Faulk, mother also lived rent-free, residing in her parents’ home with her parents and her child. 166 N.E.3d at 944–45. She worked full-time as a teacher and did not contribute to utility, taxes, or insurance expenses for the home. See id. We held the trial court abused its discretion by not imputing at least some portion of mother's in-kind benefits to her gross income. See id.

[44] In contrast to both Glass and Faulk, the trial court recognized the in-kind benefit Mother received from her husband based upon his payment of a portion of the childcare expenses. There was no evidence that Mother was underemployed, as Mother made approximately $15.00 per hour consistently from the issuance of the Decree through the date of the modification hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impute income from Mother's current husband to Mother.

C. Uninsured Healthcare Expenses

[45] Both the January Order and the July Order require Father to pay 55% of annual uninsured healthcare expenses. However, each of the child support worksheets attached to those same orders calculate Father's share of the uninsured healthcare expenses to be 73.3% and Mother's 26.7%. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 8–11. The 55% figure contained in the body of the orders appears nowhere else in the record: not in the transcript, not in any party's proposed calculations, and not in the trial court's worksheets. Father identified this discrepancy in his opening brief, and Mother concedes the orders are internally inconsistent.

[46] Because the orders are internally inconsistent on a material term, and we are already remanding to calculate support retroactive to May 29, 2025, on remand, we instruct the trial court to address the allocation of uninsured healthcare expenses, either adjusting the allocation to conform to the worksheets or explaining the basis for the percentages set forth in the body of the child support orders.¹³

Conclusion

[47] Although the trial court had authority to modify legal custody, remand is necessary because it did not enter sufficient written findings and conclusions supporting its decision, as was required under the Special Findings Statute. We affirm the trial court's modification of Father's child support and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mother's and Father's gross incomes. The trial court did err in determining the effective date for the modification of child support. Remand is necessary to calculate child support retroactive to May 29, 2025, and to correct the allocation of uninsured health care expenses.¹⁴

[48] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

[49] I concur with the majority regarding the issues of child custody, the calculation of the parties’ incomes, and the allocation of uninsured healthcare expenses. I respectfully dissent, however, with regard to the issue of the effective date of the trial court's child support order.

[50] I conclude that the trial court had the authority to order Father's child support effective January 23, 2025, not May 29, 2025, as the majority concludes. I do so for two reasons. First, the “child support” order of $0.00 contained in the original Decree was not a child support order at all, and the trial court's support determination was, therefore, not a modification of child support but a determination of child support in the first instance. Second, even assuming that the earlier order for $0.00 was a support order subject to the modification statute, the court could modify the order under the “unreasonableness” subsection of the modification statute, which places no time limit on the request for modification.

I. There was no existing support order.

[51] The child support modification statute presupposes an existing support order. Where support has never been ordered, however, there is nothing to modify, and a request that child support “start” is a request to establish child support in the first instance, and such a request is unconstrained by the twelve-month waiting period that governs support modifications. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24

[52] Here, the “award” of $0.00 in child support was not a support determination. The child support provision of the Decree merely adopted the parties’ own agreement that Father would owe no support. The parties, who were acting pro se, wrote “$0” into the blank on a self-help settlement agreement form. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. The trial court approved the parties’ agreement without a child support worksheet, a Child Support Guideline calculation, or any findings supporting a deviation. Id. at 23.

[53] Our Child Support Rules and Guidelines create a rebuttable presumption that the Guideline amount is correct, and they permit a departure only when the court enters “a written finding articulating the factual circumstances supporting that conclusion.” Ind. Child Support R. 2, 3. This requirement applies to agreed orders: such orders must comply with the rebuttable presumption requirement by reciting why the order deviates from the Guideline amount; must include a copy of the child support obligation worksheet; and must set forth a reason for such deviation—“a simple statement the parties agree to the deviation is not sufficient[.]” Ind. Child Support Guideline 1, Preface.

[54] Here, the trial court's initial Decree contains no worksheet, no computation of either parent's income, and no finding explaining why a $0.00 obligation—a 100% departure from any Guideline figure—could be justified. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. It simply approved, without explanation, the parties’ submission that there would be no child support. A Decree that neither applies the Guidelines nor supplies a reason for departing from them does not “establish[ ]” an “amount of child support.” Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1(e)(1).

[55] Although not dispositive, I also note that Mother's pro se filing requested that the trial court “start child support,” not modify it. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24 (emphasis added). At the hearing, Mother's counsel described the court's task as being “to establish an appropriate child support order.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 58 (emphasis added).¹⁵ To recast Mother's request as one for “modification” misconstrues what actually occurred. Because Mother sought to establish support in the first instance, not modify an existing child support order, the twelve-month limitation of Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1(b)(2)(B) does not apply.¹⁶

II. A $0.00 child support obligation was unreasonable.

[56] Even assuming that the $0.00 of child support awarded in the initial Decree was a “support order” subject to the modification statute, the trial court possessed the authority to modify it under Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1(b)(1), which permits modification “upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable.” Subsection (b)(1) contains no twelve-month waiting period, unlike the twenty-percent deviation justification for modification found in subsection (b)(2).

[57] Here, the unreasonableness of a $0.00 obligation is apparent. The Children were three and four years old, and each had significant special needs. Their care created ongoing expenses, including $480.00 per week in childcare. Father, for his part, earned roughly $1,360 per week in military pay alone, in addition to a varying amount from his part-time job. Appellant's Ex. Vol. 3 p. 4; Tr. Vol. 2 p. 50. Given this evidence, an order requiring Father to contribute zero dollars toward the support of his two young children was not reasonable. The trial court's own calculation emphasizes this—support as calculated under the Guidelines was $428 per week, a stark contrast to $0.00.

[58] The gap between the Guideline amount of $428 and $0.00 is compelling evidence of the unreasonableness of the original support amount. Mother's original willingness to accept $0.00 in “child support” cannot be used against the Children to defer the support they are owed. See Rolley v. Rolley, 22 N.E.3d 558, 559 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the invited error doctrine does not bar modification where a parent agreed to accept substantially less child support than the Guidelines would require, since the right to support belongs to the child and cannot be bargained away by either parent), adopting in relevant part Rolley v. Rolley, 13 N.E.3d 521, 530–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[59] The majority's contrary conclusion rests on two premises, neither of which I find persuasive. First, the majority notes that Father “conceded” a twenty-percent deviation under Indiana Code Section 31-16-8-1(b)(2). But a litigant's position about which statutory provision is applicable should not alter the legal character of the underlying order, and it cannot contract away the Children's entitlement to support. The fact that Father conceded the twenty-percent deviation does not mean that the non-support ordered in the original Decree was reasonable.

[60] Second, the majority states that the trial court did not find a substantial change in circumstances. But the trial court made no such negative finding. Instead, it was Father who proposed a stipulation that no substantial change had occurred; Mother declined, and the trial court proceeded “with the understanding that all potential issues are ․ available to the Court.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 13. The trial court then received extensive evidence of the Children's needs and of Father's income and set support accordingly. Because the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision supports the conclusion that a $0.00 child support obligation was unreasonable, the trial court acted within its discretion by modifying support without waiting for the twelve-month period to pass.

[61] For all of these reasons, I conclude that the trial court had authority to “modify” Father's child support effective January 23, 2025, and would affirm the modification on that basis, subject to the corrections the majority orders with respect to the allocation of uninsured healthcare expenses. Because the majority instead limits the modification to a May 29, 2025, effective date, I respectfully dissent from that conclusion. In all other respects, I concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Decree provided that Father “will pay child support in the amount of $[0.00] per week ․” and that Mother was responsible for all “controlled expenses related to the upbringing of the minor child[ren,]” while Father was responsible for “annual uninsured health and medical, dental, optical, hospital[,] and prescription expenses for the minor child[ren].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14.

2.   Father contends that he did not attend the hearing because he did not receive notice. See Appellant's Br. p. 6.

3.   The court further ordered Father to pay “55% [of] any uninsured medical, dental, optical, hospitalization, prescription, orthodontia[,] and all other health related expenses on behalf of said child[ren.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25.

4.   We note it was difficult to discern the trial court's handwritten portions of the order, and that illegible handwriting may impair our ability to properly review an order.

5.   The trial court entered identical provisions regarding custody in paragraph 11 of both the January Order and the July Order. We note that, although there are two distinct orders, we refer to both orders as one singular order with respect to custody.

6.   Ms. Klink is Mother's counsel.

7.   The Special Findings Statute became effective on July 1, 2025.

8.   Neither party requested written findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), so we confine our discussion to the Special Findings Statute.

9.   Ind. Trial Rule 54(A) defines “Judgment” to mean a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. T.R. 54(A).

10.   Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15 provides that:In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:(A) live in close proximity to each other; and(B) plan to continue to do so; and(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15.

11.   Because we are remanding for the entry of findings and conclusions, we do not address Father's contention that the trial court improperly based its decision on Father's military duties, which require living out of state.

12.   The dissent would affirm the trial court's modification of child support as of January 23, 2025, reasoning that the Decree's $0.00 provision was not a support order and that subsection (b)(1) authorizes immediate modification. We disagree with both. An agreed support obligation, even one a court may not have entered on its own, is a valid support order subject to modification, not a nullity. See In re Marriage of Kraft, 868 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); In re Paternity of M.R.A., 41 N.E.3d 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Rolley v. Rolley, 22 N.E.3d 558 (Ind. 2014). The Guidelines require a numeric amount of child support and treat a “$0.00” obligation as a support order, not the absence of one. Ind. Child Support Guideline 2. Neither of the parties challenge the validity of the Decree and both characterize the trial court's order as a modification of the Decree, rather than the establishment of an initial order of support. Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b)(1) requires a change in circumstances subsequent to the prior order that makes the prior order unreasonable. MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 2005). A claim that the $0.00 figure was unreasonable from the outset fails to meet the plain language of the statute and amounts to nothing more than a collateral attack on the prior order. Neither Mother nor the dissent points to any substantial change in circumstances relevant to the calculation of child support that occurred subsequent to the issuance of the Decree. As such, the only basis for modification remains under Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b)(2), which requires a deviation from the prior order by 20% and a twelve-month wait, resulting in an effective date for modification of no earlier than May 29, 2025.

13.   In his reply brief, Father for the first time challenges the trial courts orders regarding the calculation of any child support arrearage. See Appellant's Reply Br. p. 11. However, since Father raises these claims for the first time in his reply brief, they are waived. See Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (stating “[t]he law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.”). Therefore, we do not further address this argument, except to note that any arrearage determination must be consistent with the effective date of the modification of Father's child support.

14.   To the extent Father argues that the trial court's determination of Mother's income, Father's income, and the daycare expenses are a deviation from the CSG and represent an independent basis for reversal, we disagree. Because we have already found the trial court's determination of those matters were within the trial court's discretion, the trial court's calculation does not constitute a deviation from the CSG.

15.   Father's filings were not entirely consistent regarding how he referred to the issue in question. Although Father requested that the trial court reset the hearing on Mother's “Motion to Establish Child Support,” he also referred to his own motion for “[m]odification” of child support. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 27, 29 (emphasis added). Father's own motion also claimed that there had been a “substantial change in circumstances which makes the current order unreasonable.” Id. at 29. Regardless, what matters is whether a prior child support determination existed to be modified. As already explained, none did.

16.   The cases cited by the majority do not establish that the $0.00 obligation here was a valid support order. Kraft and Rolley addressed whether an agreed support figure (above the Guideline amount in Kraft, substantially below it in Rolley) could be modified under subsection (b)(2), despite the parties’ agreements. See Kraft, 868 N.E.2d at 1189; Rolley, 13 N.E.3d at 530. Neither case addressed whether the underlying obligation satisfied Child Support Guideline 1. M.R.A. did involve an agreed zero-dollar child support obligation, but the parties’ agreement there explicitly stated the basis for the zero-dollar, below-Guidelines child support obligation—shared physical custody and Father's agreement to pay certain extra expenses. 41 N.E.3d at 294 n.4. It was on that basis, and the fact that Mother had no living expenses, that we rejected the trial court's conclusion that the agreement was void. Id. Here, however, the Decree contains no explanation for the $0.00 figure, and no worksheet appears to have been attached.

Foley, Judge.

Weissmann, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion.