Eric De Shawn Nicholson, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Eric De Shawn Nicholson appeals his convictions of resisting law enforcement and driving while suspended as well as his adjudication as an habitual offender. Finding no error, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Nicholson presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred when it refused Nicholson's proffered jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence; and

II. Whether the trial court erred when it denied his challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) to the State's use of a peremptory strike of a potential juror.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 24, 2024, Nicholson, whose license was suspended, was driving his motorcycle when Officer Alex Ball of the Madison Police Department attempted to conduct a traffic stop. Nicholson refused to stop, and Officer Ball terminated the pursuit when speeds reached eighty-five miles per hour.

[4] Nicholson was arrested a few days later, and the State charged him with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class A infraction driving while suspended. The State also alleged that Nicholson is an habitual offender. A jury found Nicholson guilty as charged and determined that he is an habitual offender. The court sentenced Nicholson to seven and one-half years, and he now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Jury Instruction

[5] Nicholson first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his proffered jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence. Instructing the jury lies solely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Ellis v. State, 194 N.E.3d 1205, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. When evaluating whether a trial court properly refused to give a tendered instruction, we consider the following: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that were given. Mathews v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1172, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[6] At Nicholson's trial, the court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence as follows:

Under the law of this State, a person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent. This presumption of innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout each stage of the trial and you should fit the evidence presented to the presumption that the defendant is innocent, if you can reasonably do so.

To overcome the presumption of innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove his or her innocence or to prove or explain anything. Further, his failure to do so cannot be considered as evidence of guilt.

Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 207 (Instruction No. 8 Presumption of Innocence). The court denied Nicholson's request to add an additional paragraph that stated:

If the evidence lends itself to two reasonable interpretations, you must choose the interpretation consistent with the accused[’s] innocence. If there is only one reasonable interpretation, you must accept that interpretation and consider the evidence with all the other evidence in the case in making your decision.

Id. at 80.

[7] In McCowan v. State, our supreme court declared:

A defendant in a criminal case is per se entitled to a jury instruction that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defendant is entitled to request the following jury instruction, and the trial court must give this instruction if requested: “The presumption of innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout the trial. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can reasonably do so.” If the defendant adds to or varies this language in his request, inclusion of that variation remains within the discretion of the trial court, under the traditional three-prong analysis established by our jurisprudence.

27 N.E.3d 760, 766 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

[8] While Nicholson acknowledges in his brief that the trial court's instruction conforms with the bright line rule set forth by our supreme court in McCowan, he nevertheless points out that the additional language in his proffered instruction is contained in a pattern jury instruction and therefore asks that we find error with its exclusion.

[9] Although pattern jury instructions are preferred, there is no requirement that trial courts use them. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021). Indeed, the McCowan court specifically noted that inclusion of language similar to that proffered in this case by Nicholson “remains within the sound discretion of the trial court.” See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 766 n.4. The instruction given by the trial court at Nicholson's trial informed the jury that a person charged with a crime is to be presumed innocent, that the presumption of innocence remains throughout the trial, that it should try to fit the evidence into the presumption that Nicholson is innocent, that to overcome this presumption of innocence, the State was required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Nicholson was not required to prove or explain anything. See Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 207 (Instruction No. 8 Presumption of Innocence). The court also instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt and informed the jury that Nicholson should not be convicted on suspicion or speculation, and that if there was a reasonable doubt that Nicholson was guilty, it should give him the benefit of that doubt and find him not guilty. See id. at 208 (Instruction No. 9 Burden of Proof – Reasonable Doubt). The trial court's rejection of the additional instructional language was not error.

II. Batson Challenge

[10] Next, Nicholson contends that the trial court erred when it denied his Batson challenge to the State's use of a peremptory strike for a potential juror. Specifically, he alleges that the trial court did not properly evaluate the State's reasons to determine if they were merely pretexts for purposeful discrimination

[11] “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). To evaluate a Batson challenge, a trial court must engage in a three-step process: (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the circumstances raise an inference that the State exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race; (2) if so, the burden then shifts, and the State must offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror; and (3) the court must evaluate the credibility of the justification offered by the State. Whitfield v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1260, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (first quoting Cartwright v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (Ind. 2012); and then quoting Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208, 1209 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied.

[12] Notwithstanding the third step in the process, the ultimate burden of showing racial motivation remains with the opponent of the strike. Whitfield, 127 N.E.3d at 1266 (quoting Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 828 (Ind. 2006)). On appeal, we afford great deference to the trial court's determination on a Batson challenge, and we will reverse only if that decision was clearly erroneous. Schumm v. State, 866 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Ind. Ct. App.), clarified on reh'g, 868 N.E.2d 1202 (2007).

[13] Here, the State struck the potential juror identified as “Mr. C.,” the only African American person on the venire panel. Our supreme court has acknowledged that the removal of the only African American juror in the jury pool raises an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209 (quoting McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004)).

[14] For the second step in the process, “[a] neutral explanation means ‘an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.’ ” McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1111 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)). “ ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ Although the race-neutral reason must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, the reason need not be particularly ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’ ” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209 (citation omitted).

[15] In response to Nicholson's objection to the dismissal of Mr. C., the State articulated:

I had previously represented him as a criminal defense attorney. He previously had an existing law enforcement charge. And he indicated that he had been up since 1:00 o'clock yesterday afternoon and will be up more than 24 hours before the day was over and did not (inaudible) continue to concentrate on this case.

․

And may I add, Your Honor, that (inaudible) he was saying thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you. So that, I think, is also an indication that he did not want to be here.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 109. These are race-neutral reasons for the State's peremptory challenge of Mr. C.

[16] At the third step in the process, the trial court evaluates the persuasiveness of the State's justification from step two. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210. It is in this third step that “ ‘implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’ ” Id. (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)). Simply stated, this determination is whether the trial court finds the State's race-neutral explanation credible. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210. Once the State offers its reasons for striking the juror, the defendant may offer additional evidence to demonstrate that the proffered justification was pretextual. Id.

[17] Here, the trial court accepted the State's race-neutral reason, and Nicholson made no argument and offered no further evidence that the proffered justification was pretextual. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court's denial of Nicholson's Batson challenge is clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[18] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Nicholson's tendered jury instruction and that its denial of Nicholson's Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm Nicholson's convictions and adjudication.

[19] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Pyle, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.