Quinnshay Guyton and Kamorra Lee, Appellants-Defendants v. LP (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In July of 2025, Meadows on Main LP by Kittle Property Group, Inc. (“Landlord”), filed an eviction action against Quinnshay Guyton and Kamorra Lee (collectively, “Tenants”) in the Boone Superior Court Small Claims Division (“the small-claims court”), seeking immediate possession of the apartment that Tenants had leased but for which they had failed to pay the rent. An eviction hearing was held on August 13, 2025, which was not recorded and for which no transcript could be provided. During the hearing, Guyton ¹ verbally agreed with Landlord that Tenants would vacate the apartment by September 3, 2025, and the small-claims court issued an order for possession of the property in favor of Landlord. On August 26, 2025, Tenants filed an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment and stay the eviction, which the small-claims court denied.

[2] Tenants, proceeding pro se, contend that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying their motion to set aside the judgment and stay the eviction. They base their contention on allegations that (1) the small-claims court violated their due-process rights by entering the order of possession following a hearing that was not recorded; and (2) the small-claims court's enforcement of the possession order—while the eviction proceedings were still pending—amounted to an unlawful seizure of Tenants’ property in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For its part, Landlord contends that the small-claims court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tenants’ motion to set aside the judgment because (1) Tenants had agreed to vacate the apartment and (2) the enforcement of the possession order did not amount to a deprivation of property without due process or a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2025, Landlord renewed Tenants’ lease for an apartment located in Whitestown, Indiana, for a one-year term, from June 19, 2025, to June 18, 2026, at a monthly rent of $1275.00. At that time, an arrearage existed due to unpaid rent.² On July 24, 2025, Landlord filed a complaint and an affidavit in the small-claims court seeking the immediate possession of the apartment based on Tenants being “in arrears as to rent.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 11. The small-claims court issued an order scheduling a preliminary eviction hearing for August 13, 2025, and notifying Tenants as follows regarding the hearing:

[Y]ou may file affidavits on your behalf with the Court and may appear and present testimony on your behalf, at the time of such hearing; FURTHER, that you may file with the Court a written undertaking to stay the delivery of the [apartment], in accordance with the provisions of law, and that if you fail to appear, evidence will be heard in your absence, and [Landlord] may be granted a judgment of possession.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 26.

[4] On August 13, 2025, the small-claims court conducted the preliminary eviction hearing, “to determine whether there was a breach of the lease agreement between the parties[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30. Guyton appeared at the hearing; Lee did not. The hearing was not recorded. A court employee later indicated in a response to email correspondence from Guyton that no audio existed for the hearing, no transcript could be produced, and nothing existed for the proceeding “other than the [Chronological Case Summary] entries.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 57.

[5] During the preliminary eviction hearing, the parties had advised the small-claims court that they had orally agreed that Tenants would vacate the apartment by September 3, 2025. Landlord's counsel later indicated that counsel had reminded Guyton that she had the right to have the small-claims court judge hear and decide all the issues in the eviction case. Despite having been advised of her right to proceed otherwise, Guyton verbally agreed to vacate the apartment.³

[6] The small-claims court issued an order of possession on August 13, 2025, granting possession of the apartment to Landlord and directing that Tenants be removed from the apartment by the Boone County Sheriff if they failed to vacate the premises by midnight on September 3, 2025 (“Possession Order”). Guyton received a copy of the order at the conclusion of the hearing, and Lee was served with a copy by mail that same day.

[7] On August 26, 2025, Guyton filed an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the small-claims court's Possession Order and stay the eviction. Guyton contended that she “did not have a fair opportunity to be heard before judgment was entered”; she had “the full rent and fees available at the time of the [preliminary eviction] hearing but was unable to present this” to the small-claims court; she was “actively securing alternative housing” and had “already been approved” for new housing but needed additional time to “complete the move”; her failure to present this defense at the hearing was due to “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect”; and enforcement of the judgment would result in “substantial injustice and irreparable harm.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 29.

[8] Landlord filed its response on September 4, 2025.⁴ Landlord argued that the Possession Order had been entered pursuant to the parties’ agreement; Guyton had been advised of her right to have the eviction matter heard and decided by the small-claims court judge; Guyton having had funds available at the time of the eviction hearing to satisfy the rent arrearage was not a defense to eviction; and Guyton's motion had established neither excusable neglect nor a meritorious defense, as required under Trial Rule 60(B).

[9] On September 12, 2025, the small-claims court denied Guyton's Rule 60(B) motion. The court found that the reasons given by Guyton in support of the motion “d[id] not provide sufficient factual or legal basis to justify a ruling that [Tenants] were mistaken or that they should now be excused from their previous agreement with [Landlord]” to vacate the apartment by September 3, 2025. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30. The court did, however, modify its prior order to extend Tenants’ vacate date, allowing Tenants through and including September 21, 2025, to vacate the apartment.

[10] On September 17, 2025, Tenants filed their notice of appeal of the small-claims court's order denying Guyton's Rule 60(B) motion. Tenants filed an amended notice of appeal on October 5, 2025, correcting an incorrect lower cause number. The Boone County clerk filed the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record on October 6, 2025.

[11] Meanwhile, Tenants failed to vacate the apartment by September 21, 2025. On October 3, 2025, the small-claims court issued an order directing the Boone County Sheriff to remove Tenants from the apartment and return possession of the apartment to Landlord (“the Removal Order”).⁵

Discussion and Decision

[12] Tenants contend that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying their Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the Possession Order and stay the eviction. They claim that they are entitled to relief from the small-claims court's judgment due to mistake or excusable neglect on their part, and because they had alleged a meritorious defense. In support, Tenants contend that (1) the small-claims court violated their due-process rights by entering the Possession Order following a hearing that was not recorded; and (2) the small-claims court's enforcement of the Possession Order—while the eviction proceedings were still pending—amounted to an unlawful seizure of Tenants’ property in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Small-Claims Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Tenants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment

[13] At the outset, we note that Tenants chose to proceed pro se both below and on appeal. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Winters v. Pike, 171 N.E.3d 690, 695–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Tenants are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[14] Turning to the matter before us, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in part, that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default” for the following reasons relevant to this appeal, namely, “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1).

Our scope of review for the grant or denial of a T.R. 60(B) motion is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for relief.

McIntyre v. Baker, 703 N.E.2d 172, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). We “will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, considering instead only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Fields v. Safway Grp. Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[15] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides that a trial court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a judgment based on mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect if the motion is filed within one year of the judgment and the moving party alleges a meritorious claim or defense. Rule 60(B) “affords relief only in ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that are not the result of the moving party's fault or negligence.” State v. Moody, 51 N.E.3d 281, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Z.S. v. J.F., 918 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). The movant must carry the burden to demonstrate that relief is necessary and just. Z.S., 918 N.E.2d at 639.

[16] “There are no fixed standards” as to what constitutes mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect for purposes of a Rule 60(B) motion. Menard, Inc. v. Lane, 68 N.E.3d 1106, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Nevertheless, a movant must go beyond a mere recitation of the words “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” and describe the actual error that occurred. Moody, 51 N.E.3d at 284. “ ‘A trial court's discretion in this area is necessarily broad because any determination of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect turns upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.’ ” Z.S., 918 N.E.2d at 640 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cummings, 792 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

A. Tenants Have Failed to Establish Mistake or Excusable Neglect

[17] In her Rule 60(B) motion, Guyton alleged “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 29. She contended that she “did not have a fair opportunity to be heard before judgment was entered”; she had “the full rent and fees available at the time of the hearing but was unable to present this” to the small-claims court; and her failure to present this defense at the hearing was “not due to intentional disregard of the Court's process.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 29. The small-claims court determined that the reasons given by Guyton in support of the motion failed to provide a “sufficient factual or legal basis to justify a ruling that [Tenants] were mistaken or that they should now be excused from their previous agreement with [Landlord]” to vacate the apartment by a certain date. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30. We agree with the small-claims court.

[18] The small-claims court's order setting the eviction matter for a preliminary hearing expressly advised the Tenants, in no uncertain terms, that Tenants could appear and present testimony at the hearing, file affidavits, and file a “written undertaking to stay the delivery of the property[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 26. On August 13, 2025, Guyton appeared at the hearing, where Landlord's counsel reminded her of her right to have all of the eviction issues heard and decided by the small-claims court judge.

[19] Despite the advisement, Guyton entered into the agreement. In her Rule 60(B) motion, Guyton did not deny that she had entered into the vacation agreement with Landlord. Instead, Guyton alleged that she had not had a fair opportunity to be heard; she had the money to satisfy the rent arrearage; and she needed additional time to complete a move to a new residence. In its order denying Guyton's Rule 60(B) motion, the small-claims court acknowledged the procedural history leading to the parties’ agreement, noting that the eviction case “did not go to hearing on [August 13, 2025,] for the reason that the [small-claims court] was advised that the parties agreed that [Tenants] would vacate” the apartment on or before a certain date. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30.

[20] Guyton claims that she did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to vacate the apartment, arguing that because the preliminary eviction hearing was not recorded, the “narrative” that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement cannot be verified. Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 3. However, the small-claims court explicitly found in its order denying the Rule 60(B) motion that Guyton had entered into the vacation agreement with Landlord. Therefore, Tenants’ argument to the contrary amounts to a request for this Court to reweigh that evidence, which we will not do. See Fields, 118 N.E.3d at 809. Moreover, Guyton's decision to forgo a contested hearing and, instead, enter into a vacation agreement was her own decision, was not due to any extraordinary circumstances, and was not, without more, the kind of mistake or excusable neglect that compelled relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(1). See Moody, 51 N.E.3d at 283.

[21] Based upon the foregoing, Tenants have failed to establish that they are entitled to relief from the Possession Order due to mistake or excusable neglect. Therefore, the small-claims court did not abuse its discretion by reaching that conclusion.⁶

B. Tenants’ Due-Process Rights Were Not Violated

[22] Tenants next contend that because the preliminary eviction hearing was not recorded, “no record exists demonstrating that [Tenants] were afforded a meaningful opportunity to present evidence, confront adverse claims, or be heard in opposition to eviction.” Appellants’ Br. p. 10. Tenants assert that the “absence of a transcript or evidentiary record confirms that the procedural safeguards required by due process were not satisfied.” Appellants’ Br. p. 10. Tenants maintain that “[w]ithout a record, there is no basis upon which to conclude that testimony was taken, evidence was admitted, or findings were made sufficiently to justify deprivation of [their] possessory interest.” Appellants’ Br. p. 10. We are unpersuaded.

[23] Tenants’ arguments ignore that, despite the lack of recording for the hearing, the record before this Court clearly establishes that Guyton agreed to forego appearing before the small-claims court and presenting testimony regarding the eviction and instead agreed to vacate the apartment by a certain date. Indeed, Tenants received written notice of the hearing and of their right to appear and present defenses; Guyton appeared, was advised of her right to a contested hearing, and elected to resolve the matter by agreement. And the small-claims court memorialized the vacation agreement in its order denying Guyton's Rule 60(B) motion. Thus, the process that Tenants now say they were denied was afforded to them. Therefore, Tenants cannot prevail on their claim that their due-process rights were violated.⁷

C. The Small-Claims Court's Enforcement of the Possession Order Did Not Amount to an Unlawful Seizure of Tenants’ Property in Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

[24] Tenants next contend that the removal of their possessions and lockout from the apartment—that occurred with assistance from the Boone County Sheriff after the Boone County clerk had filed the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record—amounted to an unlawful seizure of their property in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. In support of their contention, Tenants cite to Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992). In Soldal, the landlord had evicted the tenant by physically tearing his mobile home from its foundation and towing it to another lot before the landlord had obtained a forcible entry and detainer judgment. The sheriff's deputies who were present for the eviction knew that the landlord was not acting pursuant to a court order and that the landlord's actions were unlawful. A deputy lieutenant had informed the tenant that day that any criminal-trespass complaint that the tenant might file would not be accepted, and that the landlord was “going to go ahead and continue to move out the trailer.” Soldal, 506 U.S. at 58–59 (internal quotations omitted).

[25] The landlord eventually removed the tenant's mobile home in the presence of the sheriff's deputies. The tenant filed suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States Supreme Court ultimately held that the landlord and sheriff had acted under the color of state law to dispossess the tenant of his mobile home by physically removing it from its foundation. Id. at 72. The Supreme Court thus concluded that the facts had established a “ ‘seizure’ ” “within the meaning of” the Fourth Amendment. Id.

[26] Tenants’ reliance upon Soldal is misplaced, as the facts of the case before us are readily distinguishable from those in Soldal in one important respect. In Soldal, the sheriff's deputies knew that the eviction was unlawful, but they nonetheless allowed the eviction to proceed. In the instant case, the Boone County Sheriff acted pursuant to a valid removal order when the Sheriff executed the removal and lockout of Tenants.

[27] Furthermore, to the extent that Tenants contend that the enforcement of the eviction and the subsequent lockout constituted an unlawful seizure of their property because the eviction and lockout occurred while their appeal was pending, we cannot agree.

[28] Generally, once a judgment is entered, an appeal is filed, and the clerk's record is complete, “Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated.” Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corners Owners Ass'n, Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (quotation and citation omitted). However, trial courts “retain authority over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted). Such independent matters include “reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing the judgment.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Additionally, as provided in Appellate Rule 39(A), “[a]n appeal does not stay the effect or enforceability of a judgment or order of a trial court ․ unless the trial court ․ or Court on Appeal otherwise orders.”

[29] It is undisputed that Tenants’ appeal was pending when the removal and lockout occurred. The small-claims court entered its judgment on September 12, 2025. Tenants filed their notice of appeal on September 17, 2025, and the Boone County clerk filed the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record on October 6, 2025. However, Tenants never obtained a stay of the small-claims court's Possession Order, either from the small-claims court or this Court. Thus, the Possession Order was enforceable immediately, notwithstanding Tenants’ appeal. See Ind. App. Rule 39(A). Furthermore, we have already determined that the Boone County Sheriff acted pursuant to a valid removal order when the Sheriff executed the removal and lockout of Tenants. Therefore, the small-claims court's enforcement of the Possession Order—and the Boone County Sheriff's subsequent removal and lockout of Tenants—that occurred while Tenants’ appeal was pending did not amount to an unlawful seizure of Tenants’ property.⁸

[30] We conclude that Tenants have failed to demonstrate that the small-claims court abused its discretion in denying their Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the Possession Order and stay Tenants’ eviction.

[31] The judgment of the small-claims court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kamorra Lee did not appear for the eviction hearing.

2.   While the small-claims court had noted that under such circumstances, the “renewal by [Landlord] could be considered as [Landlord] having waived the arrearage[,]” it “decline[d] to view the renewal as such.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 43.

3.   Landlord acknowledges that the agreement between the parties was “neither put in writing nor signed by either party.” Appellee's Br. p. 6, n.2. According to Landlord, the Boone County Courts follow a “standard process” in eviction cases in that “[w]hen an agreement is reached, court staff are informed verbally and then prepare a possession order that includes the agreed-upon vacate date. Copies of the order are provided to both parties.” Appellee's Br. p. 6, n.2.

4.   The small-claims court stayed the proceedings pending the filing of Landlord's response to Guyton's motion to set aside the Possession Order.

5.   Tenants filed motions to stay the Removal Order in both the small-claims court and this court. Both motions were denied. Moreover, we note that on February 10, 2026, Landlord filed in the small-claims court a motion to dismiss its complaint against Tenants, without prejudice, which the court granted that same day. See Odyssey Case Management System, Cause No. 06D02-2507-EV-430. Because neither party has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, we resolve the matter on the merits.

6.   Because we have determined that the small-claims court did not abuse its discretion in finding an absence of mistake or excusable neglect under the meaning of Trial Rule 60(B)(1), we need not address whether Tenants have alleged a meritorious defense.

7.   Likewise, Tenants cannot prevail on their claim that the “agreement to vacate relied upon by the [small-claims court]” was “generated through a Docusign account that was fraudulently created and used in [Guyton's] name, without her authorization[.]” Appellants’ Br. p. 11. This claim is unsupported by the record, as it appears that Tenants have conflated their agreement to vacate the apartment with their lease agreement. The Docusign-generated document found in the record was the lease that Tenants signed in 2025. The agreement to vacate the apartment, by contrast, was reached orally and was never reduced to writing.

8.   Finally, Tenants assert that certain “private actors” acted jointly with state officials to “effectuate the unlawful dispossession of [Tenants’] property.” Appellants’ Br. p. 15. However, Tenants raise the claim “for preservation purposes only” and concede that resolution of the claim “[is] not required for disposition of this appeal.” Appellants’ Br. p. 15. As such, we decline to address the claim.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.