Kenneth W. Viars, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Kenneth W. Viars drove his truck over Jacqueline Tegeler, his former intimate partner, in a gas station parking lot, running over her foot and leg, pulling her leg into the wheel well, and injuring her arm. A jury convicted Viars of Level 3 felony aggravated battery,¹ Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon,² and Level 6 felony leaving the scene of an accident.³ He appeals on two grounds: that the trial court should have declared a mistrial after a juror briefly exchanged words with Tegeler while exiting the courtroom, and that the State presented insufficient evidence of protracted loss or impairment to support the Level 3 felony. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[1] Viars and Tegeler began an intimate relationship around August 2021. On the morning of August 16, 2023, Viars was taking Tegeler to get her children. As he was driving, he argued with Tegeler and she repeatedly asked to be let out of the truck. Viars repeatedly pulled over as though he would stop, then accelerated and drove on. He eventually pulled into a gas station and Tegeler got out.

[2] As Tegeler walked away from the truck, Viars yelled at her, and she threw a can of soda at his truck. Viars then accelerated into Tegeler as she walked away. The truck hit Tegeler on the left side of her body and ran over her foot, pulling her leg into the wheel well. Tegeler was knocked to the ground and the rear tire passed over her leg. Viars sped away from the gas station.

[3] When first responders arrived, Tegeler was on the ground screaming in pain. A paramedic observed a left arm injury, an injury to her right buttock, and an abrasion on her left chest resembling tire marks. Tegeler rated her pain at ten out of ten. She was transported to the hospital in a neck brace.

[4] At the hospital, staff found Tegeler had skin ripped from the bottom of her left foot with soft tissue and nerve damage, nerve damage in her left hand causing loss of grip, and a wound on her left leg that cut the skin to the muscle layer. The wound on her left leg required staples and drain tubes, which remained in place for approximately six weeks. Tegeler was hospitalized for days, heavily medicated, and prescribed medication upon discharge.

[5] Police found Viars's truck parked several blocks from the gas station with his personal documents inside. They subsequently arrested Viars, and the State charged Viars with Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, and Level 6 felony leaving the scene of an accident.

[6] After her release from the hospital, Tegeler could not walk on her own for months, could not care for her children, could not work, and had to live with a friend whose mother came to assist her daily. At the time of trial – two years after the incident – Tegeler still used a cane on some days, could not sustain part-time employment, could not run and play with her children, and had lost grip strength in her left hand.

[7] During trial, near the beginning of Tegeler's testimony, the court removed the jury to address a defense objection. As the last juror was leaving the courtroom, she briefly exchanged words with Tegeler, who remained on the witness stand. The juror said, “I'm sorry, I'm slow,” and Tegeler responded, “No, no. I understand.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 185.) The juror replied, “I bet you do.” (Id.)

[8] Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial. The trial court questioned the juror who had spoken to Tegeler (“Juror 8”) individually. Juror 8 said she had not discussed the interaction with other jurors, but that the alternate juror had joked with her that she would be removed. The trial court then questioned the alternate juror (“Juror 13”) individually. Juror 13 confirmed he heard Juror 8 say she was slow on the way out and told her she would probably be in trouble for talking. He said the other jurors had been “talking about it,” but that what they discussed was only that Juror 8 said she was slow. (Id. at 90.)

[9] The trial court then questioned each of the remaining jurors individually. Every juror except Juror 13 said they did not directly hear the exchange. Most jurors who heard discussion in the jury room could recall little of substance: several knew only that something had happened, one heard a reference to Juror 8 apologizing for being slow, and one heard that Juror 8 had been told she should not have said something. Every juror confirmed that if instructed by the trial court not to consider the interaction as evidence, they would follow that instruction.

[10] After questioning was complete, defense counsel renewed the motion for mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, excused Juror 8, replaced her with Juror 13, and then instructed the jury: “I am now instructing you not to consider any interaction between any juror and the witness as evidence and part of your deliberations.” (Id. at 207.) Trial resumed.

[11] On direct examination, the prosecutor asked whether Tegeler's ongoing disabilities were caused by the incident with Viars or by an unrelated November 2024 altercation, Tegeler said: “It's [be]cause of my leg. My leg mostly. My leg and my arm injury, yes.” (Id. at 225.) On cross-examination, defense counsel established that Tegeler was involved in a physical altercation in November 2024, which was more than a year after the incident with Viars. Tegeler disputed the characterization of her role in that event, saying she was attacked rather than a willing participant. Defense counsel did not ask what injuries Tegeler sustained in that altercation or whether any of those injuries affected her leg or arm. The jury found Viars guilty on all three counts and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of eight years.

Discussion and Decision

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial.

[12] Viars argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial based on Juror 8's brief exchange with Tegeler. A mistrial is an extreme remedy granted only when no other measure can protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001). The trial court is best positioned to assess the circumstances and their effect on the jury, and its decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014).

[13] The trial court's response to the exchange between Juror 8 and Tegeler was thorough and immediate. The trial court questioned Juror 8 and Juror 13 individually before questioning every remaining juror individually. Each juror confirmed they would follow an instruction to disregard the interaction. The court then excused Juror 8, replaced her with Juror 13, and upon resuming trial instructed the reconstituted jury not to consider the exchange during deliberations. Those steps are precisely what the law contemplates when potential jury taint is discovered during trial. See Ramirez, 7 N.E.3d at 940 (trial courts must immediately investigate suspected taint, individually question exposed jurors, and collectively admonish the jury).

[14] Viars has not shown that any prejudice survived the trial court's response. The only juror who spoke directly with Tegeler was removed. Juror 13 – the only other juror present in the courtroom during the exchange – said he heard Juror 8 say she was slow and nothing more. The jurors who heard discussion in the jury room recalled fragments at most, and several could not describe what was said at all. None had been exposed to substantive information that was not already before them through admitted evidence. Every juror individually confirmed the ability to follow the trial court's instruction, and the trial court gave that instruction before testimony resumed. The brief, ambiguous exchange between one juror – who was immediately removed – and the witness, followed by the trial court's prompt and thorough remedial response, does not establish that Viars was deprived of an impartial jury.⁴

II. The evidence was sufficient to support the Level 3 felony aggravated battery conviction.

[15] Viars argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he committed Level 3 felony aggravated battery. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, this court considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could have found the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191.

[16] To sustain the Level 3 felony aggravated battery conviction, the State was required to prove that Viars knowingly or intentionally inflicted an injury on Tegeler that caused the “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ[.]” See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(2). Viars does not challenge that he inflicted injury on Tegeler. He argues that the State failed to prove Tegeler suffered from protracted loss or impairment and that any impairment Tegeler described cannot be attributed to his conduct because she sustained a separate injury in November 2024.

[17] “Protracted” means “draw[n] out or lengthen[ed] in time[.]” Fleming v. State, 833 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Neville v. State, 802 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). “Impairment” means the “fact or state of being damaged, weakened, or diminished.” Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 754 (7th ed. 1999)). Expert medical testimony is not required to establish these elements. Id. at 90. A victim's own account of the nature, duration, and ongoing effects of her injuries is sufficient, provided the jury hears evidence from which it can reasonably find that the loss or impairment was protracted. Id.

[18] The evidence here was more than sufficient. The truck tore skin from the bottom of Tegeler's left foot, caused nerve damage to her left hand, and left a wound on her left leg that required staples and drain tubes for approximately six weeks. For several months after her hospital discharge, Tegeler could not walk independently, could not care for her children, and could not work. Two years later, she still used a cane on some days, could not sustain part-time employment, and could not grip objects with her left hand without dropping them. That evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to establish protracted loss and impairment of function under Fleming.

[19] Viars argues that the November 2024 altercation, not his conduct, caused the impairments the State relies on to prove aggravated battery. On direct examination, before that later incident was ever mentioned at trial, Tegeler attributed her ongoing physical limitations to “my leg mostly. My leg and my arm injury.” Tr. Vol. II at 225. That testimony ties both her leg injury and the nerve damage underlying her grip loss to the incident with Viars. The jury was entitled to credit her testimony. No authority requires the State to corroborate a victim's causation testimony with expert medical evidence. Fleming, 833 N.E.2d at 89.

[20] What the record does not contain is equally important. Defense counsel cross-examined Tegeler about the November 2024 altercation and established that she suffered another severe injury from it. The trial court ruled counsel could ask about the nature and extent of that injury without getting into the details of the altercation itself. Counsel asked no further questions. The jury never learned what injuries Tegeler sustained in November 2024, whether any of those injuries affected the same leg or arm at issue here, or how her condition before and after that event compared. On this record, a reasonable jury could find – as this one did – that Viars caused Tegeler's protracted loss and impairment of function of her leg and hand. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial, and the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated battery conviction. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 42-2-1.5(c).

2.   Ind. Cod § 35-42-2-1.3(c).

3.   Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(b)(2).

4.   Viars also argues the trial court never actually admonished the jurors individually because asking jurors if they would follow further instructions was not adequate. However, as we have determined Viars was not deprived of an impartial jury based on his challenge of the entire incident and the trial court's response, we need not address this additional argument.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.