Mark Pellegrini, Appellant-Defendant v. Anthony J. Zacarias, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Mark Pellegrini agreed to rent a residential property to Anthony Zacarias, but Zacarias was unable to take possession due to the deplorable conditions therein. Zacarias filed a notice of claim in the small claims court seeking return of a payment he made to Pellegrini, and the small claims court ordered Pellegrini to return that payment. Pellegrini now appeals and raises several issues, which we consolidate as follows: Whether the small claims court clearly erred by entering judgment in favor of Zacarias.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2024, Pellegrini and Zacarias began discussions about renting a Wheatfield, Indiana, property owned by Pellegrini at a monthly rent of $1,300.00. The property required extensive repairs before Zacarias could take possession. Zacarias agreed to help with the repairs, believing his help would “cover [the security] deposit, and [the] 1,300 would be for the first month's rent.” Tr. Vol. II at 5.

[4] The repairs “carried on for months and months, and months,” which delayed settling on a firm move-in date. Tr. Vol. II at 5. In March 2025, Zacarias made a payment of $1,300.00 to Pellegrini.

[5] In June, the property was “supposedly close to being finished.” Tr. Vol. II at 6. However, when Zacarias visited the property, the basement “still was destroyed” and “smelled of [animal] urine and feces.” Id. The “room downstairs” was “still not repaired” and had “cut materials and timbers ․ down in there.” Id. Electrical sockets were “hanging out the wall,” and the “[t]rim still needed to be done.” Id. Pellegrini said he “didn't smell anything” and that the property was “move-in ready.” Id. Even though there was dispute about the condition of the property, the parties apparently settled on a July 1 move-in date.

[6] On July 2, Zacarias “notified [Pellegrini] that [he] would not be moving into [the] property” because it “still smelled of animal feces and ․ urine.” Tr. Vol. II at 7. On July 15, Pellegrini sent Zacarias a letter informing him that Pellegrini intended to offset July's “financial loss” of rent by keeping the $1,300.00 payment, which Pellegrini referred to as a “security deposit ․ paid in anticipation of renting the property.” Appellant's App. at 7. Pellegrini ultimately rented the property to another person in September.

[7] Zacarias filed a notice of claim in the small claims court, seeking return of his $1,300.00 payment. At the ensuing bench trial, Zacarias testified regarding the defects in the property. Pellegrini testified that on July 1, the property was “ready for [Zacarias] to move into,” but Pellegrini did not dispute the defects identified by Zacarias. Tr. Vol. II at 11. The parties disagreed about whether the $1,300.00 Zacarias paid was a security deposit or prepaid rent.

[8] After Pellegrini's testimony, his counsel stated, “Nothing further, Your Honor.” Tr. Vol. II at 15. On rebuttal, Zacarias testified Pellegrini did not incur damages. The small claims court then announced its ruling, ordering Pellegrini to return the $1,300.00 to Zacarias. This appeal ensued.¹

Discussion and Decision

The Small Claims Court Did Not Clearly Err by Entering Judgment in Favor of Zacarias

[9] Pellegrini argues the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of Zacarias. Judgments rendered by a small claims court are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). “We generally review small claims judgments for clear error, giving considerable deference to the small claims court and its assessment of witness credibility.” Piccadilly Mgmt. v. Abney, 215 N.E.3d 1078, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)), trans. not sought. “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, ‘with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice’ between parties according to the rules of substantive law.” Branham v. Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011) (citing Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008)).

We consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. [Berryhill v. Parkview Hosp., 962 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).] However, we still review issues of substantive law de novo. Id. The burdens of proof are the same in a small claims suit as they would have been if suit had been filed in a trial court of general jurisdiction. Martin v. Ramos, 120 N.E.3d 244, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Josh's Lawn & Snow, LLC, 130 N.E.3d 1191, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[10] Before addressing the merits, we note that Zacarias did not file an appellee's brief, so we will reverse the small claims court's judgment if Pellegrini's brief presents a case of prima facie error. See Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758).

[11] Turning to Pellegrini's arguments, he claims (a) the trial court ruled prematurely, and (b) the evidence does not support the order requiring him to return the payment to Zacarias. We address each argument in turn.

a. Premature Ruling

[12] Pellegrini argues that the small claims court “rul[ed] before key issues were fully explored” and “denied [him] the opportunity to fully rebut allegations and detail damages.” Appellant's Br. at 6. Pellegrini had a full opportunity to develop the issues, rebut Zacarias's allegations, and detail damages during Pellegrini's testimony. After Pellegrini completed his case in chief, he had an additional opportunity to contest Zacarias's allegations on rebuttal. Instead, Pellegrini's counsel stated Pellegrini had “[n]othing further” to present. Tr. Vol. II at 15. The small claims court did not rule prior to the submission of evidence, and Pellegrini's contention that the trial court ruled prematurely has no support in the record.

b. Sufficiency of Evidence

[13] Pellegrini also argues that the small claims court's ruling was “unsupported” by the evidence. Appellant's Br. at 5. Indiana Code section 32-31-8-5 requires, among other things, that a landlord “[d]eliver the rental premises to a tenant in compliance with the rental agreement, and in a safe, clean, and habitable condition.” Ind. Code § 32-31-8-5(1). Pellegrini argues that Zacarias “presented no documentary evidence, photographs, inspection reports, or corroborating witnesses supporting his allegation that the property was uninhabitable,” Appellant's Br. at 5, but Zacarias was not required to present evidence in these specific forms. Zacarias testified regarding the property's deplorable conditions, and Pellegrini never addressed, much less contested, that testimony. Pellegrini merely testified that the property was “ready” for Zacarias to move into. Tr. Vol. II at 11. Pellegrini essentially asks us to reweigh his and Zacarias's testimony, which we cannot do. See Piccadilly Mgmt., 215 N.E.3d at 1079 (citing Muldowney, 83 N.E.3d at 132). The small claims court was permitted to credit Zacarias's testimony as true and find that the conditions of the property prevented him from taking possession.

[14] As for the return of the $1,300.00 payment, though the parties disputed whether this payment constituted a security deposit or prepaid rent, Pellegrini testified it was a security deposit.² Indiana Code section 32-31-3-12(a) provides that within 45 days of termination of a rental agreement, “a landlord shall return to the tenant the security deposit minus any amount applied to” certain enumerated expenses. If a landlord fails to comply with this requirement, the tenant “may recover all of the security deposit due.” I.C. § 32-31-3-12(b).

[15] In Mileusnich v. Novogroder Co., Inc., this court held that the landlord was required to return the tenant's security deposit when the rental property was not “ready” for the tenant to take timely possession, the tenant “tore up the lease,” and the landlord accepted the tenant's surrender by renting the property to another person. 643 N.E.2d 937, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied. Here, Zacarias was unable to take possession of the property due to its deplorable conditions, he informed Pellegrini that he no longer wished to take possession, and Pellegrini accepted this surrender by sending the letter purporting to keep the security deposit as compensation for Zacarias cancelling the lease.

[16] Because Zacarias was unable to take possession of the property and Pellegrini accepted Zacarias's termination of the leasehold, Pellegrini was not permitted to retain the $1,300.00 payment. Pellegrini has not shown prima facie error in the small claims court's judgment, so we cannot say the judgment is clearly erroneous. We thus affirm the small claims court's judgment in favor of Zacarias.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pellegrini appeals pro se. Pro se litigants are “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)).

2.   In his Appellant's Brief, Pellegrini argues the $1,300.00 payment “was a hold deposit or advance rent.” Appellant's Br. at 5 (capitalization removed). “In general, a party cannot present a different argument on appeal than he presented to the trial court.” GSE Realty LLC v. Miller, 272 N.E.3d 166, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Gladstone v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 166 N.E.3d 362, 372 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 171 N.E.3d 609 (Ind. 2021)), reh'g denied, trans. not sought. To the extent Pellegrini now argues the payment was not a security deposit, that argument is waived. See id.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.