Cr.J. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] When four-month-old C.J.’s pediatrician found unexplained bruising on her, he referred her to Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley”) for further evaluation. Her caregivers refused to allow it, so the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed her from the home, Cr.J. (“Mother”) spent the following months refusing nearly every service offered to her – she would not complete the drug screen required to see C.J., engage with her Court Appointed Special Advocate, or attend a Child and Family Team Meeting. The trial court adjudicated C.J. a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”), Mother appeals the sufficiency of the evidence, and we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] C.J. was born March 4, 2025. Mother was married to Ch.J. (“Legal Father”) at C.J.’s birth, making him the presumptive legal father under Indiana law. Mother, Legal Father, and J.M. (“Alleged Biological Father”) agreed, however, that Alleged Biological Father is C.J.’s biological father.¹ No DNA test had been completed at the time of the fact-finding hearing. The trial court ordered testing at DCS's expense.

[3] Mother had a significant prior DCS history. Her twin boys had been adjudicated as CHINS in 2023. That case ended in guardianship with a relative in 2024. During the twins’ case, Legal Father overdosed on methamphetamine and fentanyl and was arrested on drug-related charges. Neither parent complied with drug screening requirements in that case.

[4] On July 7, 2025, Mother and Alleged Biological Father took four-month-old C.J. to a well-child appointment with Dr. Michael Scott at Columbus Pediatrics. Dr. Scott found bruising on C.J.’s right forehead, left arm, left elbow, and left thigh. She also had a red lesion in the center of her forehead. Mother and Alleged Biological Father said the forehead bruise came from C.J. rolling into a bed headboard during tummy time and the arm and leg bruises came from Alleged Biological Father picking C.J. up with paint-stained hands. Dr. Scott applied an alcohol pad to the arm and leg marks, but they did not come off. He referred C.J. to Riley for a non-accidental trauma workup, and he noted that bruising on the head of a pre-mobile infant is associated with child abuse ninety-seven percent of the time in the medical literature.

[5] At Riley, Legal Father ² refused the evaluation on behalf of the family, saying they wanted a second opinion from a provider not contacted by DCS. DCS detained C.J. so the evaluation could proceed. A skeletal survey and CT scan both indicated no injuries. Staff also collected a blood sample from C.J. for testing. Doctors at Riley diagnosed C.J. with facial bruising and non-accidental trauma. DCS filed its CHINS petition the following day.

[6] At a July 24, 2025, follow-up appointment, Dr. Ann Freshour of Riley's Child Protection Team discovered C.J.’s blood test results from July 7 indicated her platelet level had been low when DCS removed her from Mother's care due to the bruising and red mark. Another blood test on July 24 revealed C.J.’s platelet level had returned to normal. Dr. Freshour consulted pediatric hematologist Dr. Terry Vik, who opined that the low platelet count could lead to easy bruising and could account for C.J.’s initial presentation. Dr. Freshour called Family Case Manager Angelique O'Neal (“FCM O'Neal”) after the visit and told her Riley was officially deeming the diagnosis medical due to the platelet count, but that Riley could not rule out non-accidental trauma.³

[7] Following C.J.’s removal, Mother did not visit her between July 2025 and the fact-finding hearing in October 2025 – a period of roughly four months. Visits were conditioned on completing a drug screen, and Mother chose not to screen. Approximately one week before the fact-finding hearing, Mother finally submitted to a drug screen.⁴ While the petition was pending, Mother engaged with no referred services, attended no Child and Family Team Meetings, and did not respond to attempts by Court Appointed Special Advocate Steve Loheide (“CASA Loheide”) to contact her after a single initial exchange. DCS was never able to see her home.

[8] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on October 31, 2025. No Riley physicians were present, but the parties stipulated that witnesses could be asked about what Riley physicians told them based on the medical records. The three caregivers all explained the nature of C.J.’s injuries and gave materially inconsistent accounts of the events. Regarding the alleged headboard incident, Mother and Legal Father said that Legal Father was in the room with C.J. when she rolled and hit her head, while Alleged Biological Father said he was trying to pick up C.J. when she rolled over and hit the side of the bed. Regarding the paint incident, Alleged Biological Father told the trial court that he wiped the stain off immediately, while Mother and Legal Father both said the paint would not come off. Dr. Scott had confirmed the marks did not come off with his alcohol pad. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, C.J.’s bruising and the red mark on her forehead had disappeared.

[9] On November 24, 2025, the trial court adjudicated C.J. as a CHINS under both Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2. On December 23, 2025, the trial court held its dispositional hearing. On January 14, 2026, the trial court entered its dispositional order declining DCS's request for it to order Mother to complete drug screens or a substance abuse assessment. Instead, the trial court required her to only complete home-based case management and pay child support.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother appeals C.J.’s adjudication as a CHINS. Our standard of review in these matters is well-settled:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (brackets in original).

[11] To adjudicate C.J. as a CHINS, DCS had to prove that C.J.’s physical health was seriously endangered by injury due to a caregiver's act or omission and that C.J. needed care unlikely to be provided without court intervention. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-2. When a CHINS allegation is related to an injury the child sustained, Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4 provides that a presumption arises that the child is a CHINS when DCS introduces competent evidence of probative value that: (1) the child was injured; (2) caregivers had care and custody at the time; (3) the injury would not ordinarily be sustained except for a caregiver's act or omission; and (4) there is a reasonable probability the injury was not accidental. To trigger the presumption, DCS need only produce some relevant and admissible evidence tending to establish these elements – not proof by a preponderance. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Once established and not rebutted, the presumption extends to all CHINS elements in Indiana Code chapter 31-34-1, including the coercive intervention element. Matter of K.Y., 145 N.E.3d 854, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[12] Prongs one and two are uncontested – C.J. had documented bruising and a red lesion, and all three caregivers had care and custody of her. The trial court's Findings 45 and 46 address these prongs directly, and Mother does not challenge either of them.⁵ Prongs three and four were established through Dr. Scott's testimony that bruising on a pre-mobile infant's head is associated with child abuse ninety-seven percent of the time in the medical literature and through the testimony of CASA Loheide, who was a retired pediatrician, that the forehead injury appeared to come from trauma rather than normal infant handling. That is sufficient to trigger the presumption. See, e.g., J.D., 77 N.E.3d at 809 (holding presumption had arisen when facts demonstrated that child was injured and continuously in parents’ care).

[13] Mother's rebuttal rested on two things: the caregiver explanations and the platelet evidence. The trial court rejected the caregiver testimony as not credible, and that determination is essentially unreviewable on appeal due to our standard of review. The trial court identified specific, concrete inconsistencies – not a general credibility assessment – and those inconsistencies are well-documented in the transcript. The factfinder's credibility determination stands. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[14] Mother argues Riley changed its diagnosis from “non-accidental trauma to a medical reason.” (Mother's Br. at 14.) DCS argues the determination was “inconclusive.” (DCS Br. at 25.) The written July 24 records – which this court has reviewed directly – support neither characterization exactly. The records use conditional language throughout, such as the platelet count “could” account for the bruising. (See, e.g. Ex. Vol. 3 at 9.) The differential diagnosis explicitly still includes non-accidental trauma as a possibility. No formal written diagnosis change appears in those records. The trial court's Finding 19, which states that Riley's determination “changed to inconclusive” and that Dr. Freshour “was unable to definitively say that the bruising was due to the low platelets,” captures the substance of the written records accurately even if the word “inconclusive” is imprecise. (App. Vol. 2 at 22.) Based thereon, we conclude that Mother did not rebut the presumption. And because she did not, the presumption extends to all CHINS elements – including the coercive intervention element Mother separately challenges. See K.Y., 145 N.E.3d at 863 (mother did not rebut presumption that child was a CHINS, so the trial court did not err when it adjudication child as such).

[15] Mother argues DCS did not present evidence that established that C.J. needed care unlikely to be provided without court intervention. The presumption that C.J. was a CHINS as defined in Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4, having arisen and gone unrebutted, proves this element automatically. However, even without the presumption, the record on this element is overwhelming. Mother did not visit C.J. once between removal in early July 2025 and the fact-finding hearing – approximately four months – because she chose not to take a drug screen. She refused every DCS service referral. She did not engage with CASA Loheide, DCS, or providers. Her prior CHINS case ended in guardianship after identical non-engagement. Family Case Manager Blythe Adcock (“FCM Adcock”) indicated to the trial court that she had no reason to believe Mother would address DCS's concerns without court intervention. Mother's argument fails. See contra In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014) (mother's attempt to participate in services during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings did not support the trial court's determination that coercive intervention of the court was needed). Thus, the trial court did not err when it adjudicated C.J. as a CHINS ⁶ based on Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court did not err when it adjudicated Child as a CHINS. Accordingly, we affirm.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Legal Father and Alleged Biological Father are not parties in this appeal.

2.   Mother was present with Legal Father at Riley. Alleged Biological Father was not.

3.   The July 24 records use conditional language throughout – i.e., the platelet count “could” account for the bruising (see, e.g., Ex. Vol. 3 at 9) – and they frame the question as a differential diagnosis that still includes non-accidental trauma as a possibility. No formal written diagnosis change appears anywhere in the July 24 records.

4.   The results of the drug screen are not in the record.

5.   Mother challenges five of the trial court's findings. Findings 5, 8, 19, 20, and 25 concern the nature of C.J.’s injuries. Finding 44 concerns the inconsistency in the caregivers’ explanations for C.J.’s injuries. Regarding the challenged findings as to the nature of C.J.’s injuries, several unchallenged findings discuss the nature and medical opinions regarding the nature of C.J.’s injuries, including Findings 9, 10, and 45. Additionally, Finding 15 relays an example of a conflicting story given by C.J.’s caregivers. Thus, any error in these findings is harmless, because there are other unchallenged findings that support the trial court's decision. See e.g., Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (erroneous findings constitute harmless error and are surplusage when there are other unchallenged findings to support the trial court's decision). Additionally, the challenged findings are supported by the evidence – Findings 5, 8, and 20 accurately reflect Dr. Scott's testimony; Finding 19 is supported by testimony regarding C.J.’s follow-up visit with Dr. Freshour; Finding 25 is based on CASA Loheide's testimony; and Finding 44 summarizes the testimony of each caregiver and notes the inconsistencies.

6.   Mother also argues the trial court erred when it adjudicated C.J. as a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. As we hold the trial court did not err when it adjudicated C.J. as a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2, we need not address her argument.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.