Deonna J. Postin, a.k.a. Deonna J. Hollingsworth, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Deonna J. Hollingsworth pleaded guilty to Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death in September 2025. In October, Hollingsworth moved to withdraw her guilty plea, which the trial court denied. Hollingsworth now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 6, 2024, law enforcement responded to a report of a child drowning at Kimmel Park. The child's body was found later that day. Hollingsworth, the child's stepmother, told officers she was wading in the water with the five-year-old when she lost sight of her. Hollingsworth showed signs of intoxication and admitted to officers she had smoked marijuana the night before. Later testing revealed Hollingsworth had a blood alcohol concentration of 199.9 milligrams per deciliter.

[3] The State charged Hollingsworth with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death on June 7. At an initial hearing, the trial court explained the nature of the charge against Hollingsworth and its possible penalties.¹ Over a year later, Hollingsworth filed a motion and requested that the court set a change of plea hearing.

[4] The trial court conducted a change of plea hearing on September 3, 2025. Hollingsworth appeared with counsel and informed the trial court that she wished to plead guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. The trial court then advised Hollingsworth of her rights to a jury trial, to cross-examination, against self-incrimination, and to appeal. Hollingsworth told the court that she had not received any promises, threats, or undue pressure to plead guilty. She indicated three times that she wished to plead guilty. The State presented a factual basis with which Hollingsworth agreed. The trial court found Hollingsworth offered her guilty plea freely and voluntarily and then found her guilty of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.

[5] Hollingsworth obtained new counsel and filed a motion to set aside her guilty plea on October 9. The trial court held a hearing on her motion on November 3. Hollingsworth stated she believed she was innocent and had a valid defense to the charge against her. She testified that prior counsel “did not give [her] access to any of the discovery” and advised her that “pleading guilty was [her] only option[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. Hollingsworth also claimed prior counsel misinformed her that she could request a reduction of a potential twenty-year sentence in “three (3) to five (5) years[.]” App. Vol. II pp. 25-26. She argued that these circumstances amounted to a manifest injustice because she could not knowingly and voluntarily offer a guilty plea.

[6] The trial court reviewed the transcript of the change of plea hearing and denied Hollingsworth's motion to set aside her guilty plea. Hollingsworth filed a motion for recusal, which the court granted. She then filed a motion to correct error on December 2, which the trial court denied. Hollingsworth now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

[7] Hollingsworth argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. “A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling, and a defendant seeking to overturn such a ruling faces a high hurdle.” Akins v. State, 245 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotations and brackets omitted). After entry of a guilty plea but before the imposition of a sentence, a court may allow a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b) (1983). The court's ruling on such a motion “shall be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. However, the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea “whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. The defendant has the burden of establishing her grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 35-35-1-4(e). Hollingsworth has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of the ruling under either avenue for withdrawal provided in Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b).

I. No Manifest Injustice

[8] Hollingsworth argues that a manifest injustice occurred because she could not knowingly or voluntarily offer a guilty plea. See Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that a manifest injustice may occur when a guilty plea is not offered knowingly and voluntarily). Specifically, she claims she “was pressured into pleading guilty, denied access to evidence, and not aware of the actual sentencing possibilities[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 10. The only evidence Hollingsworth offered in support of these allegations was her own testimony. The State argues that Hollingsworth's self-serving statements are insufficient to establish that a manifest injustice occurred. We agree.

[9] Hollingsworth did not introduce any evidence or elicit testimony from her prior counsel to corroborate her claims that prior counsel “did not give [her] access to any of the discovery[,]” advised her that “pleading guilty was [her] only option[,]” and misadvised her about the possible sentencing penalties. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. In the absence of prior counsel's testimony, “[t]he trial court was entitled to infer that counsel would have testified otherwise had he been called.” Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ind. 1995); see also Jeffries, 966 N.E.2d at 779 (“There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance.”). Additionally, Hollingsworth's claim that prior counsel pressured her into pleading guilty is undermined by her previous representations to the trial court that she freely chose to plead guilty. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 5-9. We are also unpersuaded that Hollingsworth was unaware of the sentencing possibilities, given the trial court explained this to her at the initial hearing.

[10] Rather, the record supports a finding that Hollingsworth's guilty plea was offered knowingly and voluntarily. At the change of plea hearing, Hollingsworth indicated three times that she wished to plead guilty, and she denied receiving any promises or pressure to plead guilty. See id. The trial court also explained Hollingsworth's rights to a jury trial, to confrontation, and against self-incrimination. In all, the record indicates Hollingsworth knew what she was doing when she pled guilty. Accordingly, Hollingsworth has not established that she suffered a manifest injustice, and the court was not required to grant her motion. See Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 62-63 (finding defendant did not show manifest injustice where his prior testimony undermined his claim of undue pressure on appeal).

II. No Abuse of Discretion

[11] Absent a showing of manifest injustice, a trial court may allow a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b). We review a trial court's ruling on such a motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Rhoades v. State, 675 N.E.2d 698, 702 (Ind. 1996). “In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the plea was offered ‘freely and knowingly.’ ” Jeffries, 966 N.E.2d at 777 (quoting Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Hollingsworth contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion because the State did not argue it was substantially prejudiced. But the absence of prejudice does not mean the trial court must grant the motion. Asher v. State, 128 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Instead, it means “only that the court retained discretion to grant [her] motion for any fair and just reason.” Id. (quotations and brackets omitted).

[13] As previously discussed, the record supports a finding that Hollingsworth offered her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that her claims to the contrary are not credible. Additionally, while Hollingsworth claimed she was innocent and had a valid defense, such post-plea assertions do “not require the trial court to set aside an otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty plea.” Knight v. State, 202 N.E.3d 475, 480-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. It was within the court's discretion to credit Hollingsworth's testimony at the change of plea hearing over her later assertions. Id. at 481. Hollingsworth has not overcome the “high hurdle” of establishing error in the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. See Akins, 245 N.E.3d at 183. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Hollingsworth did not include a copy of the initial hearing order in her appendix, we accessed it through the Odyssey Case Management System. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of this document. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).

2.   The trial court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. Hollingsworth has not yet been sentenced.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.