C.K., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following his admission to committing delinquent acts, C.K. challenges his placement in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). C.K. raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining C.K.’s placement.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 12, 2025, while serving in-home detention for delinquent acts committed in Floyd County, C.K., a juvenile, twice drew a knife and threatened his brother. On July 18, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition in which it alleged that C.K. committed intimidation, as a Level 5 felony; disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor; and habitual disobedience of a parent, which is a status offense. On August 6, C.K. entered into a “blind plea”¹ agreement in which he admitted that he had committed the delinquent acts, as charged. App. at 24. The trial court held a dispositional hearing on September 3 and committed C.K. to Transitions Academy, a residential placement where he would receive and complete a treatment program and services.

[4] The trial court then engaged in the following colloquy with C.K.:

The Court: Now let me say this[,] and I can't say this anymore[ ] straight forward or be more specific, is if you leave that program voluntarily[,] like if you run off from that program[,] I'm going to send you to the Department of Corrections [sic], do you understand?

[C.K.]: Yes sir.

* * *

The Court: So when I say that[,] I can't be anymore frank and make [sic] more straightforward about it. Two kids went this week to the Department of Corrections [sic] because they ran off from the facilities where I sent them to[,] okay?

[C.K.]: Yes sir.

The Court: Do you understand?

[C.K.]: Of course[,] sir.

Tr. at 23-24. The court then explained to C.K. the alternative dispositions and placements it could impose, including placement in the DOC, a detention center, a “youth shelter[,]” or a residential placement like Transitions. Id. at 27.

[5] On December 15, the State moved to modify C.K.’s dispositional decree from placement in Transitions to placement in the DOC on the grounds that: C.K. had tested positive for THC while at Transitions and following his removal to a detention center; C.K. had engaged in other infractions, including “punch[ing] a peer[,]” and failed to participate in rehabilitative programming while at Transitions; and Transitions had terminated C.K.’s placement at their facility. App. at 145. In support, the State filed a modification report, which included two reports and one positive drug screen result for C.K. from Transitions.

[6] The modification report noted that C.K. had “poor” compliance with probation supervision in that he had “continued to engage in substance abuse at [the] facility and has chosen to quit engaging in treatment and work at Transitions.” Id. at 153. The modification report noted that C.K. had “not benefit[ed] from placement [at Transitions] and ha[d] quit doing the work the placement required.” Id. Under a section entitled “Dispositional Options Considered and Evaluation of Each[,]” the report stated,

[C.K.] was not succeeding in the home. He did not succeed while on electronic monitoring through Floyd County. He is unlikely to succeed in a home or home-like or nonsecure setting. Transitions is the only facility that was willing to accept him, and they want him to be removed. [C.K.] needs to be committed to IDOC DYS [Division of Youth Services].

Id.

[7] The report further noted,

[Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)] interventions, electronic monitoring, short-term detention, community-based services, and placement have been used to address [C.K.]’s risks and needs.

***

[C.K.] is actively choosing to possess/use THC and not participate in his program of rehabilitation.

***

The least restrictive interventions have been used to address [C.K.]’s risks and needs[,] with no success.

The safety of the child precludes the immediate use of family services to prevent removal of the child because: [C.K.] has engaged in a pattern of behavior that placed himself and others at risk of harm.

It is in the best interests of the child to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the health and welfare of the child because: [C.K.] has engaged in a pattern of behavior that placed himself and others at risk of harm.

Id. at 155.

[8] One of the Transitions reports attached to the modification report stated, in relevant part:

The Transitions Academy Risk team has met and staff[ed the C.K.] situation and have determined that [C.K.] has placed himself and other residents at risk in the program. He has shown NO REMORSE, nor does he see the situation as serious as he continues to lie and use [ ] weed [ ], thinking he would not get caught. The risk team at Transitions Academy request[s] the immediate removal of [C.K.] from the program. [C.K.] shows no motivation to change nor keep himself or others safe in the program. [C.K.] is in need of a cause-and-effect program that limits the opportunity for choice[,] such as that provided by the Indiana Department of Corrections [sic].

Id. at 163 (emphasis in original).

[9] On January 5, 2026, the probation department filed a Predispositional Report in which it noted that C.K. “has received short-term detention, expulsion waiver with referral to Our Place through New Albany-Floyd Co. Schools, electronic monitoring (which failed to contain [C.K.]), case management through Associates in Counseling and Psychotherapy, and, recently, clinical interview, therapy, and medication management.” Id. at 195. The report further noted, “Less restrictive interventions than full commitment to IDOC DYS have been used to address [C.K.]’s needs and risks[ ] and have failed.” Id.

[10] At a January 23 fact-finding hearing, Probation Officer Katherine Miller testified that Transitions Academy had been the only placement other than DOC that would accept C.K. and Transitions had now terminated C.K.’s placement with them due to his non-compliance. Officer Miller recommended that C.K. be placed in the DOC because “[h]e needs programming and an environment where they can provide safe, frankly, restrain[t] if there is physical aggression.” Tr. at 94. Officer Miller believed the DOC is appropriate because it can provide C.K. with education, anger management, mental health treatment, and substance abuse programs.

[11] In its January 23 “Specific Findings on Dispositional Order,” the trial court found that it is in C.K.’s best interest “to be placed in a secure facility to protect [C.K.] and [for him to] receive therapeutic treatment[,] and no reasonable alternatives exist[ ] at the time of this order.” Appealed Order at 1. The court further found that “this Disposition is consistent with the safety of the community as well as the best interest and special needs of [C.K.] and is the least restrictive and most appropriate setting for [C.K.].” Id. The court ordered that C.K. would “remain with the [DOC] for a minimum of 1 year” and/or until he “complete[s] all programs and reaches the age of 18.” Tr. at 118. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[12] C.K. challenges his placement in the DOC. We first address his contention that that placement is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) “in light of the nature of CK's offenses and CK's character.” Appellant's Br. at 4. C.K. has cited no legal authority in support of that contention, and there is none. Rather, Appellate Rule 7(B) applies to revisions of criminal sentences. Juvenile proceedings are civil in nature, see, e.g., T.K. v. State, 899 N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), and the commitment of a juvenile is not a “sentence[ ]” for a crime, M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Therefore, Appellate Rule 7(B) does not apply to juvenile dispositions. T.K., 899 N.E.2d at 688.

[13] Rather, we review juvenile dispositions for an abuse of discretion. M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 458. And,

[t]he juvenile court's discretion is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences that can be drawn therefrom. The juvenile court is accorded wide latitude and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles.

Id. (citations omitted).

[14] Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 provides that the trial court must consider the following factors when entering a dispositional decree:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

[15] Thus, the statute requires the least restrictive placement only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” I.C. 31-37-18-6(1)(A). That is, “the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement because commitment to a public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society.” M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459 (citation modified).

[16] Here, the evidence establishes that many placements less restrictive than the DOC have been tried but have failed to produce positive changes in C.K.’s behavior. By the time of the January 23 dispositional hearing, C.K. had received DCS interventions, short-term detention, expulsion waiver with referral to Our Place through New Albany-Floyd County Schools, home placement with electronic monitoring, case management through Associates in Counseling and Psychotherapy, and clinical interview, therapy, and medication management, all of which failed to improve C.K.’s behavior. In addition, the only remaining alternative placement that had been willing to accept C.K.—Transitions Academy—had terminated him from the program for such behavior as bringing drugs into the facility, testing positive for drugs while in the facility, “punch[ing] a peer[,]” and failing to engage in rehabilitative services. App. at 145. Thus, C.K.’s contention that “[t]here was no evidence in the record that anything C.K. did at Transitions resulted in any harm to himself or others” is without merit. Appellant's Br. at 15.

[17] Nor do we find any merit to C.K.’s assertion that the trial court's decision to place him in the DOC was based on an unwritten court policy rather than the specific facts before the court in this case. C.K. cites no evidence of such an alleged policy. The warnings the trial court gave to C.K. at the September 3 dispositional hearing that he would be placed in the DOC if he ran away from Transitions Academy were nothing more than that: a warning. And there is no evidence that warning or the ultimate placement in DOC were based on anything other than C.K.’s own failure to take advantage of and benefit from the multiple less restrictive placements and interventions he already had received in the past. Cf. E.L. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding trial judge erroneously based juvenile's placement in the DOC on a “presumption of recommitment” to the DOC when a juvenile reoffends after a prior commitment to the DOC, where the trial court stated it felt “constrained” by the court's policy of recommitment).

[18] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it placed C.K. in the DOC.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A blind plea is “[a] guilty plea made without the promise of a concession from either the judge or the prosecutor.” Plea (1), Blind Plea, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.