Nicholas B. Simmons, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Nicholas Simmons violated his probation by committing new criminal offenses. As a result, the trial court revoked Simmons's probation and executed the balance of his suspended sentence, ordering 90 days to be served in jail and 275 days to be served on GPS home detention. Simmons now appeals, raising two issues for our review which we revise and restate as the following issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Simmons's probation and executing the balance of his suspended sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2025, in Cause 48C04-2406-CM-001861 (the “Invasion Cause”), Simmons pled guilty to invasion of privacy and unlawful carrying of a handgun as Class A misdemeanors and possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Simmons to 365 days suspended to probation. As part of the terms of his probation, Simmons agreed to obey all laws and “behave well in society.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 56.

[4] In June 2025, while on probation in the Invasion Cause, Simmons was charged in Cause 18C04-2506-F6-000397 (the “Strangulation Cause”) with strangulation as a Level 6 felony and domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor. On July 2, the State filed a petition (the “Petition”) alleging in relevant part that Simmons violated his probation by committing the offenses alleged in the Strangulation Cause.

[5] On January 13, 2026, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Petition. Simmons's former girlfriend Alexis Erhardt-Garcia testified that on March 22, 2025, Simmons choked her so she could not breathe, pushed her to the bed, and bit her leg. Some time later, Simmons also “grabbed [Garcia] and threw [her] to the floor.” Tr. Vol. I at 28.¹ Eaton Police Department Lieutenant Jonathan Guffy testified that Garcia reported the incident on March 24 and had “visible injuries,” id. at 52, including bruises on her arms and leg and “petechia[e]” on her neck “consistent with a potential strangulation,” id. at 56–57.

[6] Simmons also testified and claimed that Garcia attacked him, and he was only trying to “restrain[ ] her off of [him].” Tr. Vol. I at 60. Simmons admitted to biting Garcia's leg “[be]cause she kept on kicking [him] in [his] mouth.” Id. at 74. The trial court found Garcia's testimony to be “more credi[ ]ble and ․ consistent with the physical evidence in the photographs than the version given by” Simmons. Id. at 87. The trial court concluded that Simmons had violated his probation. After the disposition hearing, the trial court revoked Simmons's 365-day suspended sentence and ordered him to serve 90 days at the Madison County Jail and the remainder of the sentence on GPS home detention. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Revoking Simmons's Probation and Executing His Sentence in the Invasion Cause

[7] Simmons argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to revoke his probation and execute his sentence. As an “alternative[ ] to incarceration through the Department of Correction,” probation “is a ‘matter of grace,’ a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” Ewing v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)). We review a trial court's probation revocation and corresponding sanction decisions for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs ‘where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,’ ” Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)), or where the trial court “misinterpret[s] the law,” Ewing, 273 N.E.3d at 1110 (citing Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 970 (Ind. 2014)).

[8] Simmons challenges both (a) the trial court's conclusion that he violated the terms of his probation and (b) the trial court's sanction for that violation. We address each challenge in turn.

a. Revocation

[9] First, a “probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112 (citing Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995)). A trial court may revoke a person's probation for a single violation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1); Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), reh'g denied (July 11, 2023), trans. denied, 220 N.E.3d 54 (Ind. 2023). When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the State's evidence at a probation revocation hearing, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.’ ” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Braxton, 651 N.E.2d at 270).

[10] Simmons specifically argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show he committed a new criminal offense. More particularly, Simmons contends that the State failed to meet its burden because the “State's case rests on a single account that is not independently corroborated, while the physical evidence does not establish how the injuries were sustained.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Simmons essentially argues that we should believe his account of what happened rather than Garcia's.

[11] Garcia testified that in March 2025, Simmons used his hand to choke her during a fight, which impeded her breathing and that she and Simmons had been in a relationship. This testimony alone was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Simmons committed strangulation and domestic battery, see Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072–73 (Ind. 1991)) (explaining that a “conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim”). The trial court specifically determined that “the version of events given by Ms. Garcia was more credi[ ]ble and corroborated and ․ consistent with the physical evidence in the photographs than the version given by” Simmons. Tr. Vol. I at 86–87. Simmons's argument is thus a request to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do, see Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1267 (quoting Braxton, 651 N.E.2d at 270). The State presented sufficient evidence of probative value to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Simmons violated the terms of his probation by committing the offenses alleged in the Strangulation Cause.

b. Sanction

[12] Second, Simmons challenges the trial court's decision to execute his sentence as a sanction for violating the terms of his probation. Specifically, Simmons claims that the trial court abused its discretion because the “alleged violation arose from a single, disputed incident involving conflicting testimony.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Here, the trial court heard both accounts of the March 22 incident and believed Garcia's version. And, the trial court was under no obligation to believe Simmons's testimony—even if it had been uncontradicted, see Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 511 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004)).

[13] Regardless, we have already concluded that there was sufficient evidence establishing that Simmons violated the terms of his probation by committing the offenses alleged in the Strangulation Cause. “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.” Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. Here, the trial court revoked Simmons's probation and executed his full 365-day sentence after finding Simmons committed the offenses alleged in the Strangulation Cause. In making this decision, the trial court considered the serious nature of the offenses in the Strangulation Cause, which the State points out were committed approximately one month after Simmons began his probation in the Invasion Cause. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by executing Simmons's 365-day sentence in the Invasion Cause as a sanction for violating the terms of his probation therein. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Appellate Rule 28 and Appendix A to the Appellate Rules require a court reporter to consecutively number the volumes of the Transcript, with the first volume containing only the Table of Contents. Ind. Appellate Rule 28(A); id. App. A(11)–(13); see also id. Form # App. R. 28-1. Here, the court reporter did not identify the Table of Contents as a volume of the Transcript, and the court reporter identified the second volume of the Transcript as “VOLUME I of I.” To be consistent with the Transcript as prepared, we refer to the second volume of the Transcript as “Tr. Vol. I.”

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.