Nathaniel J. Hinds, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Nathaniel J. Hinds guilty of child molesting, as a Level 1 felony, child exploitation, as a Level 4 felony, and a lifetime parole violation, as a Level 6 felony, and also found him to be a repeat sexual offender. The trial court sentenced him to seventy-four and one-half years executed. On appeal, Hinds argues that his child molesting and child exploitation convictions violate substantive double jeopardy principles, that his conviction for a lifetime parole violation should be vacated on multiple grounds, and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Hinds was born in April 1993. In 2011, after he turned eighteen, he engaged in oral sex with a three-year-old boy whom his mother babysat. In May 2012, Hinds pleaded guilty to Class B felony child molesting and was sentenced to sixteen years, with ten years suspended to probation. Hinds thereby became subject to lifetime parole upon the completion of his sentence. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-1-7.5, 35-50-6-1; Tr. Vol. 3 at 182.

[3] Hinds violated the conditions of his probation in 2015 by accessing the internet, in 2016 by having contact with his next-door neighbor's minor child, and again in 2016 by accessing certain social media sites, texting a seventeen-year-old male for casual sex, and contacting a minor child when visiting a friend. Hinds was released to parole in June 2018, returned to the Department of Correction (“DOC”) for an unspecified violation in July 2018, released to parole again in August 2019, returned again to the DOC for an unspecified violation in February 2020, and then released to parole in May 2020. One of the conditions of Hinds's parole was that he have no direct or indirect contact with any child less than sixteen years of age.

[4] In 2023, Meghan S. was living in Indianapolis with her mother, stepfather, and son, N.S., who was born in 2018. Meghan had become acquainted with Hinds through her nephew several years earlier. Hinds would do “odds and ends” around the house for Meghan. Tr. Vol. 2 at 177. Hinds was “friends” with N.S. and would “take him out back and throw a baseball with him” and “play cars and stuff with him on the floor[.]” Id. at 179. On N.S.’s fifth birthday, Hinds helped Meghan set up for the party and gave N.S. a trampoline.

[5] On the afternoon of December 28, Hinds visited Meghan and then went to a Walmart in Plainfield with Meghan, her mother, and N.S. At some point, N.S. said that “he had to go to the bathroom[,]” and Hinds told Meghan “that he could take him.” Id. at 181. Hinds and N.S. went into the family restroom, which had a lock on the door. After approximately ten minutes, Meghan's mother went to the restroom door because “[i]t was taking too long [for N.S.] to just have to go pee.” Id. at 185. When N.S. emerged from the restroom, Meghan noticed that “[h]e was very flush in the face[,]” which was not normal. Id. at 187. Meghan asked N.S. “if anything happened in the restroom.” Id. at 188. N.S. replied that “he didn't want to talk about it.” Id. at 189.

[6] The group finished shopping and returned to Meghan's house. Hinds carried her groceries inside and then left. N.S. was “[v]ery quiet” that evening, which was not normal. Id. As Meghan was getting N.S. ready for bed, she again asked him what had happened in the Walmart restroom. N.S. replied that Hinds “touched his private area[,]” i.e., “[h]is penis.” Id. at 191. Meghan called 9-1-1.

[7] During a forensic interview in January 2024, N.S. did not disclose any sexual abuse. Sometime later, N.S. “saw something on TV” and told Meghan “that he wanted the bad guy in jail.” Id. at 211. Meghan asked N.S. “what bad guy, and he referred to [Hinds].” Id. In February, N.S. underwent a second forensic interview. N.S. told the interviewer that Hinds took him into a “locked bathroom” at Walmart. Ex. 7 at 12:10. Hinds pulled down N.S.’s pants, and when N.S. was finished using the restroom, Hinds knelt in front of him and “licked [him] on [his] private area[,]” which he uses for “peeing[.]” Id. at 12:10, 12:23, 13:31. Hinds then took “pictures of [N.S.’s] private area” with a phone and told him “not to tell anyone.” Id. at 16:52, 15:05. According to N.S., Hinds stopped when his grandmother “yelled [their] names” outside the bathroom door. Id. at 14:27.

[8] On February 21, police executed a search warrant at Hinds's home and arrested him. In his jacket pocket, police found a cell phone that had four photos of N.S.’s penis. Police also found “a few” videos of adolescent boys masturbating. Tr. Vol. 3 at 205. On a thumb drive, police found sixteen images of adolescent boys “performing sex acts on other humans[.]” Id.

[9] The State charged Hinds with child molesting, as a Level 1 felony, child exploitation, as a Level 4 felony, and a lifetime parole violation, as a Level 6 felony. The State also alleged that Hinds was a repeat sexual offender based on his prior child molesting conviction. In a bifurcated trial, the jury found Hinds guilty as charged and also found him to be a repeat sexual offender.

[10] At the sentencing hearing, Meghan gave a victim impact statement. She said that N.S. has “been scarred for life by an event that ․ can only be described as traumatic.” Id. at 208. It took months before she could get N.S. “to go near a public restroom, let alone use one[,]” and she “always make[s] sure [N.S.] has used the restroom before [they] leave home so that [they] can avoid any outburst of anger or upsetting situations.” Id. N.S. has been in therapy since the molestation and “soiled himself” when the therapist first asked him about the incident. Id. According to Meghan, N.S. “used to be outgoing, eager, eager to see and learn new things. And now he is reclusive, innovated (sic) and angry most of the time.” Id. at 209. She has helped N.S. “with recurring flashbacks and feeling the guilt of shame[,]” and she herself has become “overly protective” and “feel[s] a deep sense of shame because [she] was unable to do [her] job as [N.S.’s] mother and keep him safe.” Id. N.S. “lives in fear daily because of what [Hinds] did to him,” and Meghan “reassure[s] him frequently that [Hinds is] still in jail where [he] cannot hurt him.” Id.

[11] The State requested the maximum sentence, and defense counsel requested a sentence of forty-two and one-half years, “some combination of DOC and probation.” Id. at 219. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and found the following aggravating circumstances:

[Hinds] does have criminal history, and I understand the Defense's argument that you know he's being punished here as a repeat sex offender, but I do find that [he] does have prior, the prior molest conviction on a three (3) year old.

Number 2, I do find that an aggravator that the victim in this case was in his care, custody and control. Mr. Hinds, you were a trusted friend of this family and you completely and totally violated that trust.

I do agree with the State that the age of the victim to consider as an aggravator. He was five (5) years old, the State only had to prove that [the] victim was less than twelve (12).[1]

I do also find as an aggravator that the Defendant asked the victim not to speak or tell anyone.

And I do also find as a separate aggravator ․ that the Defendant was in possession of unrelated child sex abuse material that he had on this phone and in his possession. While that may have been uncharged, he was still in possession of it.

[A]nd then the last aggravator, you know, child molest cases there's always, you deal with the emotional trauma. But I think the emotional trauma in this case was significant to this young man.

Id. at 220-21.

[12] The trial court then stated,

Mr. Hinds, when the evidence in this case and the jury returned its verdict, the thing that kept going through my mind in this case is, was how depraved someone has to be to sit down on a public, public bathroom in a Walmart and do what you did to this five (5) year old. How desperate of an act that must have been. Anybody who's ever been to a public bathroom knows how dirty, filthy what happens in those, and you took advantage of the first opportunity to walk in that bathroom and sit down on your hands and knees or on your rear end and completely violate this little boy and that's inexcusable.

I do agree with the State in this case; I think it warrants the maximum sentence. So, I've imposed a seventy-four and a half (74 1/212) year sentence at the [DOC]. Fifty (50) years on Count 1 as a credit restricted felon, twelve (12) years on Count 2 for Child Exploitation as Level 4 Felony, two and [one-]half (2 1/212) years on the Level 6 Lifetime Parole Violation and ten (10) years for the repeat sex offender. I don't find that there's any reason to put him back on probation. Uh he violated parole for being a sex offender and he violated probation multiple times on his first go around.

Id. at 221-22. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Double Jeopardy

[13] Hinds first contends that his child molesting and child exploitation convictions violate substantive double jeopardy principles. “Whether two convictions constitute double jeopardy is a question of law that we review de novo.” Brabson v. State, 242 N.E.3d 519, 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Our Supreme Court has explained that “[s]ubstantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020).

[14] Here, Hinds violated multiple statutes when he licked N.S.’s penis (child molesting) and then took pictures of it (child exploitation).² Hinds invites us to jump through all the hoops of Wadle’s multipart test for substantive double jeopardy claims and vacate his conviction for child exploitation. We decline this invitation because, as demonstrated above, “the facts show two separate and distinct crimes.” Id. at 249. Hinds invokes the continuous crime doctrine, but that applies in only two scenarios: “(1) when a defendant is twice charged with the same base offense; and (2) when one charged offense is inherently included in the other.” Easter v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 1205892, at *10 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. May 4, 2026) (citing Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.26, and Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Ind. 2015)). Hinds was not twice charged with the same base offense, and he has failed to establish that one of the charged offenses is inherently included in the other.³ In sum, there is no double jeopardy violation, so we affirm both convictions.

Issue Two: Lifetime Parole Violation

[15] The charge for Hinds's lifetime parole violation offense alleged in pertinent part that, on December 28, 2023, while being supervised on lifetime parole, Hinds knowingly or intentionally violated a condition of his parole that involved direct or indirect contact with N.S., a child under the age of sixteen years. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27. Hinds challenges this conviction on two grounds.

[16] First, he contends that this offense is inherently included in his other offenses, that the offenses constituted a continuous crime, and that therefore his lifetime parole violation conviction should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds. Once again, Hinds has failed to establish that a lifetime parole violation is an inherently included offense of either child molesting or child exploitation, so his double jeopardy argument fails.

[17] Hinds also appears to contend that the lifetime parole violation conviction was used as an improper double sentencing enhancement. He cites no authority to support this contention, so we find it waived. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (“A litigant who fails to support his arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and record evidence waives those arguments for our review.”).

Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[18] Finally, Hinds asks us to reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that this “Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our “role under Rule 7(B) is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ and we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).⁴

[19] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented, and “the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). “In the end, ‘the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are the issues that matter.’ ” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 268 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). It is Hinds's burden to establish that his sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025).

[20] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). The advisory sentence for Hinds's Level 1 felony child molesting offense is thirty years, with a range of between twenty and fifty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(c). Per Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-2.2(c), the court may suspend only that part of a sentence for a Level 1 felony conviction that is in excess of the minimum sentence for that conviction. The advisory sentence for a Level 4 felony is six years, with a range of between two and twelve years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. The advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony is one year, with a range of between six months and two and one-half years. And finally, “[t]he court may sentence a person found to be a repeat sexual offender to an additional fixed term that is the advisory sentence for the underlying offense. However, the additional sentence may not exceed ten (10) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-14(f). The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of seventy-four and one-half years executed.⁵

[21] Regarding the nature of the offenses, Hinds minimizes them as “a single charged incident against a single victim in a single location over a span of minutes.” Appellant's Br. at 21. During those ten minutes, Hinds egregiously violated his long-standing position of trust with five-year-old N.S. by escorting him into the Walmart bathroom, locking the door, pulling down his pants, licking his penis, and then taking photos of it. Hinds then told N.S. not to tell anyone what had happened. As detailed above, that brief incident has resulted in severe long-term emotional distress for both N.S. and his mother, who must constantly reassure her son that Hinds is still behind bars and cannot hurt him. Nothing about the nature of Hinds's offenses warrants a reduction of his sentence. See Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011) (“The younger the victim, the more culpable the defendant's conduct.”).

[22] As for the second prong of Appellate Rule 7(B), Hinds has offered no evidence of substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. “When considering a defendant's character, [his] criminal history is relevant.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024). Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character for sentencing purposes. Brook v. State, 221 N.E.3d 1239, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[23] Hinds was previously convicted of Class B felony child molesting for engaging in oral sex with a three-year-old child. He repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation by having contact with minors and using social media, and he repeatedly violated the conditions of his lifetime parole, which prohibited him from having any contact with any child under sixteen. By cultivating a relationship with N.S., Hinds was in violation of his parole long before he molested the five-year-old boy. Three days after Christmas in 2023, Hinds violated his position of trust with N.S. by locking him in a Walmart bathroom, licking his penis, and taking photos of it. He then told N.S. not to tell anyone. After police executed a search warrant at Hinds's home, they found the photos of N.S. on his phone, as well as photos and videos of adolescent boys masturbating and engaging in sex acts.

[24] Quite simply, Hinds is a sexual predator who cannot refrain from preying on young boys. Incarceration, probation, and parole have failed to either rehabilitate him or deter him from victimizing vulnerable children. Hinds has failed to establish that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Consequently, we affirm it.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(3) (stating that the trial court may consider as an aggravating circumstance that the victim of the offense was less than twelve years of age at the time the person committed the offense).

2.   The charging information alleged that Hinds, a person of at least twenty-one years of age, committed Level 1 felony child molesting, as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2023), by knowingly or intentionally performing or submitting to other sexual conduct as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5 with N.S., a child under the age of fourteen years. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25. Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5 defines “other sexual conduct” in pertinent part as an act involving a sex organ of one person and the mouth of another person. The charging information also alleged that Hinds committed Level 4 felony child exploitation, as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-4(b)(5) and (c)(1) (2023), by knowingly or intentionally producing an image that depicts or describes sexual conduct by a child whom Hinds knew to be less than eighteen years of age and the sexual conduct, matter, performance, or incident depicted or described a child less than eighteen years of age who was less than twelve years of age. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26. Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-4 (2023) further provides in pertinent part that an “image” means “[a] digitized image[,]” and that “sexual conduct” means “exhibition of the ․ uncovered genitals ․ intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person[.]” See Tr. Vol. 3 at 144 (prosecutor's closing argument: “The term sexual conduct means exhibition of the uncovered genitals intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of a person. The definition[’]s very long because it wants to encapsulate a lot of things, a lot of situations that people take photos of children. But this is the one that's relevant to you.․ There was one reason and one reason only [Hinds] would take those photos immediately after he licked [N.S.’s] penis. So, that he could memorialize the event and masturbate to it later.”).

3.   “An offense is inherently included if it meets the definition of ‘included offense’ in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-168.” McGuire v. State, 263 N.E.3d 745, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. That statute defines “included offense” in pertinent part as an offense that “differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(3).

4.   Hinds contends that his sentence is an outlier, but he has not favored us with citations to cases in which similarly situated defendants were given significantly lighter sentences.

5.   Hinds asserts that “maximum sentences are appropriate for the worst offenders” and suggests that he is not such an offender. Appellant's Br. at 20 (citing Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2008)). We have explained that, “[b]y stating that maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum punishment.” Simmons v. State, 962 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “But this encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.” Id. at 92-93. “We therefore concentrate less on comparing the facts of this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced and what it reveals about his character.” Id. at 93. Hinds also asserts that “Indiana's appellate courts have repeatedly revised maximum child sex sentences downward under Rule 7(B).” Appellant's Br. at 21 (collecting cases). As indicated below, he has failed to establish that a downward revision is appropriate here.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.