Bobby J. Burris, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bobby J. Burris appeals his conviction for residential entry, as a Level 6 felony. Burris raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Beverly Collins and her ex-husband, Mark, share a trailer. The front entrance to the trailer has two doors. There is a storm door with a “homemade doggie door” that is “always shut,” and there is a “regular door.” Tr. at 112, 114. During the daylight hours of April 18, 2024, Beverly was in her bedroom watching TV and smoking cigarettes while Mark slept in his room at the opposite end of the trailer.

[3] At some point, Burris entered the Collins’ trailer through the front door. When Burris entered the home, the storm door was closed but the regular door was open “about a foot.” Id. at 115. Beverly did not hear Burris because she had the volume on her TV turned up “pretty loud.” Id. at 119. But when she became aware of his presence in her home, he was “coming towards [her] room.” Id. at 117. Burris was “erratic, walking really fast, waving his arms,” and demanding cigarettes. Id. At that point, Beverly started screaming for Burris to leave, and she screamed for Mark. The Collins’ chihuahuas “surrounded” Burris and “started nipping at his ankles[.]” Id. at 118. Beverly then stated that she was going to call the police. Mark came “running” out of his bedroom, and Burris left “[r]eal quick.” Id. The police ultimately located Burris “standing in his yard.” Id. at 149.

[4] The State charged Burris with residential entry, as a Level 6 felony. The State also alleged that he was a habitual offender. The trial court held a jury trial on October 28, 2025. Prior to jury selection, the court and the parties discussed the preliminary instructions. Burris agreed that they “look[ed] good.” Id. at 64. After the jury was selected, the court read the preliminary instructions, which included an instruction that the

term breaking may include moving a door or window, even if unlocked, or even if unlocked no matter how slight the force ․ A breaking does not have to be a fracturing or forceful entering, but it may be inferred from the slightest force if used to gain unauthorized entry.

Id. at 99.

[5] Beverly and Mark then testified to the events that had occurred. After the parties had rested, the court discussed the final jury instructions. The court noted that the instructions regarding residential entry and breaking were “the same” as the corresponding preliminary instructions. Id. at 152. Burris responded that he had “[n]o objection” to any of the instructions. Id. The court then read the final instructions to the jury, which included an instruction regarding the term “breaking” that was identical to the preliminary instruction. Id. at 161.

[6] The jury found Burris guilty of residential entry, and the court entered judgment of conviction. Burris then admitted to being a habitual offender. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Burris to an aggregate term of seven years, with five years executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Burris contends that the trial court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury on the term “breaking” because the instruction “unduly emphasized the slightest movement of a door as evidence of an unauthorized breaking.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Burris acknowledges that he did not object to the instruction, that he waived the issue for appeal, and that he must now show fundamental error. An error is fundamental if it “made a fair trial impossible” or if it “constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 595 (Ind. 2019). This is a “daunting” standard that applies only when there is an error so egregious that the trial court should have taken action sua sponte. Id.

[8] We first address the State's argument that the “fundamental error claim” is not available to Burris because he “affirmatively state[d] that he ha[d] no objection[.]” Appellee's Br. at 10. Stated differently, the State asserts that Burris invited any error in the instruction of the jury. It is true that “[t]he invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental.” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874-75 (Ind. 2022). But the doctrine is narrow:

A party invites an error if it was part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy. This means there must be evidence of counsel's strategic maneuvering at trial to establish invited error. Mere neglect or the failure to object, standing alone, is simply not enough. And when there is no evidence of counsel's strategic maneuvering, we are reluctant to find invited error.

Id. at 875 (citation modified).

[9] We acknowledge that Burris stated that the preliminary instructions “look[ed] good” and that he had “[n]o objection” to the final instructions. Tr. at 64, 152. However, we find nothing in the record—and the State cites no evidence—showing that Burris “made an ‘active’ or ‘affirmative’ request for this instruction, let alone that he intended to exploit it as a deliberate trial strategy.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 559 (Ind. 2019). As such, Burris did not invite the error, and we will address his fundamental error argument.

[10] Burris asserts that the language of the instruction was taken from case law addressing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims and that our Supreme Court has held that appellate sufficiency review will “rarely, if ever” be an appropriate basis for a jury instruction. Keller v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1205, 1209 (Ind. 2016). Burris also argues that the instruction “elevated one evidentiary fact—the slightest movement of a door—above all others[.]” Appellant's Br. at 15.

[11] However, any problem with the instruction was not so egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error. First, the instruction was a correct statement of the law. See Anderson v. State, 37 N.E.3d 972, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that “breaking is established when even the slightest force is used to gain unauthorized entry, such as opening an unlocked door.”). Second, there “is no blanket prohibition against the use of appellate decision language in jury instructions.” Munford v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Third, and most importantly, this was not a case where the jury had to decide whether Burris opened the Collins’ door. Beverly testified that Burris entered her house through a closed storm door and mostly closed regular door, which would clearly constitute breaking. Further, Burris’ theory of defense was that he had permission to enter. He did not challenge whether he opened the door; he challenged only whether he gained unauthorized access. As such, any error in the instruction did not amount to fundamental error, and we affirm Burris’ conviction.

[12] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.