Justin Troy Henry, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Justin Troy Henry (“Henry”) appeals the sentence imposed for his convictions for two counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder,¹ Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement,² Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine,³ and his adjudication for being an habitual offender.⁴ Henry argues that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Henry.

Facts

[3] At approximately 6:00 p.m. on February 24, 2023, Danville, Illinois Police Department Officer Tyler Starkey (“Officer Starkey”) and his partner (collectively “the Danville officers”) observed a black Lincoln (“the Lincoln”) with no license plate on the front of the vehicle. The Danville officers initiated a traffic stop on the Lincoln. But instead of stopping, the Lincoln's driver, who was later revealed to be Henry, accelerated to around seventy miles per hour and fled from the Danville officers. Thereafter, the Danville officers activated their vehicle's sirens and began pursuing the Lincoln.

[4] Henry, while accelerating to seventy miles per hour in a densely populated urban area, avoided being stopped by the Danville officers. While fleeing, Henry ran multiple red lights through busy intersections and accelerated the Lincoln to ninety miles per hour while driving through a busy urban area and into a neighborhood. Eventually, Henry drove east along Perrysville Road towards Indiana and nearly struck a Vermilion County, Illinois ⁵ Sheriff Deputy's car. Additional police officers with the Danville Police Department also joined the pursuit, but the Danville officers were in the closest car to the Lincoln.

[5] During the pursuit, another officer informed, over the radio, Danville Police officers and Vermillion County Sheriff Deputies that the Lincoln's registered owner was Henry and that there was an active Illinois arrest warrant for Henry. The officer relayed that the warrant was for an attempted murder of Henry's wife (“Henry's wife”) in Champaign County, Illinois.

[6] Meanwhile, Henry continued driving the Lincoln eastward and entered Indiana and accelerated to speeds exceeding 110 miles per hour. Henry maintained high speeds while traveling along “windy turns” and over train tracks before he headed southbound. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 162). By this point, the Danville officers notified the Indiana State Police about the pursuit.

[7] Soon after, Henry turned east onto a dead-end road and stopped his car. The Danville officers, who were still the first police car behind Henry, stopped and exited their car in preparation to initiate a felony traffic stop. Henry began backing up his car, and Officer Starkey drew his pistol and pointed it at the Lincoln. However, Henry continued backing up his car, passed the Danville officers, and backtracked west. As the Lincoln passed Officer Starkey, he saw Henry driving the Lincoln with a woman, later identified as Henry's wife, in the passenger seat.

[8] Henry continued fleeing from the police. Vermillion County Sheriff's Department Deputy Joseph Wilson (“Deputy Wilson”) heard the dispatch regarding Henry entering Vermillion County and joined the pursuit at the time Henry backtracked to the road. Additionally, Vermillion County Sheriff's Department Deputy Keith Warner (“Deputy Warner”) also joined the pursuit. From this point onward, Deputy Wilson was the closest car to Henry, and Deputy Warner's car was behind Deputy Wilson's. Henry drove at speeds between 100 and 130 miles per hour as he attempted to evade Deputy Wilson. By this point, law enforcement officers from the Indiana State Police, the Vermillion County Sheriff's Department, and the Danville Police Department were all engaged in the pursuit, which had covered multiple counties and two states.

[9] Henry drove the Lincoln into the driveway of a residential farmhouse in Indiana. Deputy Wilson pulled in behind Henry. Henry exited the Lincoln, drew his pistol, and fired at Deputy Wilson as the deputy was exiting his car. Henry shot Deputy Wilson's right foot, right shin, as well as his car. Deputy Wilson “immediately fell to the ground” and shouted into his radio that he had been shot. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 177). Thereafter, Henry ran from Deputy Wilson, and Deputy Wilson drew his firearm and fired it towards Henry. Deputy Wilson attempted to stand to chase Henry but, due to his injuries, he “collapsed in front of [his] squad car.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 177). Two seconds after Deputy Wilson exited his car, Deputy Warner arrived on the scene and saw Henry running alongside a house. Deputy Warner drove his car to attempt to block Henry's path, and Henry stopped running, aimed his pistol at Deputy Warner, and fired. Henry shot the front windshield of Deputy Warner's car, just inches from Deputy's Warner's head, and the windshield glass shattered. Deputy Warner then “bail[ed] out” of and “maneuver[ed] around the back” of his car. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 194).

[10] Henry continued running, jumped over a fence, and entered a nearby barn. While Henry was fleeing into the barn, Officer Starkey arrived on the scene. He saw Deputy Wilson “on the ground[,]” and Deputy Wilson told Officer Starkey that he had “a gunshot wound to his leg.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 166). Officer Starkey and other officers administered first aid to Deputy Wilson, and another Vermillion County deputy transported Deputy Wilson to a hospital.

[11] Meanwhile, multiple police officers arrived on the scene, set up a perimeter, and searched the property for Henry. Thereafter, the officers heard sounds coming from inside the barn. Multiple police officers took cover behind grain bins near the barn. In the barn, Henry discovered and got into a dump truck, started the dump truck, and backed it out of the barn, knocking down the barn door in the process. As Henry continued backing up the dump truck, he pointed his pistol out of the driver's side window. In response, officers, including Deputy Warner, fired their weapons at the dump truck. Additionally, a Fountain County, Indiana Sheriff Deputy fired over twenty rounds into the driver's side door of the dump truck. The dump truck “slowly roll[ed] backwards” and “crash[ed]” into a grain bin. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 32). The officers removed Henry, who had multiple gunshot wounds, from the dump truck and arrested him. The officers found Henry's pistol in the dump truck and a loaded pistol magazine in his pocket. The officers administered first aid to Henry and transported him to the hospital.

[12] Other officers secured the Lincoln and found Henry's wife in the car. Police officers removed Henry's wife from the Lincoln and moved her to a nearby squad car. By this time, Indiana State Police Sergeant Michael Featherling (“Sergeant Featherling”) had arrived on the scene and had become the lead investigator on the case. The officers interviewed Henry's wife, who told them that Henry had consumed methamphetamine earlier that day.

[13] The police officers searched the Lincoln and found methamphetamine. The Indiana State Police compiled a nearly 800-page incident report (“the incident report”) detailing the events surrounding Henry's pursuit and capture. Later testing revealed that Henry had methamphetamine in his system.

[14] The State ultimately charged Henry with two counts of attempted murder (for shooting Deputy Wilson and shooting at Deputy Warner), Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. The State also alleged that Henry was an habitual offender.

[15] In July 2025, Henry waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court held a bench trial. The State and Henry stipulated to the admission of over forty exhibits, which included the incident report, vehicle and body camera footage from the law enforcement officers involved in the case, multiple images of the farmhouse crime scene, and certified records of Henry's prior felony convictions in Illinois.

[16] Deputy Wilson testified that he had seen “[t]he muzzle flash from [Henry's] pistol” when Henry had fired at him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 178). Additionally, Deputy Wilson testified that Henry had struck the sun visor of his squad car, and the State presented a photo of a bullet hole in the roof of Deputy Wilson's squad car. Deputy Warner testified that Henry had shot his car's windshield “[i]nches” away from his head. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 195).

[17] Sergeant Featherling testified that Henry had tested positive for methamphetamine and that the police officers had recovered methamphetamine from the Lincoln. Additionally, Sergeant Featherling testified that, during the investigation for this case, he had interviewed Henry's wife. Sergeant Featherling explained that Henry's wife had told him that, back in Illinois, Henry had strangled her with a seat belt and had bitten off the tip of her finger.⁶

[18] The State presented evidence that Henry had two prior unrelated felony convictions in Illinois, and Henry stipulated to the fact that he had those convictions.

[19] At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Henry guilty and entered judgment on all counts. Additionally, the trial court found that Henry was an habitual offender and entered an habitual offender adjudication.

[20] The trial court held a sentencing hearing in August 2025. The presentence investigation report (“the PSI”) revealed that Henry has multiple felony convictions. Specifically, Henry has a 2009 felony conviction for home repair fraud and a 2013 felony conviction for aggravated home repair fraud. Further, Henry has a 2025 felony conviction for aggravated domestic battery as a result of pleading guilty to aggravated domestic battery in the Illinois case in which the State had charged him with attempted murder of his wife. Additionally, Henry has a 2009 misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence. The PSI provided that Henry was at a high risk to reoffend.

[21] During Henry's sentencing hearing, both Deputy Warner and Deputy Wilson testified about the emotional toll that they had experienced from the circumstances of Henry shooting at them. Specifically, Deputy Warner testified as follows:

Sir, what I lost that night I may never regain. I still see the shattering glass in my nightmares. I still see [Henry] shooting at me. I still see and hear and smell everything from that night as if it was still happening. The fear of seeing another bullet bridge that three inch difference from my mirror to my head. The fear of seeing my partner lying on the ground injured, possibly dying.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 59). Deputy Warner testified that he had forgiven Henry but explained that there needed to be consequences for Henry's actions.

[22] Additionally, Deputy Wilson testified that every day since he had been shot, he “ha[s] dealt with this.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 61). He further testified that “[d]ealing with the recovery, the injury, the emotional trauma from all this, it took a huge toll on my marriage to where I thought it was going to end.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 62). Deputy Wilson also testified as follows:

When I was laying on the ground waiting for Deputy Warner to put a tourniquet on me[,] my three year old daughter at home was constantly in my mind. I didn't think she was going to have a dad. I was certain that my wife was going to be a widow. It is my job to protect them and there was not going to be anyone to do that job․ Every day I still have constant nerve pain in my foot․ [O]ne of my shoes ․ my right shoe is wor[n] out from the way I walk now. I go to therapy once a month to talk about this incident. I've gone through EMDR training, which is for PTSD. Every day I still -- I still deal with this.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 62).

[23] The State argued that Henry's criminal history was an aggravator. Further, the State argued that the nature and circumstance of Henry's actions was an aggravator. Specifically, the State noted that Henry had put every person in danger throughout the pursuit and that Henry had “10,000 opportunities to stop doing what he was doing.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 69). Further, the State argued that Henry had never given up his gun and had continued to look for more vehicles throughout the pursuit. Additionally, the State told the trial court that Henry's actions had negatively impacted the family who lived in the farmhouse where Henry's pursuit had ended. Finally, the State requested consecutive sentences for the two attempted murder convictions.

[24] Henry argued that “drugs were a major influence” during the commission of the crime and that “rehabilitation would be a major factor to help him[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 75). Henry argued that he would respond to rehabilitation and that this was a mitigator.

[25] Thereafter, the trial court found as a mitigator that Henry “might benefit from and respond affirmatively to substance abuse treatment[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 75). Further, the trial court found as a mitigating circumstance that Henry had waived his right to trial on the habitual offender enhancement and waived his right to a jury trial.

[26] As an aggravating circumstance, the trial court noted Henry's criminal history “in addition to those” used for his habitual offender adjudication. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 76). The trial court noted Henry's history of arrests that indicated to it that Henry was more likely to reoffend. Further, the trial court noted the significant amount of uncharged activity from the instant offense. Specifically, the trial court noted Henry's unlawful possession of a firearm, his numerous instances of reckless driving during the pursuit, which included traveling over 130 miles per hour, passing cars, and driving left of center, and the fact that he had pointed a pistol at police officers as he backed out of the barn. The trial court described Henry's actions as an “unprovoked and callous attempt to murder” two police officers and that Henry's “unprovoked attack on police weighs on the gravity of these crimes.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77). Also, the trial court noted that “imposing a sentence lesser than the presumptive would depreciate the seriousness of this crime.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77). Further, the trial court noted that it saw “no signs of remorse or emotion” from Henry and found that he demonstrated “a complete lack of remorse and disregard for the harm he [had] imposed on Deputy Wilson and Deputy Warner as well as this community.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77). Also, the trial court found “that any one of these aggravators, including his prior criminal behavior, is sufficient to aggravate this sentence.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77). Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated that “even if one or more of the above aggravators had not been found, based upon [Henry's] criminal history and likelihood to reoffend, the sentence imposed today would remain appropriate.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77-78). The trial court further described the nature and circumstances of Henry's offenses as follows:

The Court finds from the evidence that after committing Count I the Defendant fled. He had time to reflect. He had time to think about what he had just done, to drop his weapon and to abandon his pursuit, but he continued to carry his weapon and extra ammunition with him and then to engage in a separate crime while attempting to shoot a second deputy, and continued to carry that weapon and ammunition with him while he attempted to flee the scene much later.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 78).

[27] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Henry to thirty-five (35) years for each of his Level 1 felony attempted murder convictions, two (2) years for his Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement conviction, and two (2) years for his Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine conviction. The trial court ordered the two attempted murder convictions to be served consecutively to one another and ordered the two Level 6 felony convictions to be served concurrently with the attempted murder convictions. Further, the trial court enhanced one of Henry's attempted murder convictions by twenty (20) years for his habitual offender adjudication, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety (90) years, fully executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”).

[28] Henry now appeals.

Decision

[29] At the outset, we note that Henry initially presents his argument as one challenging the appropriateness of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[30] Henry, however, provides no cogent argument or analysis related to why his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and his character and instead argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, Henry has waived any such inappropriate sentence argument. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (explaining that an appellate argument must be supported by cogent reasoning); King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that “inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately”); Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that the defendant waived an inappropriate sentence argument by failing to advance cogent argument on that issue), trans. denied.

[31] We now address Henry's arguments challenging the trial court's determination of aggravating circumstances. Specifically, Henry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Henry's criminal history and a “series of criminal arrests”; (2) the nature and circumstances of his offenses because the facts relied upon by the trial court were material elements of his offenses; (3) the fact that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; and (4) Henry's lack of remorse. (Henry's Br. 11).

[32] It is well settled that sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion in several ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[33] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 905 (Ind. 2019). Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied. “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023) (cleaned up), reh'g denied, cert. denied.

[34] Henry first argues that the trial court improperly found his criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance. Henry addresses a specific portion of the trial court's statement regarding Henry's history of arrests making him more likely to reoffend and challenges this statement as an improper aggravator. He contends that the trial court “failed to consider the remoteness of [Henry's] misdemeanor arrests[.]” (Henry's Br. 11).

[35] However, the statement Henry challenges was only a portion of the trial court's explanation as to why it was finding Henry's criminal history as an aggravating circumstance. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court, in its sentencing statement, found as an aggravating circumstance Henry's criminal history “in addition to those” used for his habitual offender adjudication. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 76). Indeed, the PSI revealed that Henry had a 2025 felony conviction for aggravated domestic battery as a result of the attempted murder charge he had at the time of the instant offense. Further, the PSI revealed that Henry had a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence. Concerning remoteness, we note that the felony conviction for aggravated battery was entered in 2025 and, at the time of the instant offense, Henry had a attempted murder case pending in Illinois. We also note that the trial court mentioned Henry's history of arrests and likelihood to reoffend. Given the record before us, the trial court did not improperly find Henry's criminal history as an aggravating circumstance.

[36] Next, Henry argues that the trial court improperly found as an aggravating circumstance the nature and circumstances of his offenses because the facts that the trial court noted to support this aggravator were material elements of his offenses. Specifically, Henry argues that the trial court improperly found as an aggravating circumstance the fact that: (1) the victims were police officers; and (2) Henry had been driving recklessly.⁷ We now address each of these arguments.

[37] While it is true that a trial court may not use a factor constituting a material element of an offense as an aggravating circumstance, we have long held that the seriousness of an offense, “which implicitly includes the nature and circumstances of the crime as well as the manner in which the crime is committed,” is “a valid aggravating factor.” Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (Ind. 2007).

[38] Henry argues that, because the State alleged that Henry had fired a pistol at Deputy Wilson and Deputy Warner in the charging information, shooting at police officers was an element of attempted murder. Thus, Henry argues that the trial court improperly found as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victims of Henry's offense were police officers. However, a victim being a police officer is not an element of the offense of attempted murder. See I.C. § 35-41-5-1; I.C. § 35-42-1-1. Further, we have previously held that a victim being a police officer was part of the nature and circumstances of the crime and is a valid aggravating circumstance. See Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 556-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that “by highlighting the fact[ ] that the victims of some of Mendoza's crimes were law enforcement officers[,]” the trial court “impliedly found the seriousness of the offenses – which includes the nature and circumstances of the crimes and the manner in which they were committed – as an aggravator.”), trans. denied.

[39] Next, Henry contends that the trial court improperly found as an aggravator Henry's reckless driving. He argues that his driving amounted to fleeing in a vehicle, which is a material element of resisting law enforcement, and thus, cannot be found as an aggravating circumstance. We summarily reject this argument. Henry's egregious driving – which included a multi-county and multi-state police chase at speeds over 100 miles per hour – is not a material element of resisting law enforcement. We note that, in its sentencing statement, the trial court noted the fact that Henry had traveled over 130 miles per hour, passed cars, and drove left of center. Further, we have held that the danger of a police chase to the community, not the act of fleeing from police, was a valid aggravating circumstance in the context of a sentence for resisting law enforcement. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (the fact that a defendant led police on a high-speed chase exceeding speeds of 100 miles per hour was a proper aggravating circumstance and a comment on the nature and circumstances of an offense), trans. denied.

[40] Further, we note that the trial court spoke at length regarding the manner in which Henry had committed these offenses. The trial court did not improperly find as an aggravating circumstance the nature and circumstances of Henry's offenses and did not rely on material elements of Henry's offenses to support this aggravating circumstance.

[41] Lastly, we turn to Henry's arguments challenging the trial court's statements that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime and that he had a lack of remorse. However, we note that we need not specifically address these challenged aggravators because even if we were to conclude that they were improper, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 269. Here, the trial court specifically found “that any one of these aggravators, including his prior criminal behavior, is sufficient to aggravate this sentence.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77). Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated that “even if one or more of the above aggravators had not been found, based upon [Henry's] criminal history and likelihood to reoffend, the sentence imposed today would remain appropriate.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 77-78). As discussed above, Henry's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offenses were valid aggravating circumstances. Based on the evidence in the record as noted by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence, even if it had not considered these two challenged aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's sentence.

[42] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code § 35-42-1-1; I.C. § 35-41-5-1.

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1.

3.   I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1.

4.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

5.   Vermilion County, Illinois sits on the eastern edge of Illinois and Vermillion County, Indiana sits on the western edge of Indiana.

6.   These actions led to the attempted murder charges in Illinois.

7.   Henry also argued that the trial court abused its discretion by finding as an aggravating circumstance that Henry had carried a gun as a convicted felon. Henry specifically argues that “shooting a firearm” necessitates carrying a gun and is a material element of the offense. (Henry's Br. 12). However, we need not address this argument because “[a] single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence[,]” and, as discussed below, the nature and circumstances of Henry's offenses was a valid aggravating circumstance. Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 487 n.1.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.