Jeffrey Hutter, Appellant-Petitioner v. Angela Hutter, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jeffrey Hutter (“Husband”) and Angela Hutter (“Wife”) signed a prenuptial agreement (“the Agreement”), got married, and got divorced. Husband now appeals the trial court's dissolution decree, arguing that the court erred in disposing of certain financial assets, valuing Wife's pet care business, and disposing of miscellaneous personal property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] When Wife met Husband, she was a practicing dentist, and he co-owned and managed several dental practices. “The parties co-owned some dental practices together.” Dissolution Decree at 3. Husband told Wife that he would not marry unless they executed a prenuptial agreement. He used a computer program to create the Agreement and printed out the document for her review. The Agreement reads in pertinent part as follows:

PROPERTY

1. Other than any particular piece of property that is documented as being owned by both Parties, the following property will be treated as separate property (the “Separate Property”):

a. any property owned by a Party at the date of execution of this Agreement;

b. the property itemized in the attached list will be and remain the property of the owner described in the said Schedule, assuming that property shall change in value over time; and

c. any property acquired by a Party through an inheritance.

2. Any Separate Property owned by a Party will be and remain property of that Party and the other Party will have no rights or interests in that property, except as agreed to by the Parties below:

Upon the division of Property in the event of divorce, a Total Value (Total Value) of Separate Property for both Parties shall be determined including those holdings listed on the attached Schedule of Separate Property and other Separate Property known at the time of divorce, and excluding their respective ownership in those dental companies listed on that Schedule.

[Wife] shall receive from [Husband] the value of five per cent (5%) of that Total Value for each year of their marriage, but in no event shall that total of funds to be transferred by [Husband] to [Wife] be greater than $250,000, nor shall the amount to be transferred be greater than 25% of the Total Value held by [Husband] at the time of divorce, nor shall the amount to be transferred by [Husband] to [Wife] result in the Total Value of [Wife] exceeding the Total Value of [Husband] after the transfer.

Property acquired by [Husband] through an inheritance at any time shall not be included in the above calculation of Total Value or transfer of funds.

3. All property that is not Separate Property or the property itemized in the attached list, however and whenever acquired, will remain the property of and be owned by both Parties and will be treated as shared property (the “Shared Property”).

4. In the event of the Parties dissolving their marriage through divorce, all Shared Property will be deemed to be owned equally and each Party will be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the net equity of the property, regardless of the initial or ongoing proportion of each Party's investment, unless the Parties have agreed otherwise in writing.

5. Nothing in this Agreement will prevent or invalidate any gift, or transfer for value, from one Party to the other of present or future property.

6. Unless a Party can reasonably show that he or she solely owns a piece of property, where either Party commingles jointly owned property with Separate Property, any commingled property will be presumed to be Shared Property.

DEBTS

7. Other than any particular debt that is documented as being owed by both Parties, the following debts will be treated as separate debts (the “Separate Debts”):

a. Debts owing by one party at the execution of this agreement, with the exception of the debt owing for the purchase of 7383 E. 209th [referred to below as the Morse Reservoir Condo], which shall be the mutual and equal liability of both parties regardless of the fact that the mortgage is listed in the name only of [Wife].

8. Any Separate Debt owed by a Party will be and remain the debt of that Party and the other Party will have no financial obligations owing with respect to the debt.

9. All debts that are not Separate Debts or the debts itemized in the attached list, however and whenever acquired, will remain the debts of and be owed by both Parties and will be treated as shared debts (the “Shared Debts”).

10. In the event of a separation, or upon the death of a Party, all Shared Debt will be deemed to be owed equally and each Party will be financially responsible for 50% of any jointly acquired or jointly held debt, regardless of the initial or ongoing proportion of each Party's borrowed amount, unless the Parties have agreed otherwise in writing.

MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY RELEASE

11. The Parties covenant and agree that they are aware of the equitable distribution laws of the State of Indiana, and that it is their intention that the equitable distribution laws will not apply to the status, ownership, interest and division of their property, either jointly or separately owned, nor to their future property, whether real or personal, and owned by either one or both of them, and the Parties further covenant and agree that it is their desire and intent by the terms of this Agreement to contract out of the equitable distribution laws of the State of Indiana, and to make a full and final settlement of all matters of property, both real and personal, previously and presently owned by either of the Parties or to be acquired by either of the Parties in the future.

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TERMINATION OR AMENDMENT

27. This Agreement may only be terminated or amended by the Parties in writing signed by both of them.

Ex. Vol. at 6-8, 10.¹

[3] Husband's schedule of Separate Property lists the following assets:

Account at Raymond James AXA Baird TD Ameritrade 401 K Scottrade Cash Stock Yards Bank Real estate- Boat slip / Riviera Dunes Value at purchase 44,500 Personal Property- 1991 Californian boat Value at purchase 125,000 Personal Property Value 504,399 Value 85,246 Value 128,756 Value 45,036 97,000 Honda CRV Ascentia Management, LLC-Holdings at 5/21/16: 50% ownership AMR-Scottsburg, LLC 45% ownership AHC New Castle, LLC 50% ownership Ascentia-DeHaven, LLC 50% ownership Ascentia-Bolt, LLC

Id. at 14. And Wife's schedule of Separate Property lists the following assets:

TD Ameritrade 401 K Scottrade Certera Savings account at First Merchants Bank Value at purchase 11,000 Buick SUV All bank accounts held jointly with her children Personal Holdings in companies: 50% ownership Ascentia-DeHaven, LLC 50% ownership AMR-Scottsburg, LLC Angela DeHaven, DDS, LLC A L DeHaven, DDS Value Value Personal property- pontoon boat Personal Property

Id. at 14-15.

[4] Both parties signed the Agreement on May 20, 2016, and they were married the following day.² No children were born of the marriage.

[5] On April 21, 2023, Husband filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. In February 2024, Wife filed a motion for findings of fact. The trial court held the final hearing on February 24, 2025. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated as to the value of certain assets and liabilities. The parties also agreed that Wife would receive her horse, each party would receive their own tack, and they would sell a horse trailer and divide the proceeds equally. The parties submitted proposed orders in lieu of closing argument.

[6] On May 28, 2025, the trial court issued a twenty-six-page dissolution decree, which contains over 100 findings and reads in pertinent part as follows:

19. During the marriage, the parties sold assets and transferred assets from account to account.

20. At the time the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage was filed, the only property identified as Husband's Separate Property on the Schedule of Separate Assets was the AXA Baird account, valued at $110,000, and the Honda CRV, valued at $8,000. After the date of filing but before the date of decree, the Honda CRV was destroyed when Hurricane Helene hit St. Petersburg, Florida in 2024. At the time the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage was filed, the only property identified as Wife's Separate Property on the Schedule of Separate Assets was the pontoon boat valued at $15,000.

21. All other property listed on the Schedule of Separate Assets had either been sold, transferred, or the account(s) had been closed. In fact, during the marriage, Husband moved funds into and out of accounts and opened and closed multiple accounts.

22. In November 2016, Husband opened an individual account in his name at First Merchants Bank xx1374.

23. The parties also opened a joint account at First Merchants xx3597 during the marriage.

24. At some point during the marriage, Husband closed his Stockyards Account listed on the Prenuptial Agreement and deposited the funds into the Raymond James account listed on the Prenuptial Agreement.

25. In 2019, Husband sold his interest in the businesses identified in the Prenuptial Agreement for total cash proceeds of $1,287,144. He deposited these funds into a wealth management account.

26. At some point during the marriage, Husband opened accounts with Edward Jones.

27. In January 2020, Husband made two separate deposits into the First Merchants xx1374 account. On January 15, 2020, he deposited $250,000, and on January 31, 2020, he deposited $254,279.32. Upon questioning, Husband had no knowledge regarding the source of these funds and could not identify from where these funds came. These deposits were not an inheritance, nor were they proceeds from the sale of any of the property listed in the Prenuptial Agreement. On January 16, 2020, Husband transferred $250,000 from the First Merchants xx1374 account into his Edward Jones individual brokerage.

28. In 2020, Husband closed his Raymond James account and transferred the funds from Raymond James to Edward Jones. Husband also transferred the funds from his wealth management account to his individual Edward Jones account.

29. At some point during the marriage, Husband opened a joint account with Wife at Edward Jones. He and Wife each deposited $250,000 into their joint Edward Jones brokerage account. Thereafter, Husband withdrew approximately $240,000 from the joint Edward Jones brokerage account and deposited the joint funds into his individual brokerage account with Edward Jones.

30. By the end of 2021, Husband had a total of $3,036,048 in his Edward Jones accounts (brokerage and IRA combined).

31. In 2022, Husband elected to close his accounts at Edward Jones and opened accounts with Schwab. He moved all the funds in his Edward Jones accounts to his Schwab accounts.

32. On November 28, 2022, Husband withdrew $47,962 from a jointly owned business account for Moravian Properties and deposited those funds ($47,962) into First Merchants xx1374. Two days later, November 30, 2022, Husband transferred $31,000 of the $47,962 from First Merchants xx1374 directly into his Schwab brokerage account.

33. By the time of the filing of the dissolution of marriage in April 2023, Husband had consolidated his funds into his Schwab accounts. The Schwab accounts contained all the funds from his Edward Jones accounts, including those which had been moved from the parties’ joint Edward Jones brokerage ($240,000) and at least $250,000 from the funds for which Husband had no knowledge of the origins. The Schwab accounts also held funds from First Merchants xx1374 ($31,000) directly deposited into it, which was originally sourced from a joint business account.

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HUSBAND'S SCHWAB ACCOUNTS ARE SHARED PROPERTY

37. The primary dispute between the parties is whether Husband's Schwab accounts are Shared Property or Separate Property pursuant to the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement. Husband contends that the accounts are his Separate Property because the funds flowed from or were derived from accounts or assets listed on the Prenuptial Agreement.

38. Wife contends that Husband's Schwab accounts are Shared Property because Husband commingled them throughout the marriage, and he cannot reasonably show that the funds flowed from a protected account to an account which existed on the date of filing to overcome the presumption of Shared Property.

39. The court is unpersuaded by Husband's argument. Paragraph 6 of the Prenuptial Agreement creates a rebuttable presumption that Separate Property commingled with Shared Property becomes Shared Property. When a rebuttable presumption occurs, the party seeking to rebut the presumption bears the burden of proof. In re Marriage of Marek, 47 N.E.3d 1283, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

40. Here, Husband bears the burden of proof. Husband moved funds into and out of multiple accounts, repeatedly commingling his Separate Property with Shared Property, and his attempt to trace these assets is insufficient to overcome the presumption that commingled property is Shared Property.

41. Furthermore, Husband's Schwab Accounts do not meet the definition of Shared [sic 3] Property as set forth by the Prenuptial Agreement. The definition of Shared Property is exclusionary, meaning all property is Shared Property, unless it falls within one of the three excluded categories: (1) owned on the date of execution; (2) listed on the Schedule of Separate Property; or (3) inherited. Husband's Schwab accounts do not fit within any of the excluded categories of property: the accounts were not opened on the date of execution of the Prenuptial Agreement, the accounts were not identified on the Schedule of Separate Assets, and the accounts were not inherited.

42. Husband's argument that the Schwab Accounts derived from his Separate Property and so therefore they remain his Separate Property must also fail. There is no language in the Prenuptial Agreement allowing for property to be converted to other property, or successor property, or proceeds or income from protected property to remain Separate Property. The language in the Prenuptial Agreement is clear and unambiguous and cannot be construed to say what it does not clearly say.

43. The Court finds that Husband's Schwab accounts are Shared Property, subject to 50/50 division.

HUSBAND'S INHERITANCE

44. Husband contends that his inheritance is his Separate Property. By the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement, his initial inheritance is Separate Property; however, that does not end the inquiry. The Prenuptial Agreement is silent as to the appreciation of the inheritance, rendering it Shared Property by default.

45. No evidence was presented regarding any appreciation of the inheritance. Any appreciation which may be attributed to the inheritance is therefore Shared Property and will be divided equally.

DAISY MAY, LLC d/b/a CAMP BOW WOW

46. During the marriage, Wife began experiencing health conditions which made it uncomfortable and painful for her to practice dentistry. Ultimately, the parties decided to sell their dental businesses. In conjunction with the terms of the sale of the dental practices, Wife was obliged to continue to practice as a dentist for two years. Wife completed her obligation, despite her debilitating health conditions.

47. After the sale of the dental practices and the completion of her personal service contract, Wife purchased a franchise from Camp Bow Wow to open a kennel and doggie day care business in Noblesville. At the time of the filing of the dissolution of marriage, the business was owned by Daisy May, LLC, a single member LLC, titled in Wife's name.

48. The business was created/opened/founded after the execution of the Prenuptial Agreement, was not listed on the Schedule of Separate Property attached to the Prenuptial Agreement and was not inherited. As such, per the plain and unambiguous terms of the Prenuptial Agreement, Daisy May, LLC is Shared Property.

49. Husband expressed concerns to Wife that the business had significant risks due to the capitalization needs of the business. However, Husband never sought to, and the parties never amended the Prenuptial Agreement to render Daisy May Wife's Separate Property.

50. At the time of the filing of the dissolution [of] marriage, Daisy May, LLC owed Husband $150,000, which he had loaned to the business to cover unexpected cost-overruns. This loan was not carried on Daisy May's financial books. Rather, according to Daisy May's Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Equity dated August 31, 2023, Daisy May had total liabilities of $907,188.19, and net owner's equity of $72,442.87. Including the off-the-books loan to Husband, Daisy May actually had total liabilities of $1,057,188.19, and a negative net owner's equity of $77,557.13 (-$77,557.13). As such, the value of Daisy May, LLC as a Shared Asset was -$77,557.13. This Shared Property will be set over to Wife at a value of -$77,557.13.

51. During the dissolution of marriage proceedings, Wife sought to sell the Camp Bow Wow location. She had an offer from a third-party to purchase the location in exchange for an assumption of Daisy May's $900,000 loan. To secure Husband's consent to the sale, the parties entered into [an] Agreed Order, wherein Wife agreed to personally assume Daisy May's $150,000 debt to Husband. As such, Wife owes Husband $150,000. Pursuant to the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement, this is Wife's Separate Debt.

52. Husband contends that Wife dissipated the parties’ marital assets by Wife's decision to purchase and operate Daisy May, LLC. Husband presented testimony that he had expressed concern regarding the capital outlay for the business and the riskiness of the business.

53. During the marriage, Husband understood Wife was purchasing a franchise and opening a kennel. In 2022, Husband and Wife executed documents to open a Home Equity Line of Credit [(“HELOC”)] against their condo located on Morse Reservoir. Husband knew that Wife was drawing down on this line of credit to finance the buildout and construction of the Camp Bow Wow location. By the date of filing of the dissolution, the balance on the loan was $400,000.

54. Husband concedes that this debt is a Shared Debt pursuant to the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement.

55. Nonetheless, Husband contends that Wife dissipated the marital assets, primarily the value of the Morse Reservoir Condo, when she drew down on the HELOC against it to fund Camp Bow Wow.

56. However, the parties waived all rights and protections afforded them by Indiana law, including those of the doctrine of equitable distribution, when they entered into the Prenuptial Agreement. Specifically, the parties agreed that “it is their intention that the equitable distribution laws will not apply to the status, ownership, interest and division of their property, either jointly or separately owned, nor to their future property, whether real or personal, and owned by either one or both of them.” Para. 11. This provision is clear and unambiguous.

57. The Prenuptial Agreement was never amended by the parties. An amendment could have been made specifying that the HELOC on the Morse Reservoir Condo, or the entirety of the Camp Bow Wow debts could be Wife's Separate Debt. They did not do so, despite Husband's testimony that he was against Wife's investment in the business.

58. The Indiana equitable distribution laws do not apply. While the Court would be generally inclined to consider factors such as an investment of hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars on a business proposition against the advice of a seasoned and successful business owner, where the investment lasts a matter of months before being sold at a considerable loss to be indicative of a dissipation of marital assets, it is ultimately irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Morse Reservoir Condo is jointly titled, and the HELOC against it is jointly executed. Pursuant to the plain language of the Prenuptial Agreement executed by the parties, the Morse Reservoir Condo is a Shared Asset and the $400,000 HELOC against it is a Shared Debt.

Dissolution Decree at 8-16.

[7] Later in the decree, the court inserted a table itemizing the parties’ Shared Property, its value, and its disposition, which resulted in a 50.11/49.89 split between Husband and Wife. Among the Shared Property is the horse, the horse trailer, and tack, the value of which the court ordered to be split equally between the parties.

[8] The court then entered the following findings regarding the disposition of property and payment of Husband to Wife under the Agreement:

81. Husband is ordered to transfer $1,357,814.38 from the Charles Schwab x2971 brokerage account (53% of the value), together with any gains or losses from April 21, 2023 until the date of segregation, to Wife within thirty (30) days of this Decree. Husband is ordered to inform Wife of the basis of each asset so transferred within thirty (30) days of Decree. All other Shared Property shall be distributed to each party as set forth above.

82. The Prenuptial Agreement includes a provision providing for Husband to pay Wife a cash payment based on a calculation of the parties’ Separate Property. The court calculates the payment from Husband to Wife as follows:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

83. Husband owes Wife $29,750.

CAMP BOW WOW DEBT

84. The parties executed an Agreed Order whereby Wife agreed to personally assume a $150,000 loan from Husband to Camp Bow Wow. As such, Wife owes Husband $150,000.

Id. at 22.

[9] Finally, the court made the following relevant findings:

OFFSET OF MONIES OWED

93. Wife owes Husband $150,000 from the Camp Bow Wow debt.

94. Husband owes Wife $29,750 from the Separate Property formula.

95. Husband owes Wife $25,500 from interest on the HELOC tied to the Morse Reservoir Condo.

96. Wife owes Husband $16,134.50 for expenses on the St. Pete property.

97. Wife owes Husband attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500.

98. The court orders the funds owed by Wife to Husband to be offset against those funds owed by Husband to Wife. Wife owes Husband a total of $173,634.50. Husband owes Wife a total of $55,250.00. Considering the offset, Wife owes Husband $118,384.50.

99. The court orders Wife to pay Husband $118,384.50 within thirty (30) days of Wife's receipt of the funds to be transferred to her from Husband's Schwab xx2971.

Id. at 24.

[10] Husband and Wife each filed a motion to correct error. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

HUSBAND'S MOTION TO CORRECT ERRORS

5. Husband alleges several errors by the Court in his Motion to Correct Errors. Overall, Husband's Motion is simply another argument of the issues raised at trial and most of his alleged errors are without merit.

6. There is one issue where the Court finds error and agrees with Husband and that is in the valuation of the parties’ Morse Reservoir Condo.

․.

10. The Court finds error in the valuation of the Morse Reservoir Condo and finds that the condo should have been valued at $600,000.

WIFE'S MOTION TO CORRECT ERRORS

11. Wife alleges one error by the Court in her Motion to Correct Errors, and that was in the value of Daisy May, LLC.

12. The Court agrees with Wife that there was error in the value of Daisy May, LLC but does not agree with Wife's argument.

13. The parties stipulated to certain values of their assets and debts as listed on pages 2 and 3 of the Findings.

14. The parties stipulated that Wife's Daisy May/Camp Bow Wow Debt to Husband in the amount of $150,000 was a debt to be included in the Shared Property and the overall property distribution, but the Court included it instead only in the offset payments owed from Husband to Wife and from Wife to Husband.

15. The Court finds that it erred in not including the $150,000 Daisy May/Camp Bow Wow Debt owed by Wife to Husband in the overall distribution of Shared Property.

․.

16. Wife argues that the Court erred in not including the negative net owner's equity of $77,557.13 in Wife's Shared Property. That error has been resolved by including the Daisy May debt owed to Husband and the inclusion of the Daisy May bank accounts to Wife.

17. As a result of this change as well as the change to the value of the condo as indicated in paragraph 10, there is a change to the overall property distribution between the parties.

18. Husband is ordered to transfer $1,400,000.00 from the Charles Schwab x2971 brokerage account (55% of the value), together with any gains or losses from April 21, 2023, until the date of segregation, to Wife within thirty (30) days of this Order. Husband is ordered to inform Wife of the basis of each asset so transferred within thirty (30) days of the Order. 19. All other Shared Property remains distributed to each party as set forth in the Findings and Decree.

Order on Motions to Correct Error at 1-2, 4. In its revised Summary of Shared Property, the trial court included Husband's Honda and Wife's pontoon boat, which had been listed as Separate Property in the dissolution decree. Id. at 3.

[11] Husband now appeals. Additional facts will be provided below as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Husband's Schwab Accounts

[12] Husband contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the funds in his Schwab accounts are Shared Property pursuant to the Agreement.⁴ Initially, we note that the division of marital property “is a task within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.” Mitten v. Mitten, 44 N.E.3d 695, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. “When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property, we will not reweigh the evidence and must consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the property.” Id. “Even if the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id.

[13] When a trial court's dissolution decree is accompanied by factual findings, “the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Thompson v. Wolfram, 162 N.E.3d 498, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “In determining whether the findings or judgment are clearly erroneous, we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment.” Id. “The trial court's findings control unless there are no facts in the record to support them, either directly or by inference, but we review legal conclusions de novo.” Id.

[14] “We will set aside a trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous, and a judgment is ‘clearly erroneous’ if, after review of the evidence most favorable to it, we are firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. Where, as here, “a party has requested special findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Id.⁵ Because Husband bore the burden of establishing that his Schwab accounts are Separate Property under the Agreement, he appeals from a negative judgment. Accordingly, “he must demonstrate that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law; that is, the evidence of record and the reasonable inferences therefrom are without conflict and lead unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court.” In re Est. of Holt, 870 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[15] To the extent that the trial court's findings regarding Husband's Schwab accounts are based on its interpretation of the Agreement, we note that premarital agreements “are legal contracts by which parties entering into a marriage attempt to settle their respective interests in the property of the other during the course of the marriage and upon its termination.” Magee v. Garry-Magee, 833 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). They “are to be construed according to principles applicable to the construction of contracts generally, and they are to be liberally construed to carry out the parties’ intent.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The interpretation of a contract is primarily a question of law for the court, even if the instrument contains an ambiguity needing resolution.” Id. “Thus, on appeal, our standard of review is essentially the same as that employed by the trial court.” Id.

[16] “To interpret a contract, a court first considers the parties’ intent as expressed in the language of the contract.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 812 N.E.2d 1074, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “The court must read all of the contractual provisions as a whole to accept an interpretation that harmonizes the contract's words and phrases and gives effect to the parties’ intentions as established at the time they entered the contract.” Id. “We will make all attempts to construe the language of a contract so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.” Rogers v. Lockard, 767 N.E.2d 982, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Unless the terms of a contract are ambiguous, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Magee, 833 N.E.2d at 1087. “Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the terms are conclusive and we will not construe the contract or look at extrinsic evidence.” Id. “A court may not add a term or condition to a contract.” Id. at 1088. “The terms of a contract are not ambiguous merely because controversy exists between the parties concerning the proper interpretation of terms.” Id. at 1087. “The terms of a contract are ambiguous only when reasonably intelligent persons would honestly differ as to the meaning of those terms.” Schmidt, 812 N.E.2d at 1080. We construe any ambiguities against the drafter of the contract, i.e., Husband. Thompson, 162 N.E.3d at 506.

Husband's Inheritance

[17] Husband first asserts that the trial court clearly erred in finding that “the funds in [his] Schwab accounts he inherited from his father are Shared Property.” Appellant's Br. at 27.⁶ He emphasizes that when he received the first $525,000 inheritance payment in 2020, “he deposited it into his solely owned Edward Jones investment account, and later moved it into his solely owned Charles Schwab investment account.” Id. And when he received the second $525,000 inheritance payment in 2022, he “deposited [it] into his solely owned individual Schwab account.” Id. But both the Edwards Jones and the Charles Schwab accounts were opened after the parties married, so Husband's characterization of the accounts as “solely owned,” without more, is meaningless.

[18] Wife points out that Husband “deposited $250,000 and $254,279 into the First Merchant[s] Bank marital checking account 1374, but he had no knowledge regarding the source of these funds and could not identify from where these funds came.” Appellee's Br. at 34 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 75). Wife further observes,

Husband thereafter made three transfers (totaling $250,000) from the First Merchant[s] Bank marital checking account 1374 into his Edward Jones account.

Husband then closed his Edward Jones account and transferred the proceeds of that account—which now included undisputed Shared Property—into a new Charles Schwab account. Husband thereafter transferred $31,000 from the First Merchant[s] Bank marital checking account 1374 into the Charles Schwab account.

Id. at 34-35 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 67-68, 75-76; Ex. Vol. at 97).

[19] The foregoing evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment supports the court's conclusion that Husband's inheritance is Shared Property because it was commingled with Shared Property. In his reply brief, Husband insists that the Agreement

does not state that if Shared Property is commingled with a party's solely owned Separate Property, all of the Separate Property becomes Shared Property. It states that only the commingled jointly owned property will be presumed to be Shared Property and only if the party does not solely own the property.

Reply Br. at 11 (record citation omitted).

[20] To reiterate, the Agreement provides, “Unless a Party can reasonably show that he or she solely owns a piece of property, where either Party commingles jointly owned property with Separate Property, any commingled property will be presumed to be Shared Property.” Ex. Vol. at 7-8. Husband's interpretation of this provision—which he drafted without benefit of counsel—renders it meaningless by disregarding that jointly owned property is, by definition, Shared Property under the Agreement. Thus, “commingled property” must refer to both the jointly owned property and the Separate Property. At the final hearing, Husband failed to reasonably show that he solely owned the inheritance funds that he had commingled with Shared Property in his Schwab account. In sum, Husband has failed to establish that the trial court clearly erred in finding that his inheritance is Shared Property.⁷

Husband's other Separate Property

[21] For the same reason, we reject Husband's argument that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that his other Separate Property, i.e., his financial accounts and his ownership interest in several businesses, became Shared Property under the Agreement. As detailed in the trial court's findings, the proceeds from those assets were ultimately commingled with Shared Property in Husband's Schwab account, and Husband failed to reasonably show that he solely owned those proceeds.⁸

Issue Two: Valuation of Daisy May

[22] Next, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing Daisy May, Wife's pet care business. As mentioned in the dissolution decree, prior to the final hearing, the parties entered into an agreed entry, which provided that Daisy May's “$150,000 debt to Husband [for the business] is now Wife's $150,000 debt to Husband.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 50. The agreed entry further stated,

The parties agree that Wife is granted leave to sell the assets of the pet boarding facility. The proceeds shall be used to settle the debts of the pet boarding facility. In the event the pet boarding facility is sold, Wife shall provide Husband with a copy of the executed sales agreement and a full accounting of the transaction. All proceeds remaining after payment of the costs necessary to close the business, including but not limited to utilities, franchise transfer fee, rent, including overdue rent payments, phone, credit card, and payroll, shall be held in the client trust account at [Wife's counsel's firm], pending future agreement or Final Hearing.

Id. at 50-51. Husband points out that after Wife sold the business in July 2024, she failed to provide him with a copy of the sales agreement and a full accounting of the transaction, and thus he “was unable to determine what was left of the business's debts prior to the hearing and [Wife's] testimony.” Reply Br. at 5-6.

[23] At the final hearing, the parties stipulated that Wife owed Husband a debt of $150,000 for the business; that the aforementioned HELOC had been taken out for the business in the amount of $400,000; and that “there was a construction loan on [Daisy May] in the sum of $375,590.03 as of date of filing.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. Wife testified that the purchaser of Daisy May “assumed the construction line of credit which totaled $900,000.00 at the time of the sale” and that the construction loan “had been paid off by the final hearing.” Appellant's Br. at 39 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 101). According to Husband, “[t]he only assets of Daisy May remaining by the final hearing were ․ two [First Merchants] bank accounts[,]” valued at $27,260.81 and $15,641.12[,] id., which by stipulation were set over to Wife. Dissolution Decree at 2.

[24] Husband goes on to state,

In [its] summary of shared property ․, the trial court included the value of the Daisy May construction loan as of the date of filing, $375,590.03, as a liability. But it did not include the value of any assets held by Daisy May on that date, even though in Finding 50, the court valued the net owner's equity as of a little over four months later at $72,442.87. The only assets attributed to Daisy May by the trial court in its summary of shared property were the two First Merchants Bank accounts remaining at the time of the final hearing, totaling $42,901.93. But the value of the construction loan as of the date of filing had been paid off prior to the final hearing in exchange for the assets held by Daisy May on the date of filing.․

․.

Also in Finding 50, the trial court erroneously added the “off-the-books loan”[9] of $150,000.00 from Husband to Daisy May to the net owner's equity of $72,422.87, even though [Wife] had personally assumed that debt prior to the final hearing.․ Thus, the finding that the value of the business is -$77,557.13 is erroneous.

The court attempted to correct its error in the Order [on the Motions to Correct Error], by adding [Wife's] debt of $150,000.00 to [Husband] as a liability in the revised summary of shared property. However, it did not add the receivable owed to [Husband] as a corresponding asset. As such the trial court undervalued the total assets of what it determined to be shared property. Nor did the court account for the value of the net owner's equity or the assets of Daisy May on or near the date of filing in the revised summary of shared assets, even though it continued to include the construction loan of $375,590.03.

The trial court erred in including the value of Daisy May's construction debt as of the date of filing and including the value of the assets of Daisy May as of the date of the final hearing, which was almost 2 years later.

Appellant's Br. at 39-41 (record citations and footnote omitted).

[25] Based on the foregoing, the upshot of Husband's argument appears to be that (1) the $375,590.03 construction loan, which was paid off at the time of the final hearing, should not be included as a liability in the marital balance sheet, and (2) Wife's currently existing $150,000 debt to Husband should be included as one of his assets to offset Wife's liability. We agree, and we do not find Wife's argument to the contrary persuasive.¹⁰ Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to revise the decree and redistribute the marital estate accordingly.

Issue Three: Disposition of Miscellaneous Personal Property

[26] Finally, as mentioned above, the parties stipulated that Wife would receive her horse, each party would receive their own tack, and they would sell the trailer and split the proceeds. Husband contends, and Wife does not dispute, that the trial court erred in awarding each party half the value of the horse and ordering the tack to be sold. Husband also contends, and Wife does not dispute, that the trial court erred in including his Honda and her pontoon boat in its revised Summary of Shared Property. Wife characterizes these errors as de minimis and therefore not grounds for granting relief under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). Because we are reversing and remanding on other grounds, we direct the trial court to correct these errors on remand as well.

Conclusion

[27] We affirm the trial court's disposition of Husband's Schwab accounts. We reverse the trial court's valuation of Daisy May and its disposition of the miscellaneous personal property and remand with instructions to revise the decree and redistribute the marital estate accordingly.

[28] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The index of exhibits does not specify the page number of the exhibit volume “where the exhibit is located[,]” in contravention of Appendix A(14) of the Indiana Appellate Rules.

2.   The Agreement states, “The Parties ․ acknowledge that they have had an opportunity before signing this Agreement to consult with independent legal counsel in their jurisdiction and of their choice. Notwithstanding, they have chosen to expressly and voluntarily waive their right to legal counsel.” Ex. Vol. at 6.

3.   Given the context, it appears that “Shared” is a scrivener's error and that the trial court meant to use “Separate” instead.

4.   In a footnote, Husband asserts, “The trial court also erroneously included [Wife's] individual Schwab accounts as shared property subject to equal division.” Appellant's Br. at 24 n.3. Because Husband fails to develop a full-fledged argument on this point, we do not address it further.

5.   Husband criticizes the trial court's adoption of many of Wife's proposed findings and argues that our confidence in those findings should therefore be “diminished.” See Appellant's Br. at 24 (quoting Beckman v. Beckman, 271 N.E.3d 1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). Wife points out that the trial court did not adopt all of her findings verbatim and in fact made numerous changes, and she contends that therefore we should afford the decree “the standard level of deference.” Appellee's Br. at 27 (quoting Atterholt v. Robinson, 872 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). We agree with Wife.

6.   We note that finding 44 could be read to suggest that the corpus of Husband's inheritance is Separate Property, Appealed Order at 13, but the decree as a whole clearly indicates that the trial court treated it as Shared Property. Husband observes that Wife's Exhibit K, which she submitted at the final hearing, “deducts [his] inherited funds from the value of his Charles Schwab account.” Appellant's Br. at 28 (citing Ex. Vol. at 130). But Husband does not argue that Wife is bound by this submission.

7.   Husband also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the “Agreement is silent as to the appreciation of the inheritance, rendering it Shared Property by default.” Appealed Order at 13. We need not address this argument because Husband presented no evidence regarding appreciation at the final hearing.

8.   Husband also argues that any appreciation in the value of those proceeds is his Separate Property. We need not address this argument because Husband presented no evidence regarding appreciation at the final hearing. Additionally, Husband emphasizes that he and Wife “each paid their pro rata share of tax resulting from the sale of their business interest[s,]” Appellant's Br. at 37, but that is irrelevant to our analysis. Finally, in his reply brief, Husband argues for the first time that Wife “presented no evidence that any jointly owned property was ever deposited in [Husband's] Charles Schwab IRA account -9639.” Reply Br. at 11. It is well settled that an appellant may not raise a new argument for the first time in his reply brief. Card v. Sprinkle, 194 N.E.3d 627, 635 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

9.   Husband asserts that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that this was “an ‘off-the-books loan.’ ” Appellant's Br. at 40. This has no bearing on our analysis.

10.   Wife asserts that the trial court simply disposed of Daisy May's assets and liabilities pursuant to the parties’ stipulations. This assertion is inaccurate. Husband stipulated that the construction loan existed as of the date of filing, but he did not stipulate to its inclusion in the parties’ balance sheet. In fact, Husband's proposed balance sheet does not include a value for the construction loan. Ex. Vol. at 74.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.