1415 1415 v. City of West Lafayette, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] 1415 Woodland Trust (“the Trust”) and Kevin Hunter, as Co-Trustee of the Trust, appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment that the court had entered in a lawsuit against them by the City of West Lafayette (“the City”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] The Trust and Hunter raise three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to set aside the default judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The Trust owns property at 1415 Woodland Avenue in West Lafayette. On August 20, 2023, the Trust entered into a lease agreement pursuant to which it leased a room to Lukas Miller. Miller remained at the property for fifty-five days, until October 14.

[4] On December 12, the City filed an amended complaint against the Trust and Hunter. The City alleged that the Trust had violated City Code sections 6-193 and 6-195 when it failed to: submit a complete property owner registration, have the City conduct a valid inspection of the property, and provide an occupancy affidavit. The City served Hunter in person while he was at the courthouse representing the Trust in an eviction proceeding. On December 22, the Trust filed a demand for a jury trial and stated that it “was officially served the City complaint on December 12, 2023.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 16. The demand was signed “1415 Woodland Trust.” Id. The court scheduled a hearing for January 22, 2024. The City appeared at that hearing, but neither Hunter nor any other representative of the Trust appeared.

[5] On February 28, 2024, the City filed a motion for default judgment. The City alleged that the Trust and Hunter had failed to appear at the January 22 hearing and that they had “failed to file an answer or other responsive pleading[.]” Id. at 19. The next day, the court entered a default judgment against the Trust and Hunter and scheduled a hearing for April 1 to determine the amount of fines owed. The City appeared at that hearing, but the Trust and Hunter did not.

[6] On June 17, the court issued its judgment finding that the Trust had violated two sections of the City ordinance when it failed to: provide the City with a complete property owner registration, obtain a valid inspection, and provide the City with an occupancy affidavit. The court then ordered the Trust to pay $120,000 in fines for its violations of the ordinances.

[7] On July 17, the Trust and Hunter filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. They alleged that they “were entirely unaware” of the hearings that had been scheduled, “as they were out of state dealing with family matters.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 32. They also alleged that they “were not properly served with hearing notices at their official county registered address in Indianapolis” but that the notices were “erroneously sent to [their] West Lafayette property address, where they were physically absent between December 2023 and May 2024.” Id. As such, the Trust and Hunter maintained that they had been “unfairly deprived of the opportunity to defend” against the City's claims. Id. And they asserted that the fine was “[e]xcessive.” Id. at 33. The signature on that motion was “1415 Woodland Trust.” Id. at 34. Following a hearing at which the Trust appeared by counsel, and by agreement of both parties, the court set aside the default judgment and scheduled the matter for a jury trial on September 2, 2025.

[8] On February 13, 2025, the City filed a motion to compel discovery compliance and alleged that the Trust and Hunter had failed to provide discovery responses prior to the due date of December 26, 2024. The Trust responded on March 3 and stated that it had been working “diligently” with counsel but that a change in the attorney's fee schedule may result in the Trust being required to hire new counsel and that the discovery requests “are overly broad, irrelevant, and encompass matters outside the scope of the original complaint.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 69. On that same day, Hunter filed a request for audio files from two hearings. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the issue of discovery for April 11 and ordered Hunter to appear in person.

[9] Hunter and the Trust failed to appear at the hearing but, at the time the hearing was supposed to begin, filed a motion to continue based on “challenges in obtaining legal representation and limited access to legal guidance[.]” Id. at 99. The Trust further alleged that Hunter was “currently experiencing some health-related issues.” Id. at 100. The Trust signed the motion “1415 Woodland Trust.” Id. After the hearing, the court found Hunter in contempt and ordered him to serve time in the county jail.

[10] On May 2, the City filed a motion to reinstate the default judgment due to the Trust's and Hunter's failure to comply with discovery requests and failure to file a responsive pleading. On May 7, the court set a hearing for June 18 on the motion to reinstate the default judgment and ordered “all parties ․ to appear.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 23.

[11] On June 18, the court held a hearing at which the City appeared but at which the Trust and Hunter failed to appear “despite being ordered to do so.” Id. at 5. The same day, the court entered a default judgment against the Trust, finding that the Trust had violated City Code section 6-193 “because it was utilizing the Property as a rental property and failed to provide the City with a complete owner registration and further failed to obtain a valid inspection by the City.” Id. The court additionally found that the Trust had violated City Code Section 6-195 because “it failed to provide [the] City with an occupancy affidavit as required.” Id. The court further found that, pursuant to City Code Section 6-210, the Trust was subject to a fine of $2,500 per day for failing to submit a complete property owner registration, $1,000 per day for renting without an inspection, and $2,500 per day for failing to submit an accurate occupancy affidavit. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment against the Trust in the amount of $330,000.

[12] On July 19, the Trust and Hunter filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Trust and Hunter alleged that they “are currently experiencing health-related challenges and are in the process of retaining legal counsel to represent them in this matter.” Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 2. They also alleged that they “were not informed that the June 18 hearing would serve as an evidentiary hearing or bench trial on damages[.]” Id. The court denied that motion on August 4. Then, on August 11, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order and additionally directed the Trust to pay the City $16,980 in attorney's fees. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Whether the Judgment is Void

[13] The Trust and Hunter first assert that the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Notably, “a judgment entered where there has been no service of process is void for want of personal jurisdiction.” Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 n.3 (Ind. 1998). Typically, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment for an abuse of discretion. Hair v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 18 N.E.3d 1019, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant is a question of law we review de novo. Id.

[14] The Trust and Hunter contend that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because the City only named the Trust and Hunter as parties but that the Trust “is not an entity that can be sued” and that, under the Trust agreement, Hunter lacked “the authority to receive legal documents or act as an agent for service of process[.]” Appellants’ Br. at 12-13 (quotation marks omitted). They maintain that the only proper parties to the lawsuit were the foreign trustees,¹ not the domestic co-trustee.

[15] We first note that this is not a question of minimum contacts because the subject of the litigation is real estate located in West Lafayette, Indiana, the possession of which property is enough to ensure “that a defendant's contacts with Indiana make an Indiana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction fair and just.” Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). Rather, as presented, the issue in this case is whether the service necessary to notify the defendants of the action against them was adequate to provide them with notice of the action and an opportunity to present a defense. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).

[16] Under Trial Rule 4(A), “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who ․ commences or joins in the action, is served with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected to the power of the court under any other law.” Further, Indiana Trial Rule 4 states that a court “acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who ․ is served with summons or enters an appearance[.]” In addition, Rule 4.1(A)(2) provides that service “may be made upon an individual or an individual acting in a representative capacity” by “delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally.” The purpose of those rules is to ensure that a defendant has notice of the claim and an opportunity to defend itself.

[17] Here, Hunter was served with a copy of the complaint in person, and he was served while representing the Trust at a proceeding to evict Miller from the subject property. Hunter was therefore not a stranger to the Trust.² Subsequent to accepting service, the Trust filed a motion for a jury trial and explicitly stated that it “was officially served” with the City's complaint. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 16. As such, there is no doubt that the Trust was properly served under Rule 4.1 and that the court acquired jurisdiction over the Trust pursuant to Rule 4.

[18] Further, when a party believes that personal jurisdiction is lacking, he has the “option ․ to ignore a pending proceeding and take the risk that a subsequent challenge to personal jurisdiction will prevail.” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1156. Of course, doing so “is a bold move.” Id. The other option is to appear in the case and challenge jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity. See Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d 1153, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. If a defendant participates in the action without first challenging personal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction requirement is satisfied. See T.R. 4(A); Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155.

[19] Hunter and the Trust took neither route. They did not choose the bold option to ignore the pending proceeding; rather, they engaged in the proceeding by filing a demand for a jury trial, filing a motion to set aside the first default judgment, appearing at a hearing on the motion to set aside while represented by counsel, filing a motion for enlargement of time to respond to discovery, filing a motion to reconsider the court's order regarding discovery, and filing a motion to continue. Nor did they appear in the case for the limited purpose of challenging personal jurisdiction. Indeed, Hunter and the Trust failed to raise any defense under Trial Rule 12(B), including a “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the person”; “[i]nsufficien[t] service of process”; or “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which shall include failure to name the real party in interest[.]” They also failed to raise an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction in either motion to set aside default judgment. Stated differently, Hunter and the Trust neither boldly ignored the proceeding nor challenged the court's jurisdiction over them.

[20] It is well settled that a defendant “submit[s] himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 626, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); see T.R. 4(A). Put differently, the trial court “has no power over [the] person[ ] ․ unless and until there is a response or an appearance and the lack of personal jurisdiction is not protested.” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155.

[21] Hunter, as co-trustee of the Trust, was personally served while at the courthouse representing the Trust in a related matter. Further, as represented by the various documents filed by the Trust itself, the Trust was aware of the action and had an opportunity to defend itself. At no point did Hunter as co-trustee or the Trust protest to the court or the City that Hunter lacked the authority to accept service.

[22] Because Hunter and the Trust neither ignored the proceeding nor challenged the court's jurisdiction over them, they submitted to the court's authority to adjudicate issues regarding the property in West Lafayette. As such, Hunter and the Trust have not met their burden on appeal to demonstrate reversible error.

Issue Two: Motion for Relief from Judgment

[23] The Trust and Hunter next contend that the court erred when it denied their motion for relief from judgment. Generally, a grant or denial of equitable relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60 is within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Baker v. Baker, 50 N.E.3d 401, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “However, if a trial court's ruling is strictly based upon a paper record, we will review the ruling de novo because we are in as good a position as the trial court to determine the force and effect of the evidence.” Jahangirizadeh v. Pazouki, 27 N.E.3d 1178, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court here ruled solely upon a paper record, and so our review is de novo.

Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

[24] On this issue, the Trust and Hunter initially contend that they are entitled to have the default judgment set aside pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), which provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than those reasons set forth elsewhere in Rule 60(B). “In order to prevail under Rule 60(B)(8), the movant must 1) allege sufficient grounds showing exceptional circumstances justify relief from the operation of the judgment other than those set forth in Rule 60(B)(1)-(4), 2) allege a meritorious defense, and 3) file the motion within a reasonable time.” Dalton Corp. v. Myers, 65 N.E.3d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[25] Hunter and the Trust argue that they were entitled to relief because the judgment entered was for $330,000 plus attorney's fees “for allegedly renting a property for 55 days without complying with the City's” ordinances. Appellants’ Br. at 15. And they contend that the default judgment “was challenged only a month after it was entered” and cited factors including “poor health and difficulties in securing legal counsel”³ to justify relief from the judgment. Id.

[26] But Hunter and the Trust have not shown exceptional circumstances to justify relief from the judgment. Even if they are correct that Hunter had health issues and trouble finding an attorney, that is no excuse for not appearing at hearings or filing responsive pleadings. Indeed, Hunter and the Trust could have simply filed a motion to continue in advance of the hearing dates. Instead, they failed to appear at all but one hearing, and, when they filed a motion to continue, it was after the hearing was scheduled to begin. Hunter and the Trust provide no explanation as to why health issues or lack of counsel prohibited them from appearing at hearings or seeking continuances. We therefore affirm the court's order denying the motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B)(8).⁴

Trial Rule 60(B)(1)

[27] The Trust and Hunter also assert that they were entitled to relief pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1), which states that “a judgment by default” may be set aside based on a party's “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” if the motion is filed within one year of the judgment and the moving party “allege[s] a meritorious claim or defense.” “A motion under Rule 60(B)(1) does not attack the substantive, legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural, equitable grounds justifying the relief from the finality of a judgment.” KWD Industrias SA DE CV v. IPM LLC, 129 N.E.3d 276, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Kmart v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied).

[28] Hunter and the Trust contend that the notice sent to the parties regarding the June 18, 2025, hearing “stated that the hearing was on the matter of” the motion to reinstate the default judgment and that “nothing in the notice suggested that evidence would be taken to assess fines or damages beyond” the $120,000 in fines the court had previously ordered the Trust to pay. Appellants’ Br. at 16.

[29] However, Hunter and the Trust have not demonstrated any surprise. They were aware that the first motion for relief from judgment, which ordered the Trust to pay fines, had been granted and that the case was placed back on the court's calendar. Despite that, the Trust continued to fail to file responsive pleadings or appear at hearings. Then, after the City filed its motion to reinstate the default judgment, the court scheduled a hearing for June 18. Hunter and the Trust knew, or should have known, that the hearing was to discuss reinstatement of the default judgment, which would have included the corresponding fines. In addition, Hunter and the Trust knew, or should have known, that the code provided for a total of $6,000 in fines per day for each of the three different violations. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 27-28. While the court did not impose the maximum fine in the first default judgment, it nonetheless imposed the maximum $6,000 fine for each of the fifty-five days that the Trust rented the property to Miller, which equated to a total fine of $330,000.

[30] Even though the fines in the ultimate default judgment were higher than in the first default judgment, the Trust has not demonstrated surprise when the court imposed the amount allowable by code. As a result, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant the Trust's Rule 60(B)(1) motion based on fines the court was authorized by code to impose.

Conclusion

[31] The Trust and Hunter have waived their argument that the court lacked jurisdiction when the City failed to name the correct party. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Trust's motion for relief from judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trustees are two individuals who reside in Taiwan. Hunter was named as the U.S.-based co-trustee. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 91.

2.   We further note that the Trust document naming the Trustees was not public record and that the Trust tried to avoid sharing the document with the City. The document was only shared after the court compelled the Trust to provide a copy to the City.

3.   Our Supreme Court has held that the contention that a person is not represented by legal counsel “is more appropriately characterized as one under Trial Rule 60(B)(1)[.]” Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ind. 1994).

4.   The Trust and Hunter briefly assert that “the imposition of $330,000 in fines violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.” Appellants’ Br. at 16. However, other than a bald statement that the fine is “disproportionate to the alleged violation,” the Trust and Hunter have not supported their contention with cogent argument or citation to authorities. As such, that purported issue is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.