J.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The juvenile court adjudicated J.W. to be a delinquent child after he admitted to having left home without permission and to committing what would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult. The juvenile court placed J.W. in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) after determining that there were no other available placements. J.W. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a competency hearing and in placing him in the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 5, 2025, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) initiated proceedings alleging that J.W. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). DCS “became involved [with J.W.] due to housing instability, [his f]ather's lack of ability to get his children to school, and his [father's] inability to manage his children's behaviors.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. J.W.’s mother passed away on December 11, 2025.

[3] On December 17, 2025, the State filed a delinquency petition, alleging that J.W. had committed what would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult. The petition alleged that on December 5, 2025, J.W. had fled from “a law enforcement officer with the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Office, after said officer” had identified himself and had ordered J.W. to stop. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. J.W. was also alleged to have committed the juvenile offense of leaving home without permission.

[4] The Dual Status Assessment Team (“DSAT”) provided a report to the juvenile court on December 19, 2025, which noted that J.W. had

had four (4) prior referrals [to probation], for a total of six (6) referrals to Juvenile Court. His previous referrals are for theft (three) and leaving home (one). Two of the theft referrals were not filed due to [J.W.’s] cognitive delays. Father has historically struggled to control [J.W.] and his actions. [J.W.] was detained at [the Youth Care Center (“YCC”)] for the most recent offense of resisting law enforcement and remains in detention[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. The DSAT report indicated that J.W. had previously been “diagnosed with ADHD combined type, [o]ppositional defiant disorder, [and] adjustment disorder with depressed mood.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. J.W. had received psychiatric services through the Neuro Diagnostic Institute (“NDI”) and had not been successful “with academics” due to his “terrible school attendance[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. J.W. is “very persuasive and demonstrates a good amount of emotional intelligence” but “has an extensive history of eloping and self-harm.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. The DSAT report indicated that “[i]t is apparent [that J.W.] is beyond the control of his parent, and requires a secure facility where he can receive appropriate services relating to his mental health and processing the recent loss of his [m]other.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The DSAT report recommended that both the CHINS proceedings and delinquency proceedings should continue, as “DCS and Probation will best provide for [J.W.’s] needs with a dual adjudication.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The juvenile court accepted the recommendations of the DSAT and ordered DCS and the Probation Department “to coordinate in the supervision of” J.W. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47.

[5] J.W. appeared before the juvenile court on January 2, 2026, on which date he was represented by counsel and was accompanied by his father. The juvenile court advised J.W. of his statutory and constitutional rights, and J.W. indicated that he understood each of his rights. J.W. admitted that he had left home without permission and had run from the police. In admitting to the delinquent acts, J.W. responded clearly and appropriately to each question posed to him, confirming his identity, residence, parentage, and the conduct underlying both allegations. The juvenile court found “that a factual basis ha[d] been established” and adjudicated J.W. delinquent. Tr. Vol. II pp. 8–9. Neither defense counsel nor J.W.’s father expressed any concern about J.W.’s ability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense during the hearing. Defense counsel did not request a competency evaluation, nor did she indicate that J.W. had had difficulty communicating with her or comprehending the nature of the proceedings. The juvenile court did not mention any behavior suggesting incompetency.

[6] A pre-dispositional report was filed on January 27, 2026, detailing J.W.’s prior referrals. The report indicated that with regard to a referral in June of 2025, J.W. had stated that “he is well aware of what he does before he does it and has no excuse for his behavior” and that “although he knows what he's doing, he doesn't really care.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. At the time J.W.’s father indicated that J.W.’s mental health had been evaluated at the NDI “and it was determined that [J.W.’s] mental health is fine” and that a “majority of his decision making is not due to mental health, but more so because of him making a choice on his own to just be defiant.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. J.W. indicated “that he needs a consequence for his actions, and he understands that he was wrong.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. Father additionally reported that although J.W. had been prescribed “many medications” for mental health conditions, he “does not believe [J.W.] actually takes his medications.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 57.

[7] A dispositional hearing was conducted on February 2, 2026. At the beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court heard that the YCC had “asked for [J.W.’s] removal [because he had] been putting feces in his hair, on cameras, on other people. He's been using bad language towards African Americans, using slurs. He has just been a complete problem while he's been there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. During the disposition hearing, J.W. again communicated coherently with the juvenile court, and explained that his behavior had been the result of him getting “too angry.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Neither defense counsel nor DCS suggested that J.W.’s behavior reflected an inability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense during the dispositional hearing. The juvenile court addressed J.W. regarding his behavior at the YCC, telling him “I genuinely have no options of places to put you that are trying to help you, and YCC is one of those places. So when you behave the way you've behaved and they ask for your removal, it just -- you're just harming yourself. Do you get that?” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. J.W. responded in the affirmative.

[8] J.W.’s probation officer indicated that she and DCS had been working to find a placement for J.W. and that DCS had “reached out to several people and have yet to find some places. He's on the do not admit list at Hillcrest. We've reached out to NDI, Damar, SAFE Passages, and about 20 other people and have yet to find somewhere for him to go.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 15–16. Damar did not have any open beds and had “no scheduled [upcoming] discharges[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. NDI had also indicated that J.W. had “made no progress in treatment” during his prior stay. Tr. Vol. II p. 16. The juvenile court noted that the DOC was “the last alternative to the Court” and placement in the DOC was “not something that ․ [the juvenile court took] lightly at all.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 17–18. In placing J.W. in the DOC, the juvenile court noted that it had “nowhere to put [J.W.] other than” the DOC. Tr. Vol. II p. 18.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Juvenile Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Failing to Conduct a Competency Hearing

[9] The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents. Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae.

In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, which implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system.” Id. at 636.

[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “a juvenile alleged to be delinquent has the constitutional right to have [his] competency determined before [he] is subjected to delinquency proceedings.” Id. at 635. The Indiana General Assembly has also codified the right of a juvenile to have their competency determined, requiring that “[i]f, at any time before disposition, a court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child is not competent, the court shall order the child to undergo a competency evaluation ․ unless the child is represented by counsel and waives the competency evaluation.” Ind. Code § 31-37-26-3. Upon the motion of any party, a juvenile court “shall conduct a hearing to determine competency.” Ind. Code § 31-37-26-5. As it relates to juvenile delinquency proceedings, “ ‘[c]ompetent’ and ‘competency’ mean the present ability of a child to: (A) understand the nature and objectives of a proceeding against the child; and (B) assist in the child's defense.” Ind. Code § 31-37-26-2.

[11] Although an impaired [person] might be limited in his ability to assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence, the [person's] inability to assist counsel can, in and of itself, constitute probative evidence of incompetence, and defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the [person's] ability to participate in his defense.

Medina v. Cal., 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992). In other words, “[b]ecause legal competency is primarily a function of [a person's] role in assisting counsel in conducting the defense, [a person's] attorney is in the best position to determine whether the [person's] competency is suspect.” Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied. “Accordingly, failure of defense counsel to raise the competency issue ․ while not dispositive, is evidence that the [person's] competency was not really in doubt and there was no need for a” competency hearing. Id.; see also Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1996) (providing that the defendant's counsel was “in the best position of any lay person to evaluate” the defendant's competence), cert. denied. Again, at no point during the delinquency proceedings did J.W.’s counsel request a competency hearing or raise any concerns about J.W.’s competency.

[12] While acknowledging that neither he nor his counsel had requested a competency hearing, J.W. contends that the juvenile court nonetheless abused its discretion in failing to conduct one before adjudicating him to be a delinquent child and placing him in the DOC. J.W. argues that “the record demonstrates more than reasonable grounds to question J.W.’s competency at multiple points before disposition, yet no competency evaluation was ever ordered.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. In support of this argument, J.W. points to his prior psychiatric treatment at NDI, diagnoses listed in the DSAT report, and worsening behavior at the YCC.

[13] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that

[n]ot every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges. Similarly, neither low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial. The fact that a [person] has been treated with anti-psychotic drugs does not per se render him incompetent to stand trial.

Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation omitted, brackets added), cert. denied; see also Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that in order for an individual to be incompetent to stand trial, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges), cert. denied. Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[n]ot all mental conditions are serious enough to relieve one of criminal responsibility.” Anderson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ind. 1998) (internal quotation omitted, brackets added).

[14] While the DSAT report indicated that J.W. had previously been diagnosed with several mental-health conditions, nothing in the record even suggests that any of these conditions rendered J.W. unable to assist counsel during the admission or dispositional hearings or to understand the allegations against him. Rather, J.W.’s demeanor and behavior before the juvenile court indicated exactly the opposite. The pre-dispositional report also contained a statement from J.W.’s father indicating that J.W.’s behavioral issues were not the result of any mental-health condition, but rather J.W.’s decision to behave in a defiant manner. J.W.’s father's assessment is supported by J.W.’s statements that he was “well aware of what he does before he does it and has no excuse for his behavior[,]” “although he knows what he's doing, he doesn't really care[,]” “he needs a consequence for his actions, and he understands that he was wrong.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53.

[15] Moreover, while J.W. asserts that his conduct at the YCC could “demonstrate an acute psychiatric disturbance rather than willful conduct,” Appellant's Br. p. 16, J.W.’s statement at the dispositional hearing that his behavioral outbursts at the YCC had occurred after he had gotten “too angry” could reasonably be interpreted to support the inference that his misconduct was willful and not the result of a psychiatric disturbance. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. In any event, J.W.’s misconduct at the YCC, while troubling, does not render him incompetent as it does not demonstrate that he was unable to understand the delinquency proceedings or assist his counsel.

[16] We disagree with J.W.’s claim that the record “demonstrates more than reasonable grounds to question J.W.’s competency at multiple points before disposition[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Instead, we agree with the State that the juvenile court could have reasonably determined that there were no serious mental-health conditions affecting J.W.’s competency at the time of the delinquency proceedings. As such, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a competency hearing.

II. The Juvenile Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Placing J.W. in the DOC

[17] The specific disposition of a delinquent is within the juvenile court's discretion, to be guided by the following considerations: the safety of the community, the best interests of the child, the least restrictive alternative, family autonomy and life, freedom of the child, and the freedom and participation of the parent, guardian, or custodian. We reverse only for an abuse of discretion, namely a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.

K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Without question, [Indiana Code section] 31-37-18-6 requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive placement in most situations. However, the statute contains language which reveals that under certain circumstances a more restrictive placement might be appropriate. That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only if consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child. Thus, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement.

K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386–87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[18] J.W. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him in the DOC, arguing that this was his first delinquent finding and a less-restrictive placement would be more appropriate given his mental-health deficiencies. We have previously concluded that

[i]n some instances, confinement may be one of the most effective rehabilitative techniques available. A delinquent child's first exposure to the consequences he will face should he continue to break the law may indeed be the best treatment available in helping a young person readjust his values and priorities in life.

B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted, brackets added).

[19] The record in this case indicates that while this was J.W.’s first delinquent adjudication, this was not his first referral or contact with the juvenile court. Furthermore, while the DSAT and pre-dispositional reports ¹ outlined J.W.’s mental-health diagnoses and intellectual challenges, these reports also indicated that J.W. was “very persuasive and demonstrates a good amount of emotional intelligence[,]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11, and was “well aware of what he does before he does it and has no excuse for his behavior[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. J.W. had indicated that “although he knows what he's doing, he doesn't really care[,]” “he needs consequences for his actions, and he understands that he was wrong.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. J.W.’s father had also indicated that J.W.’s mental health had been evaluated at NDI “and it was determined that [J.W.’s] mental health is fine” and that a “majority of his decision making is not due to mental health, but more so because of him making a choice on his own to just be defiant.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53.

[20] Furthermore, while the juvenile court indicated that it would have preferred a less-restrictive placement for J.W., it had “nowhere to put [J.W.] other than” the DOC. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. The juvenile court heard testimony indicating that DCS and the Probation Department had “reached out to several people and have yet to find some places. He's on the do not admit list at Hillcrest. We've reached out to NDI, Damar, SAFE Passages, and about 20 other people and have yet to find somewhere for him to go.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 15–16. Damar did not have any open beds and had “no scheduled [upcoming] discharges[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. NDI had also indicated that J.W. had “made no progress in treatment” during his previous stay. Tr. Vol. II p. 16. J.W. had been warned that continued misconduct could affect his placement at YCC, which is what happened with the YCC asking for his removal prior to the dispositional hearing. J.W. indicated during the hearing that he understood that his misconduct had resulted in the juvenile court having “no options of places to put” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Given the limited options available to the juvenile court, which was in part caused by J.W.’s misconduct, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing J.W. in the DOC.

[21] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that J.W. argues that the pre-dispositional report was defective “because it failed to evaluate dispositional options in light of J.W.’s cognitive and mental health needs[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 22, it is clear from review of the pre-dispositional report and the dispositional hearing that dispositional options taking into account J.W.’s mental-health needs had been considered and the lack of available options was squarely before the juvenile court.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.