Valurie Kaye Mettler, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Michigan State Police, Trooper Jacob T. Robison, Trooper Mark S. Poyhonen, Tyler Vandoeselaar and Ottawa County Sheriff's Department, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Valurie Kaye Mettler (“Mettler”) brings this pro se appeal challenging the dismissal of her tort claims against various Michigan law enforcement officials and government entities (collectively, “the Defendants”) related to an alleged false arrest. Mettler presents the following consolidated and restated issues:

I. Whether the motion to dismiss was void; and

II. Whether any basis supports the trial court's dismissal of each set of claims.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 1, 2025, Mettler filed a pro se complaint in the LaGrange Superior Court against the Michigan State Police (“MSP”) and MSP Troopers Jacob T. Robison and Mark S. Poyhonen (collectively, “the Troopers”), in their official and personal capacities. We refer to MSP and the Troopers in both capacities as “the MSP Defendants.” Mettler also sued the Ottawa County Sheriff's Department (“OCSD”), also located in Michigan, and OCSD Detective Tyler Vandoeselaar (“the Detective”), in his official and personal capacities. We refer to OCSD and the Detective in both capacities as “the OCSD Defendants.”¹

[4] The complaint focused on events that allegedly occurred on August 21, 2023. Mettler claimed that the Troopers—“acting as the MSP Fifth District Fugitive Team”—entered the Holiday Inn Express in Howe, Indiana, and “demanded [Mettler's] room number from staff under threat of ‘harboring a fugitive’ ” before locating Mettler in a hallway and arresting her. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5. She claimed the Troopers were armed and that their show of force “created a coercive environment, causing [her to] fear for her life.” Id. Mettler alleged that, following the arrest, the Troopers “transported [her] across state lines to Michigan without any extradition hearing or waiver, in violation of Indiana law.” Id. She claimed to be “denied due process, including a governor's warrant and an opportunity to challenge extradition.” Id. Mettler alleged that the Detective had “coordinated the investigation leading to [her] arrest in Howe, Indiana.” Id. at 4. She further asserted that the MSP later conducted an internal investigation, producing a report that “sustained [her] allegations, confirming the [T]roopers acted outside their jurisdiction, had no authorization to leave Michigan, and violated the extradition process.” Id.

[5] Mettler brought five claims: (1) Count I – a federal claim under 42 United States Code section 1983 (“Section 1983”) for unlawful seizure; (2) Count II – a second federal Section 1983 claim alleging a due process violation as to the circumstances of her extradition; (3) Count III – municipal/county liability for the foregoing Section 1983 claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (4) Count IV – false arrest and false imprisonment under Indiana common law; and (5) Count V – intentional infliction of emotional distress under Indiana common law. Mettler sought compensatory and punitive damages, together with declaratory and injunctive relief.

[6] In the complaint, Mettler anticipated a challenge to the timeliness of her claims. In a section titled “Tolling / Timeliness of Filing,” Mettler stated: “Although the underlying events giving rise to this action occurred on or about August 21, 2023, [Mettler] respectfully submits that this [c]omplaint is timely under the doctrines of equitable tolling, delayed accrual, and the discovery rule as recognized in federal [Section] 1983 jurisprudence and Indiana law.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5. Mettler asserted that she was “denied access to essential facts confirming the illegality of the arrest and transport until after the initial limitations period had nearly expired,” noting that the report from MSP's internal investigation “was not disclosed until late in the relevant period.” Id. Mettler alleged that she “could not have reasonably discovered the basis for certain claims until documentation and admissions from the internal affairs process became available.” Id. Mettler also alleged that she “diligently sought clarification of her rights but was hindered by lack of access to counsel, financial hardship, and delayed access to investigative documents.” Id.

[7] The Indiana Office of Admissions and Continuing Education (“ACE”) granted Michigan Assistant Attorney General Shelley M. McCormick (“Michigan Counsel”) temporary admission to practice law in this specific LaGrange Superior Court proceeding under Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2). Michigan Counsel's temporary admission was designated as effective on November 12, 2025. On November 21, 2025, Michigan Counsel and Indianalicensed co-counsel Erin A. Graham (“Indiana Co-Counsel”), who was also an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Michigan, filed appearances on behalf of the MSP Defendants and moved to dismiss all claims against them under Trial Rules 12(B)(1), 12(B)(2), and 12(B)(6). In a supporting brief, the MSP Defendants asserted constitutional sovereign immunity as to the claims against MSP and the official capacity claims against the Troopers. As to the personal capacity claims against the Troopers, they argued that personal jurisdiction was lacking due to insufficient contacts with the State of Indiana. They also argued that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In support, the OCSD Defendants stated that “[a] review of the Ottawa County, Michigan District Court case reflects that Mettler was arraigned on criminal forgery charges on September 28, 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. The OCSD Defendants did not appear and, therefore, did not join the motion.

[8] On November 25, 2025, Mettler filed a response in opposition. On November 26, 2025, Mettler moved to strike portions of the MSP Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On December 23, 2025, Mettler filed a second motion, seeking leave to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

[9] On December 31, 2025, the trial court denied Mettler's motions. In a separate written order, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Citing Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230 (2019), the trial court found that principles of constitutional sovereign immunity barred the claims against MSP and the official capacity claims against the Troopers. The court determined that dismissal was necessary as to the personal capacity claims due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. Although the court determined that the requirements of Indiana's long-arm provision was satisfied, it found that “the exercise of ․ jurisdiction over the [Troopers], in their personal capacit[ies], would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” and thus would not comport with due process. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The trial court specifically found that “[t]he burden on the Michigan law enforcement officers would be great, considering that [Mettler's] claims against the official agencies and the claims against them in their official capacities have been found to be barred from suit in Indiana” under principles of sovereign immunity. Id. The court further reasoned that “[s]eparation of [Mettler's] claims against the parties named in this suit would be inconvenient for all and inefficient,” noting again that “claims against the official agencies and the claims against them in their official capacities have been found to be barred from suit in Indiana.” Id.

[10] After finding that all claims against the MSP Defendants should be dismissed, the trial court addressed—sua sponte—all claims against the OCSD Defendants. Regarding the OCSD Defendants, the court stated:

12. Although [the OCSD Defendants] have failed to appear to this action and to formally challenge subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, the Court finds that the claims against [OCSD] and [the Detective], in his official capacity, are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

13. Although not specifically challenged by [the Detective], the Court finds that the lack of personal jurisdiction over [him] is apparent on the face of the [c]omplaint and allowing [Mettler's] lone claim against [him], in his personal capacity, to remain pending in this cause, would be certainly inefficient and inconvenient for the parties.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. In the order, the court did not address any arguments about the timeliness of Mettler's claims. Mettler now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] We consolidated the issues as whether the motion to dismiss was void because Michigan Counsel lacked authority to participate in the case when the motion was filed, and whether there were proper grounds to dismiss all claims.²

I. Michigan Counsel

[12] Mettler contends the motion to dismiss was “void ab initio” because Michigan Counsel signed the motion before proper Indiana authorization was established. Appellant's Br. p. 7. Mettler does not dispute that Indiana law allows for the temporary admission of out-of-state attorneys, nor that Michigan Counsel was granted such admission. Instead, Mettler claims that Michigan Counsel did not file her appearance in the action until January 14, 2026—well after filing the motion to dismiss—and that the motion was void as a result.

[13] The record does not support Mettler's argument, as it reflects that ACE granted Michigan Counsel temporary admission on November 12, 2025. See Appellant's App. Vol. V pp. 8–10. Nine days later, Michigan Counsel appeared and filed the motion to dismiss. Id. at 5–6; Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 9–10, 32. Michigan Counsel was therefore authorized to participate in the action when filing the motion. Mettler has not established that the motion was void.

II. Grounds for Dismissal

[14] Mettler claims the trial court erred in granting the MSP Defendants’ motion to dismiss and in dismissing, sua sponte, all claims against the OCSD Defendants. The trial court determined that some claims were subject to dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim, and that other claims were subject to dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the trial court ruled on a paper record, we review both types of rulings de novo. Kelly v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 260 N.E.3d 934, 937 (Ind. 2025) (explaining that Trial Rule 12(B)(6) rulings are reviewed de novo); Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that, when the court rules on a Trial Rule 12(B)(2) motion based entirely on a paper record, whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law subject to de novo review).

[15] Our Supreme Court recently explained our approach to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motions seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim: “Taking the facts alleged as true and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we ask whether a legally actionable injury has occurred.” Kelly, 260 N.E.3d at 937–38. As to Trial Rule 12(B)(2) motions alleging a lack of personal jurisdiction, dismissal is proper if “the lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 57. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on either type of motion to dismiss, we may affirm on “any theory or basis supported by the record, regardless of the explanation provided by the trial court.” Blackman v. Gholon, 46 N.E.3d 975, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

A. MSP

[16] The trial court dismissed all claims against MSP based on sovereign immunity. That ruling was correct. The United States Constitution does not permit a state to be sued by a private party in the courts of another state without its consent. Hyatt, 587 U.S. at 245–249. MSP is an agency of the State of Michigan. Because a suit against a state agency is the equivalent of a suit against the state itself, MSP is entitled to sovereign immunity as to all claims asserted against it. See id.; cf. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Mettler's claims against MSP.

B. The Troopers

1. Official Capacity Claims

[17] The same sovereign immunity that shields MSP extends to the Troopers in their official capacities. A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity “is a suit against the official's office” and, as such, “it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. The Troopers, acting as agents of the State of Michigan, stand in the same position as MSP when sued in their official capacities. We therefore affirm the dismissal of all official capacity claims against the Troopers.

2. Personal Capacity Claims – Personal Jurisdiction

[18] Turning to the personal capacity claims against the Troopers, the complaint asserted Counts I, II, IV, and V in this capacity. The trial court dismissed these claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. We disagree with that ruling.

[19] Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A)—the State's long-arm provision—is written to “reduce analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause.” LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006). There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 12 (2025). General jurisdiction exists in the forum where a defendant is domiciled or “fairly regarded as at home,” and it permits suit in that forum for any claim against that defendant, regardless of where the underlying events occurred. Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). Specific jurisdiction is narrower: it applies where there are minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Id. at 12. The pertinent inquiry is whether (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state and (2) the plaintiff's claims “ ‘deriv[e] from, or [are] connected with,’ those activities.” Fuld, 606 U.S. at 13 (first alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). The defendant's single contact with the forum state can establish specific personal jurisdiction if it creates a substantial connection with the forum state and the suit is based on that connection. Wolf's Marine, Inc. v. Brar, 3 N.E.3d 12, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “However, the act must be purposeful, not random or attenuated or the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. (quoting Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[20] Even if the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, “due process requires that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable.” LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967. Nonetheless, the Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he assertion of personal jurisdiction will rarely be found unreasonable if ‘minimum contacts’ are found.” Id. The reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction is evaluated using five factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum [s]tate's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenien[t] and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several [s]tates in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985); Arnold v. Long, 59 N.E.3d 1075, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[21] We begin our “minimum contacts” analysis by determining whether the Troopers purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Indiana in a manner that created a substantial connection between themselves and the state. Importantly, it is the defendant's own conduct that must create a substantial connection with the forum state; mere contact with a resident plaintiff is not enough. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284–85 (2014). In Walden, the United States Supreme Court explained that, “although physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction,” physical “entry” into the state—“either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means”—is “certainly a relevant contact.” Id. at 285. There, the Court considered whether a Georgia police officer had minimum contacts with Nevada when he “never traveled to, conducted activities within, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.” Id. at 289. The events took place in a Georgia airport, where he approached, questioned, and searched the plaintiffs—airline passengers with a connecting flight to Nevada—before seizing their cash. Id. The Court concluded that the officer's actions at the airport “formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada,” where the airline passengers had filed suit. Id.

[22] In Rogers v. City of Hobart, 996 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2021), the Seventh Circuit applied these principles in a case involving an Indiana law enforcement officer facing suit in Illinois. There, the Indiana officer consulted an Illinois database to help identify a suspect; the officer applied for an arrest warrant, which was issued by an Indiana court, then entered the warrant into an interstate database. Rogers, 996 F.23d at 815–16. The warrant was for an Illinois resident—the plaintiff—who was subsequently arrested by an Illinois police officer who had conducted a traffic stop, accessed the database, and found the Indiana arrest warrant. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Indiana officer did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois to support specific personal jurisdiction because he “did not undertake any affirmative action in Illinois, or any action purposefully designed to have an effect within Illinois.” Id. at 820.

[23] Here, in contrast, Mettler alleged that the Troopers physically entered Indiana as part of a pre-planned operation, went to an Indiana hotel, questioned hotel staff to obtain her room number, executed a custodial arrest on Indiana soil, and transported her out of the state without following extradition procedures. Each of the acts was performed by the Troopers themselves, within Indiana, and each of Mettler's claims arises directly from this conduct. The Troopers argue that this was a single, isolated event, asserting that their “one contact with ․ Indiana on August 21, 2023” was “too attenuated to pass muster” as a minimum contact supporting personal jurisdiction. Appellees’ Br. p. 14. But a single, purposeful contact with the forum state can establish specific personal jurisdiction if it creates a substantial connection with the forum state and the suit is based on that connection. Wolf's Marine, Inc. v. Brar, 3 N.E.3d 12, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We conclude that the complaint alleges sufficient minimum contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction over the Troopers.

[24] Having identified sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, we turn to whether exercising jurisdiction over the Troopers would be reasonable, i.e., whether doing so comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967. Here, the trial court found that “the exercise of ․ jurisdiction over the [Troopers], in their personal capacit[ies], would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. It specifically found that “[t]he burden on the [Troopers] would be great, considering that [Mettler's] claims against the official agencies and the claims against them in their official capacities have been found to be barred from suit in Indiana.” Id. The court further reasoned that “[s]eparation of [Mettler's] claims against the parties named in this suit would be inconvenient for all and inefficient,” noting again that “claims against the official agencies and the claims against [the Troopers] in their official capacities have been found to be barred from suit in Indiana.” Id. On appeal, the Troopers argue that the court “correctly determined” that “their contacts on August 21, 2023, were insufficient” to satisfy due process. Appellees’ Br. p. 14.

[25] We first consider the burden on the defendant. This factor examines the practical costs to the defendant of defending suit in the forum, such as travel, unfamiliarity with the forum's legal system, and other concrete difficulties. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14, 115 (1987) (involving personal jurisdiction in the international context, noting that the “unique burdens” of defending suit in a foreign legal system warrant “significant weight”). In Arnold, this court found that the burden on Michigan defendants litigating in Indiana “would not be great,” but that the significance of this factor was diminished because the claims were intertwined with a federal criminal proceeding pending in Michigan related to the same allegations. 59 N.E.3d at 1083. In the instant case, the trial court reasoned that the burden would be great because Mettler's claims against MSP and against the Troopers in their official capacities had been barred by sovereign immunity. However, as previously discussed, a personal-capacity defendant appears in court as an individual, not as the sovereign. Thus, the dismissal of claims against the Troopers in their official capacities did not alter the practical burden on the Troopers as individuals defending themselves in Indiana. Nonetheless, although the geographic distance involved may not be particularly burdensome here, see id., we conclude that the first factor weighs in favor of the Troopers.

[26] The second factor is the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that each state has a “ ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). A custodial arrest carried out on Indiana soil by out-of-state officers, followed by removal from the state without extradition process, implicates Indiana's authority to regulate law enforcement conduct within its borders. This factor favors jurisdiction.

[27] The third factor is the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. Mettler is an Indiana resident who was arrested in Indiana. Litigating her claims in Indiana is more convenient for her, so this factor favors Mettler.

[28] The fourth factor is the interstate judicial system's interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies. This factor accounts for where the events occurred, the location of evidence, and the existence of parallel proceedings. See Arnold, 59 N.E.3d at 1083; Foley v. Schwartz, 943 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. In Arnold, this court determined that the fourth factor weighed against exercising jurisdiction because the defendants, witnesses, and relevant documents were all located in Michigan, and there was a pending federal criminal proceeding in Michigan that addressed the same underlying allegations of fraud. 59 N.E.3d at 1083. Here, however, neither circumstance is present. The arrest occurred at an Indiana hotel, where some portion of the relevant witnesses and evidence would be located, and the record discloses no parallel Michigan proceeding related to the Troopers’ conduct. This factor favors exercising jurisdiction.

[29] The fifth and final factor considers the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. The conduct at issue in this case implicates such a shared interest: the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified in Indiana at Indiana Code section 35-33-10-3, reflects the states’ shared interest in ensuring that officers who cross state lines to seize a person do so in a manner that protects both the sovereignty of the receiving state and the rights of the arrested individual. If a forum could not hear claims arising from a circumvention of this framework, the statutory protections would lack meaningful enforcement. This factor favors jurisdiction.

[30] Balancing all five factors, we conclude that asserting personal jurisdiction over the Troopers is reasonable, particularly in light of the nature of their activities within Indiana. Thus, exercising jurisdiction is consistent with due process.

3. Statute of Limitations

[31] As we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, we proceed to evaluate whether the personal capacity claims against the Troopers were nonetheless subject to dismissal because Mettler filed her complaint outside the applicable statute of limitations. A Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion tends to be a poor vehicle for resolving a statute of limitations defense, as the defense often turns on facts outside the complaint. See Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017). However, the plaintiff “may plead [herself] out of court if [the] complaint alleges, and thus admits, the essential elements” of a statute of limitations defense. Id. Therefore, if the complaint establishes on its face that a claim is time-barred—in other words, where “it appears to a certainty on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief”—the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and dismissal is proper under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Am. Fam. Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 2008)).

[32] Mettler does not dispute that a two-year limitations period applies. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) (establishing a two-year limitations period for injury to person or character); Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 30–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying a two-year limitations period to claims similar to Mettler's). Rather, Mettler challenges whether the period expired before she filed suit.

[33] The statutory limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff's cause of action “accrues.” Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind. 2008). Under Indiana law, accrual generally occurs when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that she sustained an injury as a result of the tortious act of another. Id. For Section 1983 claims, accrual is a question of federal law that, in general, “conform[s] ․ to common-law tort principles.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the standard rule is that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, i.e., when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. Id.

(a) False Imprisonment – Counts I and IV

[34] There is an important refinement to the standard accrual rule for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment. Both state and federal law recognize “the common law's distinctive treatment” of this category of tort. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; see Johnson, 885 N.E.2d at 30–31 (citing Wallace). Because false arrest is a variant of false imprisonment, we hereafter refer to both claims collectively as false imprisonment. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (noting that “the former is a species of the latter”). A claim of false imprisonment does not accrue on the date of arrest; rather, it accrues when the false imprisonment ends and the plaintiff is held pursuant to legal process—that is, when the plaintiff is bound over for trial or arraigned. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389; Johnson, 885 N.E.2d at 31.

[35] This analytical refinement controls the analysis of Counts I and IV. The complaint alleges that Mettler's arrest occurred on August 21, 2023, and the complaint makes clear that Mettler was subsequently incarcerated and subjected to Michigan criminal proceedings. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5. Thus, from the complaint, it is apparent that Mettler was at some point held pursuant to legal process. But the critical question for the accrual analysis—the date on which that legal process attached—is not answered by the complaint.

[36] Below, the Troopers argued that Mettler was arraigned on September 28, 2023, and they relied on that date to argue the claims were untimely. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. However, accepting that date requires consideration of matters outside the complaint. Under Trial Rule 12(B), when matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the trial court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment” and disposed of pursuant to our summary judgment procedures. Here, the trial court did not convert the motion; it resolved the matter under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Our review is therefore confined to the face of the complaint, which does not allege the date legal process attached. Because that date is absent from the complaint, we cannot conclude that the false imprisonment claims are time-barred. See Bellwether, 87 N.E.3d at 466 (“Dismissals are improper under 12(B)(6) ‘unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief.” (quoting Am. Fam. Voices, 898 N.E.2d at 296)). We therefore reverse the dismissal of Counts I and IV against the Troopers in their personal capacities.

(b) Due Process and IIED – Counts II and V

[37] We turn to the remaining personal capacity claims against the Troopers: Count II, a Section 1983 due process claim based on the alleged failure to follow extradition procedures, and Count V, a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) under the Indiana common law. For these claims, the standard accrual rule applies without the false imprisonment refinement. Therefore, accrual occurred when Mettler knew or should have known that she had sustained an injury from the Troopers’ allegedly tortious conduct. See Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082.

[38] Mettler argues that neither claim accrued on the date of her arrest. Her theory is that the limitations period did not begin to run until she received the MSP internal affairs report. See Appellant's Reply Br. p. 16. Mettler argues that “[s]he was not aware—and could not reasonably have been aware—of the full facts establishing the unlawfulness of the arrest until [the report] became available.” Id. She claims that the report “confirmed the absence of authorization, the extradition-process failure, the prosecutorial contradiction, and the internal inconsistencies in the officers’ accounts.” Id. Mettler points out that “[t]he complaint expressly pleaded tolling, delayed accrual, and discovery-rule facts” in avoidance of a statute of limitations defense. Id.

[39] Under both state and federal law, the limitations clock runs from the point a plaintiff had sufficient information to bring a claim as a tort victim—not from the point she possessed documentary evidence sufficient to prove it. Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388–90. This general principle is known as the discovery rule. See Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082. This rule “only postpones the statute of limitations by belated discovery of key facts, not by delayed discovery of legal theories.” Bambi's Roofing, Inc. v. Moriarty, 859 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, “a plaintiff has a duty under the discovery rule to exercise reasonable diligence” with regard to a potential claim. Id.

[40] In this context, the exercise of reasonable diligence means that the plaintiff “must act with some promptness where the acts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.” Id. In short, “[t]he discovery rule is not intended to toll the limitation period until optimal litigation conditions can be established.” Rieth-Riley Constr. Co., Inc. v. Gibson, 923 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Its purpose “is to limit the injustice that would arise by requiring a plaintiff to bring his or her claim within the limitation period during which, even with due diligence, he or she could not be aware a cause of action exists.” Id. Thus, even a defendant's fraudulent acts do not result in equitable tolling of the statute of limitations where the plaintiff already has adequate information to discover a claim. See Town of Cicero v. Sethi, 189 N.E.3d 194, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[41] Count V—the IIED claim—rests on the circumstances of the arrest itself. Count II—the due process claim—rests on the alleged failure to follow extradition procedures in Mettler's transportation to Michigan. As to both counts, the complaint establishes that Mettler was present for and directly experienced the conduct she now alleges was tortious. Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, Mettler witnessed the arrest, knew the officers were Michigan law enforcement officials acting outside their home state, and experienced firsthand the absence of any extradition process. Those facts were sufficient to place her on notice of the alleged injuries and their cause. The MSP internal affairs report did not reveal a new injury or a previously unknown tortious act; at most, it provided additional support for allegations derived from events Mettler experienced. Accordingly, Counts II and V accrued on August 21, 2023. Because Mettler filed her complaint on October 1, 2025—more than two years later—those claims are time-barred, and we affirm their dismissal.

C. The OCSD Defendants

1. Sua Sponte Dismissal

[42] Mettler challenges the trial court's authority to dismiss, sua sponte, all claims against the OCSD Defendants, who did not appear. She claims the trial court “dismissed claims against non-appearing defendants without motion or notice,” which “deprived [her] of a meaningful opportunity to respond and constitute[d] procedural error requiring reversal.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. Because the OCSD Defendants did not appear below, there is no responsive appellate briefing on this issue. Under these circumstances, we may reverse if Mettler establishes prima facie error—i.e., “an error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” In re Paternity of I.P., 148 N.E.3d 1098, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting In re Paternity of S.C., 966 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

[43] “Ordinarily, ‘a trial court may not sua sponte dismiss an action unless the court lacks jurisdiction or is otherwise authorized by statute or the rules of procedure.’ ” Zavodnik v. Richards, 984 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Tracy v. Morell, 948 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). Thus, when a defendant has not appeared, the court retains only narrow authority to dismiss. See id. And while a court may raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time, personal jurisdiction is waivable and is ordinarily asserted—or forfeited—by the defendant. M.B. v. State, 815 N.E.2d 210, 213–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

2. Sovereign Immunity

[44] Constitutional sovereign immunity extends to “States and state officials,” but “does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Thus, neither OCSD nor the Detective in his official capacity is entitled to the constitutional sovereign immunity that shielded MSP and the Troopers in their official capacities. That is, OCSD is a county law enforcement agency—and the Detective, when sued in his official capacity, represents the county rather than the State of Michigan.³ See id.; cf. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (explaining that an official capacity suit against a state official is a suit against the state itself). It was error to dismiss claims against these defendants due to sovereign immunity.

3. Personal Jurisdiction

[45] The trial court also concluded, sua sponte, that the lack of personal jurisdiction over the Detective was “apparent on the face of the [c]omplaint ․” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. We disagree.

[46] Although the complaint does not allege that the Detective entered Indiana, physical presence in the forum is not required for specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fuld, 606 U.S. at 12–13. Rather, a defendant who deliberately directs activity toward a forum state may be subject to that state's courts for claims arising from that state-directed activity. Id. Here, the complaint alleged that the Detective “coordinated the investigation leading to [Mettler's] arrest in Howe, Indiana.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 4. Taken as true, that allegation describes a defendant who purposefully participated in a plan to take Mettler into custody in Indiana. Under those circumstances, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not apparent from the face of the complaint. Furthermore, the trial court's additional stated ground for dismissal—that retaining the Detective's claims would be “inefficient and inconvenient for the parties,” id. at 24—has no support in the law governing sua sponte dismissal of claims against non-appearing defendants.

[47] At this stage, and on the face of the complaint, we cannot say that personal jurisdiction is lacking as to the Detective—or to OCSD, through whose authority the Detective allegedly acted.⁴

4. Statute of Limitations

[48] Having concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor lack of personal jurisdiction justifies the sua sponte dismissal of the claims against the OCSD Defendants, we consider whether the claims against those defendants are time-barred. The same two-year limitations period and accrual rules discussed above apply here.⁵

[49] As to the false imprisonment claims—Counts I and IV—the analysis tracks the analysis for the Troopers. The complaint establishes the arrest date but not the date on which Mettler was held pursuant to legal process. Without that date, the face of the complaint does not establish that the false imprisonment claims are time-barred. We therefore reverse the dismissal of Counts I and IV against the OCSD Defendants.

[50] As to Count II (extradition-related due process) and Count V (IIED), those claims accrued on the date of the arrest for the reasons already discussed. Mettler's personal knowledge of both the arrest and the cross-border transport provided the information needed to pursue those claims on August 21, 2023. Counts II and V against the OCSD Defendants are therefore time-barred, and we affirm their dismissal.

Conclusion

[51] The trial court properly dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds all claims against MSP and all official capacity claims against the Troopers, so we affirm the dismissal of those claims. However, sovereign immunity did not apply to claims against OCSD and the Detective in his official capacity. Although we disagree that the complaint foreclosed the possibility of personal jurisdiction over the remaining defendants—i.e., OCSD, the Detective in his personal and official capacities, and the Troopers in their personal capacities—we conclude that Counts II (extradition-related due process) and V (IIED) were time-barred, so we also affirm the dismissal of those claims. As to the remaining claims of false imprisonment—Count I under Section 1983 and Count IV under Indiana common law—the face of the complaint does not establish they are time-barred, so we reverse the dismissal of these claims. We remand for further proceedings on the false imprisonment claims against OCSD, the Detective in his personal and official capacities, and the Troopers in their personal capacities.

[52] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The OCSD Defendants did not appear in the action, and they do not participate on appeal.

2.   In appellate briefing, Mettler cites fictitious caselaw. See, e.g., Appellant's Reply Br. p. 7. While we cannot be certain of the origin of such error, here, it appears likely to be the result of hallucination from generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) used in the briefing process. See Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We admonish Mettler for citing fictitious caselaw and “caution attorneys and pro se litigants alike against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated.” Id.

3.   Mettler alleged that the Detective “coordinated the investigation” and that certain acts were undertaken by the “MSP Fifth District Fugitive Team.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 4. Whether these allegations would support treating the Detective as a state actor for immunity purposes—rather than as a county official—involves a fact-sensitive inquiry that cannot be resolved on the face of the complaint. See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997) (whether a local official acts for the state or the county is determined by that particular state's law and turns on the nature of the function the official was performing). That inquiry is undeveloped on this record, where the OSCD Defendants have at no point participated in the action.

4.   A personal jurisdiction challenge remains available to the OCSD Defendants if they properly present it.

5.   We address the Section 1983 claims in Counts I and II, but do not separately address Count III; that count referred to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978), which is merely the authority recognizing that governmental actors for a county or municipality can be subject to Section 1983 liability and fails to otherwise state a claim or cause of action.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.