BOWMAN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Brittany Bowman appeals the Hancock Superior Court's sanction following the revocation of her probation. Bowman presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a 365-day executed sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Bowman is the mother of two children who, during all times relevant to this appeal, have lived with Bowman's mother. In 2021, a court ordered Bowman to pay $62 per week in child support for the children.¹ In July 2024, the State charged Bowman with two counts of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent based on her nonpayment of child support between 2021 and 2024. Bowman's arrearage was more than $6,000. Bowman pleaded guilty to one count, and the State dismissed the second count. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Bowman to 778 days suspended to probation in November 2024.

[4] In April 2025, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging that Bowman had paid only $600 in child support since she had started probation five months prior, which was “well below the amount ordered.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 30. The State also alleged that Bowman had failed to attend a scheduled appointment with her probation officer, as required by the terms of her probation.

[5] Bowman, pro se, admitted to the violations during a hearing. Bowman then requested counsel, who represented her at the ensuing sentencing hearing in February 2026. Bowman's probation officer testified that Bowman had missed several child support payments and had not made any payments since May 2025.

[6] Bowman testified that she had worked at Speedway “most of the time” since she had started probation, and she had worked part-time for a cleaning company. Tr. p. 19. Bowman testified that she had paid her daughter $200 to $300 per month directly instead of making the child support payments. And Bowman conceded that she knew that those direct payments did not satisfy her child support obligations. In addition, Bowman's public defender read into the record an email from an attorney who has befriended Bowman, which stated in part as follows:

[Bowman] is the hardest working person I have met in quite some time. While she has been staying with me, she has had three jobs. One is scanning returns in a warehouse where she works from 6:30 a.m. to 8 or 9 depending on volume. She also has a woman who owns several B & B's in Penn Towers downtown, and [Bowman] cleans those as needed. Finally, she was working for a married couple, Scott and Sarah, with several rental properties and other properties that are now fixing to flip.

Id. at 24. Bowman asked the trial court to let her continue on probation so that she could work and pay down her arrearage.

[7] The trial court sentenced Bowman to 365 days executed. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Bowman argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. In appeals from trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of discretion. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id. (citations omitted).

[9] Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provides that, upon the revocation of a defendant's probation, the court has discretion to impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[10] Bowman maintains that the trial court abused its discretion because her failure to pay child support was due to her “financial hardship.” Appellant's Br. at 10-11. But Bowman ignores the evidence that she had steady employment and made direct payments to her daughter of $200 to $300 per month instead of making her child support payments. And Bowman testified that she knew that those payments did not satisfy her legal obligation.

[11] We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Bowman to serve 365 days executed. See, e.g., Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ind. 2010) (rejecting appellant's argument that “a shorter period of incarceration would have been more appropriate in light of the defendant's financial circumstances and would permit him to be gainfully employed so as to reduce the support arrearage”).

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both children have since been emancipated. The youngest child was born in 2007 and is not in college. Thus, Mother currently owes only an arrearage.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.