Deon Woods, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Deon Woods appeals his conviction of Level 4 felony arson.¹ He raises two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to remove Juror 16 after that juror initiated a conversation with deputy prosecutors during a lunch recess; and (2) whether remand is required to correct the sentencing order, abstract of judgment, and chronological case summary to reflect Woods's acquittal of Level 6 felony arson.² We affirm Woods's conviction and remand for the trial court to correct the record.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 11, 2024, the State charged Deon Woods with two counts of Level 4 felony arson and one count of Level 6 felony arson. All three charges arose from a fire set at the home of Trunyna Highbaugh on June 5, 2024.

[3] At Woods's trial on October 9, 2025, after the jury was sworn, the trial court gave preliminary instructions. The court told the jurors: “Until you have returned to [sic] the verdict in court and I have released you from your service, do not talk to any of the parties, the lawyers and witnesses, or members of the media.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 183.) The court also instructed that jurors “must not ․ communicate with any of the parties, their lawyers ․ or any of the witnesses, members of the media, or anyone else about the case.” (Id.) The court dismissed the jury for lunch just before noon.

[4] When court reconvened that afternoon, Deputy Prosecutor Michelle Sharpe reported the following to the court:

[Deputy Prosecutor Natalie Mongarella] and I went outside over the lunch hour, and as we were walking by, there was what we know now as a juror, sitting on the bench outside in front of the building. He approached [Deputy Prosecutor Mongarella] and he said, Hey, do you know Emily Chastain? Emily Chastain used to be a prosecutor in our office. [Deputy Prosecutor Mongarella] did not recognize him as a juror and was, like, oh yeah, I do. And he is, like, she just had – oh, she just had a baby. And I was, like, I was whispering, is he a juror? Is he a juror? ․ I took a surreptitious [photograph of him]․ We actually then did not even go back that way into the building. We went the other way into the building so we wouldn't even pass him again.

(Id. at 194.)

[5] The trial court then questioned Juror 16 individually, outside the presence of the other jurors, with counsel for both parties present. When asked what he had said to the Deputy Prosecutors, Juror 16 responded: “I said hi.” (Id. at 196.) When asked whether he said anything else of substance, he replied: “No. No, we had a mutual acquaintance.” (Id.) He did not identify the acquaintance until further questioning revealed the acquaintance was his daughter, who was a former Marion County deputy prosecutor. Juror 16 acknowledged the court had instructed him not to approach the prosecutors. He confirmed that the interaction had not changed his opinion concerning either the State's or Defense's role in the case and that he had not discussed it with any other juror.

[6] Defense counsel moved to remove Juror 16 for cause, arguing that he had violated the court's instruction and that his daughter's former position with the prosecutor's office raised a concern about bias. The State responded that the conversation was “innocuous” and bore no relation to the case. (Id. at 200.) The trial court denied the motion:

I am going to deny your request to remove him for cause. I believe the conversation was innocuous. It had nothing to do with the case, Mr. Woods’ case. I do not think that there was anything that showed that he is no longer fair and impartial. His daughter's former job could have been voir dired on. It was not, and so I think I am going to deny your request.

(Id.)

[7] At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Woods moved for a directed verdict on the Level 6 felony charge on the ground that the State had not proven the pecuniary damage element. The State conceded the issue, and the trial court granted Woods's motion for a directed verdict. The jury convicted Woods on the two remaining Level 4 felony counts of arson.

[8] At the sentencing hearing on November 14, 2025, the trial court vacated Woods's conviction of the first count of Level 4 felony arson on double jeopardy grounds and sentenced Woods to eleven years in the Indiana Department of Correction for the remaining Level 4 felony conviction.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Declined to Remove Juror 16.

[9] We review a trial court's decision on whether to remove a juror for abuse of discretion. May v. State, 716 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ind. 1999). “Typically, ‘the trial court [is] in the best position to assess the honesty and integrity of [a juror and their] ability to perform as a conscientious, impartial juror[,]’ ” id. (quoting Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind. 1995)), and we will overturn its decision only when it is “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Id.

[10] Woods alleges the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove Juror 16 for bias and prejudice. “An impartial jury is the cornerstone of a fair trial,” Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 936 (Ind. 2014), and one of the ways we protect impartiality is by prohibiting “unauthorized contacts and communications with jurors.” Id. If contact or communications occurs between jurors and unauthorized persons regarding the matter before the jury, then a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises in favor of the defendant, and the State is required to rebut the presumption of prejudice. Id. at 939. However, in more “egregious” circumstances, “where juror conduct fundamentally compromises the appearance of juror neutrality, trial courts should ․ find irrebuttable prejudice, and immediately declare a mistrial.” Id.

[11] Herein, during a lunch recess, Juror 16 spoke to the two deputy prosecutors assigned to Woods's case outside the courthouse to see if they knew his daughter, who had also been a deputy prosecutor, and to tell them that his daughter had a baby. The interaction between Juror 16 and the State had nothing to do with “the matter before the jury,” id. at 939, such that no rebuttable presumption of prejudice could have arisen in Woods's favor. Instead, Woods argues the trial court should have found an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice because the appearance of juror neutrality had been compromised.³

[12] Our Indiana Supreme Court has described this narrow exception as one “aimed at identifying egregious ‘juror conduct with witnesses occurring contemporaneous to the trial proceeding.’ ” Id. at 937 (quoting May, 716 N.E.2d at 422) (emphasis originated in May). Because interactions between jurors and witnesses during trial “are of a different character and more directly implicate the public's trust and confidence in our criminal justice system,” May, 716 N.E.2d at 422, such interactions are considered prejudicial even if the juror and witness did not communicate about the case before the jury. Id. Accordingly, the three cases in which our Supreme Court has applied the narrow exception of irrebuttable prejudice all involved a juror socializing with a witness: police officers visiting with jurors in the jury room during recesses, Woods v. State, 119 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1954); jurors having lunch with a State's witness, who commented on the defendant's guilt during lunch, Kelley v. State, 555 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ind. 1990); and a witness receiving a personal social invitation from a juror to watch a pay-per-view boxing match, May, 716 N.E.2d at 420.

[13] The circumstances herein are not like any of those cases. Juror 16 initiated a brief exchange with prosecutors – not witnesses. The prosecutors responded to Juror 16 no more than was necessary to be polite and reported the contact to the court immediately upon returning from the lunch recess. The conversation did not concern the case, and no other juror witnessed the exchange. We do not believe these are the circumstances to which the narrow exception of irrebuttable prejudice was intended to apply, because nothing in this record approaches the fraternization with witnesses that has characterized the narrow exception in Indiana law.

[14] Instead, the decision whether to remove Juror 16 remained within the discretion of the trial court, and our review of that decision is “highly deferential.” May, 716 N.E.2d at 421. The trial court questioned Juror 16 individually, outside the presence of the jury, with counsel present, and he confirmed he remained fair and impartial. The trial court found the conversation “innocuous” and unrelated to the case, (Tr. Vol. II at 200), and nothing in the record compels a different conclusion.⁴ The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to remove Juror 16.

2. Remand Is Required to Correct the Court's Records to Reflect the Acquittal of Level 6 Felony Arson.

[15] The requirements governing the content of the chronological case summary and abstract of judgment are questions of law that we review de novo. Baker v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1199, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). The parties agree remand is appropriate, (see Br. of Appellee at 14-15), and the record leaves no doubt that it is. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Woods moved for a directed verdict on the single count of Level 6 felony arson; the State conceded that a required element was unproven; and the trial court granted the motion. Yet the sentencing order lists no disposition for that crime. (App. Vol. II at 177.) Similarly, the abstract of judgment lists the Level 6 felony as “Pending.” (Id. at 179.) Moreover, the chronological case summary contains no entry reflecting the directed verdict or the acquittal. (See id. at 2-13.) Each document is incomplete or inaccurate as to that charge, and each must be corrected. We accordingly remand for the trial court to correct the sentencing order, abstract of judgment, and chronological case summary to accurately reflect that Woods was acquitted of Level 6 felony arson by directed verdict.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to remove Juror 16, and we therefore affirm Woods's conviction. We remand with instructions for the trial court to correct the sentencing order, abstract of judgment, and chronological case summary to reflect the acquittal of the Level 6 felony count.

[17] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-1-1(a).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-43-1-1(d).

3.   The State argues Woods waived this argument because he did not invoke “the narrow exception ․ for an appearance of harm to the fair and impartial administration of justice” at trial. (Br. of Appellee at 11.) We disagree. Defense counsel argued below that removal was warranted because Juror 16 violated the court's preliminary instruction and because his daughter's former position with the prosecutor's office raised a bias concern. Those are the same facts and the same core concern that Woods presses on appeal.

4.   The trial court also observed that Juror 16's daughter's former employment “could have been voir dired on” and was not. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 200.) The record confirms this: no question directed to Juror 16 or to the second panel as a whole called for disclosure of a family member's prior employment at the prosecutor's office. Because the connection was never the subject of a voir dire question, Juror 16 made no misrepresentation.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.