HARRIS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Quinton Lee Harris appeals his two convictions for Level 5 felony child seduction. Harris raises a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on Harris's purported mistake-of-fact defense.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the 2021-22 school year, Harris was a wrestling coach and substitute teacher at Cascade High School. M.C. was a female student at the high school who was sixteen at the start of the academic year and turned seventeen during the fall semester.

[4] In the spring semester, Harris began “flirting” with M.C. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 151. He eventually asked her to “come over to [his] house,” and M.C. did so. Id. at 155. Over the course of several visits to his place, Harris had M.C. perform oral sex on him and touch his penis with her hand, and he touched her vagina with his hand. In April 2022, M.C. “stopped” communicating with Harris. Id. at 162. M.C. turned eighteen in the fall of 2022, and Harris wished her a happy eighteenth birthday. She graduated high school in the spring of 2023.

[5] In July 2024, M.C. informed law enforcement officers of her encounters with Harris. The State then charged Harris with two counts of Level 5 felony child seduction. At his ensuing jury trial, Harris admitted to his sexual encounters with M.C. and admitted that he knew she was seventeen years old at the time of those encounters. But he argued that he believed those sexual encounters to have been lawful because a written policy of the school corporation referred to avoiding “unwelcome” sexual interactions with others. Ex. Vol. 4, p. 6.

[6] Based on his testimony about the school policy, Harris proffered a mistake-of-fact jury instruction. That instruction read:

It is an issue whether the Defendant mistakenly committed the acts charged.

It is a defense that the Defendant was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact if the mistake prevented the Defendant from knowingly committing the acts charged.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not reasonably mistaken.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 153.

[7] The trial court refused Harris's proffered instruction. The jury then found him guilty of both Level 5 felony charges, and the court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Harris accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Harris appeals the trial court's decision to not instruct the jury on his purported mistake-of-fact defense. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

We review a trial court's manner of instructing the jury for an abuse of discretion. Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 201 (Ind. 2014) (citing Cline v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. 2000)). To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, we consider “(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that are given.” Chambers v. State, 734 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. 2000) (citing Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 926 (Ind. 1999)). Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole. Ibid. A trial court acts within its discretion if it denies a request that would likely confuse the jury. Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 461-62 (Ind. 2003).

Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 267-68 (Ind. 2023). Further, for a defendant to make a showing of a viable mistake-of-fact defense, “three elements must be satisfied: (1) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (2) that the mistake be about a matter of fact; and (3) that the mistake negate the culpability required to commit the crime.” Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997).

[9] We agree with the State that Harris's essential argument in the trial court was that the written school policy effectively exempted him from the law. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 225; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 8. We thus also agree with the State that, among other possible reasons for rejecting his proffered instruction, Harris's argument failed to demonstrate that his purported mistake was reasonable. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied Harris's mistake-of-fact instruction.

[10] Still, on appeal, Harris appears to shift gears by arguing that his understanding of the written school policy meant that he was mistaken on the factual requirements of what it meant to be a “child care worker” as required under his statute of conviction. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-7(m) (2021). We agree with the State that Harris may not raise this argument for the first time on appeal. We also agree with the State that, regardless, Harris's argument is really about the legal status of his relationship to M.C. through the school corporation, not a question of what the facts here might have been. Accordingly, his argument pertains to a purported mistake of law and not to a mistake of fact.

[11] For all of these reasons, we affirm Harris's convictions.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.