Julius W. Lawson, Appellant/Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2024, Julius Lawson pled guilty to Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”) and Level 3 felony possession with intent to deliver at least five grams of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to thirteen years of incarceration with five suspended. The next month, Lawson petitioned for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), claiming that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to move to suppress certain evidence that had been found during a search of his vehicle. In July of 2025, the post-conviction court denied Lawson's PCR petition. Lawson contends that the post-conviction court's denial of his PCR petition is clearly erroneous. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Early in the morning of July 4, 2024, Allen County Police Officer Anthony Miller was on patrol in a fully marked police vehicle when he observed a black 1994 Oldsmobile Cutlass bearing an invalid license plate. Officer Miller initiated a traffic stop and spoke to the occupants, including Lawson, who was in the front passenger seat. Lawson stated that he was the registered owner and that the license plate belonged to another vehicle he owned.

[3] As Officer Miller spoke with Lawson, he detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Another officer who was present during the traffic stop informed Officer Miller that he had seen “a glass pipe on the rear passenger floorboard that appeared to be used for a narcotic drug.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151. Based on the odor of marijuana and the pipe observed in plain view, officers conducted a search of the vehicle, during which several items incriminating to Lawson were found.

[4] On July 8, 2024, Officer Miller filed a probable-cause affidavit, and the State charged Lawson with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF, Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun with a prior felony conviction, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On October 25, 2024, Lawson pled guilty to the SVF charge and Level 3 felony possession with intent to deliver at least five grams of cocaine. Lawson's plea agreement provided that an aggregate sentence of thirteen years would be imposed with five years suspended. At the guilty-plea hearing, when asked if he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, Lawson replied, “[y]es.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13.

[5] On November 14, 2024, during his sentencing hearing, Lawson for the first time indicated his dissatisfaction with trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. Trial counsel stated that Lawson had “decide[d] to take the plea knowing that the suppression issue was there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Lawson in accordance with the agreement.

[6] On November 20, 2024, Lawson filed a PCR petition, in which he claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence found in Lawson's vehicle, and the post-conviction court directed that the case would be submitted by affidavit. On March 24, 2025, Lawson filed a “Motion for [PCR,]” in which he argued why his petition should be granted, which the post-conviction court treated as Lawson's attempt to satisfy the requirement that the case be submitted by affidavit. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 116. On July 24, 2025, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon and denied Lawson's PCR petition.

Discussion and Decision

[7] A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief faces a rigorous standard of review. As such, the petitioner must convince the court on review that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Stated differently, “[t]his Court will disturb a post-conviction court's decision as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion.” Further, the reviewing court accepts the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.

Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169–70 (Ind. 2001) (citations omitted). “Because th[e] clearly erroneous standard is a review for sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses; rather, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Greene, 16 N.E.3d 416, 418 (Ind. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[8] Lawson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence found during the search of his car. There is a strong presumption that Lawson's counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of his reasonable professional judgment, and Lawson could only have rebutted this presumption with “strong and convincing evidence” to the contrary. Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 132 (Ind. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In particular, Lawson must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984)). A reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

[9] The decision of whether to file a particular motion is generally a matter of trial strategy, and, absent an express showing to the contrary, the failure to file a motion does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. Glotzbach v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, the petitioner must demonstrate that such a motion would have been successful. See Moore v. State, 872 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that the petitioner had “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress, i.e., that such a motion would have been successful”), trans. denied. Lawson has failed to establish that a motion to suppress would have been successful.

[10] In the probable-cause affidavit filed after Lawson's arrest, Officer Miller stated that, while speaking to Lawson, he “could smell a strong odor of Marijuana coming from” the vehicle. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151. There is no question that Officer Miller's detection of the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, by itself, provided sufficient probable cause to search it. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 211 N.E.3d 574, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding that an officer's “detection of the odor of marijuana immediately upon his arrival at the open window of the car” “provided probable cause for him to search the car”); Marcum v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that two officers’ testimony that they had smelled marijuana coming from a vehicle provided probable cause to search the vehicle).

[11] Lawson argues that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress because the probable-cause affidavit Officer Miller filed after his arrest did not establish that Officer Miller had detected the “ ‘strong odor of marijuana’ by his training and experience[,]” which he characterized as “magic words” below. Appellant's Br. p. 8; Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 120. In support, Lawson relies on cases discussing the requirements for probable cause to issue a search warrant. See, e.g., Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1235–38 (Ind. 2021) (upholding search warrant based on statements in probable-cause affidavit that officers detected the odor of marijuana based on their training and experience).

[12] This argument, however, fails to account for the difference between a probable-cause affidavit filed in support of a search warrant and a probable-cause affidavit filed following a warrantless arrest. The former are presented to a magistrate who determines whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, while the latter are presented at the initial hearing of a person arrested without an arrest warrant in order to determine if the arrestee is to be held to answer in the proper court or immediately released.¹ As the New Jersey Supreme Court has put it, “[w]arrantless searches, of course, are not supported by an affidavit in advance of the search but rather are evaluated based on testimony and other evidence presented to the trial court [․] at a subsequent suppression hearing.” State v. Wilson, 833 A.2d 1087, 1091 (N.J. 2003). Caselaw discussing the adequacy of probable-cause affidavits in search-warrant cases have no applicability here.

[13] Lawson's opportunity to test Officer Miller's ability to accurately identify burnt marijuana would have been at a suppression hearing that never occurred because Lawson pled guilty. So, in order to accept Lawson's argument that a motion to suppress would have been successful, we would have to assume that if a motion to suppress had been filed, Officer Miller would not have established that he had the training and experience to properly identify the odor of burnt marijuana. We will not make this assumption. As the Indiana Supreme Court has observed, “Indiana law enforcement officers undergo mandatory training at the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy[,]” and such training includes “instruction on detecting the odor of both raw and burnt marijuana.” Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235. Lawson points to no evidence, much less strong and convincing evidence, that Officer Miller never actually received the training allowing him to identify the odor of burnt marijuana. See Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind. 1998) (to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner “must present strong and convincing evidence”). Consequently, Lawson has failed to establish “a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress would have been granted,” Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 717–18 (Ind. 2007), which means that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file one.²

[14] We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 35-33-7-2 provides, in part, as follows:(b) At or before the initial hearing of a person arrested without a warrant for a crime, the facts upon which the arrest was made shall be submitted to the judicial officer, ex parte, in a probable cause affidavit.[․.](d) If the judicial officer determines that there is probable cause to believe that any crime was committed and that the arrested person committed it, the judicial officer shall order that the arrested person be held to answer in the proper court. If the facts submitted do not establish probable cause or if the prosecuting attorney informs the judicial officer on the record that no charge will be filed against the arrested person, the judicial officer shall order that the arrested person be released immediately.

2.   Lawson also lists as a separate argument that the post-conviction court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions thereon, which it actually did do. Lawson never actually fleshes out this argument, however, only going so far as to challenge the post-conviction court's conclusion that the officers’ failure to find any marijuana in Lawson's car did not rule out the possibility that its occupants had recently smoked it therein. This conclusion does not strike us as unreasonable. This challenge is related to Lawson's claim that Officer Miller's averment that he had smelled marijuana in Lawson's car was a fabrication. To the extent that Lawson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this below, he offered no evidence to support the argument beyond his bare assertion that Officer Miller had made a “False statement About the strong odor of marijuana[,]” which the post-conviction court was under no obligation to credit. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 127; see, e.g., Greene, 16 N.E.3d at 418 (stating that, in reviewing the denial of post-conviction relief, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses[, considering] only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.