IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.N. and A.N. (Minor Children) and Z.N. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Z.N. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights over his two minor children, M.N. and A.N. (“the Children”). Father raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the trial court's termination of Father's parental rights is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] H.H. (“Mother”) is the mother of M.N., born in 2015, and A.N., born in 2022, and Father is the biological father of the Children.¹ In July 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother had tested positive for fentanyl. Mother and Father lived together with the Children and were known to DCS for substance abuse.

[4] DCS filed a petition alleging the Children to be Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Neither parent challenged DCS's allegations that the Children were CHINS, and the trial court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS accordingly. Thereafter, Father agreed to engage in substance-abuse-related services and various other provisions pursuant to an agreed entry with DCS.

[5] However, throughout 2024, Father failed to fully comply with services. He failed to complete a substance use disorder assessment. He repeatedly failed drug screens, failed to set appointments for drug screens, and failed to show up for them. The court eventually moved his parenting time to supervised visits and then ended up suspending his visitation with the Children altogether.

[6] In January 2025, the State arrested Father for Level 6 felony possession of cocaine and Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug. In March, Father pleaded guilty to both charges and received a suspended sentence. However, later that year, the State alleged that Father violated the terms of his suspended sentence by having committed a new criminal offense of theft.

[7] DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights over the Children. At an ensuing fact-finding hearing, DCS offered into evidence numerous court records from the CHINS proceedings. Father objected only to the CHINS petitions on hearsay grounds, and the trial court admitted the petitions after stating that it was not admitting them for the truth of the allegations stated therein. Father had no objection to the admission of the other CHINS records.

[8] DCS also called two witnesses at the fact-finding hearing. Deana Burger, a permanency supervisor with DCS, testified to DCS's historical involvement with the Children in the CHINS proceedings and to the parents’ lack of compliance with services. For example, Burger testified that, after two years of proceedings in the CHINS cases, Father still had “not ․ completed” any of the recommended services. Tr. p. 64. Aubrey Ramsey, the Children's CASA, testified that termination of parents’ rights over the Children was in the Children's best interests, stating that the Children “deserve permanency” of adoption and that “the parents[’] substance use issues” were “a big stressor” for M.N., the older child. Id. at 84-85.

[9] Thereafter, the trial court entered its order terminating the parents’ rights over the Children. In findings 27, 29, and 31, the court “adopt[ed]” previous statements the court had found to be true during the CHINS proceedings. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15. Those statements generally referred to Father's noncompliance with services in the CHINS proceedings. But the court also separately found that Father had failed to comply with services in findings 26 and 35, the latter of which states as follows:

35. Father tested positive for illicit substances a number of times during the CHINS case, including on

a. November 8, 2023, for Buprenorphine and NorBuprenorphine, although he reported being on no prescribed medication;

b. January 17, 2024, for Buprenorphine and NorBuprenorphine, again although he reported being on no prescribed medication;

c. February 5, 2024, for Cocaine[,] THC, and Fentanyl, again, making no mention of being on prescribed medication;

d. May 17, 2024, for Benzoylecgonine and Cocaine, Morphine, THC[,] and Fentanyl, again, making no mention of being on prescribed medication(s);

e. August 13, 2024, for Benzoylecgonine and Cocaine[ ] and Fentanyl, making no mention of being on prescribed medication(s).

Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted). And, in finding 36, the court found that, “[f]rom the period of November 18, 2024, to June 2, 2025, Father missed 138 calls to confirm [drug] screening and 61 random tests, of which 56 were unforgiven missed tests.” Id. at 16.

[10] Based on its findings, the court concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from Father's care were likely to be remedied. The court then terminated Father's parental rights over the Children accordingly, and this appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[11] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[12] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[13] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024).

[14] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

1. The disputed findings are not clearly erroneous.

[15] On appeal, Father first asserts that findings 27, 29, and 31, in which the court “adopt[ed]” previous statements found to be true during the CHINS proceedings, are clearly erroneous. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15. Specifically, he contends that, because CHINS proceedings are under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the outcomes from those proceedings cannot form a factual basis for a termination order, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant's Br. at 10-12.

[16] We think Father overstates the termination court's reliance on the CHINS records. First, the termination court's judgment is not based solely on determinations made during the CHINS proceedings. Rather, the CHINS records were admitted during Burger's testimony, and she likewise testified to the termination court regarding DCS's history with parents and the Children during the underlying CHINS proceedings. The challenged findings may “adopt” prior CHINS determinations, but they are nonetheless also consistent with Burger's supporting testimony to the termination court.

[17] Second, the CHINS records were in evidence before the termination court, and largely admitted without any dispute. Thus, the termination court's findings from those records are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Indeed, findings 27, 29, and 31 are, in relevant part, duplicative of findings 35 and 36, which findings Father does not challenge on appeal as being unsupported by the evidence. We conclude that Father's arguments against findings 27, 29, and 31 fail.

[18] Father also argues that the trial court's findings with respect to his failed drug screens are clearly erroneous because his failed drug screens never received a second, “confirmatory” test. Appellant's Br. at 12. Father did not object to the admission of the evidence on these grounds, and we conclude that his challenge on appeal therefore goes to the weight of the evidence, which we will not reconsider. His argument as to these findings therefore also fails.

2. The trial court's judgment is not clearly erroneous.

[19] We thus turn to Father's argument that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of his care will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal and, second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Id. In other words, the court must balance any recent improvements by a parent against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[20] The Children were removed from Father's care due to his repeated substance abuse. Throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, Father continued to struggle with substance abuse. He repeatedly failed drug screens or missed them. He never completed a substance abuse assessment. And he continued to engage in criminal acts relating to substance abuse. Thus, the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence, and the court's judgment is supported by its findings.

[21] Still, Father argues that “[t]here was no evidence that any use of controlled substances by [him] had an adverse effect on his ability to be a proper parent to his [C]hildren.” Appellant's Br. at 15. But we agree with DCS that Father's numerous positive drug screens created “a reasonable inference” that he either had in the past or would in the future use illicit substances while caring for the Children if they were placed in his care. Appellee's Br. at 17-18. Father's argument here is simply a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[22] Father raises other challenges to various findings and conclusions on appeal, but, given our analysis above, we conclude that any error as to these additional findings and conclusions is harmless.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Father's parental rights over the Children.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Mother's parental rights over the Children. She does not participate in this appeal, however.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.